CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGE

SPECIAL ISSUE ON RESETTLEMENT IN ISRAEL

Refugee Settlement and Resettlement in Israel

Settlement and resettlement of refugees in Israel has been a function of waves of forced migration. In the early 1930s, at a time when Jews could still flee Nazi Germany, waves of migrants made their way to Israel, then called Palestine. Britain, which ruled over Palestine, had only a small quota for visas, however, and in practice refused visa entry to many would-be immigrants in the late 1930s and the 1940s; this led to illegal migration that continued until Israel became a state in 1948.

In the first several years of its existence, Israel absorbed more than one million refugees, Arab Jews (Jewish migrants from neighbouring Arab countries) as well as American and European Jews (Lova Eliav). The melting pot process was slow, but although many mistakes were committed, there was a genuine attempt to absorb all refugees. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s the problem of Arab refugees, Palestinians and Bedouins, attracted international attention (Abu-Rabia, and Bligh). The problem of integrating the most recent large wave of refugees (Jews from the former Soviet Union) is discussed by Shuval. Significant atten-

tion is also given to psychological aspects of integration, an issue which the Israeli experience may help to illuminate. However, cultural, political, and national differences have also played an important role in the integration process. In the 1950s, problems of integration stemming from cultural and political discrimination, particularly against Arab Jews, were commonplace in Israel, but such problems have since

been overcome, and now play only a minor part in the culture. The richness and plurality of the Israeli experience can serve as series of lessons in integration policy.

This collection of articles touches upon potential further areas of research, such as the settlement of Arab Jewish refugees in Israel, resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Israel, resettlement of Palestinians in the context

of the Peace Accord, settlement of Ethiopian refugees in Israel, settlement of World War II refugees in Israel, and cultural conflict and integration problems in refugee resettlement.

Fifty years of Israeli experience on refugee settlement and resettlement is unique in the post-World War II society—and a perspective on it is bound to enrich the study of resettlement of refugees.

Absalom M. Adam, Ph.D., is a researcher at the Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Geneva University, Switzerland.

Resettlement of Russian Immigrants in Israel: 1989-93

Judith T. Shuval

The Meaning of Immigration in Israeli Society

Immigration has been an ongoing process in Israel during its entire history, including the period predating independence. It is of central significance that one of the first legislative acts passed by the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) after the declaration of independence in 1948 was the Law of Return, which stated that every Jew has the right to immigrate and settle in Israel. This formal open-door policy accepts virtually all Jewish immigrants and views their arrival as a symbolic reaffirmation of the fundamental raison d'être of the society.

Pragmatic considerations of economic need, job availability, or physical fitness have not served, as in other countries, as criteria for admission. The "ingathering of the exiles," defined as the acceptance and integration of Jewish immigrants who may be forced to immigrate or who freely opt to come, continues to represent one of the cardinal values of Israeli society, which has allocated major resources to the absorption process. In addition to the ideological commitment, immigration has been seen as fulfilling the need to augment the population in order to strengthen the economic and social foundations of the society.

The assumption has been that the society and its economic structure must be adapted to the economic and social needs of the immigrants rather than the reverse. In fact, a variety of publicly sponsored intervention programs and benefits are offered to promote immigrants' entry into the society. These include language courses, hostels for immediate housing, tax breaks, import privileges,

Professor Judith T. Shuval is attached to the Faculty of Sociology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.

rental subsidies, housing mortgages at favourable rates, and small business loans on preferential terms.

There have been periodic protests regarding the priority in allocation of resources to immigrants by various deprived groups in the society: slum dwellers, disabled persons, veteran soldiers, and young couples. But none has changed the basic priority that has been accorded to admission of immigrants and the national commitment to their needs.

Motives and Background of Russian Immigrants

In recent years, there have been two major waves of immigration from Russia to Israel. During the 1970s, when the Soviet regime was still in its prime, some 137,000 Jews left the Soviet Union to settle in Israel. Between 1989 and 1993—after the collapse of the Soviet Union—over three times that number, 450,000, arrived in Israel. While the background, motives, and social and political circumstances of the two waves of immigration differ, they are not unrelated. This paper focuses on the more recent group of immigrants but will refer briefly to the earlier settlers as well. (For research on immigration from the Soviet Union in the 1970s, see Friedgut 1984; Gitelman 1982, 1985; Horowitz 1986, 1989; Ofer and Vinokur 1989; Shuval 1983, 1984, 1985; and Simon 1985.)

The most recent wave of immigration began in 1989 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, against a background of glasnost and perestroika. The newly-found freedom from an oppressive, autocratic, and decadent regime was accompanied by widespread social unrest, economic instability, and public exposure of the corruption and malfunctioning of most of the major social institutions including government offices, the army, the health care system, schools, and industry. The col-

lapse in social order and the widespread anomie—loss of norms and values—unleashed forces of chauvinism and ethnic conflict. Previously clandestine anti-Semitism has been openly expressed in the media by populist leaders eager to blame the ubiquitous social problems on minority groups and specifically on the Jews. "Pamiat" has publicly demanded expulsion of Jews and rumours of coming pogroms have been widely circulated; Vladimir Zhirinovsky is only the most candidly outspoken and visible of anti-Semitic figures (Baizer, 1992).

Growing evidence of virulent, uncontrolled anti-Semitism served as the principal motive for the large-scale immigration of Jews to Israel in the 1990s. In addition, for many, disillusionment with the Soviet system brought a sense of diminishing confidence that effective, democratic solutions would be found for the massive economic and social problems that came in the wake of that system's collapse. Despite the fact that Jews were

Table 1. Immigrants to Israel from Russia, 1965-93	
Period	Number
1965-71	24,730
1972-79	137,134
1972	31,652
1973	33,477
1974	16,816
1980-84	11,549
1985-89	18,205
1990	184,602
1991	147,292
1992	64,648
1993 (Aug.)	41,126
Total	711,231

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 22. 1992, p. 174

more freely admitted to the universities, became more active in political life and liberal causes, and gained access to jobs that had previously been closed to them, there was growing fear of the future. Lack of control over the newly-independent states raised concern over the possibility of further ecological disasters similar to Chernobyl. Even if some preferred other destinations, Israel is open, accessible and, despite many difficulties, provides a relatively supportive social environment for immigrants. Relatives in Israel who had settled during the 1970s encouraged immigration, and there were periodic rumours and panic that Russia might suddenly limit emigration again or that Israel might limit entry (Baizer 1992).

Eighty percent of the immigrants of the 1990s have come from Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Baku, Moldavia, and Uzbekistan—areas where Jewish traditions and identity were minimal. Compared to the 1970s, fewer have come from the Balkan republics where Jewish traditions and identity were relatively strong. Thirteen percent of the recent immigrants are from the Asian republics and 7 percent from the Caucasian republics (Naveh et al. 1993). Demographically, the immigrants differ from the 1970s group. The population includes more elderly than before; the high divorce rates in Russia have resulted in a high proportion of single-parent families, mostly headed by women. There is a relatively high proportion of non-Jews in mixed marriages.

What is most striking about this wave of immigration, as indicated in Table 1, is its absolute and relative size. In the early 1990s, the population of Israel was just over 4 million, so that 450,000 immigrants comprised over 10 percent of the total. This means that the size of the work force seeking to enter the occupational system is extremely large. These immigrants are also very well-educated: 60 percent are engineers, technicians, teachers, physicans, scientists, musicians, or performers. This wave of immigration resulted in Israel's population being one of the

most educated in the world, with between 11 and 14 percent of university-educated people. The critical issue facing the society is how to take advantage of this high-quality scientific and technical talent (Ofer et al. 1991).

The immigrants of the 1990s found in Israel a society in which successful efforts to control runaway inflation resulted in an unemployment rate of 10 percent before the large-scale immigration from Russia started. As in many countries experiencing a crisis in an over-extended welfare state, there has been growing attention in government circles to cost effectiveness, rational planning, curtailing welfare services, and setting limits on public spending. Past experience has shown that, in the long run, it is dysfunctional to encourage over-dependence on the public services. There is growing encouragement of private initiatives and a general reduction in government intervention.

Occupational Patterns

During the past twenty years, there have been major changes in the occupational structure of the Israeli society. This is seen in the increased proportion of persons with academic training in the professions and in administration. The proportion of office workers and sales personnel has grown, while the number of persons working in agriculture, industry, and construction has decreased. Services, both public and private, have grown as have the financial and business sectors. The striking difference between the occupational structure of the immigrant population and the Israeli labour force is seen in Table 2. The immigrants are characterized by large groups of university graduates, engineers, architects, physicians and dentists, middle-school teachers, and computer technologists; the Israeli work force has higher proportions of post-primary teachers, administrative, clerical and sales personnel, agricultural workers, and industrial workers. Table 3 presents the same comparison by grouped sets of occupations which

make the differences between them clearer.

It is widely believed that the rate of downward occupational change among the recently arrived immigrants will be greater than it was for Russian immigrants from the Soviet Union who arrived in the 1970s. This is partly a result of the fact that some occupations are already saturated; a dramatic example is medicine. Over 12,000 Russian physicians arrived in Israel between 1989 and 1993, and it is estimated that the health care system will be able to absorb only 2,000 of them. This is in sharp contrast to the earlier period, when 95 percent of the immigrant physicians were employed

Table 2. Comparison of Selected Occupations among 1990 Immigrants with 1989 Israeli Total Labour Force

	Immigrants 1990	Labour 1989
	%	%
University graduates, natural sciences	1.6	0.6
Engineers, architects	25.0	2.0
Physicians, dentists	6.3	1.0
Post-primary teachers	1.5	3.0
Middle-school teachers	8.5	5.5
Tech., practical engineers, computer specialists	15.0	4.2
Admin., management	0.3	5.8
Clerical	4.0	17.4
Sales	2.2	8.5
Service	3.9	13.2
Agriculture	0.1	4.3
Skilled industry, construction, transport	12.6	23.0
Other	19.0	34.5

Table 3. Grouped Occupation: Comparison of 1990 Immigrants with Israeli Labour Force (1989)

	Immigrants 1990	Labour 1989
	%	%
University graduates	40.6	8.6
Technically trained	34.3	21.8
Skilled workers	12.6	23.0
Clerical, sales, unskilled	12.5	46.6
Total	100	100

Source: *Ofer, G. et al. 1991*

in their profession (Ofer and Vinokur 1989). With regard to other occupations, it is still too early to determine if, after a period of retraining, some immigrants who have changed their occupation in order to make ends meet, will return to their original occupation or even improve their status in the long run.

One of the complicating factors in analyzing occupational change in this population stems from the fact that some occupations have different names in Russia and in Israel: for example, certain types of "engineers" in Russia are defined as technicians in Israel.

Employment of this large pool of skilled persons requires a major input of investment capital that would move the economy into a rapid growth phase. Clearly, this is dependent on progress in the peace process. In mid-1994, economic indicators show that this turnaround in the economy has already started. In the long run, there will be growth in high-tech industries, especially chemicals, metals, electricity and electronics, and in the essential sectors of the infrastructure such as construction, communications, and transportation. In future years, it is expected that these will expand and employ many of the highly-trained immigrants.

The expansion of these industries depends on the encouragement of investment and on the provision of incentives in the form of government loan guarantees. But there is an inevitable time gap during which immigrants have no choice but to seek employment in alternative sectors which, in many cases, do not suit their skills. Indeed, feedback from immigrants in Israel to their friends and families in Russia concerning difficulties they are now encountering has resulted in fewer arrivals in 1992 and 1993, and in a lowering in the level of skills among the more recent arrivals. Thus, 27 percent of the 1990 immigrants were engineers while only 19 percent of the 1992 immigrants were trained in that profession. The proportion of unskilled workers increased from 15 to 25 percent during that period.

A study of the employment status of immigrants from the former Soviet Union who arrived between October 1989 and February 1992 was carried out from July to September, 1992, when the respondents had been in Israel from 6 months to two-and-a-half years. The research was based on a sample of 1,200 immigrants aged 25–64, living in 30 communities in Israel, who were interviewed in their homes by Russian-speaking interviewers (Naveh et al. 1993).

The study shows that passage of time has a positive effect on general employment status: the longer immigrants are in the country, the more likely they are to be employed, although not necessarily in the occupation for which they had been trained. About one-half of the total immigrant population surveyed was employed but, among those who have been in Israel for two-and-a-half years, 62 percent were working. Except for the oldest group of immigrants (aged 55–64), this percentage employed is only slightly lower than in comparable age groups of the veteran Jewish population: see Table 4. Among the immigrants recorded as not working, 17 percent are studying or participating in various retraining courses, while 40 percent are actively seeking work.

The study shows that gender and age are critical factors in employment status. In all age groups, men are more likely to be employed than women, and the likelihood of employment decreases with age in both genders: see Table 5. When retraining is needed, employers tend to prefer younger trainees. The sharp decline in employment comes at an earlier age among women (at age 40) than among men.

Immigrants whose occupations before coming to Israel were in the industrial and technical sector are the most likely to be employed in Israel: 69 percent. Of these, 52 percent were working as skilled workers in industry. Among those trained as engineers, 60 percent were employed, one-third of them as engineers and another 11 percent as technicians and programmers.

