CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGE

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WORKING WITH REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Displaced Persons: Protection and Assistance Challenges

Ogenga Otunnu

Profound crises of legitimacy of the state, its institutions, political incumbents and their challengers continue to violently displace tens of millions of people.[1] These crises, which are partly the logical outcome of the severe crises of legitimacy of the international socio-economic and political systems, have more harrowing effects on two types of states: those that are despotically strong but infrastructurally weak, and those that are despotically weak and infrastructurally weak.[2] Most of these states are located in what is controversially referred to as the "Third World." It is also in this geopolitically and economically marginalized and unstable region, where the overwhelming majority of those who are externally and internally displaced reside, that massive violations of human rights take place. Indeed, the growing number of refugees and internally displaced persons in this region highlights both the magnitude and intensity of massive violations of human rights. Also, it illuminates the severe inadequacy of existing humanitarian and human rights response systems, and the international moral deficit in the post-Cold World era.

The growing magnitude of the crises of external and internal displacement calls for comprehensive and coordinated strategies to address the causes of displacement: profound crises of legitimacy on both the domestic and international fronts, and violations of human rights. On the domestic front, the severe crises of legitimacy of the state, its institutions, the incum-

CONTENTS:

CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES
REFUGE

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bents and their challengers generate tensions, conflicts, violence and violent displacement. Such a society, which may be despotically strong but infrastructurally weak or despotically weak and infrastructurally weak, is an important site of violations of human rights and pressing humanitarian tragedies.

On the international front, the severe crises of legitimacy of the despotically strong international economic and political systems undermine economic development and the emergence of sustainable democratic, accountable and legitimate political systems in the faltering states. The despotically strong international economic and political systems also violate the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* of the marginalized and vulnerable inhabitants of the "weak" states. By violating these rightswhich work together with the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and form the basic norms for individual protection in the human rights fieldthe international systems contribute to the crises of both external and internal displacement, and humanitarian tragedies in the weak states.

Although the need to address the causes of the multifaceted crises has been highlighted for decades, no substantial, coordinated and sustained progress has been made on either the
domestic or international front. Indeed, whatever progress has been made on the international front, for example, is an uncoordinated and quite inadequate to address the causes of the crises. Similarly, on the domestic front, in the weak states, very little efforts, if any, has been made to change the despotic nature of the states, institutions, political culture and systems. In fact, even many of the so-called "new leaders" in some of these states, particularly in Africa, are as despotic as the old rulers they replaced. The result is that the problems persist, and very pressing humanitarian tragedies continue to confront the international community.

As the causes of the crises persist, the UN office responsible for assisting and protecting those who are externally displaced, as a result of wellfounded fear of persecution, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), attempts to apply three "durable" solutions: voluntary repatriation; settlement in the country of asylum; and resettlement in a third country.

However, as many studies demonstrate, repatriations are rarely voluntary. Often, they also take place when the very hostile conditions that displaced the refugees have not changed. 3 For example, in 1996, approximately 100,000 Rwandan refugees were forcibly repatriated from Burundi.4 In December 1996, Tanzania forcibly repatriated some 470,000 Rwandan refugees. Tanzania justified its violations of the rights of the refugees on two grounds. First, that the former Hutu extremists who committed genocide in Rwanda were preventing the overwhelming majority of Hutu refugees from repatriating voluntarily to Rwanda. While it was true that the former Hutu extremists controlled the camps and did not want the refugees to repatriate, the overwhelming major
ity of the refugees did not want to repatriate for fear of persecution by the Tutsi-dominated regime and army in Rwanda. The deaths of more than 2,000 Hutus in the overcrowded jails in Rwanda, the torture and dehumanization of many more Hutus in jails in Rwanda, the confiscation of land and property previously owned by Hutu, the massacre of over 4,000 Hutu in Kibeho camps by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RP A), and the massacre of over 100 Hutu in the northwestern village of Kanama by the RP A, convinced the overwhelming majority of the refugees of the danger of repatriation. It was, therefore, not surprising that the overwhelming majority of the refugees responded to the forcible repatriation by attempting to escape to less hostile neighbouring countries. The second rationale that Tanzania offered for the *refoulement* was that the condi

tions that had displaced the refugees did not exist any more in Rwanda.[5]

However, the primary motives for the *refoulement* were to restore regional security, discourage possible armed opposition by the refugees against the Rwandan government, ensure the arrest of Hutu extremists or the *interhamwe* who had committed genocide in Rwanda, reduce the growing financial and environmental responsibility of protecting and assisting the refugees, contain the growing hostility in parts of Tanzania towards the Hutu refugees, and force the international community to re-direct resources from refugee camps in the neighbouring countries to Rwanda.[6]

Another example of forced repatriation that took place during conflict was from Zaire (renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo) in mid-November, 1996. This incident was sparked off when Zairean rebels, heavily supported by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, waged war against the Mobutu regime in October 1996. Many Hutu refugees were subsequently slaughtered by the rebels. Denied both protection and assistance by the international community, induced to repatriate by some international aid agencies, suffering from increasing terror from armed Hutu extremists, and faced with possible extermination by the Rwanda and Uganda-assisted Zairean rebels, some 500,000 refugees repatriated to Rwanda.[7] The forced repatriation was supported by some of the 70 international aid agencies that had crowded Zaire to assist the refugees, and some human rights organizations. These groups supported violations of the rights of the refugees for a variety of reasons: frustration with the reluctance of the international community to disarm the Hutu extremists who continued to destabilize both the camps and Rwanda; the need to restore security in the region; the need to protect the Rwandan government; and the need to cut down the financial costs of assisting and protecting the refugees. Industrialized countries, under the leadership of Canada, also supported and celebrated the *refoulement*. The position of these countries reflected the unwillingness to engage in a potentially dangerous armed humanitarian intervention to provide the refugees with protection and assistance. It also reflected the reluctance by these countries to provide the resources requested by some member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for an armed intervention by a regional force. Having forfeited their international obligations, the industrialized countries, with other supporters of the *refoulement*, began to play the numbers game regarding the hundreds of thousands of the refugees who "suddenly disappeared" in the forests of Zaire.[8]

Resettlement in a third country, as a durable solution, does not provide protection or assistance to the overwhelming majority of the refugees. Thus, focusing on African refugees, B. E. Harrell-Bond made the following observation:

> Resettlement in a third country as a durable solution for African refugees, in terms of the numbers affected, is insignificant. Even if they were to be accepted, there are very few refugees who, unless guaranteed employment, would opt to be relocated in yet another poor African country, and the mood of industrialized countries towards receiving African refugees from this continent is highly restrictive.[9]

This observation, which is relevant to other continents with major refugee crises, is supported by many findings, including that by N. Stein, F. C. Cuny and P. Reed. These scholars add that, "Each year, resettlement in third countries is offered to only 1 percent of the world's refugees."[10]

The remaining "durable" solution, settlement in the country of asylum, also poses serious problems of protection and assistance. This is so because most of the countries that host the vast majority of those who are externally displaced are chronically poor, suffer from harrowing debt crises, experience violent political instability, are major violators of human rights, and generate many refugees and internally displaced persons. This hostile environment does not only make asylum a painful myth to the overwhelming population of refugees, it also complicates the work of the UNHCR, other UN agencies and non-governmental organizations that attempt to assist and protect the refugees.

The problems of protecting and assisting refugees are compounded by escalating numbers of refugees, the growing numbers of protracted humanitarian emergencies, concerted attempts by armed opposition groups to derive maximum political and military gains from frustrating humanitarian emergencies, the unwillingness of the international community to respond promptly and with adequate and coordinated measures to early warning signs of impending humanitarian crises, donor fatigue, the failure to provide security to refugees and humanitarian agencies in zones of armed conflict, and inadequate funding required by the UNHCR, other UN agencies and non-governmental organization to provide basic protection and assistance to refugees.

These problems are exacerbated by the inability of humanitarian agencies and organizations to coordinate their efforts, avoid *ad hoc* and inadequate responses to large scale humanitarian disasters, avoid duplication of programs, and contain their chaotic competition for funding. Lack of appropriate expertise and accountability also plague many humanitarian agencies and organizations. These problems, that plague humanitarian organizations and agencies, persist despite the presence of volumes of conference reports, scholarly literature, guidelines, handbooks and manuals that highlight the need for urgent organizational reforms, prompt and coordinated emergency response, and improved protection of refugees and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population.

The most vulnerable victims of the profound crises of legitimacy and massive violations of human rights are "persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly

in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters; and who are within the territory of their own country."[11] Internally displaced persons, whose numbers are far larger than those of refugees (see Table 1 and Table 2), remain subject to the violence and abuses that uprooted them from their homes.[12] In many instances, they are inaccessible to sources of assistance and protection. Often, armed protagonists make them pawns in on-going armed conflicts by preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching them. The plight of internally displaced persons is compounded by the determination of some regimes to withhold or distort information about the nature, intensity and magnitude of the humanitarian crisis. Such regimes also tend to deny free access to international media and the humanitarian assistance community. In such instances, governments may use the guise of national sovereignty to justify their violation of the rights of internally displaced persons.

Faced with this dilemma, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations may decide to wait until a national authority has requested their assistance. Since some of these states do not request humanitarian assistance or request assistance but deny full access to humanitarian agencies, the overwhelming majority of internally displaced persons languish without international protection and assistance. The growing preoccupation by states to formulate and enforce more credible refugee deterrence policies also present the violently uprooted with increased problems: remaining caged in their own hostile countries and in dire need of international protection and assistance.

Compounding these problems is the absence of a clear, coordinated and effective international responsibility for internally displaced persons. The question of international responsibility has been discussed in a number of international fora. As a result of these discussions, a number of non-governmental groups, humanitarian organizations and United Nations agencies have expanded their areas of operations to respond to the needs of the distressed population. Some of the most prominent players in this area are the UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organizations (WHO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Organization of Migration (IOM), and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The DHA, in particular, has taken steps, through the Inter-Agency Task Force on Internally Displaced Persons, to strengthen coordination of assistance and protection. Another important development is the creation

Table 1: Countries that Have Produced the Greatest Number of the World's Refugees (≥ 30,000)

Palestinians	3,718,500 *	Armenia	197,000 *
Afghanistan	2,628,550 *	Burma	184,300 *
Bosnia and Hercegovina	1,006,450 *	China (Tibet)	128,000
Liberia	755,000 *	Bhutan	121,800 *
Iraq	608,500 *	Zaire	116,800
Somalia	467,100 *	Georgia	105,000 *
Sudan	433,700	Sri Lanka	100,150 *
Sierra Leone	350,000 *	Mali	80,000
Eritrea	343,100 *	Western Sahara	80,000 *
Croatia	300,000 *	Mauritania	65,000
Vietnam	288,000	Ethiopia	58,000
Burundi	285,000 *	Bangladesh	53,000
Rwanda	257,000 *	Uzbekistan	52,000
Azerbaijan	238,000 *	Iran	46,100
Angola	220,000 *	Guatemala	34,650
Tajikistan	215,600 *	Cambodia	34,400
		Togo	30, 000

Table 2: Countries with the Highest Number of Internally Displaced Persons (≥ 25,000)

Sudan	4,000,000	Russian Federation	400,000
Afghanistan	1,200,000	Zaire	400,000
Angola	1,200,000	Georgia	285,000
Bosnia and Hercegovina	1,000,000	Cyprus	265,000
Liberia	1,000,000	India	250,000
Iraq	900,000	Somalia	250,000
Sri Lanka	900,000	Guatemala	200,000
Sierra Leone	800,000	Croatia	185,000
Colombia	600,000	Syria	125,000
Azerbaijan	550,000	Kenya	100,000
Turkey	500,000–2,000,000	Papua New Guinea	70,000
Burma	500,000–1,000,000	Uganda	70,000
South Africa	500,000	Armenia	50,000
Lebanon	450,000	Tajikistan	50,000
Peru	420,000	Cambodia	32,000
Burundi	400,000	Nigeria	30,000
		Djibouti	25,000

* Sources vary widely in number reported.

Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 1997*, Washington, DC: USCR.

of the position of Representative of the Secretary-General in 1992, at the request of the Commission on Human Rights, to focus specifically on the questions of internal displacement, protection and assistance of the affected population. Nonetheless, international efforts are mostly *ad hoc*, inadequate and fail to reach the overwhelming majority of internally displaced persons.[13]

This issue of *Refuge* analyzes some efforts being made to provide protection and assistance to externally and internally displaced persons. It also highlights the need for improvement at two intimately linked levels: local and international. At the local level, there is urgent need to address the causes of displacement. Improvements are also needed to provide protection to population in distress and to ensure that adequate humanitarian assistance reach the population it is intended to help. This will also require that protection and assistance are provided on a non-partisan basis by people who possess relevant expertise. At the international level, protecting and assisting displaced persons should aimed in the first place at addressing the causes of the crises. Such a strategy is morally, financially and politically cost-effective. There is also an urgent need to coordinate and improve humanitarian assistance and protection, and pay appropriate attention to early warning signs. It is only when human rights, humanitarian, economic, political and security dimensions of the crises are handled simultaneously that the escalating problems of displacements and humanitarian disasters will lend themselves to a high and sustainable rate of resolution. ■

Notes

1. Diverse and competing definitions of legitimacy emphasize the following criteria: (i) power which is derived from a morally and/or legally valid source of authority; (ii) power in the hands of those with appropriate qualities to obtain and exercise them; (iii) power whose exercise conforms to recognizably shared interests, values, beliefs and expectations of the subordinates; and (iv) power that wins reciprocal cooperation, responsibility and obligations from the subordinates or the contracting parties. These criteria incorporate socioeconomic and political expectations and obligations into the definition of legitimacy. With regard to the question of international legitimacy of a regime, two competing and somewhat ambiguous criteria are often emphasized: power whose exercise conforms to international norms, customs, obligations and rules by which relations between states and other international persons are governed; and power in the hands of those who control internationally recognized political jurisdiction or sovereign state. Since the criteria of legitimacy are interpreted and ordered differently from time to time by the stakeholders, a crisis of legitimacy is a common characteristics of politics. This crisis is closely associated with increased tensions, conflicts, instability, uncertainty and violence. See, for a start, J. H. Scholar, *Legitimacy in the Modern State* (New Brunswick, NJ; & London: Transaction Books, 1981); D. Betham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1991); N. N. Kittre, *The War Against Authority: From the Crisis of Legitimacy to a New Social Contract.* (Baltimore &London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
2. For informative discussions about state powers, see J. A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
3. See, for example, B. N. Stein, F. C. Cuny and P. Reed, eds., *Refugee Repatriation During Conflict*. Dallas: The Center for the Study of Societies in Crisis, 1995.
4. U.S. Committe for Refugess, *World Refugee Survey 1997*, Washington, DC: USCR, 85-86.
5. Ibid. 86–87; *World Refugee Survey 1996*, 63–64.
6. See *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, December 24, 1994; *The East African*, Nairobi, December 26, 1994; *The East African*, January 9–15, 1995; *The East African*, January, 23–29, 1995; *The East African*, April 3–6, 1995; *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, April 3, 1995.
7. *World Refugee Survey 1997*, 86.
8. See Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *The Fifth Estate: Rwanda*. November 1997.
9. B. E. Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 1.
10. Stein, Cuny and Reed, eds., *Refugee and Repatriation During Conflict*, 4.
11. F. M. Deng, *Internally Displaced Persons: An Interim Report to the United Nations Secretary-General on Protection and Assistance* (New York & Washington, DC.: Department of Humanitarian Affairs & Refugee Policy Groups, December 1993), 25. Although this working definition is problematic, because some observers consider it too broad while others view it as too narrow, it describes both the phenomenon and major causes of internal displacement.
12. Estimates of the numbers of both externally and internally displaced persons are provided by many agencies. See, for a start, various issues of U.S. Committe for Refugess, *World Refugee Survey*. Washington, DC: USCR. It is important to note that documentation of the number of displaced persons, even when they are considered refugees under international law, is notoriously poor. Estimates vary widely depending on who estimates; why, how and for what purpose the estimates are carried out; what methodologies are used in the documentation; who is included and excluded in the estimates; and when the estimates were carried out. Thus, Refugee Policy Groups, *Internally Displaced Persons in Africa: Assistance Challenges and Opportunities.* (Washington, DC: Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugees, October 1992), 14, observed that, "As the situation stands now, estimates of the number of people who have been forced to flee their homes within their nations' borders are often made only when relief agencies are able to reach them. In a number of cases, it is only after an area has been 'liberated' and more accessible to the outside world that the extent of internal displacement becomes clear. Further, it may be in the interest of the government to minimize the number and condition of the displaced. The result has been that there is no accurate or consistent way of tracking and tabulating the numbers of internally displaced." It is hoped that the on-going project at the Refugee Studies Programme at Oxford will provide more credible estimates of internally displaced persons.
13. See, for example, Deng, *Internally Displaced Persons: An Interim Report to the United Nations Secretary-General on Protection and Assistance.*; Refugee Policy Groups, *Internally Displaced Persons in Africa: Assistance Challenges and Opportunities.* □

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Managing and Containing Displacement after the Cold War: UNHCR and Somali Refugees in Kenya

Jennifer Hyndman

Abstract

This paper argues that distinct patterns of managing human displacement have emerged since the end of the Cold War. Using the case of Somali refugees in Kenya, the author illustrates what some of these strategies are: the deployment of "preventive zones" on the Somalian side of the border; the designation of prima facie refugee status which restricts Somali refugees to camps, and the reduction of opportunities for resettlement abroad. All of these serve to regionalize displacement in camps, for the most part, without providing a sustainable solution to the social and political crisis at hand.

