CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGE

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SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Aiding and Abetting: Refugee Politics in the Territories of the Former Yugoslavia

Edith S. Klein

Probably the most vivid images in Western minds of the wars in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina are those of columns of people marching away from their burned-out villages, or of children leaving their parents and boarding buses to escape from their war-ravaged cities. These images are more than merely symbolic. Indeed, the massive movement of citizens of the former Yugoslavia away from their homes—whether a farm in a village caught in the crossfire, or a city apartment located on the wrong side of a bridge—is the central feature driving the war brought on by the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.

One of the common features of the many political crises of the post-Cold War era has been intense conflict between members of ethnic groups that had formerly lived together in the same state. With the disintegration of the federal states of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, the idea of re-associating populations with territories seems to have remarkable appeal. Indeed, each successive war in Europe has shifted boundaries slightly in favour of conterminous territorial and demographic units. Thus, while there is nothing essentially new in the idea itself, it has managed in an unusually short period of time to launch newly formed political parties into power and armies into war. Observers of these crises, as well as participants, debate the reasons for the dramatic resurgence of ethnic antagonisms, but on one point there would surely be

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agreement: the redrawing of borders to accommodate ethnocultural communities, or the accommodation of ethnocultural communities to existing borders, will in either case require massive population movement. At present, these alternative scenarios are being fought over in the regions of former Yugoslavia.

While all wars produce refugees,[1] the displacement of civilians in the territories of the former Yugoslavia has reached massive proportions. By the end of 1993, it was estimated that approximately one in five persons had been displaced by the war (4.2 million people out of a prewar population of 22 million), with the largest displacement occurring in the first six months of 1993, i.e., in the wake of intensification of the Bosnian conflict.[2] Yugoslav refugees, civilians forced out of their homes at gunpoint or through deprivation of life-sustaining needs, or escaping before the onset of direct combat, fled in many directions: some to Serbia, some to Croatia, others to third countries (abroad), while many were displaced within Bosnia itself—to "safe" areas or regions controlled by their own ethnic group. It is difficult to say with any precision who the refugees are, why they left, what the circumstances were like in which they departed, what they left behind, how they made their journeys, what awaited them in their destinations, and how their lives have been irreparably damaged. Transformed and traumatized by the experience of war, they were traumatized once again through the process of becoming refugees.

The characteristics of the refugee population on the territories of former Yugoslavia (and beyond its borders) are now the subject of extensive research efforts by a number of scholars, some of whom have contributed their work to this issue of *Refuge*. This area of research is more than descriptive, however; these scholars understand the refugees produced by these wars as symptomatic of violent social upheaval in its post-cold-war rendition—the shifting of the burden of conflict more directly onto civilians, the creation and reinforcement of ethnic or national identity by efficient and effective media in service to the state, and the rapid fragmentation and shattering of individual life histories.

It should also be noted that this refugee population is the target group of what may turn out to be the largest humanitarian effort of its kind ever undertaken by the international community. In an era when the relationship between humanitarian intervention and military conflict is becoming increasingly nebulous, it is vital to understand more about the target population and the impact of assistance from a material, psychological, and political (including logistical) perspective. The Guest Editor of this issue of *Refuge*, Maja Korac, has drawn together a number of papers that shed some light on the internal and international facets of the conflict on the territories of the former Yugoslavia. By way of background, I offer some brief notes on the context of this research so that the reader may have a better appreciation of some of the obstacles placed in the path of such inquiries.

Reconstruction of Identity

In modern-day warfare, the distinction between civilian and non-civilian groups in battle zones is becoming increasingly blurred, to the extent that principles of international humanitarian law seem irrelevant. Within the logic of this stance taken by belligerents in ethnic conflicts, civilian populations are legitimate objects of violence, either in direct combat or through forced expulsion. Thus, the civilian's ethnic identity becomes the involuntary equivalent to a marker of military allegiance. In itself this might not be so unusual were it not for the

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fact that refugees from the Bosnian and Croatian wars became, for all practical purposes, "internal" refugees.

This state of affairs had several important ramifications. Above all, it threatened to homogenize ethnic identity by making it a paramount category for the individual, who might in normal circumstances be indifferent to, vaguely aware of, or generally uninterested in that identity. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims became undifferentiated groups. At the same time, individuals whose ethnic identity was unknown, unclear, or had been relinquished experienced an unwanted identity crisis.[3] This reconstruction of identity is also defined in terms of the "other"—a neighbour, close friend, or even family member, who now becomes an enemy. At the level of the individual, as well as of the state, the future is hostage to the past, as the redefinition of one's national group (a process which in normal circumstances might take generations) happens overnight, and is accompanied with much uncertainty. Croatian and Serbian scholars have already begun to document the traumatizing impact of such identity crises among refugees.[4] In their contributions to the present collection, Slobodan Drakulic addresses the complex political backdrop that set the stage for these crises; Zarana Papic examines the dynamic development of nationalism, particularly in Serbia, while Zdenka Milivojevic analyzes the role played by the media in triggering ethno-national consciousness and interethnic conflict. Nergis Canefe Günlük provides a broader theoretical interpretation of the development of nationalism in the geopolitical space of former Yugoslavia.

The traumatizing experience of departure was compounded by the reception of refugees in their places of destination. Here we must consider the most important actors on the scene: humanitarian assistance organizations (United Nations agencies, international NGOs, domestic NGOs, and various ad hoc groups and individuals), the international diplomatic community, as well as the host governments of Serbia (and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Croatia.

Response to the Refugee Crisis

The uprooting of the civilian population in various parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina posed a great many dilemmas for the humanitarian assistance organizations designated to deal with refugee problems.[5] For contextual purposes, it is necessary mainly to point out that humanitarian assistance organizations have been faced almost from the onset of the conflict with making choices between assisting in the removal of civilians to fulfil their humanitarian mandate, or protecting civilian populations from forced expulsion, but at great risk to themselves and their beneficiaries.[6]

UNHCR, the designated "lead" agency in the field, along with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, have been particularly vulnerable to the charge of assisting with the process of "ethnic cleansing." The international diplomatic community, struggling unsuccessfully to find political settlements to this ethnic conflict, has also been regarded as contributing directly or indirectly, through such devices as the establishment of "safe" zones, to population shifts and to placing populations at risk. It has been further noted that international posturing on the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia has been influenced by Western reluctance to receive refugees. Lack of inspiration on the diplomatic front, and failure to grasp the political, as well as the humanitarian, repercussions of misinformed decisions, has had consequences that lend some credence to these charges. As the UN and NATO presence evolves in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mandate for humanitarian intervention threatens to include military force, shifting the framework for settlement from the political to the military, and more than likely escalating the already dramatic and tragic population shifts. The impact of international posturing on the plight of refugees from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is addressed here by Michael Barutciski and Albrecht Schnabel.

The governments of the two major neighbouring host societies, for their part, were quick to recognize the influx of refugees into their territories as both a political asset and a liability. An essential element to the context is the fact that the governments of both Croatia and Serbia, since the collapse of the federation and its Communist regime, had been reconstructed as quasi-democratic multi-party systems with extremely problematic human rights agendas of their own, while at the same time militarily engaged, with fundamental interests at stake in the Croatian and Bosnian wars. Within the domestic frameworks of the two host societies, which were to a significant degree war-driven, refugees were not only the tangible consequence of an unjust and violent political conflict, but also had significant impact on the social order.

For the Milosevic regime in Serbia, refugees represented living proof of the victimization of Serbs. Very much a patriarchal society in many respects, as Zarana Papic notes in her contribution, Serbia absorbed more than 90 percent of its estimated half million refugees into private accommodation with relatives and friends. The inevitable tensions that arose within these arrangements, as temporary stays appeared likely to become long-term if not permanent, have been documented by a number of observers; to be sure, the widespread belief that refugees were living much better than the host population, thanks to humanitarian assistance, had some credible basis.

Serbian government authorities, however, exploited these tensions for the purpose of keeping the Serbian agenda within the conflicts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina at the forefront of the popular imagination, and to strengthen their case for the lifting of sanctions. Antiwar groups and independent assistance organizations have made extraordinary efforts to aid in the adjustment and support of refugee groups.

For the Tudjman regime in Croatia, refugees (who numbered more than half a million) were a symbol of the struggle to return contested territories to Croatian control (indeed, refugees of Croatian nationality are usually referred to as displaced persons). As in Serbia, a significant percentage of refugees were privately housed, with similar consequences for the social order. Particularly problematic for the Croatian government were the large numbers of Muslims, whose mistreatment from time to time at the hands of Croatian authorities has been the primary concern of opposition and anti-war groups in that republic.[7] Any efforts to facilitate Muslim refugees' departure to third countries have been interpreted as simply another form of "ethnic cleansing."

While both governments have manipulated the social tensions aroused by the presence of large refugee populations, they have also from time to time made use of various strategies to reverse population movements, expelling refugees and returning them to their homes (or in the case of men of military age, to the front). Such actions were intended to earn credit among the host population by giving the appearance of alleviating the burden of support, shifting the blame for the conflict onto the target populations, and distancing the regimes' constituents from the responsibility for conflict. The manipulation of figures pertaining to the influx and outmigration of refugees also disguised the acceleration of the "brain drain," as many individuals with sufficient resources were able to leave their country with fewer difficulties.[8]

Postwar Prospects

As prevailing social policies change according to the availability of resources and the degree of fit with the political agenda of the day, the situation of refugees in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is by no means static. What is even more uncertain is the long-term prospects for these uprooted individuals, many of whom simply may never be able to return to their homes. Refugee populations—made up largely of women, children, and the elderly—are by definition extremely vulnerable, and will face tremendous obstacles once they are in a position to rebuild their lives. Wherever they finally settle, however, they have every right to expect credible human rights protection from the state in which they reside.

Even a cursory survey of the reconfigured territories of the former Yugoslavia and their neighbouring states suggests that it may be some time before this expectation can be fulfilled. The current regimes in Croatia and Serbia are consumed with the tasks of nation-building and of sustaining military projects, tasks that do not appear to include emphasis on development of an ethos of pluralism and tolerance. Other host countries, such as Germany, face increased domestic resistance against any further influx of refugees, as noted in Albrecht Schnabel's piece. Wherever they find themselves, refugee populations are regarded as a social and economic burden whose tenancy is hoped to be as short as possible. When this kind of upheaval occurs as a result of the failure of old states and the creation of new ones, the prospects of bringing security to the victims seem very dim indeed.

A ten-year-old boy displaced by the war in Bosnia, who was a guest at one of the Soros Foundation's camps for refugees, recently pondered his fate: "I was a refugee last year, and a refugee before that. I think I am going to be a lifelong refugee." A first step in preventing this kind of tragic destiny from materializing is to determine, through a clearer understanding of the contributing circumstances, how states, nations, and individuals can manage these traumatized populations, and prevent refugee-producing conflicts in the first place. ■

Notes

1. A useful survey of current refugee-producing ethnic conflicts can be found in Kathleen Newland, "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," *Survival*, Vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 81–101.
2. Larry Minear, *et al.*, *Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The U.N.'s Role, 1991–1993* (Providence: Brown University, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 18, 1994), pp. 11–17. By this calculation, individuals displaced by the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina constitute more than 20 percent of the present world population of refugees.
3. Ruza Petrovic estimates that approximately 13 percent of marriages in Yugoslavia (and as high as 27 percent in Vojvodina) were between members of different ethnic groups (1981 figures); accurate estimates of the numbers of children of mixed ethnic background were not available at the time of writing. Ruza Petrovic, *Etnicki mesoviti brakovi u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade: Institut za socioloska istrazivanja Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu, 1985).
4. See, for example, Nada Korac, "The Confining of Children's Minds: Cognitive-Developmental Effects of War Atmosphere," unpublished manuscript (author's files); Maja Korac, "Women Refugees from the Former Yugoslavia: Problems of Disintegrated Identity," paper presented to the Conference on Gender Issues and Refugees: Development Implications (Centre for Refugee Studies and Centre for Feminist Studies, York University, May 9–11, 1993); and forthcoming work by Mirjana Morakvasic-Muller and Zdenka Milivojevic. In Zagreb, the Institute for Migrations and Nationalities has been established by Silva Meznaric within the University of Zagreb; works by Zagreb-based scholars can be found in issues of *Migracijske teme*; see also, for example, Dean Ajdukovic (Ed.), *Psiholoske dimenzije progonstva* (Zagreb: Alinea, 1993).
5. These dilemmas are dealt with extensively in Minear, *op. cit.*
6. A rather typical statement concerning the priorities of humanitarian organizations in decision-making with respect to this dilemma can be found in UNHCR/UNICEF Joint Statement no. 2, "Further Considerations Regarding the Evacuation of Children from Former Yugoslavia," 16 December 1992, in Everett M. Ressler, *Evacuation of Children from Conflict Areas: Considerations and guidelines* (Geneva: UNHCR and UNICEF, 1992).
7. For an example of the type of work being carried out by independent organizations in Croatia, see Centre for Women War Victims, *Interim Report*, compiled by Martina Belic and Vesna Kesic (Zagreb: August 1993), section IV, "Report on the Work in Refugee Camp 'Studenski grad'."
8. Komesarijat za izbeglice republike Srbije, *Izbeglice u Srbiji* (Beograd: Sept. 1, 1993), a periodical publication issued by the Commissariat for Refugees for the Republic of Serbia, gives sample figures. □

Pandora's War: The Multi-Dimensional Nature of the Yugoslav Conflicts

Slobodan Drakulic

This paper is an attempt to define the general nature of armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. First, is there a single, and then perhaps polycentric Yugoslav war, or several successive or concurrent wars? Second, is that war, or those wars, civil, international, ethnic, religious, or something else—a combination of two, three, or all four of the above characteristics? Third, why did the war break out? And fourth, who was right and who was wrong in waging it?

The answer to the first question determines the answer to the second one. If there is only one war in the former Yugoslavia, then it should be viewed as a polycentric armed conflict. That premise leads to the conclusion that we are dealing with a Yugoslav civil war fought between several antagonists, and assuming different forms in diverse parts of that multicultural country.

Such interpretation establishes the interconnectedness of the successive armed conflicts in three out of six former Yugoslav republics. It highlights the conflict as war of all against one—predominantly Croat, Muslim and Slovene against the mostly Serb forces. At the same time, it reduces the significance of local, autochthonous factors, picturing them as derivatives of the Yugoslav federal politics. It even maintains an illusion that Yugoslavia may still exist somehow—perhaps as a commonwealth of battlefields.

The Yugoslav republics were distinct and even partially separate ethnic societies and states even before the outbreak of the war. The only exception was Bosnia and Herzegovina, that miniature Yugoslavia which encapsulates the very core of the contradictions that ripped Yugoslavia apart—ethnicity based upon religion that produces an ethnic society governed by an ethnic state guided by the political doctrine of ethnocracy.

At the end of the eighties, Yugoslavia was loose even by the confederal standards, and it entered the nineties as a disorderly society and a disarrayed state. That looseness of Yugoslavia opened sufficient space for autochthonous movements and tendencies to develop in the federal republics, and at once reduced the degree to which anything, including war, could be *Yugoslav* in nature or in scope.

The series of armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could not be defined as a Yugoslav civil war. There simply was not enough Yugoslavia—in terms of both state and the people—for a Yugoslav civil war. The only Yugoslav state institution left in place was the moribund Yugoslav People's Army, and the only people ready to fight for Yugoslavia were the Serbs of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, backed by the Serb nationalists of Serbia.

Yugoslav federal army soon was reduced to one of the Serb armies in the former Yugoslavia, composed mostly of the Croatian, and Bosnia-Herzegovinian Serbs (Kruselj, 32). By the Spring of 1992 it was entirely replaced by the local Serb armies, whose political leaderships neither could nor would fight for Yugoslavia. They had to chose between fighting for a Greater Serbia, or for their separate statelettes. They immediately opted for the first goal. Serbian leaders could not dare to accept invitations from their western cousins to annex their lands to Serbia, because of the severe opposition of the mainly Western foreign powers.

The image of Serbs fighting the rest of the former Yugoslavs tends to overshadow the existence of a number of other conflicts that happened within the heterogeneous anti-Serb camp. In one such episode Slovenian troops occupied two small areas of Croatia in 1991, and it took a while before they pulled out (Tudjman, 36). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a vicious war took place between the Croat and Muslim armed forces in 1993–94. By the time it was stopped by a resolute diplomatic intervention of the belligerents' international patrons, Croat forces were defeated in Central Bosnia, and Muslim forces in the old regional capital of Herzegovina, Mostar, were reduced to an enclave between the Croat forces to the west, and Serb forces in the east. Beneath the dividing lines marked by ethnicity and religion, the Croatian Council of Defense militia (the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats' armed force) ambushed and killed members of the Croatian Defense Forces (the party militia of the extreme nationalist Croatian Party of Rights). On the Muslim side, a civil war still goes on between the (Muslim) Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the (Muslim) People's Defense Force of the autonomous province of Western Bosnia—led by Fikret Abdic, based in the provincial capital of Kladusa, and the government in Sarajevo accuses the Serbs of backing the West Bosnian Muslim rebels.