Table 4. Employment of Russian Immigrants after Two or More Years in Israel Compared to the Population, by Age (%), 1992

	Employed	
Age	Immigrants %	Pop. %
25–34	63	66
35–44	69	72
45–54	65	71
55–64	27	8

Source: *Naveh, G. et al. 1993*

Table 5. Employment of Russian Immigrants by Age and Gender (1989-92)

	Employed		
Age	Total %	Males %	Females %
25–29	60	69	51
30–34	57	76	40
35–39	61	71	52
40–44	55	71	40
45–49	43	71	25
50–54	48	64	38
55–59	32	54	16
60–64	16	27	5

Source: *Naveh, G. et al. 1993*

Table 6. Russian Immigrants to Israel, 1989–92: Selected Measures of Job Satisfaction by Gender and Age (%)

Age Range:	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64
	Males			
Working in desired occupation	51	48	29	25
Satisfied with job	51	44	38	34
Satisfied that skills are utilized	47	41	27	19
	Females			
Working in desired occupation	39	34	23	19
Satisfied with job	49	53	36	27
Satisfied that skills are utilized	36	39	19	0

Source: *Naveh, G. et al. 1993*

Among immigrant physicians and teachers, only one-third are employed and about one-quarter of these are in the service occupations.

Table 6 indicates that when immigrants from the former Soviet Union are asked to evaluate their work status, two consistent patterns emerge: satisfaction decreases with age, and women are less satisfied with their work than men. It is undoubtedly a reflection of employers' preferences that, for both male and female immigrants, the steep decline in satisfaction occurs in the 45–54 age group. Many employers view the age of 45 as too old for effective retraining. The implication of these findings is that older immigrants, and especially the women among them, experience the greatest difficulty in finding satisfactory work.

Although the overall rates of employment are relatively high, this does not mean that Russian immigrants are having an easy time in the 1990s. Many are having difficulty making ends meet; employment in low-ranking service occupations provides low remuneration; rent and food are expensive. The feeling that one's skills and training are not being utilized serves as an ongoing source of frustration. As noted, the older segments of the immigrant population and the women are especially vulnerable, because the age of those viewed by employers as too old to be employable has been sharply reduced. Thus people at the age of 45, who were at the height of a career, find themselves defined as too old to be employed in their profession. Women of all ages are disadvantaged in the job market relative to men of comparable age, and this is especially true of older women.

Earlier Immigrants: A Significant Reference Group

Immigrants from the Soviet Union who settled in Israel during the 1970s (137,000 persons) serve as a significant reference group for the immigrants of the 1990s. The role of the former group is somewhat ambiguous, providing both positive and negative functions. On the positive side, the group includes family and friends who, in many cases, ease the entry of newer arrivals by providing practical information laced with experience on how to get along in Israeli society. They serve as important sources of social support and provide a comfortable language-based group in which immigrants can feel at home. On a symbolic level, their presence serves to make real the prospect of successful social and economic integration.

For some of the recent immigrants, on the other hand, the 1970s immigrants serve as a negative reference group—the success of which exacerbates the difficulties of the more recent arrivals and causes them to think that, under the current economic and social circumstances, they themselves are unlikely to reach the level of successful integration they see among the earlier group. The contrast in the job market in the two periods is especially hard to accept. For example, the 12,000 physicians who arrived during the 1990s cannot help looking back with some envy (possibly bitterness) at the earlier situation (in which virtually all of the physicians were employed in their profession) in light of the present reality, in which only one in six of these immigrant physicians will be so employed.

Conclusion

The full story about the resettlement of Russian immigrants in Israel in the 1990s is only emerging. Four years is a short period in the overall process of adjustment and acculturation; the research that presents reliable findings is just beginning to accumulate, and so far only selected findings have been published. However, despite differences in the historical context and in the economic and social circumstances, the experience of the 1970s leads us to be generally optimistic about the long-range prospects. This is not meant to diminish or ignore the many problems involved, many of which are painful for many people. The factors most conducive to optimism are: (1) the remarkable educational and occupational level of the immigrants; (2) their high level of motivation and adaptability to the exigencies of their new social setting; (3) the strong likelihood of dramatic economic development in the Israeli economy through major input of capital; and, perhaps most important of all, (4) the ongoing peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbours which, despite sporadic setbacks, will in the long run bring a renaissance of development to the benefit of the entire region. ■

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From UNRWA To Israel: The 1952 Transfer of Responsibilities for Refugees in Israel

Alexander Bligh

The transfer of responsibilities from UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) to Israel in July 1952 was a significant step in the resettlement of the refugees in the sovereign territory of Israel. It doubles in importance considering that Israel was the only Middle Eastern country to take over from the UN agency. However, the significance of this step should also be compared with at least two more factors: the ratio between the refugees found in Israel and the total Arab post-1948 refugee population, and the ratio between the Israeli refugee population and its total Arab body. Comparing these two sets of figures might facilitate an understanding of the reasons for the disappearance of the problem in Israel, yet have no effect whatsoever on the refugee issue in its entirety.

In the following pages an attempt made to analyze the reasons behind UNRWA's suggestion to Israel to take over, and the processes that led Israel to reluctantly accept this proposal. Of course, this move represented an opportunity to resettle the Arab refugees left behind in what became the State of Israel. However, there are other reasons for the total disappearance of the term "refugee" from Israeli terminology. First, the fact that this country never formally recognized in its legislation the distinctiveness of this particular population. Further, treating all Arabs in the same way, subjecting them all to military government, helped galvanize one politically motivated population of refugees and non-refugees. But those issues are beyond the scope of this article.

Professor Alexander Bligh teaches history at the Department of History, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, and was a visiting professor at York University, Toronto.

How Significant Was the Size of the Refugee Population in Israel?

The total number of Arab refugees emanating from the 1948 armed conflict in Palestine is important for understanding the magnitude of the issue, yet it has never been easy to calculate. It is also important to determine the proportion of Arab refugees to other Arab citizens and the total Jewish population of Israel, in considering the political, financial, and military efforts invested by the Israeli government. Further, any Israeli contribution aimed at solving the internal refugee issue should be assessed against the proportion of the total number of refugees and those living in Israel.

Most figures given are only estimates which put the number of refugees at the end of the war between 600,000 and 760,000.[1] In contrast, the number of Arab citizens in the newly created State of Israel was carefully calculated based on the results of the first Israeli census (held on 8 November 1948). One of the reasons for this census was to determine the extent of the security risk posed by the Arab population of Israel, the refugees included. Thus, bearing in mind the method and the purpose, it is logical to assume that some effort was indeed invested in those calculations. Moreover, the question of facts and figures should not only be studied on its own, but the number of refugees in Israel should always be mentioned in terms relative to the total number of Arabs in Israel. That number stood at around 102,000 in the fall of 1948.[2] A few months later, in January 1949, the number of refugees in Israel, based on figures used by the UN, stood at 40,000.[3] At the same time, Israeli sources used the figure of 30,000:[4] 11,000–12,000 (among them 4,000

peasants) in the north, plus the Bedouins of the Negev, most of them refugees, who numbered about 16,000–18,000 people (3,500 families) in 25 tribes (3 clans).[5] Most of these figures are based on the official census and the estimate of Yosef Weitz, an Israeli official responsible for land and settlement issues.

After the conclusion of the April 1949 armistice agreement between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, the number of Arabs in the area under Israeli sovereignty increased dramatically. In April 1949, about 20,000 refugees were found in twenty villages in northern Israel, and 7,000 more lived in the port town of Acre.[6] Adding the number of refugees in the south, the refugee population at that time stood at more than 40,000. This figure was later used by the Israeli government in a letter to the chief UNRWA representative in the Middle East, in which Israel agreed to assume the organization's duties on its territory. The letter stated that, originally, the number of refugees in Israel had been about 48,000, but at the time of the letter (mid-1952) it stood at 20,000. It is clear from a variety of sources that the number used by the Israeli government for internal calculations, as well as diplomatic approaches, did indeed stand at 48,000.[7]

Thus, the number of Arabs living in Israel as of 31 December 1950 stood at 170,000;[8] about one-third of them were refugees. Of these, the number of people taken care of by UNRWA in northern Israel was about 25,000: 21,001 Arab refugees, 2,995 Jewish refugees, and 891 Arabs from the demilitarized zone along the Israeli-Syrian border. This picture did not change much two years later in regard to the number of refugees on UNRWA's list. At this time, UNRWA and Israel were en-

gaged in negotiations for the transfer of responsibility for the refugees in Israel. The only major difference was that the total number of refugees was identical to the number of those helped by UNRWA, meaning that all other displaced people were already taken care of within the Israeli system. This might indicate that by late 1950 the problem of about 28,000 refugees was already resolved.[9] UNRWA figures cited by British diplomats[10] speak of 12,000 Arab refugees already resettled in Israel, and thus removed from the 1949 number of UNRWA-supported recipients. This number was further reduced in the following months by another 3,000 refugees. Thus, the Israeli ministerial committee discussing resettlement was able to reclassify the refugees: 7,000 would not need any help; 5,000 would need jobs in Israel; and about 5,000 were hard-core welfare cases. The date of this meeting, only two months after the transfer from UNRWA, strongly suggests that the Israeli government believed the UN figures to be exaggerated and thus, through recounting and not through resettlement, in eight weeks, the numbers were further reduced.[11] The 1952 figures were 17,000 and 16,500 Arabs[12] for May and November, respectively. Of these, about 40 percent were considered to be "hard-core" cases, meaning they could not support themselves. Stated differently, that was the actual number of refugees cared for by UNRWA, and the number which Israel took upon itself to deal with upon the transfer of responsibilities from the Agency to the government of Israel.[13]

Reducing the relative representation of the refugees within the Israeli Arab population from about 28 percent to about 10 percent in four years almost eliminated the problem within the Israeli borders. A few years later, the term "refugee" disappeared from the Israeli discourse. This change was largely due to the Israeli takeover from UNRWA in 1952. However, relative to the whole body of refugees in the Arab countries, the reduction was rather insignificant: from about 3 percent to about 2 percent. On this level, Israel

did not serve as a role model for her neighbours.

UNRWA Interest and Expectations

United Nations' organized involvement in the refugee issue began in August 1948 with the establishment of the Disaster Relief Project. In November 1948, the United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees. This body was replaced by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency based on the General Assembly resolution. This agency began its activities in May 1950, entrusted with projects for the permanent resettlement of refugees in Arab countries and in Israel.

Even before the establishment of UNRWA, the foreign powers involved in the refugee issue adopted a distinct policy regarding Israel. It became evident over time that Israel was treated differently from the Arab countries. The Western powers, led by the United States and Great Britain adopted,[14] as early as 1949, a three-layer approach in dealing with the Israeli dimension of the refugee issue:

- Israeli opposition to the principle of repatriation is the foundation of any future Israeli and international policy;[15] this, obviously, does not rule out public lip service in the form of repatriation demands from Israel.
- Israel is eager to resolve the problem of those refugees within its borders to eliminate a potential security threat, and aiming to manifest that the issue is more humanitarian than political.
- Israel is suspicious of unfriendly United Nations organizations and their agencies.

UNRWA policies based on these premises indicated Israel as an obvious candidate to take over from UNRWA, and made Israel a testing ground for ways of tackling the issue. Moreover, the Western powers insisted on initiating a resettlement process in Israel, in order to appease the Arab countries whose support for the West was essential with the raging Cold War. Transferring responsibility

to Israel had to be interpreted by Arab governments as making Israel admit its formal guilt in creating the problem. Perhaps the issue of guilt associated with taking care of the refugees was the main reason for the Arab governments' consistent refusal to take over from UNRWA in their sovereign territories, in spite of the economic benefits which might have accompanied such an agreement. Even though Syria was seen by UNRWA as the most likely candidate in addition to Israel, the takeover never materialized.[16] On the other hand, the policy of making Israel responsible for the refugees only within its borders, and not for the refugees all over the Middle East, is evident from contemporary diplomatic correspondence, which strongly suggests that resettlement schemes in Arab countries were usually offered to refugees found only in other Arab countries.[17]

An additional element of policy was identified and acted upon in the early 1950s: considering that UNRWA did not possess the resources to build infrastructure for the refugees in Israel, or elsewhere, and the quick pace of development in Israel in order to accommodate hundreds of thousands of Jewish newcomers, the relinquishing of powers to the local government might lead, in the view of the Agency, to the integration of the refugees into the emerging infrastructure.[18]

The outcome of these policies could be only a re-examination of the role of UNRWA in Israel. Indeed, in 1950 the Western powers began to consider the possibility that UNRWA would not be the exclusive means of dealing with the refugees in Israel.[19] This concept, at first only theoretical, became the policy of UNRWA when, in 1950, it faced dire financial straits. An internal UNRWA memorandum of December 1950 advocates[20] transferring responsibilities to local governments as a cost-saving measure, since these authorities would be less exposed to refugee pressure and excessive demands from UNRWA officials, would have better means of verifying the precise number of refugees, and thus would commit

less funds to this population than the UNRWA, while maintaining the same level of treatment. Under these circumstances, Israel was not a natural place for savings, since UNRWA allocated only 3 percent[21] of its distribution budget to refugees in Israel. However, considering the political implications, Israel could serve as a starting point accepted by all parties.