Précis

Le présent article présente une argumentation selon laquelle des schémas distincts de gestion des déplacements humains se sont développés depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide. A partir du cas des réfugiés somaliens au Kenya, l'auteur illustre ce que certaines de ces stratégies sont: le déploiement de "zones préventives" sur la portion somalienne de la région frontalière; la désignation d'un statut de réfugié légitime restreignant les réfugiés somaliens à des camps, et la réduction des possibilités de rétablissement à l'étranger. Toutes ces pratiques servent à réduire les déplacement de populations principalement aux camps, sans fournir de solution viable à la crise sociale et politique en cours.

[It is] not whether you are a refugee but where you are ... it's all a question of space and distance.
Chief, Promotion of Refugee Law Section, UNHCR (personal interview, October 18, 1994)

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Doing political and accountable protection work seems no longer the fashion ... UNHCR is tempted to engage in the politics of assistance, the politics of solutions, or the politics of prevention.
Guy Goodwin-Gill (1997)

Donor governments who fund displaced persons, whether they be refugees who have crossed international borders or uprooted people in their own countries, have increasingly urged United Nations organizations to assist them "at home" or in a first country of asylum nearby. Emerging national and ethnic divisions of power in the post-Cold War period have generated strategies of containment which serve to keep refugees and internally displaced people "over there," far from the borders of charitable donor countries in "the West." Since 1990, particular strategies have been employed to curb refugee flows through such measures as "preventive protection" and temporary refugee camps. The observation made above by a staff member from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) suggests a deconstruction of the fixed category "refugee" and grounds human displacement in a contingent geographical context rather than in a legal definition which emphasizes the responsibilities and borders of states. This approach aims to be more inclusive in terms of who UNHCR assists, but it also has strategic value for the organization which has become one of the most powerful UN agencies in the current process of UN reform. Perhaps more importantly, UNHCR is responding to its donor governments who wish to maintain "space and distance" from the massive numbers of displaced persons; governments prefer interventions which provide assistance *before* potential refugees cross a border.

Legacies of Colonialism, Cold War Proxies, and Current Trends?

> Refugees and displaced people are the human barometer of political stability, of justice and order in much of the world. (Winter 1993, 2)

Ethiopia and Somalia were central subjects in the Cold War race for advantageous positioning close to the precious resources of Western Asia, each country being a proxy for both American and Soviet interests at different times. In one sense, these countries were little more than Third World surfaces on which First and Second World superpowers poised themselves during this hostile period. The legacies of colonialism, in particular the problematic drawing of boundaries which divided ethnic Somalis in areas of Ethiopia and Kenya from the internationally recognized Somalian state, created another layer of conflict in the region. Fighting over the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, in which ethnic Somalis resided, provided yet another, even more regionalized, layer of rivalries between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) underscored the inviolability of national borders on the continent, borders which are admittedly artificial and in many cases outcomes of colonial rule dating back as far as the Berlin Conference in 1884–85. While most African governments are signatories to the OAU Convention, some critics argue that this inviolability should be reconsidered, and that borders be renegotiated as potential political solutions to current conflict and subsequent displacement in Africa (Zolberg and Callamard 1994). Recent

UN interventions suggest that borders are being blurred; UN missions, such as UNOSOM II in Somalia, crossed once inviolable borders in the name of humanitarian protection and relief.

At the same time, the sovereign state is being interrogated. Its primacy in international politics is eroded by:

1) transnational flows of capital (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994);
2) increasing deterritorialization of nations vis-à-vis diasporic movement (Grewal and Kaplan 1994); and
3) the delegitimation of geopolitics, a formerly powerful, prevailing discourse of statehood.

If it ever did, nation no longer equals state as identities which correspond. Critics have argued that the language of international relations, which emphasizes strategic perspectives of conflict rather than ethnographic ones, is "state-centric" (Shapiro 1996). Likewise, geopolitics represents an increasingly outdated discourse of imperialism and state power which is uncritical of current constellations of power (Ò Tuathail 1996).

Refugees in this century grew out of events associated with the Cold War, as did the Office of UNHCR which was given an initial mandate to assist refugees in Europe generated during World War II. UNHCR's precursor organizations, however, emerged as early as 1921 as a response to involuntary migrants created after the Bolshevik Revolution (Rogers and Copeland 1993). UNHCR operates today on a scale unimaginable at its conception. In 1990, the agency had a budget of $544 million and a staff of 2,400. By 1996, the budget had grown to approximately $1.3 billion and the staff to 5,000 (Frelick 1997). The advent of post-Cold War displacement and the responses it has generated have contributed to this transformation. While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees manages crises on a more massive scale than ever before and Western governments demonstrate unprecedented generosity in providing assistance, humanitarian responses have been expedient to a considerable extent—maintaining a distance between donor and displaced. "It has proven much easier to prevent the flow of refugees than to prevent the abuses, violence, and social inequities that cause them to flee" (Frelick 1993, 6). Refugee assistance and "preventive protection"—which underscores efforts to help displaced persons "at home"—serve to contain the problem of human displacement.

Strategies of Containment: Preventing Protection, Negotiating Borders

> The word "protection" has become something of a term of art ... The word "refugee" is also a term of art in international law ... (Goodwin-Gill 1989, 6, 17)

"Preventive protection" is a term which describes a recent trend in managing transnational displacement. Increasingly the UNHCR has become involved in operations within countries in which people are displaced, often working in conflict zones. "Preventive protection" is part of a paradigm shift in refugee policy which occurred in the early 1990s (Frelick 1993). It belongs to a discourse which emphasizes the "right to remain" in one's home country over the former dominant discourse of the "right to leave." The "right to remain" was endorsed by the UN High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata, in the early 1990. UNHCR originally defined "preventive protection" as

> the establishment or undertaking of specific activities inside the country of origin so that people no longer feel compelled to cross borders in search of protection and assistance. In this sense, for instance, action on behalf of the internally displaced can be defined as preventive protection, although the primary motive may be to address a genuine gap in protection rather than to avert outflow. Preventive protection in this sense may also include the establishment of "safety zones" or "safe areas" inside the country of origin where protection may be sought. It relates therefore to the protection of nationals in their own country. (UNHCR 1992).

A politicized discourse of borders crossings and safe areas has replaced the term "preventive protection" but not the basic concept. This entire discourse is interesting because it gives rise to a new set of political spaces and management practices for forcibly displaced people. "Safe havens" for Iraqi Kurds, "zones of tranquillity" for returning Afghan refugees, "open relief centers" for would-be Sri Lankan refugees, and "safe corridors" to Muslim enclaves in Bosnia are all examples of this current trend and expressions of a post-Cold War discourse. The legitimacy of international borders is a related and current question among organizations managing displacement. In the foreword to a UNHCR document addressing the plight of internally displaced persons, the former Director of International Protection notes that people who are internally displaced on the "other" side of the border

> have been called "refugees in all but name" ... Because they have not crossed an international boundary, the internally displaced have no access to the international protection mechanisms designed for refugees ... UNHCR finds it operationally untenable—as well as morally objectionable—to consider only the more visible facet of a situation of coerced displacement ... No two humanitarian crises are ever the same, and a global approach to such complex situations requires, if anything, finer tools of analysis and a larger arsenal of flexible responses. (UNHCR 1994a)

This is a compelling, sympathetic plea for inclusion on the part of the former head of the protection division. UNHCR has admitted, however, that crossing an international border to assist displaced people in their own country repeatedly—for instance in Iraq—may have unintended political consequences. Such a strategy may undermine the concept of the state, its authority, and most alarmingly, the obligation of the state itself to provide

protection if an international agency will do it instead. While UNHCR recognizes this risk, it continues to expand its definition of "refugee" to include internally displaced people in selected cases. While space, distance, and geographical context may be increasingly relevant to UNHCR interventions and the refugee definitions of its formal mandate less important, state interests are effaced in this move to highlight the importance of particular spaces. By framing human displacement within specific geographical contexts, UNHCR questions the utility of its own abstract, admittedly outdated operational definitions, and proposes a potentially more situated and inclusive approach. It does so, however, by employing a set of "UN protected areas" and "preventive zones" that may be less than safe.

The Case of Somalia

The events that have transpired in Somalia, illustrate the idea of "preventive protection" in Africa. Containment strategies similar to those in Iraq and Bosnia have been tested in the Horn of Africa. In Southern Somalia, UNHCR created a "preventive zone" along the Kenyan border in order to slow the flow of potential refugees into Kenya and to encourage Somali refugees in Kenyan camps to return home. The Cross-Border Operation, as the initiative launched in 1992 was called, was also a strategy to empty the Kenyan camps after the Government of Kenya issued an ultimatum in January 1993 that all Somali refugees would be forcibly sent home. At the time, the U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope was initiated. It sent tens of thousands of troops to Somalia on a humanitarian mission to assist the starving civilian population in December 1992. In May 1993, peacekeepers from UNOSOM II replaced those of Operation Restore Hope. UNHCR believed that the presence of these forces would also represent security to refugees living in Kenya and attract them back to Somalia. Some refugees did return home, but other Somali nationals left their war torn country for Kenya during the same period. In the end, the Cross-Border Operation did not meet its objectives, despite generous initial funding from donors.

"Safe havens" and "preventive zones" are expressions of an emerging post-Cold War geopolitical discourse and are strategic spaces to contain would-be refugees in their home countries. This strategy is endorsed by Western governments which fund UNHCR to execute the necessary emergency relief operations. UNHCR is revising its own traditional category of "refugee," recasting its protection mandate, and extending its reach inside the borders of countries at war where displaced people require assistance and safe-keeping. The efficacy and safety of these efforts are still in question after the U.S./UN intervention in Somalia. The massacre of civilians in Srebrenica in July 1995 and the killing of several thousand refugees in Kibeho camp in Rwanda in April 1995 also cast doubt.

On the Kenyan Side of the Border

Refugee camps constitute another strategy of containment with assistance. While camps are arguably a useful and acceptable short term emergency measure, the second-rate status accorded to refugees in these "temporary cities" is problematic. In Kenya, the vast majority of refugees are Somalis. At the end of 1996, there were approximately 185,000 refugees in Kenya; 150,000 were Somali refugees. Smaller numbers of Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees were also counted. UNHCR is responsible for refugees based on its Statute and in conjunction with the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees which oblige signatory states to assist forcibly displaced migrants who meet specific criteria. Increasingly, a smaller and smaller proportion of refugees meet the formal Eurocentric post-World War II requirements of the Convention and Protocol (Hathaway 1991a). The Kenyan Government, despite being a signatory to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, is currently not considering asylum seekers for full, Convention refugee status. Accordingly, UNHCR has been called upon through its "good offices" to protect and assist refugees who do not meet the Convention or statutory definition; this residual group is designated *prima facie* refugees.

Usually *prima facie* designation is made on a group basis, rather than by individual assessment which is the norm for determining Convention status. In Kenya the vast majority of displaced Somalis and Sudanese fall into this *ad hoc* category of refugees. All *prima facie* refugees are required by the Kenyan Government to live in camps located in isolated border areas. Needless to say, not all of them do.

John Rogge (1993, 24) has described these authorized spaces for the displaced as "bleak and insecure holding camps along the Kenyan-Somali border." UNHCR is careful not to make the camps too attractive to potential refugees or other migrants by maintaining minimum education standards and other facilities, an approach that has been called "humane deterrence" (ibid.). The Kenyan camps illustrate how protection and assistance are inextricably linked to refugee containment and immobility. A historical discussion of politics along the Kenya-Somalia border area is precluded here, except to say that the Northeast Province of Kenya—formerly known as Kenyan Somaliland—has been a hotbed of protest and repression since the time of Kenyan independence until 1967 when the Republic of Somalia renounced its goal of annexing the area. Since independence in 1963 until 1991, this region was under Government of Kenya "emergency rule." Many Kenyans of Somali origin have faced arbitrary arrest, harassment, and discrimination. Banditry and general insecurity continue to prevail in this region today.

Relief staff working in the camps, in my view, make the best of difficult situations with the interests of refugees in mind. The formal administrative practices employed, however, attest to authoritative structures and a

quasi-military mode of operations that detract from this goodwill and hard work. Administration of the camps in this region involves a number of surveillance practices through which refugees are continually mapped, marked, and monitored. While these are certainly not the only techniques employed, the primacy of surveillance in the camps is revealed in the opening paragraph of the UNHCR's Country Operations Plan for 1995:

> The reconciliation of data on the refugee population in Kenya has become a priority exercise of the Kenya programme during 1994. The Branch Office has addressed the intractable problem of discrepancies between feeding figures, registered numbers, and total populations, by camp site as well as by overall caseload and nationality, through physical headcounts and registration of refugees in the camps. These discrepancies are due to acts of refugee sabotage; double registration within camps and between camps; and inflation of the number of dependants on ration cards in a bid to maximize their entitlements to food and other relief assistance distributed in the camps. (UNHCR 1994c, 1)

The counting and coding of refugees in this passage is alarming. Nowhere is refugee assessment or need mentioned. Rather, displaced people are converted into suspicious subject populations, figures, and numbers.

The vast majority of refugees in Kenya have *prima facie* refugee status. They are entitled to assistance through the "good offices" of UNHCR but remain, in a practical sense, second-rate refugees. Their containment in camps and the suspension of basic rights which would allow them to find a more independent and self-sufficient livelihood define this second-rate status. Granted, they are given temporary safety and protection from *refoulement*, forcible return to the country from which they fled, but this is simply not good enough. While the movement of refugees outside the camps is officially prohibited, some are able to move to more strategic locations. This unauthorized movement of Somali refugees, in particular, annoys the Government of Kenya which then complains to UNHCR. Yet it is also a political statement that these authorities cannot simply "contain" the refugee problem.

The Politics of Over There

So far a number of parallel trends in the management of displacement have been identified. First, there is increasingly a two-tier refugee system in which fewer and fewer refugees meet the criteria for full Convention refugee status. Convention status has been "displaced," in the Kenya case, by the discretionary group designation of *prima facie* refugees whose movement and entitlements are much more restricted. In Kenya, *prima facie* refugees are involuntary migrants contained in refugee camps "over there." Related to this trend is a shift in the locus of responsibility for displaced people—whether they are refugees or not—from individual states to international UN agencies, in particular to UNHCR which is funded by the very states that have traditionally received refugees in their countries. A senior staff member of an American agency based in the Kenyan camps said:

> The donors are willing to pay them (UN agencies) off ... Africa is a sinkhole. You (UN agencies) take care of it; here's the money will eventually turn to you (UN agencies) take care of it; we're not paying any more. Now we are in a grazing period where there is big money to be made (working in the aid industry). (Interview, January 1995)

The popularity of and sympathy for displaced peoples on the part of Western governments lies precisely in their location, "over there." As they approach "our" borders, they become "immigrants" and "foreigners" who face a less enthusiastic reception. The distance is also a discursive one: as long as one does not need to engage in face-to-face conversations with these unfortunate people whose plight is witnessed on television or through other media, their situation remains a tragedy.

Looking ahead

As the United Nations and several of its agencies turn fifty, change is imminent. The UN reform process is well underway, and all information to date suggests that UNHCR will become the lead agency for humanitarian crises. The safety, efficacy, and legality of containment strategies, such as the camps, is questionable in the context of human rights instruments and other international protocols. In Kenya, refugees are obliged to follow the laws of the land in which they are offered temporary asylum, yet they have none of the privileges of citizens or Convention refugees: to move, to work, to own property or have temporary access to land, and so on. While they are provided with protection and basic food, shelter, and medical services, the arrangement is recognized by all parties as a temporary one. It is also a relationship of dependency. For those refugees in Kenya who have lived in camps for as long as five years, this temporary solution has become increasingly permanent and unsatisfactory. Is five years enough? If the political situation in their own countries precludes repatriation in the short term, what is to be done?

These are exceedingly difficult questions for which answers are being sought and tested. Local integration in countries like Kenya is not an option. Voluntary repatriation is the best solution if it is available. How to measure safe conditions for voluntary repatriation remains a critical question. Forced repatriation is not a solution, though incidents of it are far too common (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1997). As resettlement targets in the major refugee-receiving countries also decline, alternative solutions must be sought. ■

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Trauma, Development, Dispossession: "Telling the Story" of Refugees and Suffering in Somali Ethiopia

Christina Zarowsky

Abstract

Ethnographic research about "the refugee experience" of Somalis in eastern Ethiopia is discussed, focusing on interactions of returnees with relief and development agencies, the story of one community, and a discussion of some Somali emotion words. Exclusively psychological or psychiatric approaches to working with refugees may not provide a satisfactory point of access to displacement-related distress among Somali refugees. Highly individualizing models of suffering, focusing on psychological distress, are of only limited salience to populations of Somali refugees and returnees in the Horn of Africa—politics, poverty, and perceived collective injustice must be addressed in conjunction with any exploration of emotional distress and personal suffering.

Précis

La recherche ethnographique à propos de l'"expérience de réfugiés" des Somalis en Éthiopie Orientale est présentée et discutée, avec une attention particulière portée sur les interactions des gens qui retournent au pays avec les agences ayant pour rôle de soulager leur traumatisme et de fortifier leur développement. Une approche exclusivement psychologique ou psychiatrique du travail avec les réfugiés risque de ne pas fournir une prise satisfaisante sur la détresse associée au déplacement chez les réfugiés Somalis. Les modèles hyper-individualisants en matière de détresse morale, concentrant leur attention sur la souffrance psychologique, ont une pertinence limitée en ce qui concerne les populations en situation de refuge et en situation de retour dans la Corne de l'Afrique. La politique, la pauvreté, l'évidente injustice collective doivent être prises en considération en conjonction avec toute exploration de la détresse émotionnelle et des souffrances personnelles.