Since ethnic lines are not the only lines of division, the number of military formations exceeds the number of major ethnic groups everywhere except in Slovenia, where only two political subjects and two armed forces involved in the war: Slovenian and Yugoslav states and armed forces. In stark contrast to that; there were three major political subjects and about a dozen armed forces involved in the war in Croatia: the Republic of Croatia, Republic of Serb Krajina and Yugoslav Federation, with their assorted armed forces and militias (Gow, 18). The number of major political subjects rose to six in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Republic of Croatia and the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna; Republic of

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Bosnia and Herzegovina (Izetbegovic) and the autonomous province of Western Bosnia (Abdic); Republic of Srpska (Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The number of armed forces went down, indicating certain stabilization of various state authorities on the ground. Five armed forces confront each other in Bosnia and Herzegovina: two Croat, two Muslim and one Serb.[1]

War in Slovenia is therefore the closest to being a civil war—an ethnic-civil war, the Slovenian war of secession from Yugoslavia. Religious hues were present but not prominent. Slovenia claimed that it was invaded by the Yugoslav People's Army.[2] The Croatian war is a mixture of the Croatian war of secession from Yugoslavia, and Serb war of secession from Croatia: it thus started as a Yugoslav civil war, but ended as Croatian. As it was fought among ethnic societies governed by ethnic states and inspired by an ideology of ethnocracy, that war took the form of an ethnic war. And as the embattled ethnicities are entwined with religion in those parts (Smith, 27), their war became an ethno-religious war.[3]

War in Bosnia and Herzegovina started as the joint Croat-Muslim war of secession from Yugoslavia, countered by the Serb war of secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina. An additional momentum was the Croat war of secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina—opposed by the Muslim forces. Western Muslim war of secession from Kladusa came as a final stroke on this chaotic martial canvass. Ironically, the almost surrealistic rebellion against the state that is no more, actually provides the only possible dimension of a truly civil war in the whole conflict. Namely, that Mr. Abdic's faction politically disagrees with the pro-Islamic faction of Mr. Izetbegovic, in spite of their common ethnic identity; all other sides in the Yugoslav conflicts politically disagree because of their ethnic differences.[4]

A civil war waged between different ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic society would end up being an ethnic war. Similarly, every would-be ethnic war fought between opposing ethnicities based on religions would end up being religious war—at least to some degree.[5] To summarize briefly: first, the armed conflicts in Yugoslavia do not constitute a single Yugoslav civil war; second, those wars are a complex mixture of ethnic, religious, civil, and international armed struggles. Far from being a specie of Clausewitz's kind of war as continuation of politics by other means, they are a series of chaotic martial ruptures—Pandora's wars.

Why did these wars break out? The first and most obvious reason is that the moribund nature of the Yugoslav regime of the time—product of decades of ethnic squabbles and divisions that began in the late sixties. Those ethnic squabbles and divisions in turn promoted internal ethnic homogenization. This process was particularly intensified after the death of the late Yugoslav President Tito, in 1980. By 1990, all ethnic groups were virtually transformed into separate political-military camps and coalitions of such camps. The level of the political consensus within them was expressed in the series of plebiscites, referenda, elections, and the population census.

Ethnic Serbs of Croatia sought to pre-empt the Croat secession from Yugoslavia with their own separation from Croatia. At their plebiscite in August 1990, the results were as follows: "for autonomy 567,127; against 114; 46 ballots were spoiled" (Bisic, 63). Croatian Serb consensus around the issue of separation from Croatia, if Croatia were to separates from Yugoslavia, was the highest of all ethnic homogenizations at the time.

Slovenian government proclaimed independence from Yugoslavia following a popular plebiscite on the issue, where 86 percent of voters supported the idea of an independent Slovenian state in December of 1990 (Nakarada, 136). By that time, homogenization of the ethnic Slovene public opinion as anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav had reached the point of no return. In May of 1991, Croatian government made its final move before the act of secession, calling a referendum. More than 93 percent of all Croatians who cast their ballot, voted for their republic's sovereignty and independence from Yugoslavia (Separovic, 115–17).[6] Seven percent more than the ethnically far more homogenous Slovenians had cast in December 1990.

On February 29 and March 1, 1992, "some sixty-eight percent of all eligible voters voted in favour of independence," (Fogelquist, 26), at a plebiscite suggested by the European Community and called by the Croat-Muslim coalition's leadership. Most Serbs abstained, obviously. If their numbers were to be subtracted from the total, virtually all adult Croats and Muslims voted for secession. Taken on their own, virtually all Serbs voted against secession.

Finally, on March 1, 1992, "in the referendum in Montenegro, the majority of the people came out for a union of Montenegro and Serbia" (Djuretic, 445). The cycle of ethnic homogenization was thus completed.[7] As the passions ran high for years before, the assorted Yugoslav political-military camps and coalitions were ready to clash. Pandora's box was brimming with wars.

At that point in time, there was no major ethnic group left in Yugoslavia which was not politically homogenized around an ideological political consensus already established by the ethno-nationalist Communists, and hardened by the new political elites that conquered the state power in 1990.[8] All those elites were leaning towards pronounced ethno-nationalist stands that were about to throw the country into war.

All that was needed by the beginning of the nineties, was someone to merely touch upon someone else's sore psychohistoric spot, and things would take the course towards confrontation. No such thing happened in Yugoslavia. Nobody touched anybody's sore spot: they trampled upon them whenever and wherever they could, with both feet stuck into military boots.

Take for example the phonogram of a secret meeting held on July 23, 1990, of the President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman and his advisor, Slaven Letica, with the leader of Croatian Serbs of the time, Jovan Raskovic. At one point, Raskovic says: "I have also pleaded to you to mention the sovereignty of the Serb national being. That is not a state sovereignty of any kind, when you say that sovereignty of the Serb national being is being recognized ...." President Tudjman responded: "Those are legal formulations." His advisor Letica added: "That cannot be improvised. Croatia is the national state of the Croats" (Letica, 154), (Raskovic, 312).

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The issue at stake was definition of the state of Croatia in the new Constitution that was then being prepared. Croat ruling party wanted to define it in Letica's terms. Most Croatian Serbs insisted that they should be mentioned as a co-sovereign people of Croatia.

Letica's blunt definition of Croatia did not enter the Constitution (Constitution, 31), but it entered the corpus of the *casus belli*. About a month earlier, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic offered his contribution to the brewing war: "Serbia should let it be clearly known that it takes its present administrative borders only in connection with a federally constituted Yugoslavia," and "in case that such a Yugoslavia is not wanted, the issue of Serbia's borders is an open question" (Cavoski, 136–37). What was not accomplished by the politicians had been achieved by the propagandist intellectuals. In the first half of 1991, before the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence, Petar Dzadzic published the third expanded edition of his book *The New Ustasha State?*, relating Franjo Tudjman to the Nazi Croat *Führer* in 1941–45, Ante Pavelic, responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Gypsies and Jews (mostly), and Serbs. This was one of the particularly sore spots of both Serbs and Croats, repeatedly entered by Mr. Tudjman in his capacity of a revisionist historian of the World War II horrors (Babic, 79).[9] Croat propagandists retorted by means of books like the one edited by Boze Covic and titled *The Origins of the Great-Serbian Aggression*, proving that Serb intellectuals and politicians had aimed to attack Croatia ever since 1844 (Covic, Izvori).[10]

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Iztbegovic's *Islamic Declaration* was published in 1990 (two odd decades after having been written), subtitled "A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples" (Izetbegovic, 3). I am not sure that Mr. Izetbegovic's political theology could have impressed very many largely religiously indifferent Bosnian Muslims. I do know that its publishing was successfully used for the Serb ethnic mobilization against the Islamic fundamentalist revival of Alija Izetbegovic, promoted by the Serbian media.

Slovenian media churned their own "flowers of political and intellectual evil," like everybody else. One of the protagonists of the Slovene new social movements, Tomaz Mastnak, announced:" I see no solution and have ceased looking for one," (Mastnak, 48) in a situation where Yugoslavia was split into "two opposing models of social and political development ... one Slovenian and the other Serbian" (Mastnak, 46). The period of 1989–91 could be defined as one protracted psychosocial preparation for war—on all sides without exceptions.

The remaining question is the one of right and wrong involved in these wars. By late June 1991, when war erupted in Slovenia, a low-level warfare was already going on in Croatia since August of 1990. According to the local ethnic Serb sources, it all started on "August 17, 1990 [at the Northern Dalmatian municipality of] Benkovac," after the "Ministry of Internal Affairs of Croatia sent its special troops to prevent the plebiscite," due to be held within two days. "Serbs responded by erecting barricades," and the "war for Krajina started" (Bisic, 63).[11] Another Serb source from Belgrade states that "the 'Serb uprising' in the Knin Krajina[12] practically started," as a "response to a night attack of the 'specials'[13] against the militia[14] station in Benkovac" (Nakarada, 135).

The ethnic Croat sources reported the same event very differently. Well known Croat writer Dubravko Jelcic wrote in his diary that "military planes intercepted the official helicopters of the Ministry of Interior of Croatia, forcing them to return to their base," which is how "an open attack on Croatia started." (Jelcic, 254–55). Another Croat writer maintained that the Serbo-Croat standoff in the area of Knin was "planned in the Serbian ideological centres;" local Serbs, "encouraged by two MIGs in the sky and meetings of support in Serbia, actually declared war on Croatia" (Cuic, 9).

That was a fact confirmed by the other side in the conflict as well. On August 17, 1990, the President of Knin municipality, Milan Babic, proclaimed the state of war on the local radio. The last President of Yugoslavia and Croatian separatist Stipe Mesic cracked a joke about this incident, saying that "Mr. Babic must be a big joker when he thinks that President of a municipality can proclaim the state of war." Dubravko Jelcic who preserved Mr. Mesic's pun for posterity, commented about his own reaction to the joke: "I laughed from my heart and immediately felt the power of humour: what has once been ridiculed, cannot be serious, let alone lofty, any more" (Jelcic, 255).

On the contrary, something can be deadly serious, regardless of how much it may have been ridiculed by its opponents. Mr. Babic's declaration of war may have been pathetic, but the

fact remains that the President of the thinly inhabited badlands which is the municipality of Knin, was right: the war in former Yugoslavia started on August 17, 1990 in Benkovac, Croatia; if one prefers to talk about more than one war, than this was the first in the series, and it started with Mr. Babic's proclamation of the state of war in Knin.

That initial stage of the armed conflict is marked by the Croatian secession from Yugoslavia, and Serbian resistance to it, which manifested itself as the local Serb secession from Croatia. As two sides in this conflict were indigenous to Croatia, theirs was a civil war. Furthermore, as Croatia and all participants in the Croatian conflict at least formally belonged to Yugoslavia, that war was not ethnic, but civil as well. After the international recognition of Croatia as an independent state, that war became international and remained such until the Yugoslav Army's pull-out from its territory.

The Slovene state leadership hence faced a situation where an armed conflict was already in full motion in Croatia, involving ethnic Croat-led and dominated forces on one side, and equally ethnic Serb forces on the other. Slovenian leaders watched the federal army as it vacillated between an untenable neutrality and growing sympathies with the Croatian Serbs by most of its mostly Serb and Montenegrin, as well as mostly pro-Yugoslav federalist Communist professional military officers. They should have had no illusions about the side that those same officers would chose in an armed conflict in Slovenia.

One should bear in mind that Slovenia was the primary battleground between the increasingly ethno-nationalist and separatist Slovenian new social movements, and the steadfastly federalist Yugoslav People Army's officer corps. Slovenia's Minister of Defence since 1990, Janez Jansa, was one of the four people put on tried for treason in 1988, by a military tribunal, after rendering public some military documents of highly disputable importance, to say the least, that were stamped as "strictly confidential" by some anonymous and probably unconcerned military bureaucrat.

That trial seems to have been the breaking point in the relationship between the mainstream ethnic Slovene population and the Yugoslav regime, and particularly its military authorities. This is was indicated at the time by the Slovene political analyst Darko Strajn, who asked whether any change at all could be affected within the existent framework (Grakalic, 146–48). The implication is obvious: if no reform was possible, the Slovene new social movements would have to give up their aspirations, or make a dash for the political revolution. They opted for the latter, backed by their state and party apparatus during the Communist regime. Their struggle was continued by the new separatist regime that bore even some clericalist-nationalist hues.

With such sharply antagonistic forces dominating their respective areas of the political spectrum of the former Yugoslavia, war became increasingly unavoidable. The spark was purposely provided by the Slovenian government, and set to the Yugoslav tinderbox by its Ministry of Defense (Jansa, 155).[15] Mr. Jansa's passionate struggle to start a war in Slovenia met an equally zealous response from his government's opponents in Belgrade.

Consequently, when the Slovenian Territorial Defence units took Yugoslav border crossings to Italy, Austria and Hungary by force, federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic responded by ordering the federal army to retake them by force. The army rolled out in its armour—but with a vastly insufficient infantry of less than two thousand soldiers—and swept the lightly armed Slovene militias aside. Most border crossings were back under the federal government's control within days. In the meantime, nine Slovenian militiamen were killed in the clashes (Jansa, 5); some scores of federal troops died on the other side (Bandi, 202); some foreigners were drawn into the maelstrom by the Slovenian troops—used as a human shield of a kind—and were killed by the federal forces (Molinari, 50), their number of ten being only somewhat lower than that of the ethnic Slovenes (Bandi, 202).

Within days, foreign powers intervened, offering mediation and asking for the cessation of hostilities. A standoff followed, with Slovenian independence being suspended no more than the federal control over Slovenia evaporated into thin air. On July 1 1991, the Serbian side was pressured by international factors to accept an ethnic Croat secessionist, Mr. Stipe Mesic, as the President of the Yugoslav federal Presidency. He thus became the head of the highest instance of state power in the country—formally a head of the collective supreme commander of the Yugoslav People's Army.

Several days later, an accord between the belligerents was signed at the late President Tito's resort at the Islands of Brioni (later on renamed by the Croatian state into Brijuni). The war in Slovenia was over—if it ever happened. What did happen, however, was a series of low-scale clashes of no tactical significance, not to mention any strategic importance.

An intensive propaganda war happened instead, with Croatia and Slovenia on one side, and the federal government, Montenegro and Serbia on the other. Croatian and Slovenian propagandists claimed that their countries had suffered an aggression of the Yugoslav federal army, while the same army accused their Slovene antagonists of high treason.[19] Both arguments were vacuous from the other's point of view, and, needless to say, both protagonists practised an autistic form of political behaviour, utterly oblivious to anything beyond their obsessive goals.

The fundamentally identical political process that led to the war in Croatia, was repeated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. First Serbo-Muslim clashes occurred in the town of Foca, on September 11, 1990, less than a month after the first armed standoff in Croatia. For as long as the ethnically tripartite Presidency, Parliament and

government of the republic were in place, the balance of power kept the situation from a precipitous deterioration. Gradual worsening of ethnic relations continued nonetheless.

The first free elections held in November of 1990, confirmed the process of ethno-political homogenization. Electoral results actually looked like an ethnic census data: Muslim Party of Democratic Action won 86 seats in the new Parliament; Serb Democratic Party 72; Croat Democratic Community 44 (Nakarada, 136).

By April of 1991, predominantly ethnic Serb region of Bosnian Krajina[17] founded its own Assembly (Parliament (Nakarada, 139). In late October of 1991, an Assembly (Parliament) of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina was founded (Bisic, 66), in response to the mid-October Memorandum on the Sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted by the Croat-Muslim majority in the Parliament (Bisic, 65). In November, Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina held a plebiscite, expressing their intention to remain in Yugoslavia (Nakarada, 146). A month later, Government and Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to seek recognition from the European Community as an independent state. Serb representatives were outvoted again, by the Croat-Muslim coalition (Bisic, 66).

Then came the Croat-Muslim backed declaration of independence, wide international recognition, and breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all in the Spring of 1992. What followed was a maelstrom of war, where yesterday's allies cut each others' civilians' throats or burned them alive in their homes.

The lust of war was on the loose as villainy marched under the ethnic flags, torturing, slaughtering, raping, plundering, wrecking, even head-hunting.[18] All in the name of the people, nation, gods, history, freedom—one vast collective endeavour inspired by ethnic hatred, and dedicated to the joy of wanton destruction. In a way, this Pandora's War is indeed beyond good and evil. It is insane. ■

Notes

1. If we discount the Croatian Defence Forces, which may have no future, especially having in view that several political and military leaders were already killed by other Croat forces under questionable circumstances.
2. Such claims were made by all sides, including the Serbs. For the Slovene story see Jansa; Croatian story can be found in Covic; Muslim story is told by Fogelquist; Serb story is in Djuretic; for Yugoslav federal story see Kadijevic. These are just examples, of course.
3. I will leave alone the international dimensions of the Balkan conflicts, because such an attempt would require a comparative assessment of not only Yugoslav (Serbian and Montenegrin) role in them, but also the arming of Croatia and Slovenia by Germany, Austria and Hungary in 1990/91, or the recent American and British involvement in the Balkan conflicts on the Muslim side, which is far too complex an issue for the scope of this paper.
4. I am taking ethnic difference in the sense of subjective self-understanding, although I am fully aware of their concrete material and historical vacuousness.
5. The issue of faith and religious sincerity is another matter which I cannot pursue in this paper.
6. Let me note that the voting slip for sovereignty and independence was blue, and represented as a Croatian-Slovenian position; the other voting slip was red, it asked the voter to be for a "single federal country of Yugoslavia"—suggesting union instead of federation—and it was represented as a Serbian-Montenegrin proposal.
7. Here we encounter the much disputed issue of ethnicity of the Montenegrins. It seems to me that most of them were leaning towards closer ties with Serbia, ever since the mass uprising against the local Titoist epigones in 1988–89 (Strugar, 41). To counterbalance Strugar's Serb nationalist views, one can consult a Montenegrin independentist like Brkovic, for example.
8. Montenegro and Serbia went through a different process, wherein former Communists quite swiftly converted to Serb nationalism in 1987–89. Slobodan Milosevic is certainly the most famous example. Expounding anti-nationalist political viewpoint as late as December 1986 (Milosevic, 126–28), he was a national-communist leader of Serbia by the Spring of 1987 (Milosevic, 147–48, for example). His Montenegrin counterpart is Momir Bulatovic, who was pro-Yugoslav in 1989 (Bulatovic, 37), but ended up clashing with Slovene leadership in 1991, as we can see from his letter to the Slovenian President Milan Kucan (Bulatovic, 214–15).
9. It was his historical revisionism and nationalism that turned Tudjman into a dissident, not his rather nebulous democratic orientation (Babic, 83).
10. Although terribly slanted, this is a valuable sourcebook of Serbo-Croat ethnic relations, nonetheless.
11. *Militärgrenz, Vojna Krajina,* Military Frontier against the Ottoman Empire, demilitarized in 1881 and annexed to Croatia and Slovenia. Namely, Croatia was a "triune" kingdom at that time, composed of Croatia (North-West), Slovenia (North-East), and Dalmatia (coastal regions). Dalmatia went from being a Venetian possession for centuries, through a short French rule during Napoleon I, to being an Austrian territory until 1918, when it entered the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which in turn became Yugoslavia in 1929. A good and fair short history of the Military Frontier can be found in Roksandic.
12. A medieval toponym referring to the area around the municipality of Knin, in Northern Dalmatia, presently capital of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serb Krajina.
13. Commando units of the Ministry of Interior of Croatia.
14. Militia in this instance means the police.
15. That "highest state secret" was "known by only a few people (expanded Presidency [of Slovenia], some members of the government, and the key operative personnel" (Jansa, 155).
16. As both ministers of defense—Slovenian and Yugoslavian—have published their memoirs, one may find it useful to compare their accounts of the events. See Jansa and Kadijevic in references.
17. Western Bosnia, with the regional capital of Banja Luka.
18. See Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch reports on the war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. About head-chopping, see Soldo.