The diminishing role of UNRWA in Israel and the organization's acute financial crisis may help explain its approach to Israel. In December 1950, UNRWA first asked[22] Israel to take over the Agency's activities in the country. The offer was the result of the United Nations General Assembly resolution in November that direct relief cannot be terminated as provided for in a prior resolution, and authorized the Agency to furnish such relief, for which $20 million would be required for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952. This came on top of an existing UNRWA deficit of over U.S.$2.6 million (about 10 percent of its overall budget).[23] This resolution spelled a looming financial crisis for the Agency, and a need to turn over responsibilities to local governments wherever possible. However, since UNRWA had a UN mandate only in the economic and humane fields, no change in the position of this body could in any way be interpreted by the Arab countries as a total UN withdrawal from its commitments to a political solution to the refugee issue.[24] Thus, Israel was offered several financial incentives, including a grant of $2 per capita per month (welfare cases only, so that the approximate value of this part of the offer was about $170,000 annually), and a lump sum of $1–1.5 million for the total refugee population, provided Israel took over on 1 April 1951. One month after the deadline, and due to the fact that Israel did not respond, UNRWA withdrew its proposals. However, the United States approached Israel in December 1951.[25] Shortly thereafter, Israel indicated it would take over from the UN and absorb more than 20,000 refugees living in Israel.[26] Negotiations between the Organization and Israel were resumed in early 1952, and the two parties agreed on 18 May 1952 that UNRWA was to terminate its activities on 1 September 1952, and that Israel would not be given any financial aid for the project. That date was later to be changed to 1 July upon the request of the Agency (however, UNRWA was to continue delivery of supplies until 1 September 1952).

Israeli Reaction and Apprehension

The transfer of responsibilities was not smooth on the part of Israel. Most of the refugees found on Israeli soil had been granted Israeli citizenship in late 1948 and early 1949. Consequently, any change in the way refugees were treated by non-Israeli agencies was, from the very beginning, unwelcomed and perceived as a foreign intervention in Israeli domestic affairs.[27] Because of suspicions regarding any initiative along these lines, especially coming from UN circles, and the productive cooperation between the Israeli government and UNRWA,[28] it was unnecessary in Israeli eyes to change the current *modus operandi* into something that might become more costly, both in financial and diplomatic terms. The Israeli-UNRWA cooperation even enabled the two parties to reach[29] a *de facto* agreement denying refugees infiltrating Israel from Lebanon UNRWA's assistance in Israel. On a different level, in 1951 Israel began distributing supplies to its refugees, overlapping UNRWA activities,[30] and presumably paving the way for a unilateral takeover.

Israeli displeasure with the proposed changes was evident in April 1952 when Walter Eytan, Director General of the Foreign Office, used very reserved language in stating[31] that he "thought that Israel had agreed in principle" to the move; similar language was used in discussions with British diplomats. This, coming in the wake of negotiations for the Israeli takeover of United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) activities already at the end of March 1951,[32] was indeed taken as a setback for UNRWA. Further negotia-tions[33] with Israeli diplomats revealed the budgetary burden on Israel resulting from a possible transfer of responsibility. According to an Israeli diplomat in charge of the negotiations, about 8,000 of the 20,000 refugees taken care of by UNRWA would continue to constitute "hard-core" welfare cases. Consequently, Israel would have to put together a detailed timetable and additional sources of financing.

Concurrently, the United States Secretary of State was concerned[34] with the slow pace of resettlement in Jordan, but did not believe that the individual Arab countries (Jordan included) would accept greater responsibility for the refugees. Consequently, he and the Administration were determined to see at least Israel contribute its share to the resettlement process. Responding to U.S. pressure,[35] and based on UNRWA estimate that the annual expense for its activities in Israel would be some US$5 million, Israel suggested gradual withdrawal of UNRWA. However, Israeli insistence on receiving about one-half of the estimated costs for "hard-core" cases from UNRWA was interpreted by the U.S. as another ploy to delay the transfer of responsibility. As a result, Americans decided to pressure Israel by using their leverage stemming from the fact that Israel was a large recipient of U.S. bilateral aid for refugee expenses through UN channels. This American resolution was immediately conveyed to the governments in Beirut and Amman with the hope that Israel would now agree to transfer of responsibility as of 1 July.

On 18 May 1952, largely as a result of American and UNRWA pressure, Israel notified[36] the Director General of UNRWA, Ambassador Blandford, that it agreed that UNRWA would be relieved of further responsibility for the refugees in Israel. That Israeli agreement was reiterated at a meeting between Blandford, the Prime Minister of Israel, the Director General of the Foreign Ministry, and Mr. Michael Comay, in charge of negotiations with UNRWA at the Israeli Foreign Minis-

try. The organization's goal at that point was to end all of its activities in Israel as of 1 July 1952, and withdraw all of its staff.

Israeli opposition to the proposed change in responsibility was the result of several considerations. Leading among them was deep-rooted suspicion of any foreign involvement in the Israeli decision-making processes relating to Arab-Israeli relations, including the refugee issue. Israel initiated a gradual change in UNRWA-Israeli operations even before the formal decision; that is, Israel found it necessary to resist a beneficial move only because it was not the result of its own independent decision making. This tactic was only marginally affected by the financial factor which, if compared with other contemporary Israeli financial undertakings, was insignificant.

Postmortem: Did the Transfer of Responsibility Contribute to a Solution?

UNRWA officialy ended its activities in Israel on 1 July 1952,[37] but continued providing supplies to refugees in Israel until 1 September, and partially operated even during October of that year. The number of refugees taken care of was 17,000 (7,000 would not need any assistance, 5,000 would need welfare payments, and 5,000 would need jobs).

The process of changing responsibilities for refugees within Israeli borders involved two sets of conflicting interests. Israel, always suspicious of foreign intervention in its domestic affairs, tried to slow down the process. UNRWA, on the other hand, hard-pressed to relieve its financial crisis and eager to show some progress in resettlement, tried its best to speed it up. Looking back to the negotiations with UNRWA, Israel had every reason to be satisfied. After the transfer of responsibilities, a senior Foreign Office official summarized[38] the Israeli assessment of the change: Israel did not benefit from the activities of the organization and neither did the refugees. Aid from a foreign power contributed to the alienation of that national minority from the state. This support helped in maintaining some opposition to the government and its efforts; it also contributed to these refugees being a source of cheap labour (since they already had some income of their own). Furthermore, UNRWA did not try to advance any solution to the problem. Without the aid of the Agency, Israel was faced with the task of solving the problem. One historical precedent widely used[39] by Israel at that time was that the success of the resettlement of Greek refugees in the 1920s was in part the result of the fact that the feeding of the refugees by international organizations was discontinued in the early stages and replaced by constructive resettlement measures. This precedent, impertinent as it might be looked at four generations later, did guide the Israeli authorities. Indeed, a sharp decline in the number of refugees in Israel was reported in late 1952. At about the same time, only a few months after the transfer of responsibilities, a senior Israeli official asserted that there was no longer a problem of refugees in Israel.[40]

Notes

1. Benny Morris. *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. pp. 297–98; cf. ISA/FM2444/19/ Israel Foreign Ministry/News From the Countries of the Middle East/Report #3/ 25 February 194[9]/The Palestinian Refugees Problem—This document states (and this became the basis for Israeli policy) that there were no reliable figures, but that the total number of refugees did not exceed 600,000.

2. ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Foreign Ministry/ News From the Countries of the Middle East/ Report #3/25 February 194[9]/The Palestinian Refugees Problem; ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Foreign Ministry/2 June 1949/From: Dr. H. Meyuzam, Central Bureau of Statistics, To: A. Goren, The Foreign Ministry.

3. ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Foreign Ministry/ News From the Countries of the Middle East/ Report #4/20 April 1949/The Palestinian Refugees Problem.

4. ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Foreign Ministry/27 May 1949/From: Yosef Weitz, To: the Foreign Minister; ISA/FM2445/2A/Israel Foreign Ministry/18 December 1952/Written comments by the Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister.

5. ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Foreign Ministry/1 September 1949/Minutes of the Refugee Affairs Committee.

6. NA/RG84/Haifa/Box 1/Folder 350/570.1/ 350.21/From: the U.S. Consul, Jerusalem, To: the U.S. Consul, Haifa.

7. PRO/F0371/91411/EE1828/1, UNRWA Haifa Monthly report for November 1950; PRO/ F0371/91411/EE1826/6, UNRWA monthly report for December 1950 reports slight difference in numbers: total of 24,919; cf. PRO/ F0371/ 91411/EE1828/14, UNRWA Haifa monthly report for January 1951 speaking of 24,911; same range of numbers is repeated all through 1951; ISA/FM2445/1/Israel Foreign Ministry/26 March 1952/From: the Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, To: Israeli Embassy, Washington; NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950–52)/ Box 18/Folder 571(PRWA)/5 June 1952/ From: The Ambassador, To: Washington, transmitting a copy of the letter addressed to the UNRWA, by Michael Comay, of the Israeli Foreign Ministry; ISA/FM2406/17A/Israel Foreign Ministry/3 September 1952/From: the International Organizations Section of the Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, To: the acting Director General, Foreign Office, Jerusalem.

8. NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950–52)/Box 6/Folder 350/27 June 1951/From:The First Secretary, To: Washington; NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950– 52)/Box8/Folder350/19 July 1951/From: The Ambassador, To: Washington.

9. PRO/F0371/91426/EE1826/45, 19 December 1951, From: UK Delegation to the UN General Assembly, Paris, To: the Foreign Office, London, reporting views expressed by the Israeli Foreign minister in a discussion with the UK Ambassador; ISA/FM2445/1/Israel Foreign Ministry/18 March 1952/ From: Israeli Embassy, Washington, To: the Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem.

10. PRO/FO371/98505/EE1824/33, 20 June 1952, From: UK Delegation to Beirut, To: the Foreign Office, London.

11. ISA/FM2445/1/Israel Foreign Ministry/8 September 1952/minutes of the ministerial Refugee Affairs Committee.

12. ISA/FM2406/17A/Israel Foreign Ministry/3 September 1952/From: the International Organizations Section of the Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, To: the acting Director General, the Foreign Office, Jerusalem.

13. PRO/FO371/91410/EE1826/44, 14 December 1951, summary of discussion between the Israeli Ambassador, London, and the British Secretary of State; NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950– 52)/Box 14/Folder 571(PRWA)/18 April 1952/ From: Keeler, Tel Aviv, To: Washington; NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950–52)/Box 14/Folder 571(PRWA)/28 May 1952/From: The Ambassador, To: Washington.

14. Early indication for a similar approach to Israel can be found in PRO/FO371/75417/E263, 5 January 1949, in which a UNCCP official and a British diplomat exchange views on the Arab refugees.

15. *op. cit.,* Partial U.S. withdrawal from the repatriation principle, see: ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Foreign Ministry/29 May 1949/ From: the U.S. President, To: the Prime Minister, Israel; PRO/ FO371/82595/E1461/16/G, 12 September 1950, Top Secret, From: the British Embassy, Washington, To: the Foreign Office, London; PRO/FO371/91410/EE1826/1, 28 December 1950, From: the British Embassy, Baghdad, To: the Foreign Office, London; PRO/FO371/ 91410/EE1826/14, 26 January 1951, UNRWA

The Absorption of One Million Immigrants by Israel in the 1950s

Arie Lova Eliav

Background

From the time the Second Temple was destroyed by the Romans in 70 C.E. until the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948, the Jewish people did not enjoy political or national independence. The large majority of Jews lived in various exiles, east and west. Only a few Jews remained in the Land of Israel, and their numbers declined over the years. The Jewish people's hope of returning to their land was anchored in the Bible, in the great prophecies of consolation, and in a thousand prayers and songs of yearning.

In the mid-19th century, fewer than 20,000 Jews lived in Israel, most of them in neighbourhoods resembling ghettoes in the four "holy cities": Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias. These Jews, most of whom came to the Holy Land to die and be buried there, prayed to God, like their fellow Jews in exile, three times a day: "Bring us back to Thee and we shall return; renew our days as in the past."

From 1870 onward, a turnaround began in the lives of Jews in the land of Israel. In that year, the Mikveh Israel agricultural school was established on land near Jaffa. A few years later, the first Jewish agricultural villages arose, founded by young Jews who wanted to free themselves from the ghettoes in the land of Israel, or who came from exile, motivated both by the desire to flee oppression and the aspiration to return to their ancestral homeland.

In 1897, Dr. Theodore Herzl founded Zionism as a modern national liberation movement whose purpose was the establishment of a state for the Jews in Israel. This original goal demanded that an increasing number of Jews immigrate to the land of Israel, or "make aliyah," a new expression

Arie Lova Eliav was a member of the Knesset, the Parliament of Israel.

which became almost holy. The first condition which had to be met in order for the Land of Israel, which was then under Turkish rule and had Arabs living in it, to become a "state of the Jews"—that is, a political framework with a Jewish majority—was that Jews "make aliyah." Therefore, the Zionists made immigration their highest priority.

During the next fifty years, a few hundred thousand Jews came to Israel. These immigrants, who came in waves—or, more accurately, in spurts—had a difficult time of it. Many had to fight the authorities (first the Turks and, from 1917, the British), who occasionally closed the country's borders. Many Jews came as "illegals" via clandestine routes by sea or through the desert.

On the eve of the War of Independence in 1948, the Jewish population of Mandatory Palestine was 650,000. These Jews—who were still a minority among almost twice as many Arabs—maintained their own national, economic, and social institutions, and had close relations with the diaspora.

The Extent of Immigration During the First Decade

With the declaration by David Ben-Gurion of Israel's independence on May 15, 1948, the Jewish people's generations-old dream came true. The young state began in a bloody war for survival against the Palestinian Arabs and the armies of the surrounding Arab states. But from its very first day, even as the battles raged, Israel opened its gates to Jewish immigrants, because its leadership considered immigration the justification of the state's existence.