Introduction

A physician friend was recently asked by an immigration lawyer to do a medical exam on a client who had been refused refugee status in Canada. The key question was whether this claimant could be diagnosed as suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The client's story and claims of persecution were irrelevant. The physician was relieved to find physical signs consistent with torture, but the most salient issue was psychic—not physical—trauma.

This vignette seems to suggest a limited shift in one practical definition of "refugee" in Canada, from having a reasonable fear of persecution from which the country of origin is unlikely to defend the claimant, to having a diagnosable mental illness. In this instance, available to support a diagnosis of PTSD appears to be considered more reliable than that supporting alleged political or other persecution. The story recounted by the physician is consistent with a prevalent academic and popular view of refugee suffering as trauma, specifically as psychological trauma. It also demonstrates one possible endpoint for a trauma model of the refugee experience. Despite insistence from proponents of the PTSD model that they do not suggest that PTSD and its therapy encompass the whole of the refugee experience (Friedman and Jaranson 1994), and some psychiatrists' qualification that "trauma" must involve the individual's feeling both terrified and trapped according to their own framework (Dr. Clare Pain, personal communication), "trauma" and PTSD have come to be seen as a general model of "the" refugee experience. In the trauma model, the core of the distress experienced by refugees is the psychophysiological constellation of symptoms associated with the memory of highly disturbing events. Appropriate responses include limited pharmacotherapy and more or less intensive psychotherapy directed at encouraging the individual to "tell the story" of their trauma so that distressing memories and emotions can be healed.

The current emphasis on psychosocial effects of trauma and displacement reflects, in part, an uneasiness with a depersonalizing view of refugees as, in a sense, political and bureaucratic inventions, subject to the whims of governments and other organizations and devoid of personal histories and emotional lives. However, the endpoint of a diagnosis of disease, mental or otherwise, is perhaps even more destructive of the agency of people identified as refugees. A strength as well as limitation of the medical model is its depoliticization and desocialization of many forms of distress. This allows illness to be approached from other than a moral dimension of, for example, punishment for transgression. This process often allows taboo issues to be addressed, but it also imposes an obligation of dependency ("compliance") on patients, and it systematically blocks exploration of links to other domains of experience, especially political and economic contexts, which may in fact be critical both to under-

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standing and resolving given problems.

In this paper I wish to suggest that for some Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa, as well as for the agencies with which refugees and returnees interact, the framework for giving structure, meaning, and ultimately closure to "the refugee experience" is not that of individual psychological trauma. This paper is based on 14 months of anthropological fieldwork with Somali refugees, returnees, and agencies involved in relief and development, in eastern Ethiopia. I present an overview of some of my ethnographic findings about "the refugee experience" of the Somali populations, focusing on interactions with relief and development agencies, the story of one community, and a discussion of some Somali emotion words. My findings suggest that in Ethiopia, the more salient frameworks are "development" on the one hand (in contexts where relief and development agencies are the dominant institution), and, for the communities I focused on, a story of collective suffering framed in terms of history, justice, and dispossession, rather than in terms of individual loss or distress. Private suffering and personal memories certainly exist and can be spoken about, but these stories were almost never mentioned, let alone told, in the public discussions or private interviews about "the refugee experience."

An implication is that exclusively psychological or psychiatric approaches to working with refugees may not provide a satisfactory point of access to displacement-related distress among Somali refugees, even if in some cases a trauma or PTSD model and approach may ultimately prove helpful. Highly individualizing models of suffering, focusing on psychological distress, are of only limited salience to populations of Somali refugees and returnees in the Horn of Africa—politics, poverty, and perceived collective injustice must be addressed in conjunction with any exploration of emotional distress and personal suffering. This was true even in the two cases locally identified as "madness" related to the history of displacement: any healing, it was emphatically insisted, would arise not from talking about memories and emotions, but from restitution. In what ways and to what extent the models of dispossession and economic development remain relevant to resettled Somali refugees is unclear. However, if the trauma model is to be usefully applied among Somali refugees, it is necessary to explore the historical, cultural, and current contexts, and then to decide in each case whether or not a trauma or PTSD model is appropriate.

Development

The issue of refugees in general and refugee suffering in particular is only a small part of the discourse of "development." However, the rules and assumptions of the broader discourse also apply to interactions involving refugees. In most of the world, this is the context within which most interactions involving refugees and their would-be helpers occur. It is also a context which shapes the experience and expectations of refugees, whether or not they eventually interact with mental health practitioners.

The meanings of "refugee" and "suffering" are constructed and contested in many settings. These meanings and their implications are then brought into other settings, but they are never fixed. These moments in the trajectories of mental health workers, researchers, relief agency personnel and so on, on the one hand, and people who had been refugees on the other, can be examined in terms of Wittgenstein's concept of a language game, in this case related to the words "refugee" and "suffering." A language game is a process of creating consensual meaning in social interactions, where participants bring in assumptions, memories, and expectations around words, ideas, and issues, and negotiate or hammer out new social realities and new networks of meaning (Ulin 1984, 26–41).

One such setting is a holding camp for returnees—returning refugees—in the city of Dire Dawa in eastern Ethiopia. In this setting, psychological trauma is not salient, neither for the agency personnel distributing "repatriation packages," nor for the predominantly Somali returnees receiving the packages. Nor, however, is politics drawn on in this context, even though the reasons for flight and for return were both political and economic—the war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977–78, the political chaos and violence plus localized droughts at the downfall of the Mengistu regime in 1991, and relative stability in Ethiopia plus diminishing economic opportunities and increasing political intolerance of refugees in the neighbouring country of Djibouti in 1995. In camps of refugees from Somaliland in the far east of Ethiopia, almost every refugee with whom I spoke referred to the political situation in the capital city of Hargeisa as the determining factor for flight and future return. In contrast, returnees in Dire Dawa drew almost exclusively on bureaucratic definitions and on the suffering caused by poverty to pursue their demands for assistance. The language game is in part about legitimacy or "genuineness"—both to recognize and validate experience, and to obtain or deliver resources. Not all dimensions of "refugee" or "suffering" are in evidence here, but the language game and its context are very different from those in Canada, of which the opening vignette in this paper is one example. Neither "capital P" politics nor psychology and trauma are particularly relevant in the returnee camp. The larger language game, of which "refugees" and "suffering" are a part, is emphatically that of "Development."

Returnee Accounts

How did returnees participate in this language game where their needs were allegedly primary but the rules were set almost entirely by others? Here is an excerpt from one interview, whose tone and content are illustrative of the dozens of group discussions and individual interviews held with different train loads of returnees over the summer of 1995. The discussion is quite

blunt on one level, but the men do not allow it to stray beyond a few key points which they wish to emphasize—and neither does my Somali interpreter and friend, Rosa, who refused to engage the men in a discussion of politics once they had evaded a tentative attempt to do so. The dominant themes are poverty and the obligation—imposed by humanitarianism—to assist. These themes reflect the discourse of the agencies themselves, including agency concerns about "dependency." Governments are only peripherally involved—the relief agencies are considered the relevant sources of assistance. Agencies are the *de facto* state in refugee situations, and appear to remain so in the eyes of returnees.

Where "the men" are speakers, one or more individuals were speaking on behalf of the group as opposed to clearly on their own behalf.

Ahmed: They are giving me only 30 birr[1] and a bag of wheat.

Rosa: That's enough.

Ahmed: I want more. Can she help me? (gesturing at me)

Rosa: I don't think so.

Men: We're telling UNHCR to give us instruments to start farming, but while the crop is growing we need to eat.

At this point I enter the discussion more directly, and decide to confront the men in order to try to "get past" the repeated requests for assistance. I wondered, what is the underlying reasoning?

Christina: Why should UNHCR and the government give you anything?

Men: It's not the government, but the NGO's stand for human rights. It's very human. When we face a drought or problems, they can help us.

Ahmed: I had a shop. It was destroyed, now I need help from UNHCR.

Mukhtar: Don't speak only for yourself, speak for others in your situation as well.

Men: No one wants to be a refugee. Everyone wants to work, but there was drought and war so we had to leave. Now we are back in our country, the soil is good, there is no war ... now if NGO's and UNHCR can give us a hand—seeds, instruments, oxen, water; and if they give us a ration to wait while the crop is growing.

Christina: Who should be responsible for helping? Themselves, family, government, NGO's, the UN?

Men: What we think, is UNHCR, because they're standing for human [rights]. They're working with the government, but its UNHCR and NGO's.

Christina: Where do [you] think UNHCR gets money?

Men: They [UNHCR] have a lot of things, machines; even if there's a drought they don't suffer and can get something from the earth ... Because, when a person can help himself, then he can help others. So UNHCR has helped themselves, and now they can help others.

Jama: We need your help. We are talking a lot, but we need your help.

The Refugee Experience as "Development"

The Somali word for refugee—*qoxoti*—is relatively new. Its meanings are shaped both by Somali notions and experiences of flight, war, justice, and need, and by outside notions and social organization; specifically, by the UN Convention definition of refugee, and by the experience of refugee camps and refugee relief agencies. The word *qoxoti* literally means "people who flee before the mouth of a gun" (Sidney Waldron, personal communication). It implies dislocation, forced migration, and fear, but also dispossession and poverty that is outside the normal framework of mutual assistance, or the possibility of recovery through mechanisms such as livestock raiding. Central images are of destitution on the one hand, and on the other hand of the appropriateness of looking to outsiders for assistance. The latter aspect reflects the fact that the civil and other wars which led to the creation of the category *qoxoti* also featured highly visible involvement by international relief agencies.

The semantic network around the word "refugee" has two dimensions or axes:

1) geopolitical, evoking words such as nation, borders, migration, sovereignty, denationalization; and
2) moral-experiential, having to do with rights and obligations, notions of the self, experience, and evoking words such as persecution, suffering, duty, charity, humanitarianism.

In actual relief distribution settings in Ethiopia, most agency personnel—both Ethiopian and international—are not interested in geopolitics. Rather, they are motivated by pity and the desire to help the unfortunate on the one hand, and by personal livelihood concerns and the culture of relief work on the other. This relief work culture currently includes an official concern to avoid "creating dependency" among refugees, returnees, and other groups receiving aid, and the view that a defensive and suspicious stance is necessary to minimize the amount of cheating by people pretending to be refugees. Finally, the concrete context of this interaction—the distribution of food and money to thousands of individuals—brings in a bureaucratic and logistic dimension which is officially dismissed as irrelevant to the real business of helping people. In fact, these logistic issues place fairly rigid constraints on the kinds of interactions possible, limiting the opportunity for creating individual empathic connections which impose perceived obligations of assistance.

Observation and interviews at the holding camp revealed the absolute centrality of the identities "refugee" and "returnee" and of the attendant benefactor/dependent hierarchy in this setting. Almost all the individuals who approached me or whom I approached asked for help, citing their need and agencies' "humanitarianism" as reasons. In contrast, although virtually all of my friends and contacts in Dire Dawa had been refugees themselves or had immediate family members who were or had been refugees,

the discourse of need, humanitarianism, and suffering was conspicuously limited in these situations where other institutions—family, friendship, occupation—provided structure and meaning. This is not to say that when the "refugee relief system" was the central institution individuals lie or exaggerate—nor that their "real" feelings are apparent only in one or another setting—but that context is critical to an understanding of the larger significance of particular findings.

The language game of development provides one framework within which the experience of Somali refugees, including suffering, can be both meaningfully discussed and, perhaps more importantly, acted upon. This framework is far from ideal, but it at least acknowledges the grinding poverty which is central to the experience of most African refugees.

Dispossession

In the transient world of the returnee holding camp, life histories of individuals, families, and communities are glimpsed through the counterpoint of a language game around need, obligation, humanitarianism, and legitimacy. Despite having very little control over the material or rhetorical structure of this world, returnees shape its particular manifestations through their own accounts, claims, and actions, drawing on their individual and collective experiences as well as on more persistent themes and strategies arising from Somali, Ethiopian, and agency cultures. Hints of alternative systems of meaning emerge from these interactions, but such alternative systems can be more clearly seen in contexts where the dominant institution is not the "refugee relief system."

In this section I wish to present some aspects of one community's story. It is a story of dispossession, demoralization, and struggle. History is central to this story. Here, "history" is chronology of events, memory, ideology, a way of codifying and presenting systems of value, a way of creating society and community, and a program of action. It is, in part, a "mythico-history" (Malkki 1995, 52–54). The "refugee relief system" is an integral part of this world, but neither the optimistic rhetoric of "repatriation" and "development," nor the concerned rhetoric of "trauma," begin to capture its range. While it appears on the surface to be much more traditional and timeless than the *ad hoc* communities of refugee camps or resettled populations, this community is also an "imagined community" (Andersen 1991), where fourteen years in refugee camps are of very minor importance in accounts seeking to convey history, create meaning, and build lives.

Migration and Return

The village of Beer Weyn (a pseudonym) is about 25 km or 2 to 4 hours by bus and pickup truck from the city of Dire Dawa. The current population of the village is approximately 3,000, with at least another 1,000 former residents settled in the nearby town of Magaala, primarily in the neighbourhood known as Ganda Beer Weyn. The entire population of Beer Weyn left the village after the 1977–78 Ogaden War in which Somalia tried to annex the primarily Somali areas of eastern Ethiopia. During the war itself this village was a centre of Somali resistance, although many villagers claim that they just wanted to be left in peace to work their lands. Many villagers fled to the surrounding countryside to join their pastoralist kin, but returned to the village and their farms after several months to a year. In 1979, the entire community left again. Many of the returnees I spoken to in the Dire Dawa returnee camp were returning to Beer Weyn, Magaala, and neighbouring villages.

The story of the flight and return was told by men and women, elders as well as youth who had been infants at the time. It goes as follows. In the aftermath of the war, the Ethiopian government decided to expand the military base adjacent to the village, and began to expropriate the orchards and farmlands of this agropastoralist community. Initially, farmers were offered compensatory lands south of the capital city of Addis Ababa, several hundred km to the south west. These lands in turn had been expropriated from other communities. A few families accepted this offer and relocated, only to be evicted by the original owners after the fall of the Derg in 1991. The majority refused to leave their highly productive lands, although they say they cooperated with the requests of the government to provide evidence of the size and quality of their holdings in order that compensation could be calculated. The villagers say that one day during this negotiation process the military arrived in Beer Weyn. The community was told to gather together. They were surrounded by soldiers who pointed their guns at the villagers, who were then asked if anyone objected to leaving. They were told to evacuate within 12 hours. Bulldozers arrived and destroyed the homes and shops, and people fled, some to Djibouti, others to Somalia, depending on contacts and the availability of transport at crossroads towns. Many people were killed or died during the flight. A few stayed in the area, living in the forest or staying with pastoralists, returning to their lands and facing repeated beatings until, according to the villagers, the army realized these individuals were mad and harmless. A tiny minority of shopkeepers were allowed to stay, to service the military base and the train that stops in the village on the way to Addis; these faced very strict controls on travel, visiting, and other activity during the period 1979–91. The majority fled to Djibouti, where they stayed in UNHCR camps until 1988 or 1991–95. By 1988, the welcome in Djibouti had worn thin and a first round of repatriation occurred. Most Beer Weyn residents, however, refused to leave the camps until they were assured that their farmlands would be returned. With the fall of the Derg and the installation of the new EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) government came promises of return of expropriated lands, and the

majority of Beer Weyn villagers began to return, with or without UNHCR assistance.

In 1997, the community is still in limbo. The government has not returned the farmlands, though negotiations continue. Villagers identify the land as "Ahmed's garden," "Amina's garden," and so on, and express their impotent anger at watching the military "eat their lands," selling crops from expropriated lands while allowing other orchards to become unproductive through neglect. They do not quite believe that they will ever get their lands back, but when asked what they would do if the government clearly said the lands would not be returned, villagers reply that the government will never say this outright because then they would face an armed uprising. The military base itself is critical to the survival of the village, as it is the main market for the shops, and the brothels serving the base are an important market for the firewood gathered by many villagers as their main source of livelihood. Some villagers are soldiers at the base, as the local clan militia was in large part incorporated into the EPRDF forces. Resentment against both the base and the men and women working and guarding the lands is surprisingly low; anger is quite clearly focused on the government and specifically the military leadership, who are felt to be holding on to the lands out of greed—both for the profits obtainable from the land, and merely for the possession itself.

People survive on the edge of destitution, making a living by gathering firewood—seen as one step above begging, and a constant reminder that this is not "a human life"—or portering bundles of contraband for smugglers in the area. When I asked why they don't leave, I was in turn asked where they should go. The surrounding land looks empty but is in fact used to its carrying capacity by pastoralists, and in any case villagers say they have both lost the skills for living off the land, and have come to expect health care, water, and education as integral to "a human life." The rhetoric of development has convinced them, leaving them, as they themselves note, worse off than their pastoralist kinsmen who also do not have these services but who do not want them, either. Agricultural land nearby is full as well. In a country refederated on ethnic lines, moving elsewhere altogether is problematic. Finally, and as important as the practicalities of survival, is pride and anger—these are their lands, from which they have been unjustly dispossessed.

This, then, is a community which has been "repatriated" and "reintegrated," for whom, in the eyes of the refugee relief system, the identity of "refugee" has been extinguished. In the eyes of the community itself, the war is not yet over. The core of the refugee experience for this community, however, is not the horror of flight, nor the long years in camps, which in fact are seen as a kind of golden time when children could go to school and there was enough to eat. The centre of this community's story now and since 1979 is dispossession, injustice, poverty, and living an inhuman life.

Where is a Poor Man to Get Happiness?

