



CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES REFUGE

Vol. 13 • No. 2

May 1993

SPECIAL ISSUE ON EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL EURASIA

In Memoriam: Sidney Heitman, 1924-93

Sidney Heitman was a Jew from Missouri whose parents were born in Bukovina; a left-leaning liberal when he did graduate work at Columbia University during the height of the Cold War; an urbane and increasingly politically disillusioned intellectual who spent most of his academic years at a small university in high plains country; a man of decency, compassion and honour in an era when those characteristics often seem antiquated. Sid, in short, was a prototypical "marginal man." He exemplified the person who lives in two worlds, not feeling entirely comfortable in either, but able to use his peripheral social location as a vantage point for peering insightfully into both.

Sid's sense of marginality was evident in his choice of the two scholarly topics to which he devoted his academic life. Approximately from the time of his graduate work at Columbia until 1970, he devoted most of his time to studying and writing about Nikolai Bukharin, Lenin's designated successor and principal victim of Stalin. Bukharin argued strenuously in the 1920s for a gradualist

approach to Soviet economic development. His accession to power would certainly have allowed the Soviet Union to avoid Stalin's worst crimes. Sid understood well the immense horror of Stalinism. But rather than falling blindly

into the Cold-Warriorism of many of his contemporaries, Sid was able to envisage other historical possibilities. As a result, he edited and wrote introductions to the English editions of some of Bukharin's main works, notably *The*

Contents:

In Memoriam: Sidney Heitman, 1924-93 <i>Robert Brym</i>	1
Irredentism and New Research Questions <i>Tanya Basok</i>	3
The Third Soviet Emigration, 1948-91 <i>Sidney Heitman</i>	5
Meskhethians: Muslim Georgians or Meskhetian Turks?	
A Community Without a Homeland <i>Stephen F. Jones</i>	14
Bulgarian Refugees from the Former Soviet Union:	
A Troubled Return <i>Kustodinova Iordanova</i>	17
A Sketch of the Migration and Refugee Situation in Russia	
<i>Irena Orlova</i>	19
Troubled Settlement of Refugees in Russia	
<i>Tanya Basok and Alexander Benifand</i>	22
Who Wants to Leave Moscow for the West?	
<i>Robert Brym and Andrei Degtyarev</i>	24
Anti-Semitism and Anti-Semitic Organizations in Russia	
<i>Alexander Benifand</i>	26
In Memoriam: Andrew Forbes	28

REFUGE

YORK LANES PRESS

Centre for Refugee Studies
Suite 351, York Lanes

York University
6700 Keele Street, North York,
Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3

Phone: (416) 734-8643 • Fax: (416) 734-8837
Electronic Mail via Internet Address:
REFUGE@YORKU.CA

Vol. 13 • No. 2 • May 1993

Editor

Howard Adelman

Issue Guest Editors

Tanya Basak

Robert J. Brym

Associate Editor

Valerie Ahwée

Assistant Editor

Stephanie E. Johnson

Circulation Assistant

Dominika Zakrzewski

Managing Editor

Anal S. Anuliah

Refuge is dedicated to the encouragement of assistance to refugees by providing a forum for sharing information and opinion on Canadian and international issues pertaining to refugees. *Refuge* was founded in 1981.

It is published ten times a year by York Lanes Press for the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Canada. *Refuge* is a nonprofit, independent periodical supported by private donations and by subscriptions. It is a forum for discussion, and the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of its funders or staff.

All material in *Refuge* may be reproduced without permission unless copyrighted or otherwise indicated. Credit should be given to the author or source, if named, and *Refuge*. Submissions on related issues are welcome for publication consideration.

Current subscription rates for one year (ten issues) are:

Canada Can. \$50.00

All other countries U.S. \$60.00

Single issues are available at \$6.50 per copy.

Please enclose your purchase order or payment, made payable to York Lanes Press, with your order.