In its first session in 1949, the Knesset passed the Law of Return as a basic law—the equivalent of a constitutional article. This law states, in essence, that every Jew has a right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen.

From the establishment of the state in 1948 to the end of 1958, close to one million immigrants came to Israel. Table 1 shows the rate of immigration by year.

Table 1: Number of Immigrants to Israel in Its First Decade (1948–58)	
1948	101,828
1949	239,954
1950	170,563
1951	175,279
1952	24,610
1953	11,575
1954	18,491
1955	37,528
1956	56,330
1957	72,634
1958	27,290
Total	936,082
Source: *Jewish Agency Immigration Department*	

In the subsequent discussion of the problems of absorption, we will emphasize the difficulties and obstacles that stood in the way of the young state—which had just emerged from a bloody war of survival—in dealing with hundreds of thousands of immigrants, most of them destitute refugees who, in a period of four years (1948–51), doubled the population.

In the pre-independence period, the Zionist leadership worked through the Jewish Agency for Israel. The Jewish Agency was a sort of shadow government and contained departments that were similar to government ministries: a Political Department, an Immigration Department, a Settlement Department. Of course, the subject of immigration received the highest priority. The Agency held frequent deliberations and proposed various immigration and absorption programs; but even the greatest optimists could not have foreseen such a large and rapid immigration coming at the very time of the state's establishment.

No previously prepared solutions were available for coping with the main needs created by immigration—the problems of budget, housing and employment—and those who carried the burden of immigrant absorption had to improvise constantly.

Immigrants' Countries of Origin

The immigrants came from over 30 countries, almost literally from "the four corners of the earth." But for the purposes of this discussion we will focus on two large groups: those who came from European countries and those who came from non-European countries. During Israel's first decade, these two groups were virtually equal in size (48 percent from European and 52 percent from non-European countries).

A. From European countries— approx. 480,000

1. Prisoners on Cyprus—Approximately 30,000 Holocaust survivors who reached the shores of Israel as part of the "illegal" immigration before independence. They were arrested by the British and placed in camps on Cyprus, and were released when Israel became independent.
2. Holocaust survivors—Approximately 130,000 immigrants from the refugee camps set up after the war in Europe, primarily in Germany.
3. Eastern Europe—Approximately 300,000 immigrants from countries that fell under Communist rule after the war, such as Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
4. North and South America—Approximately 15,000

B. From non-European countries —approx. 520,000

Unlike their European counterparts, these immigrants arrived with large families and ways of life more rooted in religion and tradition.

The subdivision of the non-European immigrants reveals that approximately 270,000 came from Asia and 250,000 from Africa. From Asia, the main countries of origin were: Iraq ~130,000, Yemen ~50,000, Iran ~35,000, Turkey ~35,000, and India ~5,000.

From Africa, the main countries of origin were (approximate numbers): Morocco~130,000, Tunisia ~40,000, Libya ~35,000, Egypt ~25,000, and Algeria ~5,000.

Absorption

The rate of immigration and the large number of immigrants (as well as their great variety) presented the government and the Jewish Agency with tremendous problems of absorption.

The problems were wide-ranging in scope, and included all areas of life: the budget, food, housing, employment, health, and education. For the decision makers of the time, however, they appeared as one and demanded simultaneous solutions.

1. Budget

At the end of the War of Independence, the new government was in a desperate financial situation. The vast outlays necessitated by the war in the 1948–49 fiscal year equalled one-half of the national income. Now the government faced the problem of immigrant absorption. The amount of aid received from abroad during the state's first few years was tiny. At the time, Israel received no assistance from the United States or other foreign governments, neither in grants nor in loans. Only in the mid-1950s did the war reparations from Germany begin to arrive. The only outside aid came from the fundraising appeals of the Jewish people (some $200 million per year), but they covered only a relatively small part of the needs.

Thus, Israel had to pay for most of its needs, including immigrant absorption, from its own sources. It should be remembered that the country's exports at the time were minimal, and consisted mainly of citrus fruits.

The government chose to deal with its financial and economic problems by imposing an austerity regime based on two principles: equality in the distribution of essential goods, and full em-

ployment accompanied by economic growth.

2. Food

At independence, Israel's agricultural system could provide for only a small portion of the food needs of its rapidly growing population.

In its first few years, Israel had to import most basic foodstuffs, such as cereals, oil, sugar, meat, and fish. Even dairy products and eggs were mostly imported, in powdered form.

In order to ensure an equal distribution of food, the government instituted a severe rationing program. Products were distributed in equal amounts to long-time residents and new immigrants alike, with the criterion being family size.

To implement this program, the government set up a special ministry, which established rules for fair distribution, and issued coupons which were handed out to the entire population. Food could be purchased only with these coupons, at prices set by the government.

Naturally, along with this system there arose a black market, but it was generally insignificant.

3. Housing

In order to provide a roof for the hundreds of thousands of immigrants, the government had to find improvised, temporary arrangements, and also attempt to direct the immigrants to new towns and other settlements, in accordance with its master plan.

The very fast immigration rate of the first four years (1948–51) dictated unplanned solutions. The first was the use of the homes abandoned by Arabs during the War of Independence. Thousands of such homes that stood empty, primarily in the big cities of Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa, as well as in Lod and Ramleh, were occupied by immigrants during the first few years.

But already in 1949, the second year of massive immigration, the government (for purposes of this discussion I include the Jewish Agency in the term "government") began directing thousands of immigrants, for whom no

housing arrangements could be found, to army camps. Most of these camps had been built by the British army during World War II. Their large barracks now served as improvised housing for immigrants.

It quickly became clear that this temporary solution would not be enough. In 1950, the government began setting up large tent camps, adjacent to existing cities. The tents were initially provided by the Israeli army; at the same time, thousands of tents were purchased overseas, mostly from European army surpluses.

With the establishment of the tent camps began the period of the "ma'abarot," or transit camps. In every such camp, each immigrant family was given its own tent. Each camp consisted initially of some 100-200 tents; as immigration continued, these camps

been intended for chicken coops and cow sheds.) On one wall of the shanty a door was cut open; on the sides, openings were made for windows. The roof was also made of corrugated iron.

Transit camps consisting of thousands of shanties covered the land, from Tiberias and Safed in the Galilee to Beersheba in the Negev. The shanties were burning hot in summer and ice-cold in winter; but, thanks to them, no immigrants were homeless.

In 1952, the construction of "tzrifonim"—wood shacks—began. Some of these were built in Israel, and some were imported ready-made from overseas. That same year, the building of planned permanent structures began, mainly in new villages to which immigrants were directed. These buildings were called "blokonim"— 24-square-meter structures made of

grant population was employed in such public works, with salaries paid by the institutions employing the immigrants.

These public works can be divided into a number of categories:

Construction. Immigrants were employed as unskilled labourers by construction companies, to build their own homes. In this way, the immigrant both earned a living and learned a trade.

Land-clearing and Afforestation. Extensive tracts of land had to be prepared for farming. Many immigrants were employed in this difficult work. Many immigrants were employed in a large and impressive afforestation program conducted mainly by the Jewish National Fund. The program included both the maintenance of existing forests, mainly in the Galilee, and the planting of new forests around the country. Tens of thousands of trees were also planted along new and existing roads.

No previously prepared solutions were available for coping with the main needs created by immigration—the problems of budget, housing and employment—and those who carried the burden of immigrant absorption had to improvise constantly.

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got bigger, some housing a thousand families or more.

The tents were arranged in military fashion, in rows. Every 10-20 tents had a common outdoor latrine and water faucet. In the middle of each camp, public buildings such as a health clinic, classrooms, synagogue, and immigrant absorption office, were set up, made of large tents or wood huts.

In 1951, the supply of tents ran out. In a short time, structures called "badonim"—canvas huts—were improvized. Walls of these huts were made of wood frames, with patches of canvas sewn together from bits of torn tents pasted onto them.

But the raw materials for these huts soon ran out, too. In another quick improvization, the government came up with "pahonim"—tin shanties. The shanty was like the canvas huts, but with sheets of corrugated iron nailed to the wood frames. (At the time, the country had a few thousand tons of corrugated iron, which had originally

cement blocks. The toilet facilities and water were still outdoors, but this was the beginning of the orderly construction of permanent housing.

4. Employment

In accordance with the government's full employment policy, great efforts were made to find jobs for as many immigrants as possible.

Carrying out this policy was extremely difficult:

- Agriculture during the state's first few years was very limited. Only a small number of immigrants could be employed in agriculture; moreover, most of them had no background in such work.
- Industry was minimal, and in many areas nonexistent. Only in the mid-1950s did factories begin to be established with increasing momentum.

Therefore, the government adopted a policy of creating jobs in public works projects. A large portion of the immi-

The salary paid for land-clearing and afforestation was very low, and often arrived only after long delays.

Agriculture. In 1952, when the various transit camps were full and the problem of employment among immigrants was severe, a new, additional channel was opened up. Under the initiative of Levi Eshkol, then the head of the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department, groups of immigrant families began to settle on unused land and establish agricultural villages in which they would grow food.

This was a new concept in the history of Jewish settlement in Israel. The large majority of the immigrant settlers had no background in agriculture; they needed constant supervision by volunteer agriculture experts from among the veteran population. Conditions were very difficult, as permanent housing did not yet exist, and there was a great deal of social tension.

Despite the difficulties, Eshkol and his colleagues persisted with the program. Within the first decade, about 250 such villages were established, with a population of nearly 100,000— over 10 percent of all the immigrants.

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5. Health, Education, and Religion

In every one of these areas, complex and unexpected problems arose. There was an urgent need to establish a network of health services in the camps and other places where immigrants were concentrated. This project, undertaken by the Health Ministry in cooperation with the Histadrut Labour Federation's health fund, Kupat Holim, made possible the opening of hundreds of new health clinics and an increase in the number of hospital beds. But the health system encountered problems unique to the immigrants. Many of the Holocaust survivors were in a poor state of physical or mental health, and needed special clinical and psychological care.

Immigrants from a number of countries (such as some of the immigrants from India, and others) were found to have diseases with which doctors in Israel were not familiar. Many immigrants were not used to the type of food available in Israel, and required periods of adaptation, or had to develop new habits.

The initial problem of education was the teaching of Hebrew to masses of immigrants, the large majority of whom did not know the language or used it only as a language of prayer. The Education Ministry and many volunteer organizations undertook this task. They established many classes, both large and small, in which they gave lessons in basic Hebrew to hundreds of thousands of immigrants. The army joined this effort as well, assigning hundreds of women soldiers to serve as teachers or teaching assistants in immigrant communities.

In addition, in the 1950s, vocational schools began to be developed and expanded. These schools trained young people in many fields necessary to a modern economy.

Matters of religion brought with them special problems. A large number of the immigrants were religious, and most observed tradition, but customs and rites differed greatly from one country of origin to another. Separate synagogues had to be quickly established for each country—and, sometimes, city—of origin.

6. Sociological Problems

In addition to the many physical and economic difficulties connected with the absorption of a million immigrants, there were also tremendous sociological and psychological problems. First, there was the difficulty of being uprooted from one environment to another, from one climate to another, from one set of norms to another, from one language to another. These are problems faced by all immigrants, and they were not absent from the experience of the immigrants to Israel—even when their motivations for coming were mainly ideological or religious.

In Israel, as in other countries of immigration, there was a certain social distance—and, at times, even alienation—between the veteran population and the immigrants. It was said at the time that "Israelis love immigration but hate immigrants." Although there was no actual hatred, many veteran Israelis certainly exhibited attitudes of condescension and superiority.

Differences in income, housing conditions, and general standard of living between the veteran population and the newcomers living in the immigration camps also left their mark. The result was a social gap between "haves" and "have-nots," leading to the feeling among many immigrants that they were being discriminated against.

Another serious difficulty resulted from the different social structures among the immigrants. In general, those who came from European countries had small families (parents and an average of two children). This was a result both of the lifestyles in their countries of origin and of the Holocaust, which destroyed families. Many Holocaust survivors arrived in Israel with "broken families."

Most of the immigrants from non-European countries, on the other hand, came with large, multi-generational families with many children (grandparents, parents, and six or seven children). Many of these families were organized into "clans" headed by an elder or patriarch. Such a clan might consist of dozens of extended families, including uncles, cousins, and many other relatives.

This social structure had existed for many generations, and contained a clear hierarchy and chain of authority. But it was not familiar to absorption workers, who had little knowledge of the lifestyles of the immigrants from non-European countries. This ignorance caused many ruptures in the relations between these immigrants and the workers. Many mistakes were made out of ignorance, especially when heads of families were turned into "social cases," thus undermining their authority and causing the breakdown of the family structure.

Another serious question that faced policymakers was whether to place the immigrants, who had come from such disparate countries of origin, in separate neighbourhoods and towns, or "mix" them together without considering where they came from.

The ideology of "the ingathering of exiles" also dictated a desire to "combine" the ethnic groups immediately upon their arrival, and create mixed communities. Soon, however, it became clear that forced integration created serious problems of incompatibility among neighbours, and brought about tensions and arguments along ethnic lines. In the mid-1950s, the immigration authorities switched to a policy of creating more homogeneous neighbourhoods and communities.