This rhetorical question was the answer I received when I asked one old man if he was *niyed jabay*—demoralized/hopeless/dejected; literally, "will broken." I begin a discussion of some Somali emotion words only at this point in the paper because emotional states, identified as such, are not the central concern of this population. Emotion is important and rich in Somali life, although this is only hinted at in much of the existing literature, which focuses on politics and economics. The ubiquitous references to the importance of poetry in Somali life and politics indicate that aesthetics and emotion are not peripheral interests of elite groups (Andrzejewski and Lewis 1964; Cassanelli 1982; Lewis 1961; Samatar 1982). These very references, however, linking poetry with politics, warfare, peacemaking, and religion, as well as love, also make the point that I wish to stress: "emotion" is always embedded in life. There are abstract terms for what are considered emotional states, and I will list and briefly describe some of these states, but these words are always linked to concrete experience. Many of the words whose semantic networks I explored were linked to loss—of land, of love, of family, of livelihood. However, in interviews and life histories, the definitions of these concepts always included reference to specific examples, which vary with gender, social class, and life experience; lists of synonyms and nuances of the emotional state *per se* were not offered.

For Beer Weyn residents, the loss of the farmlands was the central motif—this is inseparable from any discussion of *niyed jab;* this is what *murugo* means (thinking or rumination about an insoluble problem or loss; sadness or depression), or *marrora dilla'* (anguish caused by sudden overwhelming loss of something precious, and characterized by rage, perceived powerlessness, and uncontrolled behaviour ranging from weeping to violence to madness). *Murugo* and *marrora dilla'* in the abstract, divorced from content and context, are meaningless words. For middle class women, *niyed jab* is linked to a husband marrying a second wife. For mothers, *niyed jab* is linked to the repeated deaths of infants, and for both mothers and fathers, to being unable to provide a decent life for one's children. Other related words arose in other conversations: *argegah* (sudden shock and the subsequent physical and behavioural reactions; *argegah* ranges from waking from a nightmare, to the horror experienced at seeing the murder of one's relatives); *wareer* (thinking/anxiety/dizziness/confusion, caused either by a febrile illness or by life problems); *waaliy* (madness, which can occur subsequent to a physical illness, or for no known reason—"sent by God," or as one of three possible sequelae—recovery, *niyed jab*, or madness—of *argegah* or *marrora dilla'*).

A second set of words is on the positive end of the emotional spectrum, including *niyed fii'an* (good morale; a sense of being able to provide for one-

self and one's family without being dependent of frequent or constant help; a general sense of well-being); *farxad* (joy, usually finite and attributable to a particular cause); *fi'il* (a spirit of action that enthuses or activates warriors, as well as, for example, athletes); *hammid* (passion/desire/love/longing/yearning, expressed in poems about the beauty and fertility of Beer Weyn and characterizing men's reactions to hearing these poems—love of home; also sexual desire and passion, and passion for activities, including contraband). The root word of both hopelessness/demoralization and well-being, *niyed*, can be glossed as mind or attention, the ability to focus, will; it was often said to be more or less synonymous with *qalbi*, or "heart" in the sense of focus of desire and love.

Spirit possessions (*zar* or *wadaado*) were not identified as being linked to, much less caused by, dislocation or loss or frustration, although they were said to be more common in the refugee camps than now. Conversely, although madness can happen for no apparent cause, and although individuals can be more or less prone to *niyed jab* or *murugo*, I did not hear of the existence of anything approaching the psychiatric notions of "endogenous" or purely biochemical depression. People manifesting such symptoms seem to be more likely to be thought to suffer from *zar* or *wadaado*, although the latter form of possession tends to present with somatic rather than emotional or behavioural symptoms. A reason offered for the apparent decline in possession states is that "the new generation doesn't believe in it, so it can't catch you; when people get sick now they go to doctors".

It is clear even from this brief catalogue that there is a rich vocabulary of emotion, and that people learn this vocabulary. It is learned through hearing and discussing life problems and issues. You don't talk about feelings, I was told; you talk about how to solve the problems, or how to live with them. Another way of coping with problems and suffering is to distract the mind, whether through laughter, or singing, or chewing *qat*, or by deliberate "forgetting" or not thinking about problems. One discussion with a women's group put it like this:

> Too many problems and too much thinking makes you *wareer* (thinking/anxiety/dizziness/confusion), but it doesn't happen all at once, it happens bit by bit. So we try to forget about the past problems.

However, they do not forget about past problems. Young men who were infants at the time of flight can recount the story in minute detail. What is done, is to frame the "past problems"—and the present ones, for that matter—in terms that provide a meaningful story and framework for action, whether of history and (in)justice, or in reference to stories about Muslim heroes, saints, and martyrs, or in other terms that reinforce the sense of community and the meaningful place of an individual in this community and its trajectory. Religion is an important source of consolation, and also of the norm of *samir iyo iman*, acceptance in faith and serenity. This simultaneous consolation and instruction is not always conflict-free, as another discussion with women revealed. Women are considered less likely to suffer from *niyed jab* or *murugo* in the case of death of a loved one because they can cry and verbalize their unhappiness, but when pressed to say whether it is better to cry or to accept the will of God, the women said it is better to accept the will of God.

Psychosocial Effects of Trauma and Dislocation

It is now possible to begin to see where notions of "trauma" may enter into the experience of this community, and, I suggest, others like it. To begin with, the story of Beer Weyn suggests, once again, that we should stop ignoring the "social" in "psychosocial" (see e.g., Boothby 1994; Eisenbruch 1991; Jenkins 1991).

Second, the ways in which madness and spirit possession were presented suggest that, in this community, an inability to link emotion and behaviour with specific events on the one hand, or an inability to "metabolize" an initial overwhelming shock into a coherent place within a collective story on the other, are, first, the exception, and second, truly outside of authentically human experience, in the realms of spirits and insanity rather than constituting the "real" core of "the" refugee experience. With respect to individuals thought to be possessed or mad, the preeminent concerns of other members of the community were to bring them back into the human community, whether through culturally sanctioned rituals of spirit appeasement, or through repair of or compensation for the initial injury, in this case, the loss of farmlands.

This suggests, in turn, that therapeutic interactions with distressed Somali refugees in Canada might take a number of directions. One might be to find ways of situating an individual's experience, distress, and current situation in a collective (family? clan? occupation? gender?) story which is both culturally and emotionally meaningful and, of critical importance, able to inform action. Individuals whose experiences or "trauma" prove to be outside the realm of such a collective story and program of action may indeed be well served by a variation of a "trauma" model, precisely because it is foreign, outside the rules, and, as discussed in the introduction, allows taboo issues to be addressed. Even here, however, the powerful stories told by Beer Weyn and other returnees and refugees suggest that a narrow focus on feelings divorced from concrete action will be both incomprehensible and ineffective: the cause of distress—*niyed jab*, *murugo*, and even madness—in Beer Weyn and elsewhere is not traumatic memory, but remembered, and unresolved, dispossession. If the problem in "average" cases is to live "a human life" and in extreme cases to bring the person back to the human realm, then the solution must involve the mundane particularities of human life. ■

Notes

1. Approximately $7 Canadian.

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Role Adjustment in Southeast Asian Refugee Families

Maureen Lynch and Leslie Richards

Abstract

Little is known about the relationship between family history and family identity. One way to initially explore whether or how families incorporate their history into the development of their identity would be to talk to members of families who have had a discrete event in their history. Refugee families are such families. Seventeen members from ten refugee families who fled Cambodia or Vietnam and resettled in the United States between 1975 and 1990, were interviewed about their perceptions of how their experience affected their family identity. Transcripts were qualitatively analyzed. The findings presented here are limited to descriptions of adjustment that occurred in family roles.

Précis

La relation entre histoire familiale et identité familiale est peu connue. Une façon préliminaire d'explorer si et comment les familles incorporent leur histoire dans le développement de leur identité serait d'échanger avec les membre de familles ayant vécu une cassure dans leur trajectoire historique. Les familles de réfugiés représentent des cas de ce type. Dix-sept membres de dix familles de réfugiés qui ont fui le Cambodge et le Vietnam et se sont installés aux États-Unis entre 1975 et 1990 ont été interviewés sur leur perception de l'impact de leur expérience sur leur identité familiale. Les entrevues ont été analysées qualitativement. Les résultats exposés ici sont limités à la description des ajustements ayant eu lieu dans les rôles familiaux.

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Introduction

Some families experience discrete events in the course of their history. The readily identifiable groups are those that experience human-initiated disasters, groups like refugees. Refugees are not people simply responding to political, economic, and social opportunities. They face "transition that involves major changes in the ... family" (Liu and Cheung 1985, 488).

The goal of the present study is to capture the unique contribution of families that have experienced a discrete historical experience, a refugee experience, while exploring the construct of family identity. Using Bennett, Wolin, and McAvity's (1988) model, the role component of family identity is examined in the light of a significant family historical event and the research question: How do people perceive a major family historical event, becoming refugees, has shaped and continues to shape their sense of family identity?

Learning about refugees and their families can enhance the theoretical understanding of family identity and family functioning as well as contribute to applied work with refugee families. That is, the present exploration offers a contribution in that its theme (family identity), population (Southeast Asians), subgroup (refugee families), and methodology (qualitative) have been underrepresented in past research.

Theoretical Background

Family identity is, according to Bennett, Wolin, and McAvity (1988, 212), the family's subjective sense of its own continuation over time, its present situation and its character. It is the composite of qualities and attributes that answer the question: "What does it mean to be a member of your family" (Sherman 1990, 255).

Family identity is composed of three primary parts: family membership, quality of day to day life, and an elusive historical component. Specifically, family membership includes family structure (members) and relationships (roles, rules, and boundaries). Discussion in this paper will be limited to role adjustment.

In general, the literature reveals members of refugee families often experience radical changes in roles (Eisikovits and Beck 1990; Westermeyer 1989). If parents are separated, one parent may have difficulty in fulfilling responsibilities that were once shared. The child may have lost a major source of nurture and may also be expected to take on major adult responsibilities at a very early age. This shift constitutes a risk because children may need to assume roles for which they may not be developmentally prepared

Refugee parents may become dependent on a child for practical needs, particularly since the child may learn the new language of the settlement country much more quickly and easily than the parent (Westermeyer 1989). Children find themselves translating for their parents in encounters with professionals, helping in the business, and negotiating situations with community agencies and helpers (Prilleltensky 1993). With understanding of the family identity construct and of role changes occurring in refugee families, this project was undertaken to explore how individuals perceived refugee experience affects family identity.

Methods

There are a number of methodological challenges associated with interviewing refugees or former refugees. Primary difficulties include finding

willing participants, discussing emotionally painful memories, and choosing an appropriate unit and method of analysis. The manner in which these issues were ultimately handled are described below.

Sample

Use of the snowballing technique (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981; Coleman 1958; Lincoln and Guba 1985) produced seventeen willing families, six Cambodian and four Vietnamese. Family size for all families (limited to father, mother, and children) before the refugee experience ranged from three to eleven members, with an average of nearly eight. All but one of the ten families were initially two-parent households.

Procedure

Personal and telephone interviews were tape-recorded and ranged in length from about one hour to nearly three hours, with an average of one and a half hours. Participants were not asked in great depth about the refugee experience itself, were free to stop the interview at any time, and there was arrangement for bilingual crisis intervention.

Data Analysis

Analysis of conversations about refugee experiences can be best accomplished by an on-going dialogue between data collection, coding of the data, and analysis (Bogdan and Biklen 1982; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Schwartz and Jacobs 1979). Thus it was planned to assess the information gathered through qualitative research which permits such a process. After verbatim transcription, data analysis was initiated with a basic organizing system developed by writing the names of key codes on separate pages to allowing for recording, expansion, and comparison within and across families (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Simple tables were constructed for each code showing speaker identification, main points addressed, and the location of the pertinent conversation in the transcripts. A list of the main categories was made which included any obvious patterns and the range of responses among families.

Findings

In the report of findings that follows, families are identified by a label such as "Family One" or "Family Two." Language errors in participant quotations have not been corrected. Bracketed words or phrases have been added for clarity. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the reproduction of words spoken during an interview cannot totally represent the original response with its producer's original tone, gesture, and expression.

Interviews started with questions about family life before becoming refugees. Responding to question about roles, members talked about what the family situation was like. Representing the majority of families in this study, the 28-year-old son of Family Six generalized that in Cambodian culture, each parent in a two-parent household has a clearly recognized role with the father commonly the head and primary provider of the family unit. The son described the traditional roles of both fathers and mothers stating:

> Normally father always man of the family ... Because he is the person who earn a lot of income and support the whole family ... Father is the man of the house.

The same participant identified the roles in his own family where his father was the main provider (who travelled extensively on business) and his mother was responsible for household tasks:

> My dad, man, always the big macho in the family. He can do whatever he want. He always think that. But I think that's the kind of tradition he take for granted ... When he came home, he brought little stuff to us ... He send money ... He always make sure that the money will go right to the kid and my mom especially. Mom take care of kid and he [father] always phone my mom, he always send a telegram in letter all the time, and once in a while he call ... My mother ... she have a servant. Yeah, because my dad make a lot of money, so they hired a servant to help.

Vietnamese fathers were also traditionally the primary providers. Mothers usually took care of the homes (though sometimes with outside domestic help) and the children. Vietnamese families in this project followed this traditional pattern. For example, the third child of Family Seven, with two parents who upheld the traditional roles in their homeland of Vietnam, said the following about her father:

> He was the only one working ... My mom took care of the kids at home. Well, my mom has always had a say in something I guess ... but ... my dad was always the head figure ... My mom was always the financial person that keeps the money ...

Her father, also a participant, concurred that he was the main provider and that his wife took care of the domestic work. Speaking about their situation he said, "My income was good enough for my family. So my wife stay at home to take care of my children." It should be noted however, that although women traditionally stayed at home and cared for the children, they also were active in other paid or unpaid outside labour while in the homeland. The youngest son of Cambodian Family Three contradictorily noted the work of his mother:

> My mother ... at the rice planting season she would go and plant rice with my grandfather, and she also had just an acre of rice field and just given by my grandparents. And when she was not busy or when nothing to do with the rice field she sold some stuff, some candy. She usually just stay at home—homemaker.

Members of three families talked about the unusual roles played by women in their families. The daughter of Family Four from Cambodia acknowledged the traditional pattern of male dominance, but said that in her family it was not maternal or paternal dominance but that the parents were equal partners because of her father's ethnic background:

> My mom is a very strong woman, and you know how usually you have the man in the household, he order everything. Well, in my family he is not really that way ... The women are very strong ... comparably to others. I mean strong in the sense like, if we don't like something we will say it ... It's kind of hard ... because he [father] makes money, but she has more power because she knows the people. He was Chinese, she was born in Cambodian. There was a lot of prejudice in Cambodian in the sense against Chinese people. I think they see themselves as equal partners.

The daughter of the single mother of Family One from Cambodia reported, "My mom was like everything. She was like the dad, the protector, the provider." Daughter of Family Two talked about the role of her strong Vietnamese mother had played, reporting, "My mom has been always the provider for the household, and she still is." After talking about family roles before forced flight, members were asked to briefly describe their experience.

Each family had a distinct experience in the process of leaving their homeland. Members discussed adjustments in roles that took place when separation and loss occurred in their families after being forced from their homes, particularly in the case of the separation from, or death of, one or both parents.

A member of Family Five, in which both parents were executed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, noted the process of how the vacant parental roles were filled by the young members. One daughter of this family, referring to the period of time from her parents' death in Cambodia through the end of their refugee camp stay in Cambodia and Thailand, described the new roles of her older siblings. They, and the participant herself, were all under the age of 21 at the time of the death of their parents and as she recalled adjustment in the Cambodian camp first, and then in the refugee camp in Thailand:

> I took a role ... probably more like an older sister in that I ... knowing that we were not given rations by the Khmer Rouge ... and we couldn't find rice ... staying in that village and noticing that there were Cambodian people who ... travelled through that village [and] back ... I thought about opportunity to make ... a business ... So somehow I kind of pulled the family together to be involved in this little business ... And also then ... my older sister decided she didn't want, ... even back in Cambodia she didn't want to sell food because she is shy and stuff. So when we came to this camp, I want to still doing some trading and stuff, like selling food. But she didn't want to, and she wanted to depend on her boyfriend. And so we, I, we gave him our share of the gold to trade with Thai and Cambodian ... My sister and my brother ... tried to take that father role ... So when we ... were transferred, ... when we were taken to the refugee camp in Thailand, the first refugee camp and we got rations again ... and when oldest sister take charge of us, making meal and stuff, but then when we didn't have enough food to eat because the rations were limited ... my brother started to smuggle refugees inside the camp and get paid from the refugees and he kind of provide food for us ... But I still play a role because I, having traded with Cambodian people in Cambodia ... I was good in detecting what was real gold, 24-karat gold and what was not ... I remember my older brother risk going to smuggle new refugees inside that camp ... He was paid by those people and I guess that kind of shift ... that kind of shifted the role of the bread [breadwinner].

In another case, with the father and oldest brother isolated from the rest of the family as anchors in the United States, a participating member of Family Ten described the specialized and cooperative roles individuals in her family played as the rest of the family prepared for departure from Vietnam:

> We didn't have a lot of feedback from him because he was so far away. But my mom ... had decided to save some money. My sister told her to move to another part, like move to my aunt's house. And then when things got really, really bad ... my second oldest brother, the one that was oldest because my oldest brother left, the one that was oldest there, ... said ... he had heard of a ship ... leaving at 2 o'clock in the morning, and we had better prepare. He was the one that made those arrangements. My mom is the one who saved the money and gave him the money and then he ran to them [ship owner] and gave them the money and did that stuff. So anybody who was old enough to really know what was going on ... helped her [the mother] make that decision [to leave]. It wasn't like everybody gave her, "We should go now" ... or "Oh, we should go tomorrow" or "We should take this boat" and stuff like that.