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From State Socialism to State Nationalism: The Case of Serbia in Gender Perspective

Zarana Papic

A Belgrade journalist once said: "We are living dream of our nationalists that has come true." Modifying his statement it could be argued that in Serbia we are living the dream of state nationalism "our Leader" dreamt of. It is not to say that in Serbia there is "one-man-nationalism," made by one person, nor one could leave out all the other important, historical, cultural factors that led to it. Among those instigators, the most prominent one is the nationalist ideology, dominant and shared among seemingly different, or antagonistic, ideological and political groupings: 1) the great majority of Serbian political (even Leftists) dissidents of Tito's Yugoslavia, 2) the Serbian anti-communist and nationalist literary intelligentsia which found the way to express its feelings only through the "fine arts" of writing, painting, etc., 3) the major opposition parties which emerged later on, and, 4) the new ideology of the converted Communist Party of Serbia ("transformed" into the Socialist Party of Serbia by decree, in one day in 1990), which put the Serbian national(ist) interest above all, but kept the socialist "screen" in order to maintain its former control over the state, media and cultural life.

Slobodan Milosevic is paradoxically or not, a unique and very complex "product" of all these factors and tendencies. He introduced nationalist mythology, which was the strongest anti-communist legacy of dissident nationalist literary intelligentsia, as the crucial, but neatly veiled substance of his "socialist" ideology. At the same time, while converting the ex-communist party into nationalist-covered-by socialist party, he also introduced, or more precisely, revived totalitarian socialist ideology as Stalinist-Bolshevik ideology, which in former Yugoslavia had disappeared long ago, abandoned after Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. The former Yugoslav "way to socialism" in many ways departed from this practice: in liberalization of the market economy, party decentralization, self-management ideology, and openness to the West, to name a few. Although many of former Yugoslavian social, cultural and economical advantages over other Eastern countries may now seem only as a "cunning of the totalitarian communist spirit," which was well hidden in these liberated forms, still it is possible to argue that the former Yugoslavian socialist reality was not, and could not be reduced only to "pure" totalitarian-Soviet-Bolshevik-Stalinist type of legacy.

But, this "post-socialist" conversion of the Serbian Communist Party into the (nationalist) Socialist Party in fact brought back to life the totalitarian-Bolshevik-Stalinist party ideology and practice. It is important to stress here that at the famous 8th Conference of the Communist Party of Serbia, held in October 1987, Mr. Milosevic successfully defeated the whole bunch of liberal but not nationalist party functionaries, and all those in control of media, culture, education, etc. who were liberal and not nationalist.1 By succeeding in making the "coup de partie," the leader had the open space and free hand to extend it to the real "coup d'état," as party structure, although in its liberated form, actually dominated and governed all spheres of public life. That is how the liberal form of former Yugoslav socialism in Serbia was transformed (by regression) into a State Socialist regime, which relied dominantly on nationalist ideology and its nationalist "activists," and actually became a mixture of state socialism and state nationalism.

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The reason why "our leader" is the "right" person to have this above mentioned nationalists' dream come true is the fact that he actually embodies both regimes: the State Socialist one which was dear to him in his "aparatchik" past, and the State Nationalist one which is now his "Czarist" present. And, also, due to the effects of his "transformation" of former (one of the more liberal) Communist Party of Serbia into state-socialist-plus-nationalist regime, we are now living in a state nationalism which is a twin, a duplicate of state socialism. As a matter of fact, under Milosevic's reign one can easily find the fundamental elements of state nationalism—so similar to those of state socialism—only under different names. Table 1 shows a list of parallel elements essential to both state socialism and state nationalism, by answering a few questions:

Table 1: State Socialism vs. State Nationalism

What did we have in state socialism? The leader of the Communist Party.	*What do we have in State nationalism?* The leader of the nation.
Who were the subjects? The mass of the "working people."	*Who are the subjects?* The mass of "true" Serbian people.
Who were ideologically correct people? Faithful, "true" communists, obedient to the sacrosanct Party "line" under the leader. leader's leadership.	*Who are ideologically correct people?* Faithful, obedient to the great national cause, and to the "line" of the great
What was the struggle against? Traitors of the Communist ideology.	*What is the struggle against?* Inside traitors of "true" Serbianhood.
Who was the enemy? The class enemy.	*Who is the enemy?* The enemies of the nation—other nations, and inside traitors.
What was the goal of state socialism? The victory of the working class; equality among all people and social justice.	*What is the goal of State nationalism?* All Serbs in one country.
When will this goal be achieved? In faraway, but sure tome—"bright future."	*When will this goal be achieved?* In heaven, because Serbs as such are "heavenly people."

And what about the categories of person and citizen?
What did we have then, and what do we have now?

In state socialism we had:	*In state nationalism we have:*
The good person: man-comrade and woman-comrade faithful to communism	The good person: Mr. and Mrs. Good Serbian, faithful to "true" Serbianhood.
The bad person: non-Communist or anti-communist.	The bad person: "bad" Serbians, traitors of "true" Serbianhood.
"True" citizen: Mr. and Mrs. Communist.	"True" citizen: Mr. and Mrs. Serbian.

> As we can see, both in Serbia's State Socialist past and State Nationalist present we did not, and do not, have a civic definition of the citizen, but only the narrow, ideologically and instrumentally defined one.

Keeping in mind these rather apparent similarities between state socialism and state nationalism in Serbia it is possible to stress two points: first, that nationalist ideology in Serbia has been introduced and established within, and on the basis of previous Communist Party ideology, structure, character of leadership, the obedience demanded of its members, etc.; second, that Serbian state nationalism, just as state socialism had been, was brought from above, as the "official" policy, and highly recommended "party" line.

In that sense one could argue that Serbian nationalism in fact was not, and is not, grassroots nationalism, but nationalism "activated" and "born" from above. That would be, in my opinion, only one side of the matter. The basis for Serbian nationalism, of course, did exist among anti-communist nationalist dissidents, as I outlined at the beginning of this text, and in a significant manner it actually prepared Milosevic's rise to power. But, when nationalism became a part of the official ideology, it was then further intentionally provoked, instrumentally constructed, programmed, cemented, and with constant media propaganda even forced upon people. Therefore, Serbian nationalism has its very specific features. It did start long ago as the oppositional, nationalist "-alternative" to communism, but—thanks to Mr. Milosevic's sudden "conversion" from communism into nationalism—became amalgamated with the previous (maintained intact) Party structure. Instead of communist ideology, the newly born Socialist Party ideology was then thoroughly, sometimes even brutally, permeated with aggressive and officially sanctioned nationalism.

But, one could rightly ask how did all this come to be possible? First, of all, in the East, socialism lost almost all credibility as a social project for a "just" society. Due to the exclusive and unhappy experience of socialism as totalitarianism in Eastern and Central

Europe, the swing of social processes is now going into another extreme direction—toward the conservative, traditional, nationalist, patriarchal and simple minded concept of democracy. Eastern countries are now going through painful (and dangerous: the best example is Yugoslavia) processes of liberation of many suppressed dimensions, which had been forbidden or restricted under socialism. These suppressed dimensions are complex and, as a rule, they are double-faced, containing, at the same time, normal and extreme shapes such as: national in the extreme shape of aggressive nationalism, religious identity as extreme fundamentalist inclination, liberal understood only as anti-communist, democratic as primarily anti-Socialist, etc. Frequently these new ideologies, in which nationalism is predominant, represent, in fact, a reversed mirror of the ex-socialist style. These new democracies and ideologies are as authoritarian, rigid, intolerant of any difference, and totalitarian as socialism itself—its great enemy—had been.

That is why, it seems to me, it is important to reverse the prevailing opinion and perspective of past socialist realities. The real issue is not what the totalitarian socialist regime had done, but quite the opposite—what this regime had not done. The question is not purely rhetorical, because the way one posits the critical perspective on the experience of the socialist past is the crucial factor leading to possible ways of seeing and recognizing its alternatives. It simply means that any (anti-communist) alternative to totalitarian communism does not necessarily have to be a democratic one. Of course, no one is denying that totalitarian socialist regimes did suppress and oppress all the "antisocialist" tendencies: democratic as "bourgeois," religious, national, ethnic, cultural, historical, etc. But, more important is the fact that socialism did not in any way help to build the complex social fabric which could serve as the basis for democratic alternatives. With such totalitarian practices, socialism consequently prevented the rise and growth of the conditions necessary for the construction of the democratic character of people.

Because of that, the collapse of communism resulted in an opening of the dangerous (deadly dangerous in the case of former Yugoslavia) civic void—the absence of democratic substances, values, institutions, patters of behaviour, etc., as the possible means and criteria for the way out of the totalitarian order. We are simply, faced with the fact that we want to change the totalitarian East into "new democracies" with unchanged people, whose personality structure is far from being democratically oriented. So, due to the opening of this kind of civic void it was possible for all sorts of overt undemocratic "alternatives" to find their place, and in which aggressive nationalism and chauvinism found perfect soil to grow.

The most striking example of this civic void which was filled with anti-democratic "solutions" is the case of former Yugoslavia. Because of its multinational multi-ethnic structure post-ex-Yugoslavia witnessed enormous growth of nationalisms and chauvinisms. The very specific feature of Yugoslavia, which to many of us seemed (naively?) as a richness of possibilities—its multinational and multi-ethnic structure—is now used (that is, abused) as the perfect instrument of hatred, the constant reason for and cause of war, and the main obstacle to democratization. Instead of having a plurality of, previously suppressed cultural, historical and national democratic solutions for such a multi-ethnic and multicultural country, as ex-Yugoslavia was—we are now facing, and terribly suffering from an aggressive plurality of nationalisms and chauvinisms of nations which have no mercy for anything, such as cities, or for anybody, such as innocent people whose only fault is that they happen to live where guns are firing. Now, every nation is losing its dignity committing unimaginable atrocities against the other enemy nation. But, aside from all previous or "historical" reasons, no one can deny the fact that Serbs, not at all in their own interest (but precisely the opposite), pulled the trigger, and started this tragic and disastrous "game."

The effects of this nationalist pluralization are, in fact, non-pluralist at all. Although there are many surface differences between new states—this non-pluralist element is their common denominator. The reason this is so lies in the very concept of the (post-socialist) political transformation, advocated by the majority of new post-communist political parties. The strongest (and winning) parties, in particular, in republics or new states, had in their programmes and objectives the extreme expression of nationalist ideologies. They were as nationalist and exclusive of other national identities, as much as they were traditional, militant, patriarchal, sexist, in their programmes, types of organization, their symbolic order, language, accents, omissions and blind-spots, etc.

Briefly, the main problem and the most tragic result of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia is the dominant, manipulative operation of purposefully provoking, constructing, and "producing" nationalisms and chauvinisms—mythological, narcissistic, non-reflexive, aggressive, hateful towards other nations, as the main and only guilty party for its sufferings and "historical losses." For the ruling parties, the nation is above everything, above every ideology. It is above every possibility of diverse political orientations within the very same nation—which are an obvious and necessary precondition of democracy. Nation is, therefore, above democracy.

The aim is not to equalize and flatten all nationalisms (because they assume different forms according to historical and cultural backgrounds, and different ways of expression), nor to negate the values of affirming emerging national and confessional values and identities, which were deeply suppressed in socialism. What I am trying to say is that when the chance of democratic national emancipation loses or abandons its tolerant and multi-ethnic possibility (being in-

stead aggressive and revengeful), it becomes deadly dangerous in fanatic hate of other nations as the eternal historical enemy, as the target on which all aggression is focused. Now we can see that it is above every human life, or any other decent human interest.

Moreover, with media-war-propaganda (going on endlessly, "bombing" people's minds every night), each side produces its "reality"—a modified and instrumentally adapted truth. In such a divided country in which travelling is no longer possible, not to mention security of existence and residence in one's own home, media-manipulated messages of these closed "entities" cuts the truth in order to prove one point—that "We," our nation, and "our Cause" for war is so justified that there should not be any doubt in the "heavenly"[2] righteousness of "our" eternal historical rights and in the war in defence of them.

With this totalitarian domination of nationalist ideologies the first and greatest victim is civil (even ex-socialist) society itself, which is always expendable when nationalist interest demands it. With civil society in danger, all human rights are in danger. They are rights on paper only, deactivated rights serving only as a nationalist smokescreen in front of Western democratic eyes. The real, effective and activated rights are now something else: they are mythological rights that glorify the old heroic and tragic national destiny; they are a historical in their obstinate revival of (past) "historical claims," unscrupulously applied to different, present-day circumstances.

Moreover, the "saint" of national interest demands unity, it cannot accept dialogue, and does not tolerate difference(s). It approves only of the collective mind and national "truth"—because the "nation is always right," as the Serbian leader once clearly put it. Nation is, accordingly, and undoubtedly, above democracy. Democracy is the traitor of the nation, because it brings with it "disunion," and questions the "rightness" and "rationality" of its goals and means.

Furthermore, one of the most pertinent features of all these new post-Communist democracies is the fact that they are male dominated, overtly patriarchal, traditional, and conservative regarding the position of women, their social role and significance. In the Eastern former socialist countries the new patriarchy is now the prevailing social reality for women, as well as for men. This is also the result of the above mentioned civic void left by the collapse of communism. The socialist regime was a communist, and male dominated, patriarchal, and authoritarian conglomerate which, paradoxically was stabilized even more by the mixture of progressive women's legal rights, and existent patriarchy that governed women's real lives. With fifty years of "socialist emancipation" behind them, women never learned to take the active, self-conscious part in facing and confronting the new political, ex-socialist, reality. Instead, they were actually very well prepared to be and stay passive in the new processes of political and democratic transformations. Before their very eyes, the new patriarchy emerged, because the whole concept of the emancipation of women and equality between the sexes simply vanished as the significant and equal component of these new democracies.

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In that sense, as all these new democracies are in fact deeply male democracies, all these newly emerged post-communist nationalisms are also male nationalisms. Their essential discourse, and practice, is that of the warrior, the "hero" of nationhood is no one else but a Man, who is defending the nation, territory, tradition, glory, honour, etc. This type of aggressive, war-oriented nationalism, as a rule, is based and functions on a patriarchal system of values and social, gendered order, in which men and women are separated into opposite zones—(battle) fields and (sheltered) fields. This kind of war-gendered-order is the most extreme example of men's and women's separated realities, which are presented and seen as a natural, unavoidable and eternal state of affairs.

In fact, one could argue that every nationalism is male nationalism. The relationship between nationalism and women is contradictory, paradoxical and, as a rule, a mystified one. The contradiction lies in the fact that all nationalist basic values, goals and myths are "feminine"—in Serbian, as in many languages, nation, motherland, tradition, honour, glory, history, etc. are of female gender. Moreover, women are of fundamental importance as actual "producers" and pillars of all these values and goals. But the problem is that there is no way women could be, or become, equal partners and subjects of these values. Instead, they are objects, consequently objectified in their prime function of reproducing the very same "feminine" values, but from which they are excluded.

Attention is focused on Serbian nationalism for two reasons. First, this is the nationalism I have lived with and through, all these years. Second, because I frankly believe that everyone has to confront and criticize primarily one's own nationalism in order to understand, and then, perhaps to criticize others. The specificity of Serbian aggressive nationalism is that it is so deeply patriarchal in its "essence" that, paradoxically, it does not even have to articulate, accentuate or to prove itself by open control over women. Serbian patriarchal ideology is a warrior's mythology in which the place for women is clearly and strictly defined—women are there because of men, they are in their function as breeders of new generations of brave soldiers. There are many examples in

Serbian mythology of women dignified exclusively as mothers of sons who went to fight, and were killed, for their national pride.

This tribalist patriarchalism indisputably put women into their submissive role of mothers, wives and caretakers of children in refuge. Some of them identify themselves with the great cause and they take part in battles, shootings and a military way of life. They are accepted as such, as equal warriors and they are media stars, of course. But, the most evident fact is that in these nationalist-war circumstances, women are completely unimportant and invisible, except in their role as mothers and wives. They are not seen or heard as possible subjects who have the right to speak their minds, or to have a voice in these matters. The war is men's world. But its victims are mostly women and children.

There is yet another possible explanation why men, actively motivated to fight to death, are so dominantly visible, and women are so invisible, almost nonexistent in all these terrible and brutal killings and media war propaganda. The main (but hidden) reason why nationalist propaganda is exclusively focused and oriented toward men is again a paradoxical one: during fifty years of peace, the Serbian traditional (patriarchal) masculine identity has, in fact, deeply changed, under the influence of civilizing and urbanizing transformations, and has become more complex, tolerant, urban-like "softer," and less eager (or, not even interested) to simply go and fight with Croats, and later with Muslims—to revenge for all the past tragic losses. So, that is why the war-hostility-propaganda is so boringly obstinent, repetitious (very effective), aggressively truthful in its open manipulation, invoking and reviving the good old warrior's masculinity—as the defender of its nation, its territory, home, family.

Media-war-propaganda is primarily oriented toward the deconstruction of the present (or, more precisely, already past and gone) urban, cultured, civilized and less aggressive prewar type of masculinity, and, at the same time, toward the reconstruction of the previous, older (but in nationalist mythologies the only "true") aggressive, abusive, "manly," "brave" militant masculinity which will obediently follow the nation's causes and calls for battle.

But in this programmed operation of reviving the old, patriarchal "order of things," all the cynicism of nationalist manipulation of basic, historical human standards and values becomes clear. This newly-constructed patriarchal order—"invented tradition" (*hobsbawm*)—is nothing but a surrogate for, and is by no means the same as the (historical) old Serbian patriarchal order. Because, in former times, the patriarchal order preserved basic values of dignity, and its type of masculinity was not sadistically violent, nor immorally prone to bestiality.