Conclusion

The discussion of immigration and absorption in Israel's first decade is, to a certain extent, arbitrary. The period's initial year (1948) is, of course, significant, since the establishment of the state was also a historic turning point for immigration; but immigration continued after 1958. It continues to this day, at rates that change according to national and international factors which dictate the size of immigration. (The immigration of nearly half-a-mil

The Bedouin Refugees in the Negev

Aref Abu-Rabia

Introduction

Most of the researchers who studied the Bedouin's history in the Negev agree that the Bedouin arrived to the Negev and Sinai from the Arabian Peninsula, and that some of them had arrived before the expansion of Islam in the 7th century. The Bedouin had three main reasons for migration: searching for grass and water sources for themselves and their livestock; avoiding blood revenge; and expansion of Islam in the 7th century. The social structure of the tribe, by ascending hierarchy, is as follows: the nuclear family, the extended family, the sub-tribe, the tribe, and the clan (federation of tribes). The traditional Bedouin family is patrilineal, patrilocal, patriarchal, endogamous, and occasionally polygamous.

The Negev Desert occupies some 12,500 sq. km. The Negev Bedouin dwell in an area of 1,000 sq. km. of which some 40 percent are range lands. This area is semi-arid and serves the Bedouin population for dwelling, grazing, and dry farming. The climatic conditions in the Negev are harsh for the vegetation, but they vary from year to year. The amount of rainfall decreases gradually from North to South, from 200–25 mm.

At the end of the British Mandate, the Bedouin population of the Negev numbered between 65,000 and 100,000 (Abu-Khusah 1979, Abu-Rabia 1994, Israel Army 1954, Marx 1967, Muhsam 1966, Shimoni 1947). These Bedouin belonged to 95 tribes which were part of the great clans or tribal confederations: Tiaha, Zullam, Tarabin, 'Azazmeh, 'Hanajreh, Jbarat, Sa'idiyeen, A'heiwat, and Jahalin (al-'Aref

Aref Abu-Rabia, Department of Behavioural Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel.

1934, Marx 1967). When the Israeli Army occupied the Negev in 1948, the majority of the tribes were expelled to Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and Sinai (Marx and Sela 1980, Diqs 1967, Higgins 1969). Other Bedouin, who were afraid of the Israeli authorities, especially because they had participated in battles against Israel, left of their own accord. The situation remained unstable until 1953, when only about 11,000 Bedouin were left in the Negev. Most of the Bedouin tribes that remained behind were remnants of tribes or branches of tribes which joined together around nineteen heads of tribes recognized by the Israeli authorities as chiefs (sheikhs). The Israeli authorities concentrated the Bedouin under military rule in the northeastern Negev, in a closed area (Sayig). A special permit had to be obtained from the authorities to enter or leave the area or to move within the region between one tribe and another. In this way, the authorities ensured that they had complete control over the Bedouin. Sheikhs, notables, and other friends of the authorities were given special permits which allowed them freedom of movement out of the closed area, on the condition that they returned to the tribe by evening. It should be noted that, after the cancellation of military rule in 1966, most of the Bedouin continued living in the former closed area.

The Bedouin land ownership has been a legal issue at least since the days of the Ottoman rule in the Negev and the Palestine. The Bedouin did not know then that the legal status of lands as laid down in Turkish law would be of significance one hundred years after it was originally defined by the Turks (Boneh 1983, p.111–25). The lands taken by the government were considered to be its property or under its control and administration. Ottoman rule permitted those using the land to work it according to law, which included

paying property tax and obtaining permission from the state for every transaction. A law enacted in 1856 classified the land into five categories: private lands (mulk); lands for agriculture or pasturage, but not for building purposes (miri); lands of the Moslem religious institutions (waqf); lands for public purposes such as crossings and public roads (matruka); and waste lands or lands which were not owned by anyone (mawat). To work mawat lands, permission had to be obtained from the Government, and the lands had to be registered. It must be remembered that only according to the legal definition was land considered to be mawat land unfit to be cultivated. When the legal definition was amended in 1921, it was no longer possible to purchase or obtain rights to these lands, even by working them (Atran 1987, Aumann 1975, Bahjat 1974, Bergheim 1895, Granott 1952, Hope-Simpson Report 1930, Graham-Brown 1980, Lewis 1987, Stein 1984).

Nevertheless, in practice, the British Mandatory authorities recognized the ownership of land by the Bedouin, and levied taxes on them on cultivated lands. Moreover, these lands became subject to sale. They were measured and registered in the land registry books; among such registered transactions were sales to the Keren Kayemet (Jewish National Fund) through Arab agents (Bresslavsky 1946, 34–91). But most Bedouin lands were not registered with the Land Registry Office, and the authorities classified the lands as mawat. According to al-Aref, the reasons for non-registration of lands were fear of the burden of government taxes, abhorrence of revealing details of private property, and the fact that the Bedouin saw no sense in registering their property on paper as proof of ownership. At that time proof, quite simply, lay in the sword. So in practice, most of the lands of the Negev were

defined as mawat (al-Aref 1933, 235–40). But the real problem lay elsewhere: the extensive areas of the Negev had simply not yet been surveyed, and could not therefore be registered, except when specific blocks of land were surveyed, usually in connection with a sale.

During British rule, the Bedouin cultivated their lands almost without interference from the authorities. The Israeli authorities adopted Ottoman law, especially in connection with mawat lands. The policy of the Israeli Lands Administration was to attempt to prevent the Bedouin from striking root in their traditional areas in the 1960s; they also sought to settle them in planned modern towns in order to vacate the land more rapidly. Today, most of the land in the Negev is held by the Lands Administration (Marx and Sela 1980, Fenster 1980). Of the approximately two million dunam cultivated by the Bedouin before the establishment of the State of Israel, about 1,800,000 dunam are in the hands of the Administration, while the Bedouin hold the rest. Almost all the land held by the Administration has been handed over to Jewish settlements in the western Negev; only about 400,000 dunam of cultivable land is in the closed area, where it is hired out to the Bedouin in small plots and on a seasonal basis. The Bedouin believe that they are owners of the land cultivated by them and that they have pasturage rights in additional areas. This right is based, in their opinion, on their forefathers seizing the land (hajr) hundreds of years ago, and on its cultivation by subsequent generations (al-Aref 1993, 1994; Kressel, Ben-David, Abu-Rabia 1991).

As a result of the Camp David Treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979, Israeli air bases in the Sinai desert had to be evacuated so that the area could be returned to Egypt. A site for the construction of a new airfield was chosen in the Tel al-Malah area, on the eastern portion of the Beer-Sheva basin. The government had to enact a special law that would enable it to start work in the area and settle the Bedouin

land problem. The initially proposed law called for the appropriation of some 300,000 dunams, almost four times the size needed for the construction of the airfield itself (Marx 1979, 6). After reconsideration of several aspects of the law, and with the input of scholars and specialists, a new version of the law was passed in the Israeli Parliament in 1980. The law stated the terms of a negotiated settlement with owners of land in the Tel al-Malah area. Drafters of the legislation intended that, once the law was implemented in Tel al-Malah, it would be extended to other areas where land problems still exist.

In its present version, the law relates only to those Bedouin who live in Tel al-Malah or cultivate land there. But it is the stated intention of the law to apply to Bedouin groups in other areas, so that a future agreement with them may become possible (Boneh 1983). In addition to land agreements with Bedouin in Tel al-Malah, and the recognition given to Bedouin as land-claimers, drafters of the law stated their intention to raise some hope for a land agreement with Bedouin groups who were previously owners of lands but were evacuted from them between 1948 and 1953 (Ben-Meir Commission Proposal 1980, 1). The recognition of the problem as relating to three different categories within the Bedouin population is important. As with the consequences of the forced evacuation and concentration of the Bedouin following the war of 1948, tribes from different areas have lived in different circumstances. Those Bedouin who have stayed on their lands, and are the subjects of the present land settlement attempts at Tel al-Malah, differ from those whose land was confiscated or its use restricted. And these two groups are different from those that were evacuated between 1948 and 1953 from areas outside the closed zone and were relocated (Boneh 1983).

The Bedouin population in the Negev in 1994 is about 85,000, comprising 40 tribes. About 40,000 live in seven permanent urban settlements planned by the authorities: Rahat, Laqia, Hura,

Tel-Sheva, Shgib, 'Aroer, and Ksifa. Some 35,000 dwell in wooden or tin huts, or concrete block houses, scattered within the various tribal areas. About 10,000 still live in tents and wander with their flocks of livestock and camels. Education plays a key role in their adaptation to the socioeconomic changes and to a new lifestyle. There has been progress in the number of schools and teachers provided, the number of children in the schools, the attendance of girls, the awareness of parents of the importance of education, and the willingness of parents to send their children to schools. In June 1994, there were 40 schools, 4 of them secondary; 25,000 students from kindergarten to 12th grade—14,000 boys, and 11,000 girls, with female students' share being 47, 41, 37, and 31 percent in grades 1, 8, 9, and 12, respectively.

The Bedouin diet is changing. Although bread was, and remains, the dietary staple, Bedouin are now freed from their previous dependence on seasonal produce. They consume more dairy products, more meat and poultry, take more sugar in their tea and coffee, and use more cooking oil in place of the traditional Samin-clarified livestock butter. They also smoke more. What is all this doing to the Bedouin? In some ways, the Negev Bedouin are beginning to resemble their fellow Israelis and are starting to acquire some of the latter's ailments— heart disease, ulcer, high blood pressure, stress, and diabetes mellitus. There are ten modern clinics serving the Bedouin population, in the urban and tribal settlements. They use the services of these clinics in case of illness, immunization, and primary health care. In case of hospitalization, the Beer-Sheva Soroka Hospital is at their service. In traditional and folk medicine, the Bedouin appeals to the dervish; the khatib—the writer of amulets; the cauterizer; the mujabbir— setting of broken or fractured bones; the herbalist; midwives; 'attar—local pharmacologist, vendor of medicinal spices.

No one knows the actual number of the Bedouin currently living in Gaza,

but by late 1948 and early 1949 some 32,000 Bedouin had arrived in the Gaza area from Beer-Sheva and the Negev Desert as refugees. Some 3,000 had also arrived from the Ramleh and Jaffa areas. The current population could be as high as 60,000. In accordance with their lifestyle, the Bedouin tend to live on the edges of populated areas, away from clinics, offices, and schools, and have little intercourse with other members of the population. Many live in makeshift shelters which are inadequate for winter cold and storms. They have tended to settle near groves and orchards, and often maintain small gardens so that some fruit and vegetables are available. There are no statistics relating to the health of the Bedouin living on the Gaza strip, but because of their isolation, wariness of strangers, and lack of money, adequate medical assistance is difficult for them to obtain. The nearest medical clinic is frequently several kilometers away and the nearest hospital much farther. They are basically a healthy group of people, but particular health problems do occur which, if treated, would greatly improve the quality of life of many families.

There are no up-to-date statistics relating to the Bedouin refugees living on the Western and Eastern Banks. In Jordan, most Palestinian refugees— including the Bedouin—gained citizenship (Brynen 1990). People may, however, retain their refugee status long after they have adapted to a new environment. But by then the meaning of being a refugee may have changed. During the earlier phase, refugeedom may have referred to their dependence, while later it may mean that the refugees organize as "refugees" in order to negotiate better with the state (Marx 1990). There are pressing problems of refugees in many parts of the world, which require answers and solutions. One of these pressing problems is the Negev's Bedouin refugees. There is a need to examine the exact nature, numbers, and conditions of the Bedouin refugees in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jordan; to describe the impact of the "Requisition of Land in Negev Law, 1980" (Peace Treaty with Egypt) on the Bedouin lands of the Negev; to examine Bedouin and Israeli land problems and possibilities for a regional solution; to determine the implications of Palestinian autonomy for the status of the Bedouin in Israel; to examine possible actions for compensation to Bedouin refugees in the Negev, Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jordan through the current peace process and negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis; to determine how many Bedouin refugees would want to return to their home lands in the Negev; and to investigate the role that Israel, the United States, European, and Arab countries might play in solving the problems of Bedouin refugees. ∎

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The Psychological Perspective of Immigration and Resettlement in Israel: Separation vs. Severance

Dan Bar-On, Michal Sadeh, and Daniela Treister[1]

Introduction

Israeli society is basically composed of accumulating waves of immigrants (Eilon 1976). Though large portions of the Israeli society are by now second and third generation of immigrants, one can still ask: When do people feel that they have finally resettled and feel "integrated"?[2] Does this process end with the first generation of immigrants? Or, alternatively, what does "becoming an Israeli" actually mean, when and how does it happen? These questions were answered differently over the years (Segev 1986, 1992). Initially a collective norm was developed defining an Israeli by external features. One was included by looking healthy ("like a Sabra"), talking Hebrew without a foreign accent, performing physical work (in the earlier days), having a social, economic, and lately also educational status; or originating from or being socialized in certain exclusive collectives (certain branches of youth movements, army units, neighbourhoods). However, over the years these norms have changed and have become vaguer. Does this change mean a "retreat" in terms of resettlement and integration, as some people evaluate it, or is it a movement "forward" as others have suggested (Segev 1992)? These differences in the narrative are part of our concern in this paper.

Generally, people tended to avoid delving too deeply into these questions during the warfare with the Arab states, because their propaganda was aimed directly at this point: "Immigrants (outsiders)! Go back to your home countries." The Israeli discourse, struggling with these attacks, pro-

Dan Bar-On, Michal Sadeh, and Daniela Treister are at the Department of Behavioural Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.

claimed a "healthy" and "well-rooted" society (Eilon 1976) which returned to its old homeland and rebuilt it. However, the beginning of the peace process, easing the need for collective identity through a common enemy, enabled us to re-examine to what extent this claim is valid, and what it is actually referring to or pointing at.