With the exception of the members of Family Ten who initially began resettlement in Germany, all of the other families came directly to the United States after leaving refugee camps. The period of time immediately after arrival was overloaded with the tasks of reorganizing life in a foreign environment without, in most cases, basic English skills. The daughter of Family Four mentioned that after they arrived in the United States, she was responsible for helping the family by doing household work so her parents could get educated and be able to find work in their new homeland. She stated:

> In household responsibility ... I end up having to do most of the work ... partly I knew I have to do that because my parents were so way too busy trying to go to work and then study at night to try and get their associate degree just so that they can have a better chance at getting another job that can help the family better. So it is like everyone of us kind of like have to play a different role to support each other.

The mother of Family Four most poignantly described the tension as she talked about her own experience of trying to go to school part time, work part time, be the housekeeper and the mother and wife, while dealing with the personal emotional upheaval of being a refugee. Remembering the frustration of trying to balance many demands and the disharmony it caused, she stated:

> I was just so busy ... two hours sleep a day and pressed, you know, depressed. And all stressed out. And so sometimes I spank her [daughter] ... Well, I picked up as much [of what was lying around the house] as I can. And I told them not to do that [leave things lying around the house] ... but nobody care ... nobody listen. And you know, I try to give them some chore, you know, like a kind of dispatching, like a sharing responsibility. And they didn't care. That frustrate me ... Well, I asked them to do something, and they never did. And then when you ask them ... they always say, "Later, later" and they never did ... So getting angry, yelling, frustration ... I didn't have time ... I didn't have time to think about anything ... When I look back now, I just can't believe that we can get through that. Because in the morning, I left home at 7 o'clock and about 3:30 got home [from school], I grab something and I went to work right away ... And I came home 10:30 [from work] and grabbed something for dinner and do the homework until I got so really tired I went to bed ... And then most the time my husband help me a lot. But you know, he never helping discipline kids either. So for him, for man, you know, he didn't see as much as we do [what needs to be done around the house and training the children]. Yeah, when I got so angry because the house was messy all the time, you spend so much time just to get it clean, and not even two hours ... mess again. And I was so really frustrate. Really feel so bad about that because I never live in the situation like that in my life. It is really hard you know ... We used to have a maid and people clean the house and everything. And my husband, finally my husband told me, "Don't look at the mess. Just go upstairs to sleep." ... Yeah, but it is really hard.

Particularly noted by the families in this project were changes in who was the economic provider or the primary breadwinner for the family. This task, which had formerly been performed primarily by the father (or by the mother in the single-parent family), was divided between two parents or was now distributed among parents and older children.

For Family Ten, responsibility shifted increasingly to the second oldest brother. The interviewed sister (self-reported as being about 5 or 6 at the time of the events) noted her brother had

> taken on that responsibility more and more than when he came over. And when he came over he didn't understand English ... He had to ... have a lot of burden of responsibility when he was really young. You know when you are 19 and expected to bring nine members of your family from Vietnam over, you take more responsibility than you can imagine.

The daughter of Family Seven addressed changes in her family during their resettlement stating, "... I guess both of my parents were breadwinners ... My brother is always the one to take care of the rest of the family—my oldest brother." Her father confirmed this change and the conditions that enabled them to have two breadwinners. He said, "And you know why me and my wife go to work at that time [within days of arrival in the United States] ... because we had my mother to stay at home and take care of my children."

Without a father figure, Family Three's second oldest brother noted that the primary burden of money-earning responsibility was carried by "mom and older sister and my brother" because the mother let both younger sons go to school. The youngest son additionally commented that additional income was earned by all family members by labouring in the strawberry field labour each summer.

Although the oldest daughter of Family Two did not take on the role of breadwinner in her family, she noticed a substantial change in her function as far as increase in responsibility-taking. The eldest daughter recalled:

> After I arrived she [mother] becomes more dependent on me because I am like the translator. I help her translate documents when she goes to the doctor and just show her around ... Well, my brother was, we ... were the same when we were in Vietnam. We weren't so close to my mom, but we were dependent on her. After we arrived here, my brother was pretty much independent by himself. My mom did not ask him to do anything for her because she knows that whenever she asks, he would not get it done. So she doesn't rely so much on him.

Family One's daughter talked about the provider role in her now single-parent family. She recognized that she had picked up some adult responsibilities before most people her age would be expected to and stated:

> I remember just being like in the eighth grade and doing like a lot of responsibilities that were like for an adult would do ... but my sister, she was more, she got into the cooking and helping out with the house and cleaning and stuff like that. And I guess I was more like maybe the semi-dad role. My sister [named] make sure my mom was taken care of and she looked after my mom.

Later, speaking about life at the present time, Family Ten's participants talked about how the older children have become increasingly responsible for the younger members. This change does not revert back to traditional roles once the family was self-sufficient but rather responsibility-taking appears to be exacerbated by the refugee experience. One of the youngest daughters remarked:

> My second oldest brother has taken on the responsibility about caring for my sister and I, which is like the two youngest ones ... Yeah I mean the ones need to look after. So he is the one who is like financing, not necessarily financing, our way, but whenever we need a quick loan, an emergency loan, we'll call him up because he will have the money. And we'll send our taxes to him. You know what I mean? And whenever we change, like our life course ... like I am going to move to Oregon or I am going to do this ... we will contact him ... He will make sure that we have computer or he will make sure that we have a car, you know. He has taken on that responsibility more and more than when he came over. And when he came over he didn't understand English ... He didn't even graduate college or anything. So after he graduated college and got

married, he assumed much more of my father's role then ...

Toward the end of the interviews, family members were asked to talk about or describe how they foresee their families in the future. Members repeatedly spoke about the importance of filial piety, taking care of older family members as they aged. Except for Family Five who lost both parents during the refugee experience and Family Six who has only one parent who is still in Cambodia, a member of every family mentioned the importance of this filial caretaking of elders to some extent. Talking about her plans for the future, Family One's first-contact, the daughter said:

> I can't imagine myself without having contact with my family and stuff. For me when I will get house, get a job or whatever, I want my mom to come and live with me. Or if she wants to stay with my sister, that's fine. But I want us to be close. I don't want to move like across country or live in a different country ... I don't think so because of the way we were raised ... because of the way each of us took the roles in the family. I think me and my sister would be the ones taking care of my mom, but if my brother wants to take care her ... I don't trust him though, just because he's being, he's just being a guy ... Also, I wouldn't mind having my mom live with me. That would be kind of cool, I think.

Talking about their future, Family Two's daughter said:

> In the future, it will stay the same, except everyone will grow up and we will be working and taking care of my mom ... I don't know yet. Maybe, maybe not. I don't know. That depends on how ill she gets. If she is like healthy then I don't need to worry so much, let them be far away ... It would be me [taking care of mother] because I am the second oldest. And my brother, he's not so reliable ... My mom wants to be near me so I can take care of her.

However, her brother said regarding his future, "I have to take care of my mom ... not stepdad, just mom ... I have to take care of that ..."

Family Three's youngest son, who currently resides with his mother, expressed great concern for her future care with increased responsibility because of the vulnerability and isolation of the family as a result of their refugee status. He stated:

> Well, you know, I thought about going, just live by yourself [myself]. But she is, my mother's almost sixty now, and then she only speak English very little bit so it is better for me to stay with her and take care of her.

Family Four's mother mentioned that her youngest daughter had already invited her to live in the same household, allowing the employed daughter to take care of the mother in older age. And Family Seven's daughter said she couldn't leave her parents in a nursing home because she is "very family oriented."

During discussion about future family issues and probing of the topic about parental care in older age, the youngest son of Family Eight was asked about who would be responsible for the care of his elderly parents. He responded, "Right now I think it is going to be me because I don't have a family yet ... [I] hope to make enough money to support them when they get older. We respect them so much."

Summary and Discussion

There was role adjustment over the time through the move from the homeland, resettlement, and the current living situation in Cambodian and Vietnamese refugee families in this project. Several patterns were evident. First, the family role of primary breadwinner shifted from one or two parental providers before flight to a more equal distribution of responsibility throughout the family membership. Mothers in most families entered the paid labour force at least temporarily, and many for the first time. This change involved increasing and sustained contributions by the older children in each family. It is not possible to say, however, that the change was entirely related to the demands of the refugee experience as there are numerous other influential factors. It should be noted though, that even families that had adult-aged or nearly adult-aged children at the time of their experience, specifically recognized this increased dispersion of roles and dependency on children for economic support.

Findings about family identity as demonstrated by the refugee families who participated in this project upheld the previously identified component parts of membership. Most importantly, topics that members raised to the interviewer actually supported the theme of how being refugees impacts family roles in more ways than were anticipated. The fact that families included the role of their experience across time and across dimensions of family identity, helps begin the necessary process of isolating a "family history" component as a critical element of the current family identity construct. Association between family histories and their perceptions of family identity was evident and could not be separated from one another.

Overall, this study makes an important contribution to the research on family identity. For at least some families, history (in the form of the life-changing event of being refugees) does colour perception of family identity, that is, the experience of being refugees does influence what it means to be a member of a particular family. As has been seen here, it may cause adjustment in roles. This knowledge can be particularly beneficial for professionals who aid refugee individuals and families trying to understand and deal with the impact of role adjustment and for researchers of other traumatized families. ■

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The Canadian Jewish Community Serving Newcomers

John Morris

Abstract

The Jewish Community is the oldest non-governmental agency serving newcomers in Canada. Its emphasis has been on employing professional, secular social work practice. This paper reports on conversations held with the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society (JIAS) staff, board members, clients and sponsors. Focus group meetings were held with clients and sponsors in nine Canadian cities from Ottawa to Vancouver. Highlighted are the conclusions that sponsors and clients have arrived at regarding services the Jewish community offers.

Précis

La communauté juive est la plus ancienne agence non-gouvernementale desservant les nouveaux arrivants au Canada. Son point fort a toujours consisté dans la mise en pratiques de procédures de travail social séculaires. Le présent article rapporte des conversations tenus avec du personnel, des membres du comité de direction, des bénéficiaires, et des commanditaires de la Société d'Aide aux Juifs immigrants. Des séances de discussions en groupe ont eu lieu avec des bénéficiaires, et commanditaires dans neufs villes canadiennes d'Ottawa à Vancouver. L'attention porte principalement sur les conclusions tirées par les bénéficiaires, et commanditaires face aux services assurés par la communauté juive.

The Jewish Community in Canada has a long history of involvement in Jewish immigration. Almost as historic are Jewish settlement services offered as professionalized services to Jewish Newcomers to Canada (Kage 1962). Settlement services are provided by the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society (JIAS) and is the focus of attention in this paper.

In the spring of 1994, I was asked to assist the organisation in coming toward a better understanding of the meaning of equitable service across the country; to help establish a minimum level of service that all Jewish communities should attain in their settlement activities. JIAS is a unique organisation in Canada—in contrast to other faith communities—in that it acts as a national policy and administrative body. It also has a direct presence as a service agency in Toronto and Montreal, and provides funding to agencies—usually Jewish Family Services (JFS)—in smaller cities to provide settlement services to newcomers. JIAS is the oldest aid agency in Canada, chartered by the Government in offering a support services that parallels Provincial welfare support.

This paper provides an overview highlighting the results of a Canada wide survey of clients, sponsors, staff and Board Members of JIAS. Added to conventional research reporting, methodology, observations and analysis is a discussion of religious obligations toward newcomers/strangers as detailed in Judaic holy texts. Doctrinal concerns aside, JIAS' head office, "JIAS National's," concerns about equity of service across Canada is outlined in the section entitled "Background to the Research." Analysis is organised in three sections: importance of jobs, listening to needs, and communities welcoming strangers.

Canada's Jewish immigrant communities are mythical in Canadian consciousness with images extending back a half century: The Main in Montreal, Spadina in Toronto, and the North end of Winnipeg. Jewish immigration to Canada continues to increase the size of Canadian Jewry though images of the concentrated settlement has dissipated. Over 30,000 Jews immigrated to Canada in the ten years period from 1981–1991.

Jewish immigrants arrive by proportion to the size of existing Jewish communities. Large numbers of immigrants settle where large communities exist, and smaller numbers settle in smaller communities. Of these arrivals in the period between 1981–1991, a third came from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Another 20 percent came from Israel. Twenty-five percent came with English as a first language originating from either the United States or South Africa, (14% and 11% respectively). The remaining 25 percent came from Europe/Scandinavia (9%) and Northern Africa including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (7%) with the balance originating in small percentages from other parts of the world.[1]

This immigration represents 9 percent of the Canadian Jewish community (totalling 303,000 people), a trend of long standing. Consequently, 15 percent of all Jews in Canada arrived in the past 20 years, an immigrant/native born ratio that is double that of Canadian society as a whole. This ratio is perhaps out of proportion with the number of strangers that a Jewish community expects to be in their presence based on religious history. Accordingly, it is difficult for Canada's Jewish community to meet rabbinical instructions on the treatment of strangers.

Judaic Ethics and Strangers

The Jewish Community in Canada has a remarkable record of helping Jewish newcomers to Canada. It has funded JIAS as an institution becoming a societal leader in the use of professional social workers to provide services to

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newcomers. Through professionalization—a secular phenomenon—there has been perhaps less pressure on the organisation to consider its mandate and mission in theological and doctrinal terms. This contrasts with other agencies from the Christian faith (Mennonite and Catholic) that do the landscape of service providers in the same cities where Jewish communities serve newcomers. There, much time seems to be spent on clarifying and tying mission statements to theology, and is, from the perspective of faith and organisational direction, a valuable use of resources (Morris 1995).

In ancient Israel the closest category to what we now consider immigrants and refugees was "resident foreigners," or in Hebrew *gerim*, the protected stranger. Prior to the Exodus, resident aliens, as a class, was unknown in Israel. Aliens went with them when they left Egypt (Ex. 12: 38, 48), non-Jews who identified with the Israelites' quest for freedom. Later, during the conquest of Canaan, the numbers of these aliens further increased (Jos. 9: 3). Beyond the Canaanites others numbered among them; foreigners who sought refuge in times of drought and famine (cf. Ruth 1: 1) and those who fled before invading armies (*Judaica Encyclopaedia* 1972, 220). They were not slain as Deuteronomy commands (cf. e.g. 7: 2) nor reduced to total slavery (cf. 1 Kings 5: 29; II Chronicles 2: 16–17).

Protected aliens could not own land as this belonged to the Israelites (cf. Lev. 25: 23–24). Consequently they worked as day labourers and artisans (Deut. 24: 14–15; cf. 29: 10). Sacred books—the *Book of the Covenant* and the *Decalogue*—class the gerim among those who were dependent, they were "your strangers." Most of them were quite poor and were therefore permitted to share in the fallen fruit in the vineyard (Lev. 19: 10), the edges of the field, and the gleanings of the harvest (Lev. 23: 22), all of which were regular provisions for the poor.

To recall the sufferings of the Israelite experience in Egypt, and to befriend gerim as one of their own, is a profoundly moral and just act. The imperative of Tikun Olam (mending the world) is a responsibility of all Jews and manifests as social justice, forms one of the guiding principles of Jewish law, philosophy, values and behaviour. In considering care for the poor, it should be carried out with a view toward redressing some of the imbalance in society (Canadian Council for Reform Judaism 1994). Helping those in need is not a matter of choice in Jewish tradition—it is a matter of law (ibid.).

The way in which assistance is given is as important, in Judaism, as that which is given. Respect for human dignity must pervade all aspects of giving. It is best to give anonymously to safeguard the feelings of those in need at all times. Further, Jewish ethics call for early action for those in need. A person's dignity should not be put at risk before the community intervenes and provides assistance (ibid.).

Most relevant for recent Jewish arrivals, are questions of how well they should be maintained? And what is the responsibility of newcomers to the community? On the question of "what level should newcomers be maintained?" is a command from *Deuteronomy:*

> If there is a needy person among you ... do not harden your heart and shut your hand against your needy kinsman. Rather, you must open your hand and lend him *sufficient* [emphasis added] for whatever he needs.
>
> Give to him readily and have no regrets when you do so, for in return the Lord your God will bless you in all your efforts and in all your undertakings. For there will never cease to be needy ones in your land, which is why I command you; open your hand to the poor and needy kinsman in your land. (*Deuteronomy* 15: 7–11)

This passage makes clear that to give is an imperative action. What is left unclear is how to interpret "sufficient." In their deliberations the Sages of the Talmud conclude that "sufficient" means that it is best to maintain the poor according to their previously accustomed lifestyle. Yet, where the previous lifestyle is excessive—or beyond the wealth of the host community—then there is a moral obligation for the recipients to defer to the community (Linzer 1990, 122).

Services across the Country

Jewish Community Services across Canada are not uniform. Nor are the number of newcomers to Canadian cities uniform to the size of Jewish communities in those cities. Beyond Toronto and Montreal with communities in the order of 150,000 and 100,000 people respectively, the next largest communities are much smaller. Vancouver has the third largest Jewish community with only 14,000 people calling themselves religious Jews. In larger cities a general trend can be observed: the number of newcomers is proportional to the size of the community. As cities become smaller, however, the pattern becomes more volatile making the burden of caring for newcomers in these places more onerous. Consider Edmonton and Windsor, as is shown in Table 1. These small communities have disproportionately more newcomers for whom to care.