This type was warrior-like, but not of this ominous kind. It was strictly and morally controlled against dehumanization, dignified in its principles, as well as in its reasons for war. That is also the reason why the present "emancipation" of previously suppressed national and confessional identities is not oriented toward recreating and rehabilitating its cultural values, morals and genuine religious humanity. On the contrary, it is oriented toward the annihilation of all those values, because they are "nonfunctional" in making nations and Confessions hate and kill each other.

This leads to another dimension of state nationalism, than of its twin, state socialism. That is the fact that state nationalism is even more totalitarian than state socialism used to be. For instance, the categories of "traitor" and "enemy" in State socialism were applied to those considered non-Communist or anti-communist. This label, however threatening and repressive it might have been, actually was a political category, leaving at least some, although very little, space for personal identity ineducable to such political stigmatization. But in state nationalism, the totalitarian concept of nationhood penetrates and every aspect of our being. It enters our birth certificate—the first document of our personal existence and individuality. It leaves us no free space for our personal articulation, or choice. We become what is written in our birth certificate, as the inescapable part of our identities, by the simple fact that we are born somewhere (territory), and to someone (national identity). This is totalitarian (very total, indeed) nationalist occupation of the total space of our identities. We cannot escape it. By this cunning operation we are forever what we can never choose—our predetermined origin, blood and nation.

Therefore, categories such as the "traitor," and the "enemy" in nationalism are no longer a political category, but an overall category that pretends to be the one and only definition of our humanity. So, being a traitor of "true" Serbianhood is an even more dangerous and much deeper stigmatization. Due to this totalitarian nationalist domination of our whole human substance, being labelled as a traitor of "true" Serbianhood means actually being a "traitor" to humanity itself, as it is so defined. There is no possibility to choose to be different, but only the "true" (aggressively nationalist) Serbian. In this, there is no plurality, no choice. They have chosen instead of us. ■

Notes

1. The very term "cleansing" actually belongs to the communist vocabulary. Therefore, one could say that the ideological cleansing of all those who were near the power and who did not adapt themselves to extreme Serbian nationalist ideology and mythology, was the essential precondition for later deadly practice of ethnic cleansing.
2. The heavenly element is very important in the Serbian mythological nation's identity. After the lost battle with Turks at Kosovo six hundred years ago (1389), the myth has been made that Serbs, by losing this crucial Battle, gained their place in heaven, and therefore, became a heavenly nation, exceptional and fundamentally different from all other nations. This mythological element is very often used as a primary criterion for Serbs' (heavenly) superiority over all other national identities. □

National Identity As Political Ideology

Zdenka Milivojevic

Introduction[1]

The events of 1990 and 1991 represent a historical turning point in the development of former Yugoslavia. That Yugoslavia, which consisted of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia), had been an example of a relatively developed multi-ethnic socialist state; but from that time its former republics began to separate into ethno-national states, and thus Serbia and Montenegro, sharing an identical national-political ideology, formed the "new" Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, up to that point the largest ideological-political institution in the land, disappeared from the political scene. Its functionaries divided off into their respective ethno-national republican parties, whose basic political motto could be expressed in two words—"national democracy." The ideological mechanisms (the political power of an elite, political monopoly, and political privilege) which became characteristic of all these parties, regardless of their changed names, were carried over from the "old" regime, because the political leaders of these new parties, as well as the vast majority of their membership, had previously been "sociopolitical" workers —Communists. Nationalism as a transition to nationalist democracy is a process which began at that point in Yugoslavia, and up to the present day can count its successes only in numbers of victims.

The approximately 22 million inhabitants of former Yugoslavia belonged, according to the census of 1981, to 24 different nationalities (see Table 1).[2]

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The two primary factors contributing to the homogenization of such an ethnically diverse population were: "brotherhood and unity," a form of politically imposed collective identity; and "self-management," a specific type of socioeconomic homogenization. Other types of collective identity such as religion and nationality were politically marginalized up until the end of the 1980s. Individual rights in former Yugoslavia were thus converged with collective rights, while the "nation," that is, its federal units, according to the 1974 Constitution, had legal status; a fact which was later shown to be a key contributing element of political support for the destabilization and collapse of Yugoslavia.

An overall portrait of the Yugoslav peoples would also include their unequal cultural, economic, and social level of development—and, indeed, the territories of the old Yugoslavia were full of extreme contradictions on all levels. The culturally and economically developed "European model" of the north contrasted with the southern, undeveloped "Byzantium." In between lay the geographical, political, economic, and cultural middle—the "Belgrade region," where, fortunately, no ethno-national or nationalistic homogenization has managed to make any inroads, even today. The "Belgrade region" constitutes the space in which, in contrast to other areas of "rump" Yugoslavia, the former identity of former Yugoslavia—an identity of ethnic mix and political pluralism—has, on the whole, been preserved.

Table 1:
1981 Yugoslavian Census Data

Nationalities	*% Share*
Montenegrins	2.58
Croats	19.75
Macedonians	5.97
Slovenes	7.20
Muslims	8.20
Serbs	36.30
Albanians	7.20
Those who declared themselves Yugoslavs	5.44
Others (Hungarians, etc.)	7.36
Total	100.00

The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was a period when nation and territory emerged as key political components of collective identity. The political ideology of "brotherhood and unity" was radically transformed, and in its place the ideology of defence of the national essence, national interest, and national borders, which up until that time had been only administrative technical questions, took its place. At the social level, however, the influence of the previous political ideology of brotherhood and unity was such that the question of ethno-national belonging, in everyday, more or less routine relations (among family, neighbours, friends, and workplace associates) did not have great significance. The years 1990 and 1991 saw the opening of a clearly visible chasm between the newborn nationalistic ideology of governments and the nature of everyday interpersonal relations of members of different nationalities.

In other words, everyday interpersonal relations still maintained the characteristics of brotherhood and unity, just as efforts were being undertaken to impose a new type of collective identity—nation and territory—and to establish it as the new political ideology, on a large scale and with all available means. It was precisely that gap between the ethno-national political ideology of the governing powers and the nature of everyday interethnic relations and behaviour of ordinary people, although of relatively short duration, which provides a clear indication of the origins of ethnic conflicts. After that brief interval, ethno-national political propa-

ganda, initiated by some intellectuals and by the government in Serbia, and in other republics, began to intensify and to attract larger and larger numbers of supporters among the population. After the breakdown of the federal political leadership of former Yugoslavia into republican ethno-national leaderships (that is, political elites), nationalist tensions heightened rapidly and the ethnocultural division of the population accelerated dramatically. The multinational population of former Yugoslavia therefore began to divide along lines of those who more or less accepted predatory nationalist ideologies and those who either ignored them or resisted them.

The point at which there was a distinguishable differentiation between the nationalist ideology of government and the quality of interethnic relations among the population coincided with the most vigorous nationalistic campaigns in which the media showed themselves to be the essential agent of communication between government and people. Aided by newly emergent, vigourous "defenders of the nation," nationalist media propaganda attracted supporters among the population and served to create refugees. The first refugees to arrive in Serbia from Croatia were recorded in September, 1990, and from that time their number has increased constantly. Refugees from the period September, 1990, to May, 1991 were on the whole made refugees by the dramatic influence of media propaganda in service to ethno-national political ideology, because the primary reasons for their departure was media-induced fear. For those refugees who departed between May, 1991, and the end of that year, the main reasons stated for leaving their place of permanent residence became, besides fear, loss of jobs, threats to individuals and families, and general endangerment of life.

For this reason refugees are living witnesses to the process by which the media promote ethno-national identity as a political ideology, and how, at that time, all types of interethnic relations in ethnically mixed areas and beyond began to be systematically crushed. The government and the people, thanks above all to the media, gradually established a correspondence, and the discrepancy between ideology and interpersonal relations began to disappear. This merging of views was based, on the one hand, on the (rather low-level) political culture of the citizenry[3] and their unpreparedness at the right moment to realize what was really happening and what the consequences would be; and on the other hand, on the narrow interests of nationalist political elites to acquire or maintain republican power. In addition to the low level of political culture, the socially urgent need for reconstruction of the economy, because of the drastic consequences for the standard of living set off by the economic and political crisis, exacerbated the dissatisfaction of the population and unleashed its irrational energies. It is precisely in such a political and social atmosphere that the media can successfully intervene between government and people, and the political nationalization of discourse through media becomes an effective model for the reaffirmation of ethno-national spirit and the intensification of national feelings. The causes of ethno-nationalistic war in the territories of the former Yugoslavia can be found at all levels: from international politics and internal relations of domestic political elites, to the concrete interethnic relations of the population. Their relative importance can be distinguished sequentially in time. The purpose of this work, however, is to shed light on the process of the internal political production of ethno-nationalist war. This analysis of the "process of mediation" between power holders and ethnically mixed communities views the individual as having different types of roles and engaging in various kinds relationships.

One of the essential questions of this work is the reasons for and the timing of the onset and acceptance of nationalistic ideologies. The text is based on data obtained through research on refugees from Croatia in 1991.[4]

The Process of Destruction of Ethnically Mixed Communities in The Former Yugoslavia

"Brotherhood and unity," which began as a political category, created a community which then began to break down according to the category of membership in an ethnic group. The radical transformation of one form of integration into another, contradictory one, over a short period of time, raises the question of the operative efficacy of individual factors. The dynamic with which the ideology of brotherhood and unity crossed over into interethnic war speaks not so much to the theory of a fertile nationalistic latent structure as the basis, but rather to the efficient joining together of diverse political interests, the symbolic order, and the specific type of individual isolated political culture as the principle reason for war on the geopolitical territory of Yugoslavia. Further, it speaks not to the equilibrium of its significance and power but rather emphasises above all the mobilizing factor which insures an indispensable homogeneity and dynamic, and at differing intervals.

The issue of resistance on the part of the ethnically mixed community to the tendency of destruction, from outside or internally, however, leads to the question of its constitutive elements and the nature of micro-factors of integration.

Within this approach to understanding the reasons for interethnic destruction, it must be kept in mind that interethnic conflicts, at a concrete level, were as a rule initiated by participants recruited from groups of sports fans, dressed in uniform overnight, and paid to become "national defenders," those who would, in their ethnically mixed environment, defend their "nation" while attacking "the other." The sports fan, symbolizing the spirit of collectivity, provides the particular type of energy capable of expressing and acting on aggression. This was not entirely coincidental, for traditionally fan euphoria at sports matches between teams from different republics

often had a nationalistic tone in former Yugoslavia.

The transformation of the individual from a non-ethnic self-manager into a vigorous ethno-nationalist began, under pressure of the media's manipulation of information, with the closing of media borders between republics. Nationalistic propaganda in ethnically mixed regions in Croatia brought out "self-invited" protectors of the nation, nationalist volunteers from all regions of Serbia and Croatia, to defend local residents from each other: a Serbian housewife from a Croatian housewife, a Serbian neighbour from a Croatian neighbour, a Serbian brother from a Croatian brother. The institutionalization of nationalism began with the firing of Serbs from workplaces in areas where Croats constituted the majority of the population, and conversely the firing of Croats from workplaces in areas where Serbs were in the majority, or where they held positions of political responsibility. The standard socialist distribution of power and decision-making, in accordance with principles of the political rotation of cadres,[5] was in this respect operative, so that it was not even necessary to take a formal institutional decision. Such decisions were, only later, retroactively entered into the books. Municipal politicians, locals of political standing, were coerced (whether or not they wanted to) into adhering to the ethno-national division of the town or village in which they lived—and this became a life or death question. If the members of the other ethnic group did not kill him, the members of his own would kill him as a traitor. With the destruction of ethnically mixed areas in this way complete, the only remaining question was the ethnic cleansing of the place.

Although within former Yugoslavia there existed several types of cultural models which were very different from one another, the relatively common characteristic of all ethnic groups was the decisive basis for the transformation to nationalism. A systematically developed authoritarian social character along with a discernible mentality, latent nationalistic tension, and worsening conditions of existence guaranteed the success of a manipulation toward the option of war. War was the consequence of the destructive influence of nationalistic ideology and depended not only on the effectiveness of the manipulating agent, but also on the latent structure of society, the micro-community.

The extent to which the ethnic community was homogeneous and the nature of influence of specific factors on the destruction of that community can best be seen from the results of empirical research carried out with refugees who left their homes prior to the summer of 1991, directly before the outbreak of the worst armed conflicts.[6]

The theoretical question with which we were unavoidably confronted in this analysis was: can the condition of being or becoming a refugee be considered a form of migration, if the primary motive for departure stems from an undefined fear (as expressed by the first refugees of 1990), or from direct threat to life (as experienced by those who came later, in the summer of 1991)? Migrants by definition always have a larger possibility of rational choices and voluntary decisions, while for refugees such choices are severely limited. It is a particular type of coercion that forces one to become a refugee, which differs from the reasons for voluntary migration, in terms of the intensity of endangerment to one's existence. Thus the refugee must be considered distinct from the migrant, and therefore the theoretical concepts concerning migrants are inadequate for the analysis of refugees. The only similarity between refugees and voluntary migrants lies in the fact that members of both groups become "second class citizens" in the milieu in which they settle, and their status becomes and remains a part of their social "identity card" for succeeding generations. The absurdity of this case is that these individuals are refugees within the former Yugoslavia, irrespective of ethno-national identity, and are thus refugees within their former homeland. Moving to their "native" ethnic republic does not, however, lead to ethno-national homogenization, but rather to an increase in intra-ethnic tensions, and even to conflicts. The assimilation of Serbian refugees from Croatia among "old Serbian residents of Serbia" is hindered by the differences between the two groups, which are manifested at several levels: from everyday habits (in workplaces and elsewhere) to language. This confirms the notion that the social impulses for conformity within everyday life, no matter what the cultural milieu, are sufficiently strong that national identity becomes overshadowed. Therefore, ethno-national predatory behaviour can become a basic part of everyday interpersonal relations only through politically manipulated transformation.

How Did They Live Together Before?

The historical memories of the population concerning brutal interethnic (and inter-religious) conflicts during the course of world war has often been referred to by some Serbian intellectuals as the key proof for the theoretical interpretation of reasons for the flight of refugees today. However, the data from our research indicate that contemporary ethnic conflicts did not start spontaneously, as a result of integration of personal and group experience in interethnic threat over the course of time from the Second World War to the present day, nor did the historical memory of "Ustasa genocide against the Serbian people in the Second World War" provoke a new wave of killing. But it is certain that "collective memory" of this act was the articulated target of the media for the purpose of strengthening Serbs' ethno-national feelings. It is also certain that its articulation as a basic element for nationalizing discourse arose from a certain latent structure through to everyday interpersonal relations, as will be shown later.

A total of 60.3 percent of the informants in this study indicated that in interethnic relations in the postwar period (i.e, after the Second World

War) there was *never* any sort of division; 60.2 percent indicated that there was *never* any interethnic intolerance; 77.7 percent said there were *never* ethnic conflicts at the personal level, and 83.9 percent said there were *never* any ethnic conflicts at the group level. At the same time, 39.7 percent of the informants indicated that there were interethnic divisions in the postwar period; 39.8 percent that there was interethnic intolerance; 22.3 percent that there were personal interethnic conflicts, while 16.1 percent said that there had been interethnic group conflicts. Careful analysis of these data, however, suggests that the latent structures for the development of ethnic conflicts in ethnically mixed areas were already present, but not to such a degree that one could expect their spontaneous transformation into nationalistic conflict or war. Informants in this study typically characterized the breakdowns in interethnic relations in the period after the Second World War in the following terms:

> ... when the opportunity arose, Croats would withdraw to their side, Serbs to theirs ... after the events at Kosovo, Croats considered that Albanians should be given their republic, while Serbs believed the opposite, and there would be arguments, especially at work. It rarely came to fisticuffs, and it would always be outside, after working hours, so nobody knows how often this happened ... [a pensioner from Vukovar].
>
> ... intolerance was always initiated from the top: usually there was some political event which the government was responsible for, and because of which people would quarrel, and divide according to ethnic identity ... [an economist from Zadar].

These expressions of these refugees reflect the political nationalization of discourse organized by the media which began the process of political and nationalist transformation of the self-consciousness of the "self-managing" individual. Here it should be mentioned that the "self-manager" was only declaratively a political subject of the melting-pot; while nationalist ideologies have as their political subject the authentic nationalist. Nevertheless, the "self-manager of brotherhood and unity" finally realized, after 40 years of manipulation, that all decisions were in any case made outside the workers' councils. This was one of the factors that gave birth to resistance to the socialist regime, and was yet another source of dissatisfaction and mobilization of irrational energy. The concept of "worker" evolved through "working people" to arrive at "nationalist" and "nationalistic interest." One form of manipulation was replaced by another. The filtered political category of "self-manager" encouraged the individual to learn conformity to the crowd, to government, and to prevailing policy, and left the individual without a suitable social role, without a wider social framework for collective identity. At the same time, as a model of "political literacy," the concept of the "self-manager" was based on the principles that authority belonged to its adherents, power accrued to its supporters and to the obedient, the political subject conceptualized according to political object, and sources of information according to the needs of the (un)informed. The possibility (and the incentives) for the self-manager to become a citizen were successfully cancelled out through political intervention.

From the data it can also be seen that the character of interethnic relations after the Second World War up until the present reflected a significantly greater measure of orientation toward "brotherhood and unity," but that they also became, in a relatively hidden way, oriented to ethnic tension. The first level of interpretation of this contradictory fact is that "Yugoslavism" and nationalism both had the foundation, and therefore the potential, to be developed further. The second level of interpretation focuses on the differences in the foundations of Yugoslavism, on the one hand, and of ethnic tensions, on the other. The concept of Yugoslavism, at first only through ideological propaganda and political directives, penetrated all interpersonal relations, and became a way of life, a peculiarly Yugoslav reality. The population of former Yugoslavia, according to the data, was to a very large extent unburdened with the question of ethnic affiliation.

Without disputing the possibility of the persistence of "historical memory" as a latent structure, we have to emphasize nevertheless that in such social and political circumstances it did not appear to play a role in the spontaneous (internal) provocation of conflict because, for one thing, the number of those who had been witnesses to those events was steadily diminishing (some 40 years had elapsed), and for another, the remaining sources through which this "memory" could continue and be sustained were neither current nor widespread. Moreover, ethno-national conflicts within ethnically mixed communities did not erupt in all ethnically mixed areas at the same time. These circumstances notwithstanding, "historical memory" has been brought directly into political propaganda, and, once conflicts escalated, used as a supplementary motive for ethnic hatred and ethnic defence.