In this paper, we wish to add a psychological perspective to the concept of resettlement, discussing specifically the Israeli case. We claim that the traditional Israeli approach to resettlement (and self-determination of identity) was basically a non-psychological one, successful in the short run but problematic in the long run. We wish to show that the difference between the two approaches concentrates around the notion of severance versus separation (Bar-On 1994). The act of severance, of breaking one's ties with the original home, accompanied by a lack of psychological sophistication, had historical, ideological, and political reasons in the Israeli case, which we will discuss in some detail.

In contrast, the psychological perspective views the process of separation as much more time- and energy-consuming. It demands a slow, back-and-forth movement from the old into the new frame of reference. It implies "working through" and "mourning" (Bar-On 1994). It suggests that resettlement is not a singular act, feeling, or thought, but rather a process which has many ups and downs, until it ripens as a new internal frame of reference (of time, place, and people). Its inadequate processing would result in a pseudo resettlement: talking

about it, behaving as if it had happened, measuring external aspects of social and economic status or language, and ignoring less obvious but deeper psychological meanings (Aroian 1990, Levi 1989). The image used to describe the difference between severance and separation is an image of a tree and its roots: one can look like a huge tree and have tiny roots, or one may look like a small tree and develop deep roots. The first may grow well in a dense forest (collective), but is in danger of being torn out when standing alone, especially during a severe storm. The second may not look so beautiful, but is better accustomed to the harsh conditions of life in this area (also when being left alone). Big

> **The act of severance, of breaking one's ties with the original home, accompanied by a lack of psychological sophistication, had historical, ideological, and political reasons in the Israeli case.**

trees with deep roots take many generations to develop. Still, even trees can slowly change their rootstock, even artificially, through "support grafting" (Bar-On 1994).

At the same time, severance was never proclaimed as a goal: it became an undercurrent, a tacit given. An example: the Hebrew language became a collective symbol of Zionism. Within the manifest discourse, it was the sign of continuity and reconnectedness to the promised land. It was also the miraculous revival of a language from the holy books in everyday life, unheard of in any other culture or history of a people (Eilon 1976). However, in reality it also implied severance from one's own home culture and language. It meant that one should speak in a language different from one's own. It also implied that the grandparents from abroad would not be able to communicate with their grandchildren. One

could still justify it as a necessary break from the old tradition in order to build a common frame of reference in Israel. However, our argument is that, since it was done abruptly (which was the case for many families or individual immigrants), it brought about severance rather than separation in the process of resettlement.

We will discuss the possibility of adding to the reality of severance a psychological separation perspective, by re-establishing physical contact and emotional ties with what one severed from years ago.

Our examples are based on interviews, which two of the authors (Sadeh and Treister) have conducted, with middle-aged Israelis who have revisited their original homelands (in Morocco and Eastern Europe) some forty years after they had left them. In these cases, there was no possibility to enter those countries all these years, because the political ties between these countries and Israel were severed. We will concentrate on the difficulties in acknowledging the need for constructing a process of separation where severance had occurred, and was assumed to have "done with" emotional ties to the past.

Cutting off the Old Roots: The Israeli Sources of Severance

In the Israeli case, the act of severance of immigrants from their home culture had five independent (though interacting) sources, which could be identified in different degrees among most of the Israeli population.

Physical Severance of Immigration. During the early days of Zionism, when people left their home country and went to Palestine, they had very few economic or technical means to revisit and keep contact with their former homeland. This created a physical distance which precluded the back-and-forth movement necessary for psychological separation. In later years, the political situation prevented such revisiting, especially among the oriental Jews, who came from the Arab countries which were at war with Israel, and those from the Communist

Bloc which broke ties with Israel after the Six-Day War (Segev 1986).

Forced Severance Caused by the Holocaust. In addition to the physical severance, the Nazi extermination process eliminated any possibility for psychological separation for millions of Jews. The lucky émigrés (who fled Nazi occupation before the war) left behind homes, families, communities, and whole cultures that vanished as if they had never existed (Bar-On 1994). Survivors from the Nazi occupation who came after the war, being initially traumatized by the sudden forced severance from their parents, homes, and communities, traumatized further by the humiliation and annihilation at the hands of the Nazi regime, experienced their third and most severe traumatization in the form of the hollowness which they found in their home-setting after the war (Keilson 1992). Their fourth traumatization occurred when they were admitted as immigrants into Palestine, due to the British Mandate policy (Yablonka 1994). Their fifth traumatization occurred when they finally came to Israel and were judged and excluded by the local collective according to its own standards of heroism, blaming them for "lack of courage" to fight back Nazism (Segev 1992). As a result, many of the survivors silenced their experiences from the Holocaust. In turn, the silence and lack of possibility to mourn transmitted the traumatic effects of the Holocaust to their descendants and interfered with their resettlement processes (Davidson 1980).

Severance by Choice of the Zionist Ideology. Zionism qualified immigration to Israel in terms of good and the diaspora in terms of bad (Segev 1986). The term "to immigrate" to Israel was defined as "Aliya," which meant in Hebrew—to ascend. This term is still being used, just as emigrating abroad from Israel is still defined as "Yerida," or descent in Hebrew.

Also, instead of resettlement, one usually talks in Hebrew about "absorption," thereby implying that when making "Aliya" everyone becomes a part of one whole (Segev 1986), but

never really clarifying what that means.

During the early years of the State of Israel, the ideological component was central to the collective. It included the revival of the Hebrew language, the linkage to the tradition of the people of Israel before they went to the diaspora (after the destruction of the Second Temple), and the vision of creating the "new Jews" who will go back to manual labour and earn their living from it. A narrative of heavy criticism of Jewish life in the diaspora evolved, accompanied by an idealistic wish to break off from it by the development of an *Altnoiland*—an old-new collective, independent of the one in the diaspora. Clearly, this ideology was the kernel of the non-psychological approach to resettlement in Israel. It proscribed any need for psychological separation which would have advised an ongoing connectedness to the home culture and people. Such an approach was labelled as "weakness" which should be overcome and disassociated from.

Severance of the Secular Trend of Zionism. Within the Jewish religious community some form of continuity, both in terms of tradition and in terms of family and community ties, was regarded as highly important.

This made it possible to ease a little, the different aspects of severance and provided more opportunities for psychological separation and mourning of the original home and culture. Also, going back to Zion has always been regarded as the ultimate wish for every religious Jew in the diaspora, and this is still the case with the last immigration waves from Ethiopia. It also gave a positive meaning to many of the hardships stemming from other aspects of severance. For the secular Jew, who had severed from religion, such softening mechanisms did not exist. Unless they were organized in new forms of communities (like kibbutzim), they had to confront the various aspects of severance by themselves, almost in anomie. This may account for the many suicides in the early days of Zionist immigration to Palestine (Segev 1986).

Severance Due to the Hardships of Daily Life in Palestine and Later in Israel. The harsh reality of life in Palestine (disease, economic and social retardation, struggles with the Turks, the Arabs, and later with the British, the Arab states, and the Palestinians) preoccupied the mind and the body of most new immigrants of the early years and, to some extent, is still the verbalized norm today. Severance from the original culture became a fact of life, not only a perceived wish of an ideology; the two clearly reinforced each other. To devote time and energy for psychological separation had been seen in the 1920s and the 1930s as a luxury in a society in which few luxuries were available. However, this collective norm changed only to a limited extent when the luxuries of life became part of the Israeli culture. The non-psychological approach could not accommodate the easing of living conditions as a signal or as a justification of a more psychological approach to life, including a retroactive separation from (the almost forgotten) past culture and home. The discourse about the hardships of life now became a justification for ongoing severance—continuing the non-psychological approach of resettlement (Segev 1992).

To summarize, in the Israeli society severance became a reality as well as a mental construct: it created a collective narrative which reflected an interaction of the need, the must, and the wish. Within this narrative there were, however, many contradictions. As already mentioned, religion versus secularity was one of them. But even within this global theme there were many different variants. For example, the Oriental Jews have a Sephardic tradition which is different from the Ashkenazi one of European Jews. The European tradition is more principle-oriented and less people-friendly than the Oriental tradition (Bar-On 1986). In addition, many of the East European Jews broke off from their extended family for Zionist ideological reasons (or were forced to, owing to the Holocaust) as part of their immigration and resettlement. Some of them severed their ties

with their extended family before they had left for Israel, owing to processes of modernization and secularization (Segev 1986). Quite a few of the Oriental Jews immigrated to Israel together with their extended families in the early 1950s. Still, for some of them, the family lost its authority structure in the process of immigration. Others, immigrating from the United States and South America, had more financial means and ability to go back and forth during their initial years in Israel. Each of these factors, and many others, affected the quality and total effect of severance or the feasibility for more or less psychological separation.

Confronted by a dense coalition of enemies, the Israeli society tried to show its relative strength by creating the image of a newly-born nation, flexible and creative, powerful in military and economic achievements. The

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young Israeli, with his open shirt, shorts, and sandals, looked well-rooted in this alien environment. Immigrants to the new state were trained to fit into this image: to learn Hebrew, adjust to the climate, tour the country, and join the army. The Israeli identity was basically that of a youth culture. It was characterized by Herzel's famous slogan: "If you wish it, it will not be a legend (but a reality)." The total identification with the Zionist ideology reinforced severance and its non-psychological perspective of resettlement.

During the early years (the 1920s to the 1940s), when the collective narrative worshipped severance, there were also individuals who intuitively practised more adequate psychological separation, paying the price of social marginality. They spoke their native language with their children and their fellow people. They tried to maintain emotional contact with and adhered to the traditional signifiers of their home

culture, until they and their descendants adopted new, local signifiers. If possible, they revisited their home culture before they finally made the choice to resettle in Israel. However, they paid a certain price: not living up to the standards of the collective, they were looked down upon by the "real" Israelis who refrained from such visits (by choice, through compliance with the dominant norm, or because of external man-made catastrophes like the Holocaust).

Severance Re-examined: Transgenerational Transmission

One could assume or claim that, owing to the powerful combination of necessity and ideology, severance would finally bring about successful resettlement and integration. Even if some emotional price had been paid for inadequate separation processing,

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To summarize, in the Israeli society severance became a reality as well as a mental construct: it created a collective narrative which reflected an interaction of the need, the must, and the wish. Within this narrative there were, however, many contradictions.

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biological processes and reality are stronger than psychologists tend to acknowledge. One would then expect that the children or grandchildren of the severed immigrants would feel deeply rooted, because they no longer suffered from the same emotional ties or childhood memories as did their parents. However, we have quite a few examples that the opposite was true. The negative aftereffects of severance could be easily transmitted to the following generations through repressed, delegitimized, or inadequate mourning processes, through "untold" or silenced stories of idealization or of traumatic experiences (Bar-On 1994). For example, in kibbutzim, one can observe today that there are founders who were left alone (their descendants had left the kibbutz), while there are others whose extended families live with them in the same kibbutz. Among the former, we find founders who, paradoxically, invested most of their energy in building up the new

society (practising and adhering to severance). Many of their descendants left the kibbutz and even emigrated from Israel. When interviewed, the latter relate their choice to their traumatic childhood, blaming their parents for the lack of attention they received in childhood, in comparison to those parents who were less fanatic about the kibbutz and more children-minded all along (Bar-On 1986).

Further, among families of Holocaust survivors, we see today a growing consciousness and legitimating to reconnect to their painful past. The grandchildren, even more than the children, feel the need to open up previously sealed-off topics that survivors had silenced for many years owing to subjective and collective reasons. We find families in which grandchildren go with their grandparents to visit their home setting abroad, even if no living family members still exist there (Bar-On 1994). This trend is associated with a new awareness of previous delegitimation of Holocaust survivors by the Israeli collective during the 1950s and 1960s, different from other forms of delegitimation of the Israeli collective (Segev 1992, Levi 1989).

In addition to legitimating and relinking oneself to roots from the past, there is also the quest to re-examine the previous ideology of severance. While some blame the parents for not allowing or enabling processing of separation (as in the case of the kibbutz descendants, above), others show more understanding for the harsh conditions which precluded the legitimating of separation and the lack of consciousness concerning its importance for resettlement. However, the narrative did not change from adhering to severance to adhering to separation. Some people still evaluate these new trends as "retreat" and "giving up" of the Zionist zeal (Meged, in Rabinowitch 1994). For more psychologically-minded people, the same trends are evaluated as compensating for inadequate processing from the past and "healthy," though difficult to achieve after all these years (Rabinowitch 1994).

Aroian (1990) suggested a psychological model for separation versus severance in the American context: Poles who revisited their home country, many years after they had emigrated, became more deeply engaged and rooted in their new context in the United States, when compared to Poles who did not bother to revisit the old country. She claimed that the former could test in reality fantasies about the "good old times" and thereby work through and let go of these fantasies. Levi examines the reasons for Moroccan Jews' visits to their original home setting. He provides a sociological perspective: they go to find their Moroccan roots and find their Israeli identity (Levi 1989).