In Toronto and Montreal, where JIAS has its own agencies, refugee claimants can take advantage of group services for psychosocial support. The National Board of JIAS would like to extend some version of this kind of service to refugees so that they might improve their initial years in Canada wherever they locate, and hopefully stay in these cities. A broad range of general services do exist in most cities. In a 1992 survey, it was found that most agencies outside Toronto and Montreal offer most of the range of services found in these larger centres, at least some of the time, if not always (JIAS 1992). Services were grouped in three categories: immigration, integration and acculturation. Immigration is used to refer to newcomer's arrival; integration—which is of most direct concern to JIAS—refers to newcomers' first two years in Canada, and acculturation refers to resettling that occurs after two

Table 1: Jewish Communities, and Numbers of Newcomers in Cities Studied

City	Population 1991	Jewish Population 1991	JIAS New Immigrant Clients (NIC) 1992	Proportion of NIC to the size of Jewish Population
Toronto	3,893,046	151,115	2,627	0.0174
Montréal	3,127,242	96,715	1,148	0.0119
Vancouver	1,602,502	14,365	173	0.0120
Winnipeg	652,354	13,325	142	0.0107
Ottawa-Hull	920,857	9,915	48	0.0048
Calgary	754,033	5,455	38	0.0070
Edmonton	839,924	4,045	81	0.0200
London	381,522	2,195	9	0.0041
Windsor	262,075	1,560	45	0.0288
Total	13,033,315	305,141	4,387	

Source: Population statistics from Statistics Canada, JIAS clients from JIAS national.

year in Canada. Acculturation is considered to be out of JIAS' purview. After two years of stay in Canada, newcomers must seek services from Jewish Family Services (JFS). This is a moot point in cities other than Toronto and Montreal as JFS is already responsible for all three functions: immigration, integration and acculturation.

Background to the Research

Since the late 1980s, there has been a directive in JIAS, as mandated by a National Taskforce report, to bring equity in service delivery across the country, and to advocate for the entire Canadian Community with regard to immigration and refugee policy (Davis 1994). The task of ensuring equitable service across Canada is made difficult by a discontinuous organisational structure: In Montreal and Toronto JIAS fully funds front-line agencies; in every other major urban centre JIAS provides inadequate funding to assist JFS to provide immigrant services in addition to their more general social work case load.

A questionnaire mailed to JFS and JIAS agencies was completed in late 1992 by member agencies. It shows that services offered across the country were based on need, and on the resources and interest found in the Jewish Communities in these cities. In many centres the low numbers of incoming immigrants did not warrant continuous, robust programming. This lack of formal programming means that it is difficult to compare services across the country. Further, the understaffed nature of virtually all service agencies means that it is very difficult to warrant spending time on data collection of service provider activities when staff time is so valuable to actual service provision. Alternatively, such information is crucial to JIAS' effective planning and budget formulating processes.

The Board of JIAS, through its executive director Susan Davis, have undertaken several initiatives over the past few years to come to a better understanding of services offered across the country. With different initiatives occurring each year, five separate efforts have been made to try to gather service provision information. The most recent of these is the research reported on in this paper. These initiatives have been conducted to improve the information available for budget and operations decision-making.

Methodology

This paper brings together highlights of conversations that were held with staff, clients, sponsors and JIAS Board Members.[2] These conversations were held in eight different cities in the following order: Ottawa, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, Windsor, and Montreal between November 1994 and January 1995. Conversations with staff, clients and sponsors were held as focus group sessions. Staff meetings were held during the day, while meetings with clients and sponsors were held during the evening. Most focus group sessions lasted between one and a half and two hours and were held in English. Clients and sponsors were paid $25 for their attendance.

Questions that predominated the research sessions included: "Are services across the country equitable for newcomers?", "How could services be made more equitable across the coun-

try?", "What is a fair formulae to use in deciding the distribution of funding to JFS offices across the country?" Clients and sponsors were essentially asked the same questions. A hybrid of questions were developed based on research carried out in Montreal, and on research conducted by JIAS in 1992. There were some trials and errors used to ask questions that seemed to sustain a conversation and elicit comments. Very general questions were used first:

If a relative of yours just arrived in the city, how would you describe JFS/JIAS services to them? Would you give them a recommendation to come to use these services? Were the services worthwhile to the point where you feel comfortable recommending them to someone else?

Do you know newly arrived Jewish immigrants that JIAS is not reaching? Do you have suggestions as to how we can reach them?

What has pleased you the most about your experience with JIAS?

What has displeased you the most about your experience with JIAS?

How could your experience with JFS/JIAS have been improved?

What services or programs would you want to see which do not presently exist? How easy or difficult is it to understand and get access to the programs and services which JIAS tells you about, or which you request?

Do you have friends or relatives that you would like to join you in this city? Have you discussed it with someone at JIAS? If yes, what was the response?

Board Members and staff were asked similar, but not exactly the same set of questions. For Board Members questions were organised so as to elicit information under the following headings: big cities and small cities; role in the local agency; important issues; vocational services; relations with JIAS National; relations with the main funder; political and religious issues; mandate; sharing service provision; and prospects for the future.

Staff meetings had to be more disciplined as I needed to collect information on a certain core of information. Questions asked were organised under the following headings: services; demand for services; newcomers joining the Jewish Community; evaluation; funding; services available in the city; sharing service provision; cutbacks; relations with JIAS National; attracting and keeping newcomers; job security and working conditions and important issues. Often it would be impossible to get answers to the questions in the allotted two hours. Some questions were dropped as the study continued, but these were more peripheral to the understanding sought.

Focus groups were organised by staff in each city. While I put into place guidelines for who should be invited to focus groups—to get a range of experience and relationships to the agency—these guidelines were not always followed. For the most part, however, it seemed that participants provided a variety of experiences save for the voices of seniors, and youth. The format of an evening focus group was simply inappropriate to seniors and youth.

Observation

After visiting two cities—Ottawa and Vancouver—I reaffirmed that the task of trying to draw together information that would constitute a meaningful comparison between places is not possible. The main difficulty in doing this is in language, and in trying to come to an understanding in each individual case about the components that comprise a generic program. Many agencies, for example, have developed a "family to family program." Yet, I have found that the program title gives little more information in terms of standards than a general intent to link families; there are no assumed standards of how often the families will meet, or the kinds of activities in which the families will engage. While such standardisation based on titles is not desirable—because local flexibility would be lost—this example does point to the need for a protocol for describing agency programs so that others—including clients, Board Members, and other agencies—can assess what the program actually does.

Analysis

There is a contradiction between what sponsors and clients say they value as important compared with JIAS/JFS social workers. Clients and sponsors are mostly concerned about jobs as is detailed in the first part of this analysis. This is followed by a contention by clients and sponsors that they need to be listened to more as well as highlighting some of the creative solutions that have been provided by agencies. Finally, issues of acceptance of newcomers by the local Jewish community is reviewed.

The Importance of a Job

Newcomers place highest priority on their first job relative to other services available. "The first job is more important than furniture, an apartment, et-ceteras. The first job provides dignity." Another former refugee agrees adding "It is also the hardest thing to find." In the past few years, with a weak Canadian economy, there has been little economic growth, and consequently little demand for newcomers who need to enter the economy. The restructuring of the Canadian economy has hit professionals particularly hard, making the heavily professionalized newcomer group of those from the former Soviet Union and Bosnia hard to employ in their chosen professions.

In one focus group words of experience are offered by two immigrants who have been in Canada for over ten years: success in the Canadian economy is based on persistence, perspiration, and patience. Another tells of his experience as an engineer. As an employment strategy, he decides not to take the Professional Engineers' designation (P.Eng.) because it prevents him from applying to work as a draftsman. Both believe that most newcomers are scared, and don't know how to apply their skills. One such

newcomer, also present at that focus group, was a Bosnian physician who concludes that if not allowed to work as a physician in Canada, that she would rather not work in any related medical field; so as to not suffer the consequent humiliation of not being a physician in that workplace.

In contrast, JIAS and particularly JFS agencies, do not share the ardent attitude toward employment expressed by immigrants in focus groups. What is looked after first are basic needs: food, shelter, security, health. Jobs are considered important, but are not what these organisations follow as a guiding principle. In some rare instances agencies are quite successful in finding jobs for clients, though clients note that these tend to be manual labour and are therefore not so desirable.

There are distinctive qualifications that help newcomers into the workplace. A primary one is to have a recognised certification. As important is how well newcomers learn English. Some cities may be more closed than others to those for whom English is a second language. A client in Vancouver says, for example, that gaining employment is made more difficult by having an accent. Another client comments that practise in English can be facilitated through volunteering. Staff in Montreal add, with some frustration, how difficult it is to offer English courses in Quebec. While the Jewish community in Montreal is mostly English, the Provincial government does not provide funding to offer English courses.

In most JIAS related-agencies there is a lack of support for job services in the Jewish Community. What seems obvious, from travelling across the country, is that JFS agencies alone cannot provide the full range of services required for quality career counselling. If services are to improve universally, traditionally uninvolved members of the community will have to get involved in mentoring activities. The only alternative is to buy services from career counsellors rather than involving those of the Jewish community who are active in diverse areas of the economy, sometimes combined with having been a newcomer themselves.

More generally, immigrants comment that orientation information to introduce the working/office/employment culture in Canada would be helpful. This kind of a program, a client in Windsor feels, could be offered by former immigrants sharing insights into the differences between Canada and their homelands. "This person could unpack meaning, conventions, and the culture here with a focus to helping us understand and deal with the differences between there and here." A Toronto client reiterates and adds that forums could be held to introduce newcomers to prospective employers. In agreement, others from Winnipeg and Windsor add that they need to learn how to separate what they have to offer an employer from their personal selves so that they are not so distraught when rejected for employment.

Some newcomers have an orientation to starting small businesses which implies transcending fears associated with this activity. A more predominant view in entrepreneurial ventures, perhaps, is as one focus group agreed, "It is too early to consider starting a business. After being here for 10 years, and after taking business courses, maybe then running a business might be a possibility." Unfortunately, employment related programmes tend to be one of the first cut in times of fiscal restraint.

Listening to Needs

A sponsor in Edmonton—though I think it could have been anywhere—commented "It would be helpful if JFS asked the question, 'What do you need in general?'" He continues, it is not that Canada is the epitome of a hard-core capitalist society, something that makes many from former socialist states twinge with anxiety. Instead, in Canada many things are free. In another focus group a sponsor in Winnipeg expresses her surprise with the welfare state. "There are many things for free here," she comments. She adds that educational materials explaining the differences between here and there (the former Soviet Union), and a book on services available to newcomers would be very useful.

Jewish Family Service and JIAS Agencies are noted for having responded to newcomers' needs with creative solutions. In Edmonton, for example, a synagogue held a mass wedding for nine Russian couples who had not before had a religious wedding. This same agency has recently started a singles group for Jewish newcomers who tend to be very isolated in the city. In Vancouver, staff speak among other needs to be able to tell people where to look for housing since Vancouver has become such an expensive city.

Outside of employment concerns the most stubborn of problems, of which those in focus groups speak, is sponsorship of parents. The number of people who would like to bring their parents constitutes a large group. Newcomers feel obliged to bring parents but receive no official support in this activity and bear total responsibility. Even with employment, caring for the financial concerns of their parents is a burden that seems too heavy for the average newcomer. Medical insurance is a daunting expense.

Sponsorship is more difficult when the newcomers are older. There is no hope that they will become financially independent. All that they worked for is left behind. What is worst, being sponsored tends to be hard on parents who experience an erosion of dignity "by knowing they are sitting on their children's support."

The difference in exchange rate, and the very high standard of living in Canada makes it very difficult to come to Canada as an immigrant, especially when head-taxes are applied. One young woman—who was employed within weeks after arriving in Ottawa—knows young Jews in her home country who are well qualified but cannot afford the processing fees the government is charging for immigration. She suggests that if the Jewish community wishes to grow that pro-

viding loans for this purpose would be a good investment.

Some feel that there is a need for more staff. More than twice I heard from clients, or sponsors, that it would be beneficial to have a lawyer on staff for assistance in working with the government bureaucracy.

Communities Welcoming Strangers

The newcomers with whom I spoke wish to become part of the Canadian Jewish Community but report varying success in becoming accepted. There is a variety of experience, though most of the comments that I highlight are from Calgary and Winnipeg. In Calgary there is anger about the way the local community treats newcomers. An immigrant summed it with the following recount, "A Calgarian Jew said to me, 'Immigrants will never be accepted or recognised by the longer-term [Jewish] Community." Another said that in Calgary she is made to feel less than others because she does not have a strong religious tradition as do Calgarian Jews. Still another was shocked by how local Jews treat immigrant Jews. "It was very unequal." One person commented that the Jewish community could learn a lot from the Chinese community. "They have real community solidarity. In the Jewish community there is little help given to newcomers by others, especially jobs. As a result newcomers are underemployed."

Similar problems were mentioned in Winnipeg where not the meanness of the local community was mentioned, just the fact that community attention is being diverted from scriptural responsibilities—such as helping the stranger—in favour of building a new campus. Another commented, "We had a good network of friends soon after arriving. The Community helps us not to feel alienated. They are nice and decent." Yet, there is a sentiment, from the same person, that the Jewish community in Winnipeg is not very strong.

Speaking about first arrival in their communities, newcomers spoke of some of the things that happened, and their perceptions. Comments seemed to be filled with the contradictions with which they are faced. A newcomer in Vancouver, for example, questions whether or not the government wants them here? In Winnipeg, a staff person accompanies them to appointments and government offices in the beginning. In Toronto, there is a volunteer program where volunteers play this role. A staff person in Toronto says that they find that this program instigates the concept of voluntarism in the community. In other places newcomers are not accompanied to these initial appointments.

Sometimes it is difficult for the service provider to ensure that all relevant information is conveyed. As a test of clients' knowledge on types of housing, I found that participants rarely knew about co-operatives as a quality type of housing that would also introduce them to long-time Canadians. In Toronto participants did not know about the Metropolitan Toronto Volunteer Bureau which is essential to getting volunteer experience in one's chosen vocational field. In Vancouver a former teacher comments:

> No one told us about a variety of things that we needed to know: how to get on a list for co-op housing, about child benefits; about how to become a substitute teacher and get a teaching certificate.

He had fortunately been able to find these things out himself and is now living in a co-operative while substitute teaching in a local school.

As for other organisations in the community, a lot was said about the synagogues. There tends to be a lack of coordination in a variety of places between synagogues themselves, and family service delivery agencies. Individual synagogues do not work together. Beyond concerns about coordination, there are general concerns in the experience of clients that arise from the expense of being a Jew. When asked about life cycle events, and what these events mean, newcomers embarrassingly comment about their high cost. Further, there is concern about the disparity, or unevenness, in how free space is allocated in synagogues for high holidays.

Generally, the experience of coming to Canada from Eastern Europe is very challenging. "There is a loss of identity when you arrive here. You are nothing", comments a woman in Vancouver. To make things worse, before coming they never realised how tough it is to make a living in Canada. A newcomer from Winnipeg builds on describing this experience and elaborates on the difference between here and there:

> The culture is different here as compared to Eastern Europe. Here it is individualistic, there emphasis is on comrades. Here people let you make mistakes, let you fail. They expect that you will do things for yourself. They feel that it should be no easier here for you than for anybody else. Here people work very hard for their living.

Being involved in community can often make life seem easier. In many places staff estimate that 50 percent of newcomers are getting involved in the Jewish Community. A universal problem, however, is that they do not tend to be giving back to the community through volunteering. Part of the reticence about getting involved has to do with feeling like they do not measure-up religiously. Besides not feeling good about themselves, because they have not received religious training, there is also a myth that it is too late to become more religiously Jewish. A man in Windsor comments, "Some of us did not receive religious training, but it does not matter so much because for us, it is a little too late. It is good for the children."

Conclusion

JIAS is grappling with how to offer services equitably across Canada; a goal attempted only by the federal government. No other non-governmental organisation in Canada comes close to the sophistication and ambition of the Jewish community in its attempt to offer services equitably across the country. This research and that

which precedes it suggests that coming to a stage where a common language exists to assess equity of service is an expensive task that lies ahead.

As a non-Jew looking in on the laws pertinent to treating foreign aliens among the Jewish community, it seems that for what is accomplished in helping newcomers the community should be joyful. The Canadian Jewish community does come up short doctrinally in their exclusive concern for Jewish immigrants. Some effort needs to be made to consider providing for newcomer non-Jews, as well as Jews. This is the Jewish tradition, but has been lost perhaps because of the contemporary situation of Jewish society. Instead of being autonomous, the Jewish community is a subset of a larger Canadian secular society. For this reason, it seems to make some sense to focus only on Jewish newcomers. However, there may be costs to this decision. III

Notes

1. Numbers originate from JIAS national office.
2. Board members from Toronto and Mon treal were not interviewed.

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So That Russia be "Saved"

Anti-Jewish Violence in Russia: Its Roots and Consequences

By Tanya Basok and Alexander B enifand

ToroIltO: York Lanes Press, 1993 ISBNl-55014-01Q-8;8.5x1161p; CON $9.95

The growing popularity of ultra-nationalism and neo-Nazism in Europe and to some extentinNorth America is truly alarming, and this publication offers a perceptive analysis of the political trends in Russia and their implications for Russian Jews. It. provides an historical analysis of anti-Jewish violence in Russia and poses an important question: can those conditions which resulted in anti-Jewish pogroms at the turn of the century re-emerge today?

Dr. Basok and Dr. Benifandarguein this occasional paper that there is a number of clear indications of the popularity of the anti-Semitic and ultranationalistideas notorily among the masses and nationalist organizations but in the government as well.

Many of those who have been impoverished as a result of the "shock therapy" or who have grown extremely disillusioned with Yeltsin' s reform policies, havebecom.eattractedto the solutions such as: getting rid of ethnic minorities, especially Jews, territorial expansion of the Russian federation to include the Jormer Soviet republics, the extension of the Russian sphere of influence in Europe and Central Asia, protection of Russian lands (e.g., the Kurile Islands) and the curbing of ethnic nationalism within the Russian federation. Basok and Benifand's insightful analysis is an excellent attempt to understand the rise of ultra-nationalism in Russia.