Interpersonal Relations Prior to Exile

We attempted to trace the mechanisms of interethnic destruction through the informants' testimony concerning the quality of relationships in everyday life with family, friends, neighbours, and workplace associates. It began, our respondents noted, "with the distancing, the cooling of relations," and "it ended up with the shelling or mining of houses, with being forced out."

Our research also confirmed at this level that the functioning of the Yugoslav "melting pot" (interethnic integration under the influence of the ideology of brotherhood and unity) was exceptionally successful: more than four-fifths (86.0 percent) of the informants testified to good relations with neighbours and with members of other ethnic groups, as many as 95.1 percent had well developed friendships, and more than two-thirds (66.5

percent) had relations with relatives who were members of other ethnic groups—primarily on the basis of ethnically mixed marriages. These findings challenge to a significant degree the theory about historical continuity of ethnic conflicts and speak to the thesis that current ethnic conflicts did not begin spontaneously, as a continuity of genocidal hatred, but rather were somehow artificially provoked or induced. The culmination of interethnic disintegration in violent armed conflicts had a decisive influence on the worsening of relations between members of different nationalities. Thus, 58.8 percent of informants testified that relations with neighbours had deteriorated, while a similar number found that friendships with members of different nationalities had been damaged (58.5 percent); family relationships, on the other hand, which tend to be strongest, were most successfully sustained—although every fifth informant (21.1 percent) confirmed that even family relationships had suffered.

Ethnic Conflicts—the Beginning and the Escalation

Current interethnic conflicts began to intensify during the pre-election campaign at the time of the first postwar multi-party elections in Croatia, in April, 1990. That campaign was identified by 14.9 percent of the informants as a contributing factor to conflict. The aggressive campaign of the victorious party, the Croatian Democratic Union, and particularly the framework of that party's electoral programme—creation of an ethno-national state with a diminishing of political rights for minorities—resulted in the establishment of a political authority which evoked suspicion among members of other ethnic groups. About one-third of the informants in this study (35.5 percent) mentioned this as a reason for the worsening of interethnic relations, and the potential realization of the party's programme, which called forth the active resistance of the Serbian population (the events of the so-called "log revolution" in the Knin region), is the next reason given by 8.2 percent of the informants. Conflicts burst into flame during the first quarter of 1991 (according to 7.7 percent of the respondents), and intensified in the second quarter (17.1 percent) when open armed conflict began.

The first refugees did not emerge as a result of the continuation of ethnic conflicts, but rather as a product of media-induced fear. In the first wave, that is, up until May 1, 1991, according to the data obtained in this study, the main reason for departure was the media coverage of Martin Spegelj, a former General of the Yugoslav People's Army and a current General of the Croatian Army—as he negotiated the purchase of weapons with which, to paraphrase his remarks, "everything that is Serbian will be killed."

The sharpening of interethnic conflicts in the months in which the number of refugees rose dramatically was manifested in different ways. A direct motive for departure was, therefore, an escalation from simply "fear" itself to "fear of war," "fear of revenge," "fear for one's life." In conditions of interethnic conflicts, fear, as an irrational category, is structured at two essential rational levels: the historical and the current political. At the same time, (the individual's) fear, at the local level of ethnic conflicts, is subjected to the influence of all kinds of anomic effects. These include: changes in the system of government, police and law; changes in leading personnel in the economic and social sectors; limitation of negative freedoms (movement and work, social security, etc.); symbolic and cultural self-identification (flags, crests, language, media); as well as different forms of deviant behaviour (from abuse of the vulnerable to robbery, theft, and violence).

The question that many citizens of the former Yugoslavia ask themselves is: who is to blame for the situation in which we now find ourselves? We felt it was necessary to pose this question about the "guilty" party to our refugee informants, but within the framework of two assumptions. First, anyone who lived through the current situation and through concrete personal (family) tragedy, such as exile, would have his or her representation of who is responsible for it. Second, we wanted to find out if and to what extent refugees merged radicalization with generalization, and whether they would consider the guilty party the Croatian people in general. The distribution of answers indicated that only one of every twenty informants blames the Croatian people. The majority of respondents (63.1 percent) blamed the current Croatian government, and its President, Tudjman. It is noteworthy that every fifth informant also blamed the Serbian leadership. The data for the two most commonly mentioned guilty parties (the "Croatian government" and "all political leaderships") differed according to the ethnic identity of the informant.

Results of research on refugees from Croatia in 1991 indicate that communal life with different ethnic groups in the same territory over many decades had those characteristics which, according to the manner of expression of ethnic identity, would be unlikely to be reversed. Rather, the characteristics of the established ethnically mixed community revealed more about the lack of civil rights and freedoms, the existence of social differences, the tendency to unlawful or wilful decisions by local authorities, that is, all other things except nationalistic tensions. Horizontal nationalistic energy was released by the interest of political elites, and distributed from top to bottom along the social vertical of the community.

The combination of underdeveloped political culture, burdensome social conditions caused by economic crisis, and the unleashing of irrational energy as a result of the precipitous fall in the standard of living, provided sufficient ground for intermediary agents to mobilize the latent structure, that is, to establish a vital "collaboration" between government and people. At the same time, the then relatively homogenous ethnically mixed community began at that point to be visited by ethno-national "volunteer" groups

(who were to become the nationalist paramilitary groups later on) from Serbia and Croatia. Their intention was to "defend" local Serb residents from local Croat residents, and vice versa. These "newcomers" proclaimed themselves protectors of the (Serbian or Croatian as the case may be) nation and of the national interest, while local residents, at least at the beginning, "asked" them not to come any more to "defend" them, because they did not need defending. But these Serb and Croat paramilitary "newcomers" started to threaten the local residents, to push people into supporting them. In addition to these paramilitary "newcomer" groups, "military" territorial defence groups were also formed, somewhat later (and these latter were joined by the local population regardless of their ethnic identity). During this time the Yugoslav People's Army was being gradually deserted by members of all nationalities except Serbs, Montenegrins, and Muslims (Muslims began to leave the Army only after the situation in Bosnia worsened in 1992). The resulting Yugoslav People's Army, now almost ethnically "pure" in composition, was later obliged to "keep the peace" in ethnically mixed areas. Thus began the armed destruction.

National Identity: Secular Religion or Political Category

National identity is a category which contains simultaneously within itself historical, individual-psychological, cultural, social, and political dimensions, and among which the dominance of one over the other depends on the degree of current sociopolitical pressure exerted upon it. It therefore can be manifested in different ways: as an individual feeling, as a cultural model, as social relationship, or as a collective and political category. Only in so far as the basic conceptual-subjective feeling in consciousness of ethnic belonging can be expressed, as a part of the individual citizen's legitimate private-legal dignity, then this inescapable characteristic of the individual does not have metahistorical, metacultural, or metasocial connotation. In every other case national identity is the instrumentalization of a privately held self-concept, and is a manipulation of those human characteristics, which in any case the individual has no choice.

Individual identity is constructed upon diverse social roles carried out more or less routinely in everyday life. Not one of these routine, everyday social roles, whether in the interpersonal sphere, working relations, or leisure time, depends upon, nor is it a function of, the person's ethno-national identity, and the nature of the individual's routine, everyday obligations does not in any respect refer to national identity. Only when ethno-national identity, "as a secular religion of the individual," is transformed into a political ideology does it become a critical precondition for the carrying out of any social role. Ethno-national identity then becomes the primary social role upon which everything else depends, and the basis of (lack of) privilege of the personality irrespective of his or her level of education, professional orientation, or some other special characteristic or quality.

Model of Nationalization of Discourse in the Former Yugoslavia

The construction of nationalist (political and everyday) culture within the behaviour of former citizens of Yugoslavia did not begin simultaneously on all levels of society. Nationalism as a political strategy significantly preceded the lower-level cheapest street production of nationalist images and sentiments. Nevertheless, some intellectuals who manufactured "Cole Porter nationalism" were, in the span of five years, able to establish successful foundations for communication—and everything that the first ones thought up, these others justified.

The manner in which a political idea (nationalism in former Yugoslavia) begins to come alive semantically, and thus to have an impact upon individual consciousness, unfolds in a politically anticipated direction. Thus, one of the questions to be asked is the "hierarchy of factors of influence" on the conditions of realization of normative acts. In cases such as Yugoslavia, "the form of political community" is (and was) dictated by the "activity of state power," and not "the political will of the community itself." From this state of affairs, "the national idea semantically began to function above all as a destabilizer of the 'ethnic state,' that is, in the form of 'regional rebellion,' 'awakening of small nations,' and 'self-consciousness of ethnic minorities.'"[7] The breakup of Yugoslavia into 'parts and unities of societies' was such that the legitimizing bases of power became weaker and weaker. At precisely this interval, the totalitarian government introduces new ruling technologies, first through new political discourse, and then through mechanisms of "controlled liberalization." Changes within political discourse provoke changes within the symbolic order and within public opinion, which begins to be pluralized: from acceptance and support of the new rhetorical project, and then further on to its practice, to its criticism, and to its rejection. In other words, the new ethno-political discourse manufactures both supporters and opponents. Supporters transform it into concrete action, while opponents remain on the margins, because their actions cannot compare with those of holders of official power and the supporters among "the wider popular masses." The collapse of "old" social connections and the establishment of new ones takes place, above all, under the influence of various communications processes.

The expressly articulated presence of nation, national interest, and national essence, and the overall nationalization of discourse in everyday speech and interpersonal relationships, began with more intensive political discussions of the meaning of national identity and the safeguarding of the national interest. The introduction of nation and national interest in everyday political rhetoric in Yugoslavia took place at the moment when an exclusively counterproductive economic policy and economic crisis

threatened the state, and not some other nation. The republican leaderships resolved the federal government's crisis of legitimacy by evoking ethno-national spirit and national interest for their respective republics. Ethno-national interest was at first politically cloaked in ideological discussions and declarations, and then evolved into political action. The most decisively important political action that facilitated the introduction of nationalism was the closing off of the media within the republican sphere. With the internal republican isolation of the media came subsequent debates about which alphabet (Cyrillic or Latin) was to be used in the subtitles of films and for the most widely viewed programmes. After the "closing off" of the media, which was initiated following the former Yugoslav state holiday of November 29, 1989, a common Yugoslav media, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. Viewers were no longer able to watch regularly alternating daily informative news reports from the other republican centres, which had been standard practice in the past; and now had the opportunity only to watch the daily news programmes prepared within their own republics.

The national interest, under this kind of political "protection," constitutes the misuse of historical roots and the vulgar manipulation of ethno-national feelings of the individual to the profit of political interests by those who measure national interest only in terms of protecting their own current political self-interests. Ethno-national interest projected in this way involves the politicization of the individual's origins, emotions, and personal fates, and enhances the construction of aggression. The raising of ethno-national interest to the level of policy was a political strategy for establishing, at the level of the republic, an illusory social equilibrium. The consequences of the economic crisis, which affected all of Yugoslavia, began to be "resolved" at the level of the nation, and the blame for that crisis was laid on the other nation.

Ethno-national interest becomes identified with the territory (in this case the region of Croatia) on which people had, over a period of many years, established a system of mixed social networks, which, irrespective of national identity, functioned to the advantage of everyone. The politicization of one's own ethno-national interest through its "protection" by means of brutal ethnic conflicts, which were allegedly only an act and product of defence, is an absurd indicator of the collective hysteria resulting from inadequate political integration of membership in the community, a community burdened with increased social misery brought on by a worn-out and inappropriate political system, and not by some other nation. The absurdity is compounded as the politicization of ethno-national interest intensifies the misery, and predatory nationalism and ethno-national hatred grows deeper, directed not only toward the "enemy" nation but also to one's own nation. The process of ethno-national transition accompanies the disappearance of the legal state, as more massive use is made of all the resources and behaviours that in conditions of social equilibrium bear the mark of the criminal—disorganization, lawlessness, and crime.

The nationalization of discourse, which unfolded from the beginning of December, 1989, also produced militant nationalists, who supported the war as national defence and liberation. The model of homogenization by means of nationalistic discourse went out in the form "us" and "them." Enemies are "them," that is, all other nations.

The symbolic order in totalitarian regimes always creates a fictive public. Real events, impregnated with ideological-political symbols, are degenerated and incorporated into a system of information/knowledge structured on a reliably predictable public opinion. Media commentaries, for example, as an essential part of this information system, have the task of "informing" according to the government's political requirements of the day. In this way a fictitious picture of reality was created, and a so-called "people's will" manufactured and set in motion with forcefully directed energy. This creation constituted "proof" of the legitimacy of "democratic" government. Such a fictive public eventually takes on a life of its own as an independent "authentic collective spirit."

From the moment that the empty legitimate space of power was "filled after the fall of communism, it began to be filled by the nation," that is, the nationalization of political discourse evolved, to the point at which a new reality was produced: "ethno-national reality: division and ethnic conflicts," on the basis of which further, and in more dramatic form, disintegrative processes unfolded for which the government's solution was held to be in narrowing of options to ethno-national interests. In the model of the authoritarian regime, as was the case in former Yugoslavia, nationalization of political discourse achieved a "special paradox: that in the name of which and because of which this began became a lever of its own destruction. That lever was freedom understood as the nation. The equalization of nations through freedom alone clears the path for its elevation to an idolized ideal, which becomes characteristic of a new authoritarian order."[8] In the "old" socialist demagogy, people were subjected to political socialization oriented to defence against the class enemy; in the "new" nationalistic demagogy people are oriented toward defence against the enemy nation—against those who,

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only yesterday, were their closest relatives, friends, neighbours, or colleagues.

Political pluralism, within the territories of the former Yugoslavia, unfortunately coincided with the rise of ethno-nationalism, and the crucial political question concerned national borders. The matter of secession of the republics from Yugoslavia, with maintenance of what had until then been "administrative borders," resulted in growing conflict among diverse political interests of republican leaderships within the federal government. The strategy according to which residents of Croatia had to decide whether or not they wanted an independent Croatia, was ethno-nationally based: Serbs who live in Croatia did not want it—this was decided for them by Milosevic, and Croats wanted it—this was decided for them by Tudjman. Whether all Croats were really in favour of an independence state and its emancipation from the "Yugoslav prison," and whether all Serbs really wanted to remain in Yugoslavia, was a meaningful question for the republican political establishments. Both the one and the other republican government "knew" in advance what their nations would support.

Notes

1. This work is a short extract from a broader study which includes data from research with refugees from Croatia in 1991 as well as refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992.
2. Figures are taken from Dusan Breznik, "Stanovnistvo Jugoslavije," Konzorcijum Instituta drustvenih nauka (Titograd: Chronos, 1991).
3. Podunavac, Milan. *Politicka kultura i politicki odnosi* (Belgrade: Radnicka stampa, 1982).
4. The project "Displaced Persons from Croatia, 1991," was carried out by the Argument Agency for Applied Political and Sociological Research (founded in 1990). Fieldwork was conducted in September 1991, at which time on the territory of the Republic of Serbia there were about 88,000 displaced persons from Croatia. The sample covers 650 informants, i.e., representatives of displaced households. According to the data of the International Committee of the Red Cross for the period September-December 1991, the number of displaced persons from Croatia amounted to 588,000. Out of this number 318,000 (54 percent) resettled from the crisis areas into provincial areas of Croatia, and 270,000 into other Yugoslav Republics. On the basis of these data, as well as according to the incomplete results of the Yugoslav census of 1991, these compulsory migrations out of Croatia constitute 12.4 percent of the total population of this Republic, of which 9.0 percent is Croatian population and 44.3 percent Serbian. However, when examining the share of displaced population compared with the total number of inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia, then the Serbian displaced population totals 5.7 percent and Croatian 6.9 percent of that number. According to statistics of the High Commission of the United Nations, at the end of April 1992, the number of refugees was increasing daily and has already passed the one-million mark.
5. Those who were loyal to the old political system now became loyal to the ethno-nationalistic order, sensing that they were called to the function of being the alert guardians, formerly of "self-management," now of ethno-national interests, because that legitimized the function that they acquired in return for their moral-political capability.
6. The research included refugees from 52 ethnically mixed municipalities in the Republic of Croatia, involving 153 settlements of urban and rural type. In more than two-thirds of the municipalities (68.4 percent), refugees were recruited from the population which represented the ethnic minority in these municipalities; in one-fifth (21.1 percent) the potential refugee population was the majority in the municipality, while in 10.5 percent there was a relative ethnic balance. More than two-fifths (44.9 percent) of the members of refugee households, for which representatives were interviewed, represent an indigenous population (that is, they resided in their place of birth); more than one-third (34.6 percent) were intra-republican migrants; while one-fifth had come from outside the Republic of Croatia to settle there.

   From the total number of all members of households in our sample in exile, 46.6 percent were male and 52.9 percent were female, and in terms of age cohort, the largest number were between the ages of 31 and 40 years. With respect to nationality, 87.9 percent were Serbs, with the remaining belonging to other ethnic groups—which is not necessarily an indication of mixed marriages, since the number of married and unmarried was almost the same: 43.1 percent and 41.5 percent respectively.
7. Djindjic, Zoran. *Jugoslavija kao nedovrsena drzava* (Novi Said: Biblioteka matice srpske,1988), p. 9.
8. Kovacevic, Djuro "Jugoslavija: osvajanje ili gubitak istorije," Zbornik *Raspad Jugoslavije produzetak ili kraj agonije* (Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije, 1991), p. 11. ⊐

The Yugoslavian Puzzle: Which Nationalism, Whose War, and Other Unsettling Questions

Nergis Canefe Günlük

Leo Kuper, in his article on the prevention of genocide, argues that a heightened salience of plural divisions in society and polarisation of identity claims should be taken as the precursor to genocidal violence.[1] For Kuper, there is usually a superimposition of differences, territorial segregation, and inequality in economic and political participation on ethnic differentiation. Thus, organized ethno- nationalist revivalism in the context of coexistence of minority and majority communities can be identified as one of the most common cases for the conditions of polarization and communal antagonism to reach the saturation point of active participation in organized political violence.