We decided to examine these theories in the Israeli context. We interviewed 15 persons who revisited their countries of origin, in Morocco and Eastern Europe.[3] We were interested in their motives, why and when they decided to go, how they experienced their visit, and how (if at all) it affected their life in Israel thereafter. The interviews were open-ended, asking the subjects to tell their life stories. They were further analyzed by methods of biographical and narrative analysis (Bar-On 1994). One should note that it was impossible to visit these countries for more than forty years. However, there is a difference between the emotional meaning of revisiting one's home setting after a Holocaust (like Poland), and revisiting a home setting which one had left by choice (or a mixture of threat, collective norm, and choice) like Morocco. This difference aside, there is also the difference of social status and social absorption in the Israeli society. While the Eastern Europeans were, and to some extent still are, the dominant stream in the Israeli society,[4] the Moroccan Jews suffered humiliation during their immigration and social marginalization for many years thereafter.

Summary of Three Interviews

Rachel[5] was born in Uzbekistan shortly after World War II. She was eight months old when her family moved back to Poland, which they had fled from the Nazi persecution and extermination. When Rachel was twelve, her parents decided to immigrate to Israel. Rachel integrated very quickly into the Israeli society and culture. She did her best to become an Israeli in every possible sense. However, when she married (another Jewish-Polish émigré), she renewed her love for the Polish language, culture, and especially manners. Rachel developed a kind of parallel life in the two (Israeli and Polish) cultures. She and her husband decided to revisit Poland in 1989. Several additional visits in the former USSR followed, on a formal mission of the Israeli government. During these visits Rachel visited her home (birth) town and addressed her roots there.

The most striking theme in the interview with Rachel was her need for balance and integrity. However, the visits to Poland and Russia upset that balance. During her first visit to Poland, she first felt very much "at home" and was overwhelmed by her strong emotions. However, at some point, she suddenly shifted to the other extreme: "[A]fter that a few days passed and all of a sudden I felt I did not want to see them, I was not interested in those disgusting Poles, they made me angry with their ugly manners. Everything was hypocritical, did not belong to me. I was not at all interested in the culture: Where am I and where are they!"

This visit strengthened her sense of belonging to Israel and she developed "patriotic, even nationalistic" feelings, which she had never had before. This was accompanied with a drastic change from admiration to rejection of the Polish culture. Rachel said she would never return to visit Poland, redefining her roots orientation towards Russia.

It seems to us as though Rachel had started her visit in Poland with one intention (to reconnect to her roots there) and suddenly shifted to the other extreme. Though we do not know exactly what caused the change, we hypothesize, based on analyzing her narrative, that the same factors which attracted her to the Polish herit-

age (their manners and culture) suddenly became "disgusting" and "hypocritical" for her. She actually lost the sense of balance and integrity carefully maintained for many years and came out of that visit "more patriotic, even nationalistic" as an Israeli. In our interpretation, she suddenly backed off from the process of separation and mourning (perhaps it became too difficult for her), thereby increasing her psychological severance from her home culture, clinging now to her resettlement in Israel, a process probably similar to the one she experienced during her early years in this country.

Moshe (40) was born in Morocco and immigrated with his family to Israel in 1954 as a five-month-old baby. He grew up in a development town in the south of Israel. He became a lawyer, and was recently nominated as a judge. Moshe tried to become an Israeli according to the dominant norms of Western culture. He learned about the Moroccan culture mostly through the tales of his father. However, because of his father's poor economic status and feelings of deprivation in Israel, Moshe believed that his father "made it all up," glorifying and clinging to an imagined past to avoid the harsh reality of resettlement. Moshe learned to resent and disassociate himself from his father's stories.

In his mature years, having attained success socially and economically, and after the death of his father, Moshe felt a strong need to revisit his birthplace in Morocco. He went to Morocco three times, visiting the village where he was born. Each visit was characterized by a deeper penetration into the way of life and culture of the village. Moshe learned a lot about the heritage of his father's family and their importance in the life of the local Jewish community for generations. Moshe had to admit to himself that he had originally misjudged his father's stories about the latter's life in Morocco. This changed Moshe's attitude towards Jewish life in Morocco almost to the point of idealization. However, alongside with this new identification with the heritage of his father, Moshe also reported a

"deeper sense of reconciliation" with his life in Israel.

In Moshe's case, we find traces of strong severance from his original heritage owing to the low status of his parents after immigration and resettlement, and his own wish to "make it" according to dominant (Western) norms. He disassociated himself emotionally from his father and the latter's "imaginary" tales about the good life in Morocco.

Unlike Rachel's, Moshe's visits to his home village helped him re-examine his roots (his relations to his father), and redefine his identity as a proud Moroccan Jew. This, in turn, added a new quality to his Israeli identity, as he could now mourn and separate from

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One may not observe and become sensitive to the differences in their psychological processes of separation and resettlement until one analyzes their stories.

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his father and original homeland. Now he could feel as a proud Israeli not based only on (alien) dominant standards, but also based on his own Jewish-Moroccan origin. Still, Moshe is perhaps stuck in a new phase of idealization which may hamper further separation processes (Bar-On 1994). Levi (1989) reports of another possibility, closer to that which Aroian mentioned (1990): during the visit to Morocco, Moroccan Israelis have the opportunity to test their previous idealizations of their place of birth, thereby reorganizing their relationship to their past and present homeland.

Joseph was born in the Ukraine in 1929 and immigrated to Israel in 1949. After being absorbed in his new country, he studied, became a banker, and later a bank manager in central Israel. When Joseph was twelve years old, the Nazis had entered his home town and murdered his father before his eyes. This traumatic experience was incised in his memory in addition to his own traumatic experiences in the Holocaust. Of all the interviewees, Joseph stood out in his obstinate desire to visit his home town even before Israel had

diplomatic relations with the former USSR.

"I felt so strongly that I should go. I wrote all kinds of letters to Khrushchev, Bulganin and everyone else who had power at that time. I begged them to let me in, even for one day, so I could visit and sit at my father's grave." Eventually, in 1990 Joseph went to visit his home town and his father's grave, and subsequently revisited these places with his sister. He describes a sense of belonging and reconciliation with his life in Israel as a result of these visits. He plans to go on with these visits and also invite his children to join.

Joseph's severance was a sharp one and difficult to process. In an intuitive psychological sense, Joseph insisted on working through the severance. He felt that only a visit at his father's grave would support such a process. The repeated visits facilitated the process of separation and mourning from his father, thereby also improving his reconciliation with life in Israel. We feel that his plans to go on with these trips (with his children) show that not just the process of separation from the memory of his murdered father is involved, but also other aspects of his original culture. Again, however, many more aspects of the past may have to be worked through, and we do not yet know if Joseph will be able to find the way and the time to handle them.

Discussion

Consequences of integrating the psychological approach of resettlement into therapy, education, and immigration policy making. It is to be emphasized that Rachel, Moshe, and Joseph may speak equally highly of their immigration and resettlement in Israel in their daily discourse. However, the previous analysis showed that, within this common narrative, there are many possibilities and undercurrents relat-

ing to separation and severance. Each of these three persons recently revisited their original home setting. However, for each one it was a different experience, based on their personal life history and life story (Bar-On 1994). One may not observe and become sensitive to the differences in their psychological processes of separation and resettlement until one analyzes their stories. Still, these psychological integrative efforts have been constructed within a social context, in which the ideology and reality of severance are still dominant. The more we become sensitive to such ongoing needs of mourning and separation, the more we will also contribute to processes of reconciliation with life in Israel (Segev 1992).

We could learn from the interviews that the picture is complex. Revisiting one's old home setting stirs up strong emotional reactions. For some, like Joseph or Moshe, it had a healing effect of rebinding and opening up, while for others, like Rachel, it caused an emotional burden and closed up something. This difference could be accounted for by a variety of factors, such as their social status and support, their personal ripeness to move from severance to separation, and others. The rebinding may also yield new idealizations, which may in turn cause new forms of severance, unless processing separates into further steps (Bar-On 1994).

One could conclude that the possibility to integrate a more psychologically-oriented approach of separation into the reality and notion of severance should be applied carefully. Its application has, however, a wide range of potential settings: in therapy, in education, and in policy making. In therapy one could suggest that, if extreme severance during resettlement should be diagnosed (even among previous generations), careful processing of mourning and separation should be recommended. Here, one should be aware of the possibility of counter-transference: therapists may suffer from the same problems of severance which their clients bring up in the

therapeutic setting. This would require special attention on the part of the therapists as well as their clients. In education (where the same danger of counter-transference exists), one could suggest educational programs which may legitimize rebinding to the family's past, especially before immigrating, including linguistic expressions, cultural habits, and family memories. One such program, though mostly poorly practised, was already formalized: the project of "family roots" in the sixth grade. However, many more such programs could be developed for different age groups, in literature, history, geography, and social sciences. In this connection, the trips of youngsters to Poland, as organized by the Ministry of Education under the heading of Linking to the Past, have been heavily politicized, and may even reinforce severance instead of separation (Bar-On 1994).

Concerning immigration policy making (where counter-transference could happen as well), the psychological notion of separation demands a more prolonged attitude to absorption and resettlement. One has to consider the specific aspect of severance which each wave of immigrants brings with them. We saw that the religious are different from the secular, the wealthy from the poor, the Ethiopian from the Russian, all in terms of their specific combination of severance. Therefore, the support they need in terms of processing adequate separation should also be adequately developed. In summary, we advocate the possibility of separation in an Israeli reality and ideology of severance. We feel that avoiding this aspect of experience has caused many problems in the process of resettlement; we now have new opportunities to address these issues and resolve them, through the helping professions and through policy making.■

Notes

1. This paper is part of a study on the issues of uprooting and re-rooting, conducted by the first author and supported by the Raab Center for the Study of the Holocaust and Redemption at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. For correspondence please write to Professor Dan Bar-On, Department of Behavioural Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P. O. Box 653, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel.

2. The word "integrated" is problematic in the sense that one assumes a collective identity to be integrated into. This was clearly not the case during the 1950s or even the 1960s (Segev 1986).

3. The full report of the 15 interviews is now in preparation by the authors. Narrative analysis of the interviews was conducted by using the method of Prof. G. Rosenthal (1987).

4. Here one should be careful. As mentioned earlier, this was true especially for those who had immigrated in the 1920s and 1930s. Those who came after the war (Holocaust survivors) also suffered from social judgment, based on the local norms of heroism (Yablonka 1994).

5. All names and personal details were changed to help maintain interviewees' anonymity. All interviewees gave their consent to be interviewed and cited in scientific reports.

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16. PRO/FO371/91401/EE1821/63, 2 April 1951, [Foreign Office] internal memorandum: Note regarding handing over refugee relief to Arab governments; PRO/FO371/91403/EE1821/ 119, 30 October 1951, From: James Keen, UNRWA, Beirut, To: the Foreign Office, London.

17. PRO/FO371/82239/EE1823/13, 6 April 1950, From: British Legation, Damascus, To: the Foreign Office, London.

18. PRO/F0371/91404/EE1822/24, 30 March 1951, *Finances for United Nations Relief and Works* Agency, Memorandum by Sir Henry F. Knight, United Kingdom Delegation, Advisory Commission, UNRWA, Beirut.

19. PRO/FO371/82595/E1461/11/G, 4 July 1950, Top Secret Foreign Office memorandum.

20. PRO/FO371/91404/EE1822/6, 17 January 1951, enclosing an UNRWA inter-office memorandum of 8 December 1950, p. 3; PRO/FO371/ 98489/EE1805/2, 18 July 1952, From: British Legation, Tel Aviv, To: the Foreign Office, London.

21. *op.cit.,p.* 8.

22. PRO/FO371/91411/EE1828/1, UNRWA monthly report for November 1950; PRO/ FO371/91411/EE1826/6, UNRWA Haifa monthly report for December 1950; NA/ RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/Box14/ Folder 571(PRWA)/5 June 1952/From: the Ambassador,Tel Aviv, To: the Secretary of State; ISA/FM2406/17A/Israel Foreign Ministry/31 December 1952/Treatment of former Arab refugees in Israel, a report covering the period 4 September 1952—15 December 1952 by the International Organizations Section of the Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem.

23. PRO/F0371/91404/EE1822/22, 7 March 1951, Assistance to the Palestine refugees; note by the Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly; PRO/FO371/98505/ EE1824/21, 26 March 1952, *Palestine Refugees*, Foreign Office internal memorandum by T.E. Evans, Middle East Secretariat.

24. cf. PRO/F0371/91410/EE1826/14, 26 January 1951, UNRWA summary record of the 5th meeting of the Advisory Commission and the Director with the Conciliation Commission, held in Beirut, 26 January 1951.

25. PRO/F0371/91410/EE1826/44, 14 December 1951, summary of discussion between the Israeli Ambassador, London, and the British Secretary of State; NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/Box14/Folder 571(PRWA)/4 April 1952/ From: [Keeler], Tel Aviv, To: the Secretary of State.

26. PRO/F0371/91410/EE1826/45, 19 December 1951, From: the Ambassador, UK Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Paris, To: the Foreign office, London; NA/ RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/Box 14/Folder 571/ 20 December 1951/From: the Ambassador, Tel Aviv, To: the Secretary of State.

27. PRO/F0371/91410/EE1826/42, [5 December 1951], suggested approach to Mr. Sharet; it is evident that the British Government shared these views.

28. UNRWA officials shared this rather positive picture of cooperation, see: PRO/FO371/ 91411/EE1828/14, UNRWA Haifa monthly report for January 1951; PRO/FO371/91410/ EE1826/14, 26 January 1951, UNRWA summary record of the 5th meeting of the Advisory Commission and the Director with the Conciliation Commission, held in Beirut, 26 January 1951, p. 12.