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Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Former Yugoslavia in the Light of Dayton and Paris Agreements

Vladimir Grecic

Abstract

This paper provides an overview and assessment of implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreements, particularly the part referring to refugees and internally displaced persons. The establishment of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the Dayton Agreement and the subsequent normalization of life in the former Yugoslavia should create prerequisites for unobstructed return of over 2 million individuals to their homes. Therefore, we will review the number of refugees from the territory of the former Yugoslavia, places of their present residence, their problems and possibilities for their return to areas where they used to live.

Précis

Cet article fournit un aperçu et une évaluation de la mise en place des accords de paix de Dayton, et particulièrement de la partie référant aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays. L'établissement de la paix en Bosnie et en Herzégovine en conformité avec l'accord de Dayton, et la normalisation de la vie en ex-Yougoslavie y faisant suite, devraient créer les conditions préalables pour le retour sans encombre de plus de 2 millions d'individus vers leurs foyers. Conséquemment, nous allons passer en revue le nombre de réfugiés éparpillés sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie, le lieu de leur résidence actuelle, les conditions favorables et défavorables à leur retour vers les zones où ils vivaient auparavant.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be interpreted as those of the staff of Refuge.

Introduction

The territory of the former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, is one of the most complex regions in Europe, from which vast numbers of population in recent years had to flee and seek refuge somewhere else. UNHCR assesses that in early 1996, over 2.6 million persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina lived away from their homes. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) numbered 1,282,257, in addition to 661,473 in other states of the former Yugoslavia and 697,198 outside former Yugoslavia. It is worth noting that people also fled from other newly founded states in ex-Yugoslav territory, above all from the Republic of Croatia. Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the refugees' territory of origin, occupied in mid-1990s the 4th place in the world (after Palestine, Afghanistan and Rwanda) in terms of the number of refugees and displaced persons, and complexity of ensuing problems.[1]

However, in this paper we will not deal separately with causes of contemporary refugee problem in ex-Yugoslavia, at least for two reasons. Firstly, the roots of the Yugoslav crisis, which lasted for about six years, were the topic of many books, studies and articles.[2] They mainly explain the origin of ethnic conflicts, civil war and forceful population movement from their hearths. The civil war, no doubt, was caused by internal, as well as external factors.[3] Secondly, from such a short historical distance and while the actors of the Yugoslav drama are still in power, the share of foreign factors cannot be strictly determined yet. It will be possible from a longer historic distance, when stenographic notes become available to researchers. Given the nature of existing data on the causes of the crises, we will review the number of refugees from the territory of the former Yugoslavia, their present residence, their problems, and possibilities for their return to areas where they used to live.

The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in Paris, on 14 December 1995. Annex 7 of that agreement envisages that UNHCR should promote voluntary return for all those who wish to return to the region they fled from, but also for those refugees and displaced persons from ex-Yugoslavia who would like to find another permanent solution somewhere else, in some other community, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia or outside it. Permanent solutions will therefore develop on the basis of refugees' intentions and political reality in the country of displacement, country of return, or country of exile.

Dimensions of the Problem

As already mentioned, over 2.6 million inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina were externally and internally displaced by the civil war. The majority were internally displaced (see Table 1).

A major exodus from the Republic of Croatia also took place in August 1995. With the aggression on newly-founded Republic of Serb Krajina (operations "Lightning" and "Storm"), the Republic of Croatia expelled almost all Serbs from Krajina. Out of 200,000 Serbs who lived there before the Croatian aggression, only an estimated 5,000 remained.[4]

The reasons for escape are numerous and not mutually exclusive. Families surveyed in 1993 in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) mentioned most frequently the following main reasons for leaving their homes:

- threat of war,
- fear and insecurity,
- threats of enemies or hostile population in the neighbourhood,

Table 1: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Refugees/Displaced Persons, 1996

Refugees	Total	1996 Movement
Europe and Other Countries	697,198*	200,000*
Neighbouring Countries (FY)		
Croatia	185,669	80,000*
FRY	450,000*	80,000*
Slovenia	18,804	8,000*
FYROM	7,000*	4,000*
(FY Subtotal)	661,473*	172,000*
Internally Displaced Persons	1,282,257*	500,000*
Total	2,640,928	872,000

* Estimates

Source: UNHCR, March 1996.

- expulsion by the enemy, destruction of property, physical and psychological harassment, and
- death or wounding of family member.[5]

The dimension of problems facing the refugees is significant. Refugees' living conditions were poor in almost all the states of the former Yugoslavia. In FRY, 73.3 percent of refugees have stayed with families (relatives, friends, unknown humane people), 21.5 percent in rented quarters and 5.2 percent in collective shelters (schools, kindergartens, hospitals, military barracks). Due to the war, economic and political problems and effects of UN Sanctions against FRY, the living standard is low. Thus, refugees shared the fate of population in FRY.

Permanent Solution of Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Problem in the Light of the Peace Agreement

In accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement, the UNHCR plan envisages repatriation of over two million refugees and internally displaced persons, currently living in various parts of the former Yugoslavia or abroad, particularly in Western Europe.

The repatriation plan has three stages. The first one anticipates the return of nearly 1.3 million displaced persons currently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, encompassing:

- 250,000 in the Banjaluka region,
- 45,454 in the Bihac region,
- 265,000 in eastern Bosnia,
- 93,379 in Sarajevo,
- 100,622 in southern Bosnia (Herzegovina),
- 288,890 in the Tuzla region, and
- 241,912 in the Zenica region.

In the second stage, UNHCR should organize the return of some 661,473 refugees who fled to FR Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia.

According to UNHCR data, there are 566,000 refugees in the FRY (28,000 in Montenegro and 538,000 in Serbia). Of these refugees, some 253,000 are from Bosnia and Herzegovina (of whom 50,000 originate from the territory of what is now Republika Srpska and 203,000 from the Federation) and 298,000 are from Croatia and 15,000 are from other republics of the former Yugoslavia.

According to the latest UNHCR data, there are 160,000 refugees in the Republic of Croatia: 85,000 from the Bosnian Federation (85% Croats, 15% of other nationalities) and 75,000 from Republika Srpska (85% Croats, 15% of other nationalities), 10,420 in Slovenia (mainly Muslims) and 5,000 in Macedonia (mainly Muslims).

In the third stage, according to UNHCR data, about 700,000 refugees from ex-Yugoslavia should return from Western European countries.

The entire operation, according to UNHCR estimates, would cost some U.S.$ 500 million. Repatriation of refugees is planned to be carried out with the participation of International Organization for Migrations (IOM), the Red Cross and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

IFOR has managed to restore peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and made it possible for humanitarian organizations to continue their care for internally displaced persons and refugees. IFOR has also been in charge of providing conditions for general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Together with the Bosnian-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska, UNHCR worked out the Program of Support for Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a strategic and operative planning of framework allowing UNHCR to efficiently and spontaneously respond to issues raised in connection with organized return of refugees and IDPs to areas where they formerly lived. The program is set flexibly, counting on voluntary decision of concerned persons to return to the territory of their origin.

In 1996 UNHCR planned to return up to 500,000 displaced persons and 370,000 refugees.

Positive Post-Dayton Developments

After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended. Humanitarian aid started to reach all areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina where displaced persons found refuge. With

Table 2: Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Host Countries (Situation as of 1 March 1997)

Current location	Durable and other solutions*	Persons still without durable solutions	Projected numbers of returnees 1997**
Austria	69,000	11,012	4,000
Belgium	175	5,709	500
Croatia	128,000	160,000	30,000
Czech Republic	4,510	850	1,000
Denmark	20,900	1,910	2,500
Finland	1,350	—	—
France	7,600	7,400	n/a
FRY	n/a	253,377	37,000
FYROM	2,210	5,000	5,000
Germany	30,000	315,000	100,000
Greece	3,750	250	n/a
Hungary	1,600	1,600	1,280
Italy	n/a	8,430	1,000
Liechtenstein	159	237	n/a
Luxembourg	1,350	466	n/a
Netherlands	17,500	6,000	3,000
Norway	12,000	—	2,000
Slovak Republic	2,138	262	231
Slovenia	25,000	8,370	3,100
Spain	n/a	2,000	n/a
Sweden	61,630	1,900	2,000
Switzerland	7,100	19,567	8,000
Turkey	2,200	1,800	n/a
United Kingdom	1,400	4,600	n/a
Subtotal	399,572	815,740	200,611
Australia	24,000 ***	0	0
Canada	38,000	0	0
Ireland	748	19	n/a
New Zealand	143	0	0
USA	38,000	0	0

* Humanitarian status; other resident status; resettlement; repatriation.

** These figures are based on projections made available by countries hosting refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

*** As at 31 December 1996.

Source: Humanitarian Issues Working Group, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Repatriation and Return Operation 1997*, UNHCR, Geneva, April 1997, 5.

the assistance of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), parliamentary elections have been organized, as well as participation of refugees in them. Diplomatic relations have been established between FR Yugoslavia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), as well as between FRY and Republic of Croatia, while negotiations are under way between FR Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and between FRY and Republic of Slovenia. According to UNHCR data, some 88,000 refugees and displaced persons returned to their homes (Table 3), which is far below the planned number.

According to the UNHCR, more than 1.2 million Bosnians sought refuge in neighbouring countries and further afield during the war years. Some 399,000 of them have already found a durable solution, have been granted a more permanent status or are in the process of acquiring new citizenships. Within this group, as noted above, 88,000 have actually repatriated to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the course of 1996. The remaining 815,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina are still in need of durable solutions.

Also, Croatian refugees in FRY are expected to repatriate voluntarily during 1997–98. UNHCR and the federal authorities of FRY believe that the primary and best solution for refugees is voluntary repatriation. Such repatriation will take place in the framework of the Normalization Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and FRY, as well as any additional agreements which may be concluded in the framework of tripartite discussions on repatriation with UNHCR. It is expected that an 60,000 Croats who fled Eastern Slavonia to other parts of Croatia will return to Eastern Slavonia or to locally integrate in other parts of Croatia.

Over 30 percent of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been displaced internally as a consequence of the war. According to UNHCR statistics, some 102,363 internally displaced persons, composed mainly of Muslims and some Croats, returned to their places of origin in the Federation territory and 61,854 in Republika Srpska, during 1996. In Republika Srpska, the authorities now estimate the number of internally displaced persons at 416,000. In the Federation, the authorities and UNHCR have agreed to use a working figure of 450,000 as a reliable estimate of the present situation.

Table 3: Summary of Organized and Spontaneous Repatriation to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 (Repatriation from Asylum Countries)

Federation	Organized	Spontaneous	Total
Una-Sana	12,168	10,717	22,885
Posavina	88	8,344	8,432
Tuzla-Podrinje	1,825	3,870	5,695
Zenica-Doboj	1,297	1,599	2,896
Gorazde	246	436	682
Central Bosnia	384	1,618	2,002
Neretva	761	0	761
West-Herzegovina	6	0	6
Sarajevo	3,857	25,143	29,000
Tomislavgrad	20	4,904	4,924
Unknown destination	2,831	0	2,831
Subtotal	23,483	56,631	80,114
Republika Srpska	0	7,925	7,925
Total	23,483	64,556	88,039

Source: Humanitarian Issues Working Group, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Repatriation and Return Operation 1997*, UNHCR, Geneva, April 1997, 36.

The implementation of Re-admission Agreements with Germany and Switzerland for returning rejected-asylum seekers in Germany (up to 120,000 Yugoslavs, mostly Kosmet Albanians) and Switzerland (some 11,000 rejected asylum-seekers, mostly ethnic Albanians) to FRY was not carried out as expected. The reason is attributable to the unfavourable economic and political situation in FRY, especially in the provinces of Kosovo and Metohija.

Negative Tendencies—Obstacles to Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Those involved in the resolution of refugee problems encountered a host of negative tendencies. Resistance of nationalist forces is still strong. This resistance is particularly obvious in matters such as citizenship (Republic of Croatia), ownership rights and general amnesty.

After operations "Lightning" and "Storm" in 1995, Croatia passed laws and by-laws in contradiction even of the state's Constitution. Thus, the government ruling on temporary appropriation and management of certain property of refugees (31 August 1995), which was later transformed into the law (Parliament decision of 20 September 1995) is a unique act of the state which takes possession of the property

Table 4: Main Majority Destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 1997*

Federation Cantons	Returnees	Percent
Una Sana	27,000	16.90
Posavina	12,000	6.30
Tuzla-Podrinje	23,000	14.40
Zenica Doboj	16,500	9.40
Gorazde	2,000	1.20
Central Bosnia	16,000	8.80
Neretva	14,500	8.10
West Herzegovina	1,000	0.60
Sarajevo	43,000	31.20
Tomislavgrad	5,000	3.10
Subtotal	160,000	100.00
Republika Srpska Regions	**Returnees**	**Percent**
Banja Luka	17,000	42.50
Bijeljina	3,500	8.70
Doboj	6,000	15.00
Sokolac	1,500	3.70
Srbinje	2,500	6.30
Trebinje	1,500	3.80
Vlasenica	8,000	20.00
Subtotal	40,000	100.00
Total	200,0000	

* The indicated Cantons in Federation and Regions in Republika Srpska comprise a number of municipalities.

Source: Humanitarian Issues Working Group, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Repatriation and Return Operation 1997*, UNHCR, Geneva, April 1997, 8.

in a way which is nothing but pure confiscation. Furthermore, Croatia applied selective approach to the Amnesty Act, in awarding citizenship and personal documents. Members of other nations are also subject to various other pressures with the aim of maintaining "ethnically pure territory."

Besides, conditions for repatriation are either poor or lacking altogether. During the four-year war Bosnia-Herzegovina was heavily destroyed. Houses have been demolished, economic facilities ruined, livestock population exterminated. Many people, both from the country and from the cities, have no place to return to.

One of the biggest problems is regaining confidence. Without absolute trust and security in the protection of human rights, ethnic and religious freedoms, refugees are unlikely to decide to return.

Vital Prerequisites for Repatriation of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

The breakup of SFRY and armed conflicts which inflicted two republics of the former Yugoslavia, disturbed the life of nearly ten million persons. Family relations became complicated, many marriages have been destroyed, relations between parents and children have been hampered, etc. The health situation in the region worsened. Besides forced migrations, voluntary migrations increased as well. In addition, refugees have not been treated equally in all states of the former Yugoslavia.

There are two critical problems faced by those who decided to remain in the state where they sought refuge, concretely in FRY—employment and housing. During the Yugoslav crisis, compatriots abroad showed great understanding for refugees and provided valuable aid. Emigrants have financed housing construction for their refugee relatives and friends in FRY. They have also made direct investments in the Yugoslav economy to create new jobs. With some aid from abroad, refugees started to organize business life. In the past four-year period, refugees founded over 3,500 enterprises in Serbia.[6]

Certain conditions must be met for the return of refugees, above all personal security and respect of human rights. Restriction of the right to move within Bosnia-Herzegovina impedes or discourages this process. Provocations have harmed the establishment of mutual confidence. The Peace Agreement envisages Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state with extreme independence of entities. Citizens will possess documents issued according to the records of respective ministries of interior affairs. Passports will bear the name of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with

an indication "Republika Srpska" or "Federation."

In sum, implementation of plans for repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons largely depends on security, i.e. making sure that lives of returnees are not threatened; on the pace of repair and construction of living quarters for refugees; on the pace of mine and ground clearing in the areas where refugees will settle.

As the war which erupted with the disintegration of Yugoslavia exacerbated decades old ethnic and political tensions inherent in the countries of the region, repatriation must be voluntary and gradual. It is extremely difficult to achieve trust and peace in a poor society with people who have been indoctrinated, and it is even more difficult to build a civil society. As a policy option, "sticks" that the international community has used directly or indirectly (that is, economic sanctions) should be replaced with "carrots." The doors of international economic, trade, financial, and other organizations should be opened as part of a larger program of active and direct assistance to establish democracy in the tormented Balkan region. According to the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), a plethora of initiatives have been conceived by the international community in attempts to abate hostilities and foster a spirit of peace and cooperation in Southeast Europe.

Conclusion

Refugees should not be the subject of political manipulation, and their choice whether to stay in exile or return to the native country must be made without undue pressure, based on realistic evaluations and adequate guarantees.

Parties which fought in the civil war for five years would have to show their earnest political will and readiness to carry out the plans for return of refugees and displaced persons. They should pass and fully observe general amnesty laws, with the exception of war crimes.

The international community should have to support all aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which stipulates necessary material aid for its full implementation. The success of each separate annex to the Peace Agreement will, no doubt, affect the implementation of Annex 7, referring to return of refugees and displaced persons.

Even with full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, some refugees will not want or could not return to areas which they had to leave. The international community has to facilitate possible and assist their integration in exile countries.