Meanwhile, some communities are vulnerable to be targeted by organized violence more than others without any antecedent deterioration of their relationship with the dominant groups. This is primarily due to their traditional positioning as cultural scapegoats. Regarding the "cultural-others" of a territorial/nation state, the dehumanisation of the victims of genocidal warfare is achieved on the basis of the older beliefs and prejudices implicated on the target group. In other words, it is important to make connections between a deliberate policy of dehumanising victim populations in the process of their annihilation, and the historical roots of the cultural and ideological identification of victim populations as outsiders to a system.

In the case of former Yugoslavia, the enunciation of cultural-others is a very difficult task. Although the main community that is victimised through genocidal warfare is currently the Bosnian Muslims, the origins of the civil war in Yugoslavia suggests a multiplicity of cultural-others that would have been prone to massacre-oriented armed clashes. Through the escalating levels of violence in Yugoslavia's tragic disintegration, loyalties were short-lived and interchangeable: Serbs versus Croats, Croats versus Serbs in Croatia and Serbs in Serbia, Serbs and Croats versus Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats versus Serbs, etc. This article analyzes the reduction of the multiplicity of Yugoslavia's cultural-others to the singular "Muslim" element. Today, the targeted Muslim community is that of Bosnian descent, and there are strong signs that in a very near future, the Albanian Muslims of Kosovo might be subject to similar atrocities. Therefore, it is urgent that the Yugoslavian case is analysed in a framework which focuses on the problems around Bosnia not simply as an episode of controversial land claims, but as part of a cultural and political conviction towards eliminating the "alien elements" in a national polity.[2]

Up to the 1970s, Yugoslavia was regarded as a success story in contradistinction to the dim economic prospects that Eastern European Communism seemed to offer. The Yugoslavian model symbolised a Third Way between Soviet-style centralisation and Western market economy. The background for Yugoslavia's different image is the 1948 split between Tito and Stalin, which announced Tito's Yugoslavia as liberated from Moscow's dictum.[3] However, as Lendvai rightfully argues, there was more to Yugoslavia's special status on the international platform than the economic novelties of Yugoslav-style communism (Lendvai 1991, 152). Yugoslavia was singularly identified with a working model of federalism which joined together communities with different linguistic, religious and ethnic characteristics. For the outsider observant of Yugoslavian politics, once its signs were there, the collapse of Yugoslavian federalism was therefore expected to take place in a gradual fashion which wouldn't lead into bloodshed. However, the scholars and politicians inside the former Yugoslavia have been issuing warnings of a fatal civil war soon after Tito's death and the practical end of his charismatic power as the unifying force of federalist centralism.[4]

The problems concerning the Yugoslavian model of federalism date back to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. After the Second World War, Yugoslavia emerged as the only "nation" who liberated themselves from Nazism. It also survived the civil war between Croats and Serbs who were the main antagonists in the prewar union of the "South Slavs." The subsequent re-writings of Yugoslavian national history mythologised the success of the strong partisan movement against the Nazi invasion, and attempted to bring together the "national minorities' of the new Yugoslavia under the rubric of a heroic national spirit. However, the narrative unity of a people named "Yugoslavs" never established a common currency other than for the purposes of referring to people born into interethnic marriages, such as Tito himself, or army officials, members of the party, and state bureaucracy. This paradox of "Yugoslavia without Yugoslavs" can be explained on the basis of four factors.[5]

First of all, the unified narrative of a strong Yugoslavia did not match with the reality of the inter-communal strife between the Croats and Serbs who supposedly stood at opposite sides during the Second World War. In contradistinction with the official narra-

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tives of the history of the state of Yugoslavia, the popular culture of Serbian nationalism emphasises the "guilty consciousness" of the Croats and reinforces depictions of Croats as "a nation under probation" (Lendvai 1991, 255).

Secondly, the original premises of both Serbian and Croatian nationalism were fundamentally at odds with the federalist aspirations of a central Yugoslavian state. The "Greater Serbia" ideal which has emerged out of the ruins of the Habsburg Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century has long dictated that minority communities such as Macedonians, Albanians in Kosovo, Bosnian Muslims and Vojvodinians should be either suppressed or conciliated. Similar projections were spelled out by the "Greater Croatia" ideal which dreamt of incorporating Dalmatia and the greater part of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a new Croatia. Therefore, the six republics sanctified by Yugoslavian federalism were simultaneously designated as the possible preys for a larger Serbia or Croatia.

Thirdly, and finally, related to the stand the larger and stronger republics took in their relations with the smaller ones, over the years, the national minority communities other then the Serbs, Croats and Slovens developed defensive nationalist agendas as a response to the scenarios of incorporation imposed on them from various sides of the Yugoslavian national polity. The Albanians of Kosovo, Bosnian Muslims, and Macedonians—the population figures of the first two including significant number of Muslims—perceived the Yugoslav state not necessarily as a protector of equal representation and harmonious coexistence. In particular, problems surrounding the national identity of Macedonians were multiplied due to Greece's and Bulgaria's open denial of the very existence of a people called "Macedonians."

If so, how did the grand ideal of Tito for a stronger and unified Yugoslavia survive the long decades of ethnic and communal strife before the actual breaking up caused by the current civil war? The answer to this question lies in the tensions between the federalist and centralist political trends in the former Yugoslavia and how these trends were operationalized by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Despite the systemic centralisation of the Yugoslav state, the battle through the Tito decades (1945–80) over the rights of the units of the federal system put the six constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia in a very precarious situation vis-à-vis their relationship with each other.

Following the suppression of the so-called "Croatian Spring" of nationalist revivalism in 1971–72, the centripetal force of the Yugoslav state, the Party (LCY), had set its tone of voice in favour of ensuring utmost loyalty to the federation by all parties involved. However, at the level of policy making, instead of restraining the separatist undercurrents of Yugoslav politics, the LCY itself became the arena for the staging of savage ethno-nationalist conflicts.

In particular, the referential channelling of funds and investments in the wake of economic and administrative decentralisation heightened the tensions between "rich" and "poor" republics. During the long processes of decentralisation, what was pejoratively named as localism and particularism before became a legitimate political cause for the capturing of competing investment projects. Consequently, the differences between communists and noncommunists, or, bureaucrats and members of the civil society, were completely overshadowed by ethno-national allegiances (Lendvai 1991, 257). In other words, the so-called Yugoslav solution of federalism aggravated the already existing tensions between conflicting truth claims of ethno-nationalist groups within a single party system.

Over the years, the central state was exposed to substantial "Lebanisation" of the administrative apparatus, and the prospects of democratisation were gradually removed from the national agenda with the ascendance of Serbian officials to all the significant offices in the state bureaucracy as well as in the national army. After Tito's death in 1980, the first episode which signalled the changing character of ethno-nationalist claims was the violent eruption of the demands in Kosovo for an autonomous province and equally violent crushing of these demands. Kosovo wanted not merely *de facto* but *de jure* constitutional status as a republic, and the removal of its formal ties to Serbia. (Lendvai 1991, 257; Denitch 1993, 26–27).

The clash between the Albanian majority in Kosovo and the Serbian-led Belgrade regime promptly fits to Kuper's preconditions for genocidal tendencies in ethnically polarised societies. For Serbian nationalists, the nascent Albanian nationhood was a threat for the memories of Kosovo as the cradle for the medieval Serbian empire of the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. Concomitantly, the Albanians of Kosovo who were a non-Slav people with different religious and linguistic affinities were identified as dissident elements to be diluted in the federalist political scheme. That is to say, prior to the actual breaking up of the federal system, although the revived hegemonical ambitions of Serbian nationalism were becoming identifiably strong, they were successfully disguised by the idiom of the unity and totality of the state of Yugoslavia.

Here, Enloe, Giddens and Zolberg are cited as the pathfinders of a new theoretical enterprise that is capable of analyzing ethnicity in its social, cultural and historical contextuality.[6] Enloe's works and those of others that followed the path that she has opened have caused serious controversies across the disciplines. The "discovery" of the role of supposedly obsolescent ethnic communalism in national politics and the belated recognition of the persistent saliency of ethnic attachments has raised unsettling ideological and methodological questions concerning nationalism.

From one point of view, race, minority status, sectarianism, and regionalism can all impinge on the single notion of ethnicity as the new analyti-

cal black sheep. Instead of such a negative loading of ethnicity, Enloe, as well as Ben-Dor, suggests referring to ethnicity as a relational pattern, and thus looks at ethnicity as a dynamic phenomenon.[7]

Secondly, Enloe's and Zolberg's contributions to the field of critical studies of nationalism from the point of view of ethnicity are pioneering in terms of joining two specific lines of inquiry: ethnicity and military studies.

Enloe, Giddens and Zolberg argue that the crisscrossing is ever present outside the domain of authoritarian societies, since it is the underlying factor in consensus building. Concomitantly, the proposition that ethnic identity is a given to which national politics can only *react* is defeated in light of how the army and the police force systemically reshuffle ethnic categories for security and recruitment purposes.

Looking at the same issue from a different angle, we can argue that ethnic differentiation, official reinforcement or denial of ethnic identification, and the place of ethnicity in the larger framework of nationalism are issues that concern the survival of the central state apparatus and its legitimacy over an assumed national polity. In this framework, ethnicity becomes the middle term that is placed between "nation building" and "state building." State-building under the guise of nation-building stimulates a unique kind of historiography which treats the national polity as devoid of ethnic characteristics.

This deletion, however, has never been a matter of ignorance. Rather, it is a choice made in the name of strengthening the accountability of "national citizenry" on the basis of a unified national past. As a result, the tradition of the modern territorial/nation state erodes the location of ethnicity in the semantics of politics and culture. As such, in national politics, ethnicity is primarily claimed to stand for deception, ambiguity and euphemism.

At the surface level, this model certainly does not fit to the case of former Yugoslavia which was by definition a multi-ethnic federalist state. However, once we start looking at the contingencies of ethno-nationalist essentialism in each of the six republics that made up the federal union, it becomes obvious that ethnic purity was a major concern in inter-republic relations.

While Slovenia was the closest to ethnic homogeneity, neither of the other five republics had the demographics to support their claims of an independent nation-state in a singular nationalist idiom. Particularly in Bosnia, the population distribution echoed the diversity that characterised the totality of the former Yugoslavian state. Consequently, the dynamics described by the thesis of the ethnocultural homogenisation of national history was put into effect in order to clarify the "real" people of Serbia, Croatia, and later Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. The implications of ethnocultural homogenisation in a multiethnic setting are very direct in the sense that the dominant ethnic group defines itself as "the nation" and degrades the other ethnicities into the status of "minorities." This scheme of analysis has explanatory power for both Croatian and Serbian ethno-nationalist revivalism. However, for Bosnia, we need a much more complicated account in order to understand why the Bosnian Muslims' claim to be "the nation" was invalidated by the rival ethno-nationalist movements of the surrounding republics.

Initially the federalist policies of the former Yugoslavia does not seem to qualify for a theory of institutionalised practices of ethnic privileging and/or segregation. However, in reality, the gradual increase of Serbian presence in the central state apparatus and particularly in the national army is very suggestive. In the context of the structural relationship between military development, the strengthening of the police force and paramilitary units, and, the utilization of ethnic politics for the political consolidation of an exclusive nationalist agenda, the rise of Serbian nationalism coalesces with the changing dynamics of who had the most powerful offices in the Yugoslavian central state before its death. For Giddens and Zolberg, the nation-state model is first and foremost characterised by its absolute command over the life and wellbeing of its members/citizens, and therefore there is an asymmetrical relationship between the central state and civil society.

In the cases of Serbian or Croatian leadership of the post-Yugoslavia era, this asymmetry has reached to a point whereby the territorial aspirations of these new states stripped the dissident elements in targeted areas from their right to live. In other words, during the clashes between Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, or Croats and Bosnian Muslims, mechanisms of control over ethnically diversified claims of identity turned into episodes of war atrocities. As far as the different fractions of the civilian population in Bosnia are concerned, these atrocities in fact assumed a very accumulative and repetitive character, which qualified them for the definition of "ethnic-cleansing."

In the wake of the end of totalitarian social and political formations in central-eastern Europe, new forms of nationalist identity claims and strong movements of religious or secular fundamentalism are rapidly filling the void left behind the trans-historical promises of a "new world order." In my view, among other examples, the civil war in Yugoslavia proves most powerfully that the equation of one nation with one nation-state set by the European precedent of nationalism, involves much more than the liberal-democratic idiom of national unity and equal participation. The commonly espoused argument about Serbian, Croat and Bosnian nationalism is that Yugoslavia in particular and Eastern Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa, and South America in general, accommodate anomalous applications of the European nation-state model with disastrous results. Here, I propose that the catastrophic events culminating into totalitarian regimes, civil wars and episodes of ethnic cleansing are actually endemic to the European blueprint for discourses of nationalism.

The nation-state model and the forms of cultural and political domination it accommodates prepare the ground for the nurturing of authoritarian cultural traditions loaded with passion for a utopian future unmatched with the regulated promises of constitutional patriotism and representative politics. In this context, the resistable ascendance of Serbian nationalism can not be seen as an anomaly that sets a cultural precedent for totalitarian expansionism. In other words, the Yugoslav civil war does not necessarily qualify for a case of archaic tribal claims leading into organized murder. Western Europe's own history has ample instances that would provide the background for the aspirations cherished by the orthodoxies of former Yugoslavian politics.

From this point onwards, my purpose here is to elaborate on overlapping cultural precedents of the elements of intolerance and sociopolitical violence embedded in the histories of nationalism in Europe on the one hand, and in the former Yugoslavia, on the other.

In the narratives of national history as well as in their particularist negations based on the revival of excluded identity claims, historical knowledge claims appear to be the battleground for a systematic assimilation of time and space. As such, a rhetorical mastery of the "national time" and "national space" becomes the tool for the hegemonic construction of a specific nationalist ideology. For instance, both Serbian and Croatian ethno-nationalisms revitalise the ideals of ancient Slavic Kingdoms as a historical justification (temporal aspect) for their territorial expansionism (spatial aspect). Consequently, the juxtaposition of time and space horizons—history and territory/historicity and territoriality—is essential for both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forms of nationalism for the validation of a selective set of identity claims.[8] In turn, the forms of the validations of chosenness—if not superiority—have a common relationship to the utilisation of power.

Gidden's approaches the central state not as an almighty political form of modernity, but as the centre of circumscribed arenas for the generation of administrative power, and as the locus for the concentration of allocative and authoritative resources. Giddens thus introduces structural and systemic forms of violence into the analysis of the central state.

In this new framework, it is necessary to think about the level of concentration of allocative resources as derivative of the institutional consolidation of authoritative power. Thereof, the concept of surveillance becomes crucial for understanding communal modes of recording and remembering.

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Surveillance is an indirect or attenuated use of violence which bridges military power with policing power. Surveillance can also be instrumental in examining the externalised and systematised character of information gathered for purposes of perpetuation of the authority of the central state.

In the light of the debates on the linkages between institutional and cultural dimensions of nationalism, the attainment of ethno-religious, linguistic, economic and territorial integration during the initial phases of nationalism should be regarded as a geopolitical calculation based on the reflection of authoritarian power relations over allocative ones. The end result of the formalisation of this reflection is a fundamental reordering of the civil society. In former Yugoslavian political unity, this reordering placed the Northern and Christian elements in a privileged position vis-à-vis the Southern and Muslim segments of the federalist structure. As a result, the allocative distribution of resources and funds were dictated by the hierarchy of valid ethno-nationalist claims. So, the structural premises of the European nation-state model implied in an explicitly multi-ethnic and multinational context created the conditions for the explosion of the Yugoslavian federalist system on the grounds of separatist and singular ethno-nationalist claims.

At the beginning of my work, I asked why Bosnian claims for autonomy were degraded to the cries of a people without a history as opposed to the legitimacy attributed to Croatian and Serbian nationalism. I believe the answer lies in the original hierarchy of the units of the federalist system in the former Yugoslavia. Serbs, Croats and Slovenes identified themselves as the true force behind the nation of "Southern Slavs," and the other components of the Yugoslav unity were thus reduced to satellite communities which were pulled to the orbit of Slavic unity. In particular, the Muslim communities were signified as the remnants of the Ottoman imperial invasion which gave rise to a hybrid population lacking the true qualities of the Slavic nations. As such, when the time came for breaking up, the scenario was obvious for the powerful republics of the former Yugoslav unity: those who had access to power and who at the same time possessed the true characteristics of a "Slav nationality" were ready for the glories of the independent singular nation-states, while those who had ethnically and racially mixed population compositions, or those who did not have the prerequisites for a true "Slav nationality" had to be eaten up alive.

To summarise, the ethnic-cleansing of Bosnians in the Yugoslav civil war does not seem to be an anomaly at all if the ethno-nationalist claims of Serbian, Croat and Bosnian nationalism are contextualized. During the years of federalist power-sharing, the Muslim elements were always made to stay at the lower echelons of the allocative and authoritative power relations. After the collapse of the federal, Yugoslavia's Christian and Northern communities have automatically turned against the Southern and Muslim communities based on the justification that

these communities never had the true grounds for an independent existence, and after all, that was why they were in the federation.