29. PRO/FO371/91401/EE1821/71, 9 May 1951, From: Sir Henry F. Knight, United Kingdom Delegation, Advisory Commission, UNRWA, Beirut, To: the Foreign Office.

30. PRO/FO371/91708/ER1016/5, 8 May 1951.

31. NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/Box 14/Folder 571(PRWA)/4 April 1952/From: [Keeler], Tel Aviv, To: the Secretary of State; PRO/FO371/ 98520/ EE18216/5, 6 May 1952, From: Sir Henry F. Knight, United Kingdom Delegation, Advisory Commission, UNRWA, Beirut, To: the Foreign Office, London.

32. PRO/FO371/91411/EE1828/14, UNRWA Haifa monthly report for January 1951; the Israeli takeover was completed only in 1952: see: PRO/FO371/ 98789/ER1016/3, 8 February 1952.

33. NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/Box 14/Folder 571(PRWA)/18 April 1952/From: [Keeler], Tel Aviv, To: the Secretary of State.

34. NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/Box 14/Folder 571(UNRWA, SECRET)/8 May 1952/From: the Secretary of State, To: U.S. Delegation, Amman.

35. NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/Box 14/Folder 571(PRWA)/14 May 1952/From: Minor, Beirut, To: the Secretary of State; NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950–52)/ Box 14/Folder 571(PRWA)/9 June 1952/From: the Ambassador,Tel Aviv, To: secretary of state; NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950–52)/Box 14/ Folder 571(PRWA)/9 July 1952/From: the Charge d'Affairs, Amman, To: the Secretary of State.

36. NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/Box 14/Folder 571(PRWA)/28 May 1952/From: the Ambassador,Tel Aviv, To: the Secretary of State; 28 May 1952, From: Minor, Beirut, To: the Secretary of State; NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/ Box 14/Folder 571(UNRWA)/ 20 May 1952/From: Bergus, Beirut, To: the Secretary of state; NA/RG84/Tel Aviv(1950-52)/Box14/ Folder 571(PRWA)/19 June 1952/ From: the Secretary of State, To: the Ambassador, Tel Aviv.

37. ISA/FM2445/1/Israel Foreign Ministry/8 September 1952/minutes of the Ministerial Refugee Affairs Committee.

38. ISA/FM2445/2A/Israel Foreign Ministry/9 November 1952/Internal memorandum of the International Organizations Section of the Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem.

39. ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Foreign Ministry/15 June 1949/From: Gershon Meron, Tel Aviv, To: Walter Eytan, Lausanne.

40. ISA/FM2445/2A/Israel Foreign Ministry/12 November 1952/comments of the Prime Minister's adviser on Arab affairs on the Internal memorandum of the International Organizations Section of the Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem.꜕

lion Jews from the former Soviet Union in the past four years is a clear example.)

Nevertheless, the arrival of one million immigrants during the first decade was revolutionary in every respect. It was a demographic revolution, increasing the country's population by 250 percent. It was a psychological revolution, because it gave the young state a feeling of power. This immigration also brought about a social revolution, changing the composition of the population and making Israel more heterogeneous, less "European," and more "Mediterranean" and "Middle Eastern."

The arrival of one million immigrants also gave Israel a jumping-off point for the development of a large, modern agricultural sector and for the beginnings of modern industry.

The immigration made possible the establishment of hundreds of new villages and some 30 new towns. In this manner, the government was able to carry out its policy of distributing the population to all areas of the country.

We also discussed the enormous difficulties of immigrant absorption, as well as the mistakes whose scars remain to this day. It is an achievement, however, that the absorption of the immigrants was accomplished while maintaining rapid economic growth, with relatively low levels of inflation and unemployment.

Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, made immigration and its absorption the highest national priority. He used his authority to make the subject a most prestigious cause, and turned immigration into the flagship of the state of Israel. ∎

Book Review
Global Apartheid:
Refugees, Racism, and the New World Order

by Anthony H. Richmond

Reviewed by Kathleen Valtonen

Anthony Richmond's topical work is a collection of essays that deal with the impact of postindustrialism, postmodernism, and globalization on international migration, racial conflict, and ethnic nationalism. Some of his previously published articles, in edited and updated form, are included, and they add depth to the current perspective. The content is organized into three sections: an extensive section on theory; analysis of the main issues with an emphasis on the multivariate nature of migration flows and ethnic relations, followed by comparisons of the policies and responses of Great Britain, the United States, and Australia with those of Canada; and the final section focuses on the priorities and dilemmas of the postindustrial era, and on prescriptive alternatives for the New World Order.

Richmond uses forcefully the analogy of apartheid to describe the strategy that is being adopted by the industrialized countries of Europe, North America, Australasia, and other wealthy enclaves that are seeking to protect themselves from what they perceive to be a singular threat to their territorial integrity and privileged lifestyles. This threat is posed by the increasing pressure of international migration movements—mass migration from poorer to richer countries, from those where government systems have collapsed to those with more stable political environments. The scale of migration has grown and the nature of

Kathleen Valtonen is a visiting researcher at the Centre for Refugee Studies. She is working on her doctoral program at the Department of Social Policy, University of Turku, Finland, on refugee and immigrant resettlement in Finland and Canada.

the flows has changed as a consequence of events and processes in our globalized, postindustrial society. It is estimated that 70 million persons live and work in other countries, and more than one million people emigrate permanently every year (UNFPA 1993). The fact that a majority of the 23 million refugees and displaced persons in the world today are from the Third World raises the question of racism, especially in the context of inhospitable responses by developed countries.

Richmond points out that while official apartheid in South Africa (the subject of some of his earlier work in

1955 and 1961) is being dismantled, the rest of the world seems bent on constructing restrictive policies and instruments of control that bear remarkable resemblance to those fashioned in South Africa in the 1950s. The reasons being advanced to justify imposition of systems of separation or "apartheid" have a familiar ring: defence of existing cultural and social institutions, state security, maintenance of law and order, the need to preserve ethnic identity, preservation of economic privilege, and the need to regulate and manage population movements. In our postindustrial society, the hedge of bitter wild almond planted by the Dutch colonials takes the form of armed frontier patrols, computer data banks, fingerprinting, travel documents, judicial hearings and, not least, the interdiction nets implicit in policy instruments like the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention.

The greatly accelerated rate of change brought about by technological advance (the revolution in communications being a salient example) has made possible closer linkages and interdependence in many areas. Incidents occurring in one place trigger a chain of events the effects of which are felt in countries far removed from the source. On the other hand, globalization has brought contradictions. The global economy is dominated by the interlinked economies of the United States, Europe, Japan, and the rapidly expanding ones of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. A glaring contradiction in the current process of global change is that, while money, goods, and information flow relatively freely across borders, people do not. Migration pressures have resulted from shifts in the location of economic growth areas and from displacement caused by conflict. The main response

> *The question is whether cultural pluralism is compatible with equality of opportunity and the coaptation of immigrants. As globalization proceeds, will heterogeneity persist, leading to deterritorialization of cultures, at the expense of homogeneity?*

has been to try to stem the flow, to label as "illegal" or "undesirable" people who formerly would have been welcomed as useful workers or escapees from oppressive regimes. This rudimentary approach to a complex phenomenon inherent in the whole process of globalization does not address the situation. The fortress walls will be eroded: "[a] system of global apartheid is bound to fail" (p. 216).

In his book, Richmond takes up the challenge of providing a competent forum for the raising of many controversial issues that are otherwise at the forefront of current political discourse in Canada and elsewhere. Given the constraints imposed by the rapidity and unpredictability of change that make it difficult to assess the significance of phenomena he has, in my opinion, succeeded. He states, for ex-

ample, that ethnic diversity is characteristic of almost all postindustrial societies. The question is whether cultural pluralism is compatible with equality of opportunity and the coaptation of immigrants. As globalization proceeds, will heterogeneity persist, leading to de-territorialization of cultures, at the expense of homogeneity?

While we are witnessing an era of change that is fraught with structural contradictions and a high potential for social conflict, we lack effective global governmental institutions. The United Nations "has failed dismally to prevent civil wars from occurring on all continents" (p. 223). How then can politicians, bureaucrats, and academics respond to the responsibility of formulating policies concerning peacekeeping, international migration, and refugee movements? At one of the few junctures in the book at which the author sets out concrete suggestions for proceeding in the New World Order, he states the imperative of dismissing as anachronistic all previous plans and programs. The whole system must be rethought in global terms and along the lines of international cooperation. Short-term self-interest must yield to policies promoting the long-term interest of all concerned, including the so-called developing countries, whose people must participate actively in making decisions that concern them.

Richmond argues that state sovereignty can no longer be maintained in an absolute way: "all boundaries are permeable and borders can no longer be defended with walls, iron curtains, armed guards, or computer surveillance systems" (p. 205). Sustainable development must be practised, and territories and their resources, material and human, must be held in trust for posterity.

Departing at times from the level of a largely structural analysis, the author links the preoccupation with territorial integrity and state sovereignty with individuals' "ontological security" needs and collective fears of loss of identity.

The author presents an extensive empirical analysis of the configurations of the present-day catalysts of social, economic, and political change that are at the root of regional instability and migration pressures: the legacy of colonialism, economic disparities between developed and developing countries, political confrontation between the superpowers, recent changes in Eastern Europe (the disintegration of the Soviet Union), the international arms bazaar. The reader should consult at an early stage the final chapter in which the author presents three alternative scenarios for the New World Order. In this way, the data in the thematic essays on, for example, "Racism and Immigration" and "Migration, Ethnic Conflict and the New World Order," can be more readily related to the typologies that facilitate the reader's own formulation of concrete alternatives in the New World Order. This is undoubtedly a process that the author intends to initiate.

The three scenarios are the nostalgic, the pragmatic, and the utopian. Significantly, the author has located the United Nations, its agencies, and Conventions within the realistic utopian alternative. At the end of the book the reader realizes that, as the author pointed out earlier, there is no exit from the global impasse. Because the author has so skilfully led the reader up to this point, the much less tangible nature of the alternatives indicated in the last chapter leaves the reader wishing for a more substantial closing to a dynamic work.

The author gives considerable weight to the theory underpinning the central issues and concepts, opening up for the student reader the parameters of academic scrutiny. This book is an exhaustive contemporary work on the impact of globalization and postindustrialization on migration and racial/ethnic conflict issues. Its wealth of empirical material, and the substantial body of relevant theory as well as policy implications, make it thought-provoking and recommended reading for students, policymakers, and researchers. ■

Immigration and Refugee Board

Convention Refugee Determination Division

Claims Process Period: January 1, 1994 – September 30, 1994

Regional Summary

	Ottawa/ Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	B.C.	National
Claims heard to completion (includes cases referred before 1994)	1,291	4,884	8,396	380	850	15,801
Decisions rendered	1,377	5,039	10,018	413	987	17,834
Claims rejected	172	1,199	3,588	104	462	5,525
Claims upheld	1,205	3,840	6,430	309	525	12,309
Withdrawn/abandoned	212	483	1,515	52	384	2,646
Decisions pending *	64	357	699	14	149	1,283
Claims pending **	809	5,781	6,903	220	1,623	15,335

* Decisions pending include all claims heard to completion for which no decision had been rendered by the end of the reporting period.

** Claims pending include all claims referred to the Convention Refugee Determination Division that have not been finalized (i.e. by a positive or negative decision or by withdrawal or abandonment) as of the end of the reporting period.

Statistical Summary by Major Source Countries

Country of Alleged Persecution	Claims Heard to Completion	Withdrawn/ Abandoned	Convention Refugee Status Claims Decided	Yes	No	Acceptance Level Rate%
1. Sri Lanka	2,406	120	2,683	2,365	318	88.1
2. Somalia	2,006	95	2,083	2,000	83	96.0
3. Iran	899	77	1,009	821	188	81.4
4. India	738	255	791	409	382	51.7
5. Israel	590	72	789	344	445	43.6
6. Bangladesh	493	52	540	381	159	70.6
7. Pakistan	431	107	534	328	206	61.4
8. China	397	69	521	231	290	44.3
9. Russia	373	51	472	313	159	66.3
10. Guatemala	368	67	378	218	160	57.7
11. Yugoslavia	354	213	388	296	92	76.3
12. Haiti	339	11	350	298	52	85.1
13. Romania	333	47	367	183	184	49.9
14. Afghanistan	328	19	333	303	30	91.0
15. Peru	283	12	310	233	77	75.2
16. Lebanon	277	59	342	191	151	55.8
17. El Salvador	266	96	280	97	183	34.6
18. Moldova	243	21	300	206	94	68.7
19. Zaire	237	13	239	218	21	91.2
20. Ukraine	219	67	276	163	113	59.1
21. Algeria	201	31	204	159	45	77.9
22. Burundi	186	2	188	187	1	99.5
23. Sudan	186	10	199	179	20	89.9
24. Iraq	170	17	169	162	7	95.9
25. Ghana	162	78	194	56	138	28.9
Top 25 Countries	12,483	1,661	13,939	10,341	3,598	74.2
Total	15,801	2,646	17,834	12,309	5,525	69.0

Source: Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa; News Release, November 25, 1994

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Dr. Tom Clark, Summer Course Coordinator
Centre for Refugee Studies, York University
Suite 322, York Lanes, 4700 Keele Street
North York, ON M3J 1P3 Canada
Tel: (416) 736-5663 • Fax: (416) 736-5837
Internet: tclark@vml.yorku.ca