Since repatriation of refugees is not proceeding according to the plan, nor quite in conformity with the principles of the Dayton Peace Agreement, remedial action must be considered. Perhaps an international conference on return of refugees and economic recovery of the region may stimulate such activity. ■

Notes

1. *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1997* (New Jersey: Mahwah, 1997), 840.
2. For example, see Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bond: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, 2nd ed., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, 1995); Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Lord David Owen, *The Balkan Odyssey* (London: VictorGollantz, 1995), Predrag Simic, "Dynamics of the Yugoslav," *Crisis Security Dialogue* (Oslo), 1996, Vol. 26, no. 2; Milan Sahovic (ed.), *Medjunarodno pravo i jugoslovenska kriza* (Beograd: Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu, 1995); and others.
3. Due to the rise of Croatian, Serbian and Muslim nationalisms, as well as traditional interests of superpowers and many neighbouring states, the former Yugoslavia has been a source of instability and political turmoil for six years now. The end of the Cold War has raised important questions about the future role of the United States and Russia in Yugoslavia. During the Cold War, the Balkan region has been considered a strategic pawn in the political struggle for influence between the two superpowers. With the end of the Cold War, both powers initially appeared to have lost interest in the area. Indeed, the most striking aspect of the initial phases of the Yugoslav crisis is the marginal role played by the two superpowers. Both preferred to sit back and let the Europeans manage the crisis. The results were poor. The Yugoslav crisis has highlighted the weaknesses of the current security institutions (CSCE—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union) to deal with these new nationalistic threats. (F. Stephen Larrabee, ed., *The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security after the Cold War*. Washington, DC: American University Press, xxv).
4. *Report of the EU Inquest Commission; Bulletin*, July–September 1995, Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia.
5. *Porodice izbeglica u Jugoslaviji* [Refugee Families in Yugoslavia], UNHCR & Institute for Social Policy, Belgrade, 1993, 21.
6. "Digest Response," *Weekly for Refugees and Civil Society*, no. 13, April 1996.

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Asylum: A Moral Dilemma

By W. Gunther Plaut

Toronto: York Lanes Press, ISBN 1-55014-239-9; 192 pages, indexed; $19.90.

Every year the refugee landscape changes, but only in that more problems are added, fewer are solved, and all become constantly more urgent. Fuelled by the explosion of the world's popwation, the quest for asylum is one of the most pressing problems of our age. Refugee-receiving nations-located frequently, butbyno me.ans exclusively, in the Western world-have to respond to masses of humanity searching for new livable homes, Human compassion for these refugees can be found everywhere, but so can xenophobia and the desire to preserve one's nation, economic well being, and cultural integrity. The dash between these impulses represents one of the great dilemmas of our time and is the subject of Plaut's study. In exploring it, he provides a far-ranging inquiry into the human condition.

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Asylum-A Moral Dilemma is simultaneously published in the United States by Praeger Publishers, andin Canada by York Lanes Press.

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Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1993, ISBN 1-55014-232-1, 117 pages, $6.99

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Hong Kong and the Indo-Chinese Refugees: Reflections on the International Refugee Environment

Alex Cunliffe

Abstract

The plight of the Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong in recent decades has brought into sharp relief the changing character of the international refugee political environment. Over the last twenty years asylum seekers from Vietnam arriving in the former colony have experienced a dramatic change in their reception, treatment and fortunes. For many academic observers, this has highlighted the problems facing the major actors, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), within the international refugee regime. This short article highlights this metamorphosis and illustrates that the refugee issue remains unresolved in Hong Kong despite the recent handover to Beijing.

Précis

La situation difficile des Boat Peoples vietnamiens à Hong Kong dans les dernières décennies a jeté une lumière crue sur la caractère changeant de l'environnement politique des réfugiés internationaux. Au cours des vingt dernières années les demandeurs d'asile politique originaires du Vietnam débarquant dans l'ancienne colonie britannique ont vu la réception leur étant faite se modifier dramatiquement. Il en est autant de la façon dont on les traite et des opportunités qui leur sont allouées. Pour les observateurs du champ académique, ces faits ont mis en relief les problèmes auxquels font face les principaux intervenants, y compris le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, dans le cadre du régime international pour les réfugiés. Ce court article décrit cette métamorphose et illustre le fait que la question des réfugiés demeure irrésolue en dépit de la récente rétrocession de Hong Kong à la Chine.

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Introduction

On July 1, 1997, the British formally handed Hong Kong over to the Chinese Government. In the months leading up to the handover, a substantial amount of academic analysis and media attention focused upon the implications of decolonization for the indigenous Chinese community in Hong Kong.[1] However, by March of the same year, barely three months before Beijing took control, there were still 5,000 Indo-Chinese asylum seekers registered in UNHCR camps in Hong Kong. The plight of these people, sometimes referred to as "Vietnamese Boat People," should also have been cause for international concern. The Beijing Government made no secret of its desire not to inherit a refugee presence in Hong Kong. In 1995, Mr. Cheng Shousan, the Beijing Minister of Foreign Affairs Division Chief for Hong Kong and Macau, announced that immediately after the handover of sovereignty, Hong Kong would cease to offer port of first asylum status. As of July 1997, the UNHCR reported that there were still 1,318 Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong, of whom only 260 are under consideration for resettlement in third countries. In addition, there are 195 Vietnamese nationals who have been denied refugee status and a further 512 people who are recognized neither as refugees nor as Vietnamese nationals by the Vietnamese Government.[2] Thus, although it is over twenty years since the end of the Vietnam War, the international refugee community has still not resolved the issues created by the Vietnamese Boat People (VBP) and their search for political asylum.

As many observers are aware, the international treatment of refugees has undergone a dramatic metamorphosis over the last four decades.[3] In large part, this appears to be a reaction to the changing nationality of the refugee population whose contemporary origins spring primarily from the less developed world. Of the three durable solutions to refugee movements presented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—namely integration, voluntary repatriation and resettlement—it would appear that repatriation (including mandatory repatriation) is the internationally preferred option. A brief examination of the fortunes of the Boat People arriving in Hong Kong since 1979 provides an interesting illustration of this changing political environment.

Hong Kong and the Vietnamese Boat People

In 1979, at the United Nations Conference on Vietnamese Boat People in Geneva, the British Government announced that Hong Kong would act as a port of first asylum for all asylum seekers from Vietnam. The "Boat People" were to be treated in a relatively liberal fashion and those arriving in the colony during the late 1970s and early 1980s were granted the status of "mandate refugees." This involved accommodation in Open Camps such as the Kai Tak Transit Centre in Kowloon and Pillar Point in the New Territories and the opportunity to take up employment in the colony. More importantly during these years, the UNHCR and the wider international refugee community were largely successful in obtaining international resettlement destinations for the Boat People based in Hong Kong. In the years up to 1982, over 95,000 VBP were resettled in countries such as the United States (45,733) Canada (14,507) and the United Kingdom (11,989). This represented a resettlement rate of almost 92

percent of those arriving in Hong Kong during these early years of flight from Vietnam.

"Humane Deterrence"

However, as the 1980s progressed, London and Hong Kong were becoming increasingly reactionary in their attitude towards asylum seekers from the less developed world. At a time when Chinese migrants from the mainland were being forcibly expelled, the indigenous community in Hong Kong began to perceive an injustice in the refugee status being accorded to the Vietnamese arrivals. Moreover, the West in general was exhibiting a less welcoming attitude towards refugee movements from the Third World who were not perceived to be of strategic or political value. On 2 July 1982, the Hong Kong Government abandoned the automatic process of housing new arrivals of VBP in open centres and introduced a more restrictive closed camp policy. From that date, Indo-Chinese asylum seekers arriving in Hong Kong were detained in closed camps like Whitehead which were administered by the Correctional Services Department. This more restrictive move was seen part of a policy of "humane deterrence."

In the short term, there was a decline in the number of arrivals from Vietnam. The "sailing season" of 1981 had witnessed 11,886 arrivals whilst the equivalent figure for 1985 was 1,167. However, this did not result in a long term resolution to the size of the refugee population in the colony. From 1982, the UNHCR found it increasingly difficult to maintain a robust resettlement program. For example, the number of refugees departing the colony for permanent destinations such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom dropped from 37,468 in 1980 to 4,754 in 1989. As a result, by the end of the decade when the arrivals of VBP began to increase yet again, the refugee population in Hong Kong had not declined substantially. By 1989 there were in excess of 56,000 Indo-Chinese asylum seekers based in the colony.

Repatriation and Screening

The failure of the closed camps policy to deter the flow of VBP resulted in an even more reactionary program in the colony. It was a program which began to place much more emphasis upon the need for repatriation of asylum seekers rather than resettlement. In 1988, a *Status Determination Procedure* was introduced whereby all VBP arriving in the colony after 16 June would be treated as illegal immigrants pending a screening procedure designed to challenge their claim for refugee status.

Justification for the introduction of this relatively restrictive policy focused upon the "changing characteristics" of the new Indo-Chinese arrivals:

> Almost all the arrivals in the 1980s have been ethnic Vietnamese. In 1979 only 27% of arrivals were Vietnamese and the rest were Chinese. Since 1980 the balance between north and south Vietnamese has also changed with the proportion of northerners steadily increasing. In 1984, 28% came from the northern part of Vietnam, in 1985 the proportion was 37%, 53% in 1986 and the figure was 70% in 1987. The proportion of northerners has increased to 72.2% during 1988 and the available evidence suggests that most have left Vietnam for economic reasons.[4]

In this respect, the British Government deemed that VBP arriving in Hong Kong after 16 June 1988, tended not to be motivated by political or racial persecution and therefore were unlikely to qualify as genuine refugees under the terms of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol on the status of refugees. From the outset, this screening procedure was very successful in denying refugee status. Within the first two years, over 17,000 Boat People in Hong Kong were "screened out." Furthermore, following an International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees in June 1989, the UNHCR agreed to organize a "Voluntary Repatriation Program" as part of the Comprehensive Plan of Action. The "voluntary" nature of the program was boosted by offering financial allowances to the returnee (initially $50) and over 26,000, including over 18,000 who did not undergo the screening process, had been repatriated under this program by January 1993. In order to deal with those VBP who do not wish to return voluntarily, and for those "double-backers" who had gone to Vietnam under the voluntary scheme and then returned to the colony, the United Kingdom, the Hong Kong and Vietnamese Governments, the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration signed a Statement of Understanding on 29 October 1991. This agreement provided the basis for the Orderly Departure Program which is now the program under which Hong Kong's remaining "illegal immigrants" are being repatriated.

Summary

The manner in which Britain and Hong Kong transformed their policies towards the Vietnamese Boat People in the colony reflects in many ways the changing character of the international refugee environment. In the years up until 1982, the British Government laid claim to a liberal humanitarian tradition by offering Hong Kong as a place of first asylum. However, as the 1980s progressed, reaction to increasing numbers of asylum seekers from the less developed world became more hostile. The introduction of the Closed Centre policy of 1982 and the Status Determination Procedure in June 1988 reflected a growing opposition to refugee movements, whilst the signing of the Comprehensive Plan of Action implemented a preference for the repatriation of refugees. Similarly, in general terms, the Western world has become less willing to accept a large-scale resettlement program and the reaction to a burgeoning refugee population appears to promote repatriation as the durable solution. In a post-Cold War environment when claims for refugee status spring mainly from third world crises, western policies towards asylum seekers appear to be more illiberal, and the capacity of the UNHCR to continue to promote dura-

ble solutions other than repatriation becomes more circumspect.

It is interesting to note that, in Hong Kong the UNHCR has allowed itself to become a signatory to many of the policy changes. The UNHCR was unable either to prevent the introduction of the closed camp policy and the screening process or to introduce a more comprehensive resettlement program for the Boat People. More importantly, its role in the development of Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Orderly Return Program reflects the contemporary overwhelming preference of the international community for repatriation as a durable solution to refugee movements. ■

Notes

1. See, for example, J. Y. S. Cheng and P. C. K. Kwong, eds., *The Other Hong Kong Report*, Annual Publications (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Chinese University Press).
2. Statistical information provided by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Statistics of Indo-Chinese Refugees/Asylum Seekers, Hong Kong Caseload," UNHCR, Geneva.
3. For an examination of the changing character of international refugee political environments, see for example, G. Loescher, ed., *The Question of Refugees in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); B. Harrell-Bond, "Repatriation: Under What Conditions is it the Most Desirable Solution for Refugees? An Agenda for Research," *African Studies Review*, no. 32 (1989): 41–68.
4. *Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong (Fact Sheet)*, Hong Kong Government, Refugees Division, Security Branch, August 1989. □

Human Rights, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: The UN Commission on Human Rights

Tim Wichert

Abstract

This article argues that protecting refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is an issue of universal human rights. It then suggests the urgent need for the UN Commission on Human Rights, working in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and member states of the United Nations, to play more important roles in protecting and enhancing human rights. It also stresses the importance of appropriate follow-up to the calls for more commitment and better actions in this area.

Précis

Cet article présente une argumentation selon laquelle la protection des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées en deçà des limites d'un territoire national est une question de droits humains universels. Il signale aussi le besoin urgent pour la Commission des droits de la Personne en collaboration avec le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies aux réfugiés et les états membres des Nations Unies, de jouer un rôle accru dans la protection et la valorisation des droits humains. L'article signale aussi l'importance du suivi adéquat de tout appel pour une implication plus assidue et des actions plus définies dans ce domaine.

The UN Commission on Human Rights, which meets each spring in Geneva, provides one of the few opportunities within the UN system for formally linking refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) with human rights. It focuses on the abuse of human rights as a cause of forced displacement, and on the human rights of refugees and IDPs themselves. Of particular importance are the resolutions on Mass Exoduses and IDPs, and the statement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The Commission resolution entitled "Human Rights and Mass Exoduses," first introduced by Canada in 1980, has traditionally embodied refugee issues. It has consistently reiterated the UN General Assembly resolution 41/70 of December 1986, calling upon all States to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms and to refrain from denying these to individuals in their population because of nationality, ethnicity, race, religion or language. In 1996, the Commission added gender to this list.

This year, much stronger human rights language was added, in particular stressing the principle of *non-refoulement* and gender-specific violations of human rights. A new paragraph expresses "distress" at the "widespread violation of the principle of *non-refoulement* and the rights of refugees." Another new paragraph emphasizes the responsibility of all States and international organizations to cooperate with those countries actually affected by mass exoduses. This is the language of "international solidarity and burden-sharing" which the UNHCR Executive Committee is using as well. Finally, another new paragraph welcomes the work of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in creating an environment viable for return in post-conflict societies, noting initiatives such as rehabilitation of justice systems, creating national human rights institutions, human rights education, and strengthening local NGOs.

IDPs were first dealt with substantively by the Commission in 1991, and in 1992 the Commission requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Representative for IDPs. As a result of the work of the Representative, Dr. Francis Deng, international awareness of the existence of IDPs has increased substantially.

The Commission resolution on "Internally Displaced Persons" continues to be the main focal point for IDP work within the UN system. Last year Deng submitted a significant *Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms*,[1] and the Commission this year called for its "rapid" publication in all the UN's working languages.[2] Deng is in the midst of preparing "Guiding Principles" for IDPs based on the Compilation, which the Commission continues to encourage. And he has visited 12 countries to date to look at internal displacement. In 1997, the Commission as boldly as possible called upon those Governments with IDPs which have not asked for or allowed a visit by Deng to do so.

This year's statement by Sadaka Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,[3] was particularly strong on refugee protection. She emphasized that "the system of refugee protection fits into, supports and is indeed an indispensable part of the global human rights regime." She went on to say that as long as people cannot have their basic human rights protected in their own country, as long as their "right to remain" cannot be guaranteed, asylum remains the most effective means for protection.

There are other Commission resolutions and reports which link refugees, IDPs and human rights. Russia introduced a new resolution on the arbitrary deprivation of nationality, a key issue in the republics of the former Soviet Union. There are country specific situations such as Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Sudan, Myanmar and Afghanistan, as well as thematic issues such as torture, violence against women, and extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions. These can be very useful for advocacy and as

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sources of information, in particular because all relevant rapporteurs, working groups, experts and treaty bodies are called upon to pay particular attention to issues of both mass exoduses and internal displacement.

To some extent therefore, issues relating to refugees and displaced have become "mainstreamed" within the Commission. In order for the link with human rights to become stronger, there must be appropriate follow-up to the calls for action.

UNHCR is well-placed to do this, as the international guardian of the human rights of refugees. But it actually provides no follow-up system, and often needs to be reminded itself that refugee protection is based on human rights. The UN Refugee Convention requires reporting about implementation of the Convention and other legislation aimed at ensuring human rights standards for refugees, but there has been little commitment by either UNHCR or States to follow through. As a result, the Commission "encourages" greater commitment to these reporting procedures.

The Commission could enhance the work of both UNHCR and the Representative on IDPs by focusing its attention on issues of "forced displacement," rather than dividing its attention between mass exoduses and internally displaced. Through a combined resolution, a new Special Repre
sentative could provide a high-level focal point within the human rights system able to engage in the requisite political discussions. Such a person could also urge UNHCR to enhance its contribution to the Commission's human rights mechanisms, and to ensure
further that UNHCR's actions are in line with its rhetoric.

The UN Centre for Human Rights must strengthen its follow-up programs. If they can prevent the violation of human rights which cause refugee movements, through monitoring or more broadly through human rights development and rehabilitation initiatives, then they would be seen as a more relevant actor.

Finally, NGOs and other refugee advocates must see the potential of such UN processes, and be prepared to participate. Written and oral submissions can be made, and there are numerous opportunities for personal advocacy. Further, the resolution on Mass Exoduses calls for NGOs to provide information for the annual report on Mass Exoduses prepared by the High Commissioner for Human Rights.4 Invariably, NGOs are the ones that not only raise important concerns in the first place, but also try to ensure that Governments and UN agencies put into practice what they preach.slD

Notes

1. UN Doc. No. E/CN.4/1996/52/ Add.2. 2. Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Span ish, Russian.
3. Statement given 1 April 1997. Available at http://www.unhcr.ch or http:/ / www.unhchr.ch. which are respectively the Internet sites of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
4. This year's report was UN Doc. No. E/ CN.4/1997/42. CI
5. For the 1997 Commission on Human Rights, the Quaker UN Office prepared a written statement on mass exoduses, another on internally displaced persons, and an oral statement entitled "Human Rights, Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons: Seven Practical Steps." CI

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