In other words, the exclusive claims of "superior" nationalisms steal the historicity of communities who are imprisoned in the nomenclature of ethnic minorities. In this context, the ultimate truth to the tragedy of the Yugoslavian civil war is that it has a generic nature which echoes the main premises of the "one nation to one nation-state" model of the European tradition, and as such, it is prone to perpetual reproduction. ◘

Notes

1. See Kuper, Leo, "The Prevention of Genocide: Cultural and Structural Indicators of Genocidal Threat," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 12 No. 2 (April 1989).
2. See Knight, D. B., "Identity and Territory: Geographical perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism," *Annals of Association of American Geographers* 72 (1982), and, Brunn, S., "The Future of the Nation-State System," in P. J. Taylor, and J. House, eds., *Political Geography. Recent Advances and Future Directions*, London: Croom Helm (1984).
3. See Lendvai, Paul, "Yugoslavia Without Yugoslavs: The Roots of the Crisis," *International Affairs*, Vol. 67 No. 2 (1991), and Anton Bebler, "Yugoslavia's Society of Communist Federalism and Her Demise," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 26 (March 1993).
4. Denitch, Bogdan. "Tragedy in Former Yugoslavia," *Dissent*, Vol. 26 (Winter 1993).
5. Lendvai, 1991, p. 253.
6. See Giddens, Anthony, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Cambridge: Polity Pres (1985), and Aristide, Zolberg, A. Suhrke, and S. Aguayo, eds., *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*, New York: Oxford University Press (1989).
7. See Ben-Dor, Gabriel, "Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 8, 1 (1977).
8. As one of the most prominent thinkers of a constructive critique of social geography, Lefebvre re-articulates Giddens's critique of the central state apparatus in his writings on the cultural formations of everyday life in pre-modern Europe. There, the time and space dimensions are interlinked in such a way that power and locality are analysed as the two components of a single unit: the sociopolitical organisation of an operative community. In my work, I would like to elaborate on Lefebvre's notion of "locale' in the specific context of ethno-nationalist/proto-nationalist ideologies. ◘

Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Myth of Preventive Protection

Michael Barutciski

The concept of "preventive protection" (or preventive diplomacy) has been used by UNHCR in recent years to help justify its shift of focus from external asylum to internal assistance. In the case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is inappropriate for the powerful states that control UNHCR[1] to speak of preventive protection when their foreign policy had more to do with geopolitical objectives than with finding a solution that could have realistically helped avert the war. This article presents selected legal problems that help in understanding the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Three Nations

There were three constituent nations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Croats, Serbs and Muslims. According to the 1981 census figures, the population of the Republic was composed as follows: 20 percent Croat, 37 percent Serb, 40 percent Muslim. The remainder of the population included various minorities and people who identified themselves as "Yugoslavs."[2] The term from which the translation "nation" is obtained, *narod*, is used in the 1974 Constitution in a way that most resembles the German *Volk* in that it refers to a people defined culturally rather than to citizenry.

There has been a certain confusion in the way many western media sources have used the terms "Muslim" / "Bosnian." Muslims were recognized *de facto* as a distinct nation in the 1971 census and *de jure* in the 1974 Consitution.[3] With their own growing nationalist sentiment, Muslims resented being referred to as "Serbs" or "Croats" who had simply converted to Islam under the Ottoman rule in order to enjoy privileges. Likewise, the term "Yugoslav" did not accommodate their desire to have their own distinct culture recognized. Therefore, the term "Muslim" (with a capital "M") was officially adopted.

Focusing on the legal terms regarding the various nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina helps avoid confusion and manipulation. Since the term "Bosnian" does not distinguish which of the three nations is being referred to, its use can easily lead to confusion. For example, using the term to designate the Muslims (as is often done in the western media) leads to the erroneous identification of the state (reduced by the media to "Bosnia") with the Muslim population. This ignores the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina belong to the Croat and Serb nations and have been present on the territory for as long as the Muslims themselves. Using the term "Bosnian" as a multi-ethnic category which includes all three nations is also misleading since it does not accurately reflect the political forces at play:

> Let's not kid ourselves either about the nature of the [Muslim-controlled] Bosnian government... It is only to the outside world that the Bosnian government maintains the fiction of its "multi-ethnic" character, for the obvious reason that a multi-ethnic state is more likely to get international aid.[4]

These comments lead us to other legal issues regarding the representation of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Constitutional Crisis

Even though it is the source of the present armed conflict, there has been almost no discussion of the constitu-

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tional crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first free elections of that state's short history (Tito's Communists created the Republic by joining two geographic regions at the end of World War II) were held in 1990 and resulted in the nationalist parties of the three constituent nations taking 86 percent of the vote in proportions generally reflecting their percentages of the population.[5]

The three nationalist parties agreed to share various functions at the Republican level.[6] This was in accordance with the 1974 Constitution which provided for the equality of the three constituent nations. At the local level, however, absolute control was seized by the party that represented the majority group in each particular region.[7] The tensions in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina finally exploded when the Muslim and Croat parties agreed to proclaim the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October, 1991. The Serbs withdrew and created their own parliament near Sarajevo (Pale).[8]

In the meantime, the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself at an impasse since it had to enact a new constitution in order for the state to become independent. To do this legally, it needed the participation of the Serb parliamentarians.

Recognition of Independence

Despite the fact that the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer contained the elected representatives of one of the constituent nations and that the state was as constitutionally illegitimate as the state of Yugoslavia following the withdrawal of Slovenia and Croatia, the Muslim-controlled Presidency decided to seek international recognition for the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European Community's Arbitration Commission (composed of the presidents of five European Union (EU) member constitutional courts and assigned to deal with legal problems regarding the former Yugoslavia) was thus notified on December 20, 1991, so that it could examine the request. The very suggestion that the EU made it possible for Bosnia-Herzegovina to ask that its independence be recognized under those circumstances left those who were aware of the situation very worried.[9]

Nonetheless, the request was examined and an advisory opinion was given on January 11, 1992.[10] The Arbitration Commission rejected the request while noting "that the Serbian members of the Presidency did not associate themselves" with the various independence declarations and undertakings. Referring to the wishes of the Serbs to remain in a Yugoslav federation as established by a plebiscite and a Serb Assembly resolution, the Arbitration Commission declared "that the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to constitute the SRBH [Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina] as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established." It concluded that its position could be reviewed if "appropriate guarantees were provided by the Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a referendum of *all the citizens* of the SRBH without distinction, carried out under international supervision" (emphasis added).

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The Muslim and Croat parliamentarians thus decided to hold a referendum on independence even though the Serbs vowed to boycott it. The results were made public on March 1, 1992: the Muslims and Croats who participated voted overwhelmingly for independence, while the Serbs effectively boycotted the referendum.

Yet the EU's policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina was more nuanced. Along with the possibility of recognition, the EU organized negotiations between the three sides so that the Republic could become a confederation divided into three ethnic regions. It had been clear for many months that no agreement between the three nationalist parties could be achieved legally and legitimately that did not involve a substantial transfer of power from the centralized Republican government to the representatives of the three constituent nations.

Moreover, none of the parties would accept any form of domination by another party. The Muslims and the Croats feared the Serb nationalist party which was under the influence of Serbia's aggressive President Milosevic; the Muslims and the Serbs also feared the Croat nationalist party which included hard-liners associated with the nationalist party of Croatia's President Tudjman; the Serbs and the Croats equally feared the Muslim nationalist party which included some radical Islamic tendencies.[11] So it is not surprising that negotiations were held between the three constituent nations in order to divide the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in a manner that would be acceptable to the nationalist leaders. Indeed, such an agreement was finally reached on February 23, 1992, in Lisbon.

International Intervention

Yet it would be a grave mistake to believe that the actors at this stage were only former Yugoslavs. The emerging conflict had captured the attention of various interests around the world and this resulted in certain powerful states reacting accordingly.[12] Of particular importance is the United States intervention: the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time has since admitted in an interview that he convinced President Izetbegovic to publicly renounce the Lisbon agreement soon after having signed it.[13] This was done because the US government had decided at that point to recognize the Republic and to support Izetbegovic's government in the UN if it "got into trouble." Consequently, the US government convinced the EU states to recognize the Republic on April 6, 1992 by agreeing to recognize Croatia and Slovenia along with Bosnia-Herzegovina the following day.[14]

Thus the international community proceeded to recognize the independence of a state that had ceased to exist in any meaningful way: the constitutional crisis had left a parliament that no longer represented the three constituent nations, the Muslim-controlled Presidency's authority was denied by a majority of its putative citizens and the territory was being seized by violent militia units from the various constituent nations. As the government was being taken over by the Muslims, it was given a seat in the UN's General Assembly despite the fact that it was engaged in an armed conflict with the other two constituent nations. In the context of the brutal disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, this situation only helped to assure that the parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina would seek their goals[15] by the most ruthless military means.

Far from preventing an explosive situation, self-interested members of the international community contributed in aggravating a situation that any informed observer should have known would lead to massive displacement of civilian populations:

> By denying that partition of Bosnia could take place when in fact it was inevitable, the international community ensured that it would be accomplished in the worst possible way. The map of Bosnia was redrawn in blood on the ground, rather than around a table.[16]

Furthermore, when the predictable refugee flows began crossing borders, these same states avoided providing refuge for victims of the war while insisting that their contribution to refugee protection would focus on concepts such as "preventive protection." The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of these concepts being used essentially to help powerful states justify to their own populations the containment of refugee flows.

Notes

1. Contrary to the fixed budgets that are guaranteed to many UN agencies, UNHCR is almost entirely funded by voluntary contributions. The top contributor for 1992 was the United States (240 690 000 $US) followed by the European Community (228 870 000 $US). See UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees*, New York: Penguin Books, 1993, p. 177.
2. See, for example, Denitch B., *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994, p. 206. These figures are generally more reliable than the 1991 census figures.
3. The Communist Party actually began recognizing a distinct Muslim nation in the late 1960s "Un plénum du Comité Central du Parti Communiste de Bosnie a officiellement proclamé le 17 mai 1968 que les 'Musulmans comme le démontre notre praxis socialiste sont une nation àpart'." *Le Monde*, March 29, 1969, p. 111. See A. Popovic, *Les Musulmans yougoslaves*, Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1990, p. 25, 36.
4. Kenney, G. (former State Department desk officer on Yugoslavia who quit in protest over U.S. policy). "A Forced Peace Is Worth Trying", *L.A. Times*, 6 February 1994.
5. SDA (Muslim): 86 parliamentary seats; SDS (Serb): 72; HDZ (Croat): 44; Communists (multi-ethnic): 20; Markovic's Reformist Party (multi-ethnic): 13. See P. Garde, *Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie*, Paris: Fayard, 1992, p. 292.
6. The leader of the Muslim nationalist party, Alija Izetbegovic, became the President of the Republic's Presidency, while Momcilo Krajisnik (Serb) became the parliamentary President and Jure Pelivan (Croat) became the Prime Minister. For a discussion of the constitutional developments, see S. Bogosavlevic et al., *Bosna i Herzegovina izmedju rata i mira*, Belgrade and Sarajevo: Forum za etnicke odnose, 1992.
7. Hayden, R. "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," (1992) 51 *Slàvic Review* 654, at 661.
8. Ibid. Several months later the Croats had also created their own state in western Herzegovina. See H. Wynaendts, *L'engrenage - Chroniques yougoslaves*, Paris: Denoël, 1993, p. 153. Yet in the meantime, there was an objective need for the Croats to be allied with the Muslims in order to separate from Yugoslavia, which at that point was clearly Serb-controlled. This however did not prevent the Croats from organizing their own military units which were not under the command of the Muslim President.
9. As a senior European diplomat who served as the assistant to the Chairperson of the EU's Peace Conference on Yugoslavia has stated: "La décision de demander à la Bosnie-Herzegovina si elle voulait être indépendante était, selon Carrington, 'une erreur tragique'". Wynaendts, H.,*id.*, p. 154.
10. *Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No 4*, in (1992) 31 *International Legal Materials* 1501.
11. Unlike Serb and Croat nationalism, the rising Muslim nationalism of the last few decades has hardly been mentioned by the western media. The Muslim nationalist party is actually quite divided, including "atheist" Muslims and "politically Islamicized" Muslims. This has left western journalists confused over certain violent events between Muslims: J. Burns, "New Horror for Sarajevo: Muslims Killing Muslims," *The New York Times*, October 31, 1993, p. 10. For an example of the Muslim nationalist party's religious component, see President Izetbegovic's *Islamska Deklaracija*, (Sarajevo: Mala Muslimanska Biblioteka, 1990). This is a fundamentalist text written in 1970 that was published and widely distributed during the 1990 elections and includes the following phrases: "Our goal: Islamization of Muslims... There can be no peace or coexistence between Islamic faith and non-Islamic institutions... The Islamic movement must and can take power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough, not only to destroy the non-Islamic power, but to build up a new Islamic one" (author's own translation).
12. For a discussion of the particular American interests in the region, see P.-M. de la Gorce, "Les risques d'extension du conflit en Bosnie", *Le Monde diplomatique*, January, 1993, p. 9, and "La crise yougoslave prise en main par Washington", *Le Monde diplomatique*, April 1994, p. 11.
13. Binder, D. "U.S. Policymakers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing Partition in 1992," *The New York Times*, August 29, 1993, p. 10.
14. *Ibid.* See also Palmer, M., "US Forces Early Move on Bosnia", *Guardian*, March10, 1992, p. 8.
15. "Il devient clair que la fuite et le déplacement de la population ne sont pas uniquement la conséquence de la guerre mais également un de ses objectifs: aboutir à des territoires 'ethniquement purs'." M. Morokvasic, "La guerre et les réfugiés dans l'ex-Yougoslavie," (1992) 8 *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* 5, at 9.
16. Hayden, R. "U.S. Efforts to Resolve Balkan Crisis Have Only Added to Muslim's Losses," *Sun-Sentinel*, February 9, 1994, p. 19.

Undermining the Refugee Convention: Germany's Civil War Clause and Temporary Asylum

Albrecht Schnabel

Ethnic conflicts such as the one raging within and between the republics of the former Yugoslavia are producing alarming numbers of refugees and displaced peoples. Countries which are in close geographic proximity to these conflicts have been literally bombarded with asylum requests from victims of the ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia. More than 400,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia came to Germany in 1992 and 1993 alone (*Bulletin* 1993, 740; Bundesminister des Innern 1994, 4; and Kohl 1993, 6). Western Europeans fear that many more refugees will be forced to escape civil conflicts which may break out or intensify in various places across Eastern and Central Europe, and the region of the former Soviet Union. In this light, Germany's new asylum law could be considered an exclusionary defense mechanism applied by a country which, due to its geographic proximity to many refugee producing regions, and its attractiveness as one of the wealthiest countries in Europe, has seen an explosion of asylum applications since the iron curtain was lifted, and ethnic conflict began spreading.

In many aspects Germany's newly revised asylum law represents a major regression from its liberal predecessor. According to the new version of the *Asylverfahrensgesetz*, stipulations which automatically reject refugee claims from individuals who had come from a "safe country" (Art. 29a), who have insufficient proof for individual political persecution (Art. 25, 30), or who had crossed into Germany coming through a "safe third country" (Art. 26a), make it much more difficult for potential refugees to claim asylum in Germany (*Bundesgesetzblatt* 1993a, 1362–83). At the same time, Article 32a of the *Ausländergesetz*, a new provision regarding the acceptance of refugees from civil wars, was introduced in order to accommodate the increasing number of civil war victims with temporary refuge in Germany (*Bundesgesetzblatt* 1993b, 1070). However, this new law can be interpreted as a major setback for ethnic refugees. The new law is promoted by the German government as a revolutionary instrument for granting refuge to groups of refugees which do not fit Germany's characteristics of traditional "political refugees," but who are nevertheless in need of assistance (Bundesministerium des Innern 1993). However, according to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 32a, these 'quasi-refugees' are granted temporary protection only until the conflict in their homeland has ended, and only if they reject the option of applying for asylum (*Bundesgesetzblatt* 1993b, 1070). One can thus argue, that this new stipulation is not directed at the inclusion of new groups of refugees, but the effective exclusion of an increasing number of asylum-seekers which, more than most other refugee claimants, match the typical portfolio of a Convention Refugee. Moreover, many victims of ethnic domestic conflict are not persecuted for their political convictions, but solely on the ground of their ethnic and racial affiliation. Even a change of the political landscape often will not resolve the problems of discrimination, oppression and persecution of ethnic minorities, and these 'quasi-refugees' will be subjected to much of the same persecution they originally had fled from.

This new approach at granting temporary refugee status, a vital part of Germany's new asylum policy, potentially excludes the largest proportions of Germany's asylum applicants from the opportunity to be granted permanent refugee status. It constitutes a particularly serious shift in policy as it challenges the Geneva Refugee Convention and as it promotes new and increasingly restrictive standards for industrialized nations in dealing with rising numbers of refugees from ethnic civil conflicts. Few groups of migrants fit the definition of a 'Convention Refugee' better than victims of ethnic wars. The evolving practice of categorizing these refugees as 'civil war refugees' is an attempt at wilfully depriving this group which Hannah Arendt described as the 'modern refugees' (Höfling 1993, 38) of the opportunity to apply for asylum in order to evade threats to their livelihood which are not simply limited to the duration of military conflict. Such action totally underestimates the dynamics of ethnic conflicts, wars that do not simply come to an end with the cessation of military activities.

During the Third Reich, members of the German Jewish Community were denied refugee status in many countries because they had not yet been physically persecuted by German authorities. Once the genocide of German Jews by the hands of Nazi authorities had begun, however, it was often too late for an escape. Many Jews who could have been rescued, became victims of systematic ethnic persecution, a low-level conflict which never developed into open civil war. Jews were not persecuted because of their political beliefs, but because of their religious and ethnic origin. Much like the victims of many of today's civil conflicts, they, too, were 'modern refugees,' in contrast to the much more narrow classical definition offered by the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. What, then, could be

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better proof for the potentially explosive nature of ethnic persecution and oppression in post-War rump Yugoslavia or Bosnia than the ethnic genocide currently being committed against members of various ethnic groups? Who could have justifiably sent back Jewish refugees to Germany after it would have won the war and the Nazi regime would still have been in power?

Granting victims of ethnic conflict anything short of full-fledged refugee status, is undermining the basis of the Geneva Refugee Convention. The Convention was created to protect the innocent. One could even argue that ethnic refugees are in a weaker position than classical political refugees: after all, political refugees are persecuted partly because of their own doing, as they choose to practice their human right to political freedom and freely chose their political orientation, while ethnically persecuted people have no choice in choosing their identity. They are the most vulnerable group of refugees, and they deserve the highest degree of compassion. Ethnic persecution cannot be degraded to the status of 'involuntary victims of war.' To do so renders current standards of human rights and refugee conventions useless if not hypocritical in nature.

If the German approach to civil war refugees passes the international community's judgement without fundamental criticism, then the road is paved for a more broader application of this new approach. Refugee status will be robbed of its permanency, and the asylum-seeker's hope to have found a safe haven will turn into an illusion. Once formal fighting has stopped, these people will be asked to return 'home' to ethnic oppression and persecution. The challenge for other nations to follow Germany's example is great, as such an approach will probably deter many potential refugees from seeking asylum in the first place; and as it will give refugee receiving nations more control over the number of permanently residing refugees, while maintaining the appearance of providing safe havens for those who flee persecution and death.

This new German policy has to come under close scrutiny. Needless to say, many countries will hope for a quiet acceptance of this new approach, as it can then be applied by them as well. As many refugee receiving countries are reinterpreting their asylum policies in ways that favour more sophisticated ways at refining exclusive measures over the inclusive nature of the meaning and purpose of refugee law, this approach only manifests the prospects for a 'fortress Germany,' a 'fortress Europe,' or a 'fortress First World.' If receiving societies are not any more able to offer asylum to anyone who deserves it, proactive measures directed at root-causes for forced migration have to be pursued if justice is to be done according to the principles established by international norms of human rights and refugee protection (United Nations 1988, Article 14). ■

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EU States and the Refugee Crisis in the Former the Yugoslavia

Michael Barutciski

Burden-Shifting Arrangements

The response of European Union (EU) states regarding refugees from the former Yugoslavia should be considered in light of recent developments that have led to burden-shifting arrangements. These arrangements have followed the large increase of refugee claims in western Europe during the 1980s which resulted in overburdened national refugee determination procedures.

EU states have been particularly interested in improving the control of refugee flows before the evolving union eliminates internal barriers to freedom of movement.[1] Since these states recognize that the ending of internal border controls greatly limits their national competence over immigration, they have been seeking agreement on common criteria to regulate the entry of foreigners.

The main concern is to prevent freedom of movement from increasing illegal activities such as drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism. Irregular migrations have also been associated to these types of criminal activities as a common policy of deterrence is being developed. EU states are worried that refugee claimants might enter by the state with the most relaxed external border controls and then take advantage of the suppression of internal border controls in order to seek out and settle in the state with the most enviable living conditions. The fear is that this would in turn encourage illegal migration and result in an increase in abusive claims.

In order to avoid this situation, a coordinated approach is being developed. Negotiations have already led to the signing of several intergovernmental agreements[2]: the Schengen Agreement[3] and Schengen II[4] on the elimination of internal border controls, and the Dublin Convention[5] which establishes the state responsible for examining an asylum claim.

The first aspect of this coordinated approach is the duty to systematically impose visa requirements on the nationals of most migrant-generating countries. This policy is enforced by sanctioning carriers which transport asylum seekers and others not in possession of the requisite visa. The second aspect of the approach is to deny to those refugees that manage to get around the access barrier the ability to choose a state of protection. It is generally only the state which issued the visa or in which the refugee claimant first arrived that will have to examine and deal with the claim. The effect strengthens the mechanisms of external deterrence because any member state which does not fend off the inflow of refugees finds itself imposed with particular duties.[6]

Several other states have indicated their willingness to be associated with this process. Consequently, a Dublin Parallel Accord has been drafted and adopted in June 1992 which allows non-EU states to join in a mechanism that is similar to the one found in the Dublin Convention. The EU's objectives regarding asylum seekers are becoming increasingly clear as states such as Poland have signed on.[7] If these new signatory states do not want to be considered as potential states of first asylum and thereby receive refugee claimants returned from western European states, they must either block their borders to potential refugee claimants or seek similar arrangements with adjacent states (preferably both). The intention is to force these "buffer" states to control their borders more effectively and prevent the entry of asylum seekers who would like to make refugee claims in western European states.

It is important to note that nowhere in any of these instruments is there any mention of procedural or substantive harmonization of affirmative norms of refugee law. No account is taken of the critical variations in recognition rates for persons with comparable claims.[8] Instead, it is assumed that the treatment refugee claimants obtain in one participating state discharges the other states from their duties. The overall result of this coordinated approach greatly reduces the options available to refugees.[9]

Escape From Armed Conflict

When the crisis in the former Yugoslavia began, the western European states were about to start negotiations leading up to the Maastricht summit in December, 1991. Although they were not prepared for this new problem, they immediately involved themselves by sending diplomatic missions to the area.

When people from Croatia started crossing international borders in order to seek refuge, some countries adopted special measures to allow the admission of these refugees. Hungary, Austria and Italy were naturally the first countries to face refugee flows and they responded by accepting several thousands of refugees. They were later followed by Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany which admitted tens of thousands of people fleeing the war zone. These countries either dropped the visa requirements for ex-Yugoslav nationals or provided a form of provisional admission.[10]

However, other EU members did not admit very significant numbers of refugees. Furthermore, when the war started to spread in early 1992, many countries such as Germany tried to limit the numbers arriving on their territory by stiffening their entry policies. This was followed by the adoption of restrictive measures by countries that were geographically

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even closer to the war zone such as Austria and Hungary. Eventually, even the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia tried to limit the number of people fleeing from Bosnia-Herzegovina

Yet as the horrors of what was going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina started appearing on television sets, most European countries relaxed their entry policies. This attitude was reversed once again in the beginning of 1993, as EU ministers agreed to stiffen visa requirements and diminish the possibility of massive arrivals of refugees. This game of dropping or imposing visa requirements continues. It has proven to be a somewhat effective way for politicians to accept or refuse refugees depending on the public mood.[11]

It should be noted that even though European states have not opened their borders to refugees from the former Yugoslavia, they have not completely closed them either. As shown in Table 1, more than 500,000 refugees have sought asylum in the member states.

Table 1: Number of Refugees from the Former Yugoslavia in various European States as of Dec. 31, 1993.

State	No. of Refugees
Germany	300,000
Sweden	50,000
Austria	74,300
Italy	32,000
Turkey	20,000
Switzerland	14,500
France	7,000
United Kingdom	6,600
Total	**504,400**

Source: *World Refugee Survey 1994*. p.41. Washington: US Committee for Refugees.

However, this hesitancy and ambiguous message has had serious consequences for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia, the most important state of first asylum for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, decided in July, 1992 that it could no longer count on other European countries to provide assistance for the refugees it was receiving. Since the government of Croatia considered that it had reached the maximum number of refugees for which it could provide asylum, it closed the border and stopped admitting refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The desire to contain the refugee flow was openly discussed on 29 July 1992 at the International Meeting on Humanitarian Aid to the Victims of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. Western European states reacted positively to the Slovenian proposal of creating "safe havens" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By having certain regions that are safe so that people would not have to leave in the first place, the pressure on asylum countries would thus be relieved.

Right To Remain

It is generally in this context that a new 'right to remain' has been mentioned. By protecting the right of people to remain in safety in their homes, it is hoped that refugee flows will be prevented. The idea is that refugee protection will be enhanced if emphasis is placed on the basic right of the individual not to be forced into exile.

The promotion of this new right should not come as a surprise. With the situation in the former Yugoslavia, UNHCR has seen its humanitarian role increase significantly. Concurrently, western governments have increased their financial contributions to UNHCR which in turn has naturally led the organization to deal with people who have been displaced in a manner that is conceptually compatible with the desires of these governments.

Likewise, we have seen UNHCR increasingly talk about preventive protection over the last few years. The goal is to eliminate the causes of displacement and give potential displaced persons and refugees the option of remaining in their homes:

> Preventive protection is activity undertaken to attenuate the causes of displacement, so that *choosing to remain* home is a humane and viable option ... Though UNHCR intends to develop the concept of preventive protection, it does not intend to do so at the expense of the principles of non-refoulement and asylum (emphasis added).[12]

Despite these assurances, the development of preventive protection at the expense of asylum does accurately describe the general tendency in the international refugee protection regime. UNHCR has in fact changed from an organization that had a strictly palliative role to one that is focusing on fixing the problems that cause refugee flows. This evolution has become even clearer in the former Yugoslavia as external asylum protection has largely been replaced by internal assistance. Indeed, it was not long before powerful European governments made the transition from giving refugees the possibility of "choosing to remain" to becoming the champions of the refugees' new right to remain. In an example of the manipulation of human rights rhetoric, Western governments openly expressed their views that ethnic cleansing would be supported if refugees were resettled abroad. Referring to this position, Frelick writes:

> By analogy, it would be like refusing refuge to the victims of the Nazi Holocaust by saying that one did not want to contribute to Hitler's 'ethnic cleansing' of the Jews, all the while barring their escape so that rather than lose their homes and countries, they would lose their lives.[13]

This development has to be examined since its consequences on people attempting to find refuge are very serious. The promotion of this new right to remain presupposes that international law does not at present deal satisfactorily with displacement. It will be noted that there is effectively no general and explicit prohibition of displacement in international law. However, if the international protection system does not deal with displacement in a clear and comprehensive way, this is because the refugee regime purposefully and strategically did not seek to focus on the prohibition of displacement. International refugee law has been conceived as having a distinctive palliative orientation which complements and helps the implementation of human rights law. By reserving a sphere of autonomy for victims of human rights violations, international

refugee law allows and empowers them to leave the abusive situation. The idea is that the international community contributes by providing relief in the form of temporary asylum. Conceived in these terms, the role of international refugee law is to provide a source of interim protection until the risks in the state of origin no longer exist. This approach does not directly attack displacement and the human rights problem surrounding it, since its concern is rather to give victims a certain amount of autonomy by having some control over their fates and allowing them to seek asylum.

The approach suggested by the states that are promoting the right to remain constitutes a fundamentally different vision of the role of international refugee law. The focus is no longer on securing a refuge outside the state of origin but rather on attacking the problem at what is believed to be its source. In this sense, the existence of a right to remain essentially undermines the right of seeking asylum and freedom of movement by having international refugee law collapse into international human rights law. This evidently poses a problem if one believes that refugee law should remain conceptually distinct from general human law. Indeed, it should be remembered that refugee law is concerned about the protection of a particular group of people who have already been victims of human rights violations.

Most importantly, the right to remain by itself will not decrease the possibility of displacement. What will affect the likelihood of a coerced population movement is the relative safety of a region. Whether the right to remain can actually help in making a region safer or whether it will end up as one more unenforceable right depends on the international commitment. There are however many risks. As the case in the former Yugoslavia has shown, it is tempting for states to give the impression that they are in favour of such policies of humanitarian intervention. Yet when the time comes for real action, consensus is found only for limited types of intervention which prove to be insufficient to actually stop displacement. Instead, these interventions mainly serve to maintain a facade of humane concern. In the meantime, receiving states can adopt the necessary measures so that displaced persons have no choice but to remain in their state.

Indeed, the current practice of many states raises concerns regarding the future of the right to seek asylum. In the context of burden-shifting arrangements, there is a real risk that receiving states will view migration away from human rights violations as inappropriate and that this vision will be encouraged by the existence of a right to remain. In effect, the right to remain gives states that want to contain refugee flows a new argument that is phrased in human rights terms and can thus be used to cloak restrictive measures. Various forms of humanitarian intervention can therefore become attractive methods that self-interested states use to avoid international obligations.

The resulting negative use of the right to remain could develop into a veritable affront to the autonomous right to access an interim remedy when residence in the state of origin ceases to be viable. Far from a right which can be exercised freely, the right to remain would then contribute in eliminating all options.[14]

Growing Number of *de facto* Refugees

The treatment of refugees from the former Yugoslavia who have managed to access EU territory also illustrates the inadequacies of the current international legal refugee definition that is used by most European states. By defining refugees exclusively in terms of persons who fear persecution based on their political or civil status, the 1951 Convention is not very useful in protecting war refugees.

Even if most EU states have very small refugee status acceptance rates (generally between 5–15 percent), in practice they have been unwilling to deport war refugees.[15] These refugees who do not qualify for Convention status are therefore given permission to stay under a designated "B status," "de facto status," "humanitarian status," etc. While this is more desirable than deportation, it often leaves these involuntary migrants in a sort of legal limbo with minimal or no rights.

The significance of this development is that there is now in Europe a new uncertain category of legal migrant that is not accorded full rights. Without a real legal framework to protect these involuntary migrants, their status remains *ad hoc* and subject to the whims of domestic politics. In the context of European populations that are increasingly becoming xenophobic, this is not a desirable form of international protection for refugees.

Emerging Norm of Temporary Protection

Thus, the refugees from the former Yugoslavia that have been admitted in EU states have generally not been legally recognized as Convention refugees. According to EU collective policy decisions, people fleeing the former Yugoslavia are to be accorded a form of temporary protection. In effect, these refugees obtain an authorization for a temporary stay which varies from state to state. In some states, refugee claims are still accepted even though the decisions are not given full effect. In other states, the whole treatment takes place outside the regular refugee status determination procedure. One advantage for EU states is that the lengthy and costly determination procedures are avoided. In cases of massive arrivals, this is even more important since decisions regarding refugee status cannot be made in a reasonable time limit.

UNHCR has announced that certain minimal conditions must be observed during the period when temporary protection is provided: admission at the border, respect of fundamental needs and authorization to stay until safe return is possible. If these conditions are respected, then UNHCR believes it is not necessary to allow beneficiaries of temporary protection to

have access to determination procedures. UNHCR has in effect accepted temporary protection as part of its mandate while justifying it as a pragmatic solution to a complicated problem.[16]

There is a serious problem in that it seems EU states are actually quietly subtracting themselves from international obligations concerning refugees. This is why UNHCR has insisted that the "freeze" on the examination of refugee status claims must only be temporary. The beneficiaries of temporary protection would therefore have access to the refugee status determination procedure if they are no longer accorded temporary protection. In practice, however, once temporary protection no longer applies, then refugee status acceptance rates will likely be very small. In the meantime, a mechanism that allows EU states to avoid international obligations while preserving a different form of humanitarian protection will have been implemented.

It should be recognized that this EU policy on temporary protection is not incompatible with the general objectives of the burden-shifting arrangements and the promotion of a right to remain—objectives that has preoccupied powerful states in the Union. The general restrictive policies meant to prevent the arrival of refugees can continue (and serve a complementary role) since temporary protection only commits EU states if refugees somehow do manage to arrive on their territories.

The result is clear. In a context where states are giving up part of their sovereignty in order to participate in the increasing globalization of economic activities, the right to exclude aliens is jealously guarded. If this is the EU response to a refugee crisis in its own back yard, we can only imagine what the response will be to situations on other continents. Unless there is a reform of the international protection regime which attempts to take full advantage of what states are in fact prepared to do, the future for the protection of refugees promises to be bleak.

The example of former Yugoslavia shows that EU states are willing to provide a form of temporary protection for a limited number of refugees. However, the bulk of the assistance takes place in the region of origin. Any realistic attempt at changing the direction of recent developments in refugee protection must fully exploit these openings. Otherwise, states will deal with the problem by themselves and the emerging regime will most likely provide even less protection for refugees.

Notes

1. The 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community has been modified by Article 8A of the 1986 Single European Act in order to establish "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured." Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Unity further establishes the concept of European Union citizenship which grants to all citizens of the Union the right to move and reside freely within the territory of any member state.
2. "The advantages of an intergovernmental approach for states committed to deterrence are clear. Because critical decisions have been taken within an international body and codified in international agreements, governments have not had to contend with the vagaries of a domestic policy debate. Yet by avoiding the supranational fora of the Council of Europe and European Community, it has proved possible to achieve the coordination of immigration policy without any formal renunciation of domestic jurisdiction or submission to substantive scrutiny and procedural accountability. There has thus been no imperative to engage in the balancing of communal closure and the human rights of coerced migrants that an open and principled reform of refugee law would have required." J. Hathaway, "Harmonizing for Whom? The Devaluation of Refugee Protection in the Era of European Integration," (1993) 26 *Cornell International Law Journal* 719, at 733.
3. Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 relating to the Gradual Suppression of Controls at Common Frontiers, between the Government of States Members of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic ("Schengen Agreement").
4. Convention on the Application of the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 relating to the Gradual Suppression of Controls at Common Frontiers, between the Government of States Members of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic ("Schengen II").
5. Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Economic Communities ("Dublin Convention").
6. "UNHCR is concerned where the emphasis on this 'authorization principle' has the effect of causing States to strengthen even further both their entry requirements (visa arrangements) and their mechanisms to enforce these requirements (airline sanctions)." UNHCR, *UNHCR Position on Conventions Recently Concluded in Europe (Dublin and Schengen Conventions)*, August 1991, p. 4.
7. See UNHCR, *Overview of Re-admission Agreements in Central Europe*, 30 September 1993.
8. See Amnesty International, *Europe: Human Rights and the Need for a Fair Asylum Policy*, 1991.
9. "While it is important that governments are able to remove clearly fraudulent asylum applications from the process as swiftly as possible, an asylum policy based solely on an accelerating process of control and deterrence throughout the Community weakens refugee protection." G. Loescher, "The European Community and Refugees," (1989) 65 *International Affairs* 617, at 631.
10. See T. Argent, *Croatia's Crucible: Providing Asylum for Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Washington: US Committee for Refugees, October 1992, p. 17.
11. For indications of which countries imposed or removed visa requirements during the summer of 1993, see, for example, Amnesty International, *Bosnian Refugees: A continuing need for protection in European countries*, London, July 1993, p. 2.
12. D. Stafford, "New Strategies for Refugees in the 1990s," (1992) 91 *Refugees* 10, at 13.
13. B. Frelick, "Preventing Refugee Flows: Protection or Peril?" in US Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 1993*, Washington: 1993, p. 9–11.
14. We should consider Frelick's warning concerning the international community's response to the situation of Kurds from northern Iraq in 1991: "This was not an effort to address the root causes of the refugee flow so that potential refugees would feel secure enough to choose not to leave. In fact, they had no choice. Asylum in neighbouring Turkey was denied, and the assistance that did arrive came as much to shore up political alliances with friendly governments and to challenge the enemy regime as it did to assist the refugees." B. Frelick, *id.*, p. 9.
15. There are some estimates that 80 percent of all rejected refugee claimants actually remain in the country where they presented a claim or in another western European country. See European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, *Working Paper on the Need for a Supplementary Refugee Definition*, April 1993, p. 2.
16. The nature of the problem is partly reflected in the following explanation: "Cette approche globale trouve sa signification dès lors qu'on la rapporte au contexte politique de fermeture des frontières que connaissent les pays industrialisés. Promouvoir une protection temporaire était pour le HCR le seul moyen de rassurer les États en réduisant *'leur degré d'obligations'* et tout en limitant les refus d'accueil de personnes en quête d'asile." V. Cochetel, "Position du HCR par rapport à la protection temporaire et au statut humanitaire" in France Terre d'Asile, *Le droit d'asile au regard de la crise yougoslave - protection temporaire et statut de réfugié*, Septembre 1993, p. 8.

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