ISSN 0229-5113

ABC of Communism (with Evgeny Preobrazhensky) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988 [1966]) and *The Path to Socialism in Russia: Selected Works of N.I. Bukharin* (New York: Omnicon Press, 1967). He compiled the invaluable *Nikolai Bukharin: A Bibliography with Annotations, Including the Locations of His Works in Major American and European Libraries* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969). He also wrote several important articles on Bukharin, especially "Between Lenin and Stalin," in *Revisionism: Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas*, edited by Leo Labeledz (New York: Praeger and London: Allen and Unwin, 1962), which has been reprinted in English and translated into German.

A distinguished Russian intellectual who fell into the interstices of history attracted Sid in the 1950s and 1960s. A great interstitial movement of Soviet citizens attracted Sid in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s: the unprecedented and unanticipated migration of Jews, Germans, Armenians, Pontic Greeks, Evangelicals and Pentecostals from the Soviet Union to Israel, Germany, the United States, France, Greece and elsewhere. Much attention was devoted to the Jewish emigration movement by Western scholars. Sid, however, was one of the very few academics who was able to see the Jewish emigration as part of a larger set of political developments.

He studied the main ethnic components of the emigration movement comparatively, demographically and historically, thus contributing enormously to our appreciation of what the emigration movement might portend. His main work of this period was *The Third Soviet Emigration: Jewish, German and Armenian Emigration from the U.S.S.R. Since World War II* (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftlichen und internationale Studien, 1987). He also wrote often-cited articles on emigration for *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, *Nationalities Papers*, *Soviet Geography* and other academic journals of the first rank. In all these works he assembled his materials meticulously and from an immense range of sources without, however, ever losing sight of the larger picture he felt compelled to sketch.

Sid served energetically on the editorial board of *Soviet Refugee Monitor* and *Refuge*. We will all miss his efforts on behalf of understanding the plight of refugees and emigrants from the former Soviet Union. I will miss him personally as a good friend, a man capable of sage advice, sardonic wit and enormous compassion. Sadly, but proudly, we publish in this issue of *Refuge* Sidney Heitman's last inquiry into the movement of people between two worlds. ■

Robert J. Brym

Sociology, University of Toronto

CRS Editorial Advisory Board

Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia Refugee Monitor Unit

Audrey Altstadt, *History*, University of Massachusetts

Tanya Basak, *Sociology/Anthropology*, University of Windsor

Alexander Benifand, *Centre for Refugee Studies*, York University

Robert J. Brym, *Sociology and Centre for Russian and East European Studies*, University of Toronto

Mirjana Morokovasie, *Centre national de la recherche scientifique*, Paris

Endre Sik, *Social Science Information Centre*, Budapest

Galina Soldatova, *Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology*, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

Irredentism and New Research Questions

Tanya Basok

In eastern Europe and central Eurasia country boundaries are being redrawn once again. Old empires are breaking up into smaller components. And in these newly created states, as well as in some old ones in this region, a general trend has been towards creating ethnic homogeneity to replace the ethnic mosaic that existed there for centuries. Consequently, members of ethnic minorities have felt compelled to return to the lands of their ancestors. Thus hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians, dispersed throughout the former Soviet empire, have returned or are thinking of returning to Russia. Similarly, Pontic Greeks, Transylvanian Hungarians, Bulgarians from Russia, and Germans from Russia, Poland and Romania have been returning to their titular states.

Free emigration has always been considered unacceptable by Soviet authorities. However, family reunification and repatriation have been allowed for some groups. Thus Jews, Germans and Greeks, as well as a small number of Armenians, were able to leave. Although Soviet emigration policies have become more open recently, there is still an underlying assumption that only a blood tie or a community link warrants an exit visa. More relaxed emigration regulations put in place since 1987 have allowed Poles, Bulgarians, and Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians to join the emigration movement. (Heitman, this issue). Other ethnic minorities, such as Transylvanian Hungarians, have also felt the need to return to their historic homelands. As a distinct form of international migration, massive repatriation of ethnic minorities to their ancestral lands poses new questions for

researchers of international migration. An analysis of the Israeli situation, where this type of movement started in the early 1970s and reached an unprecedented scale in the late 1980s, provides a useful comparison. Yet in many respects Israel's circumstances are unique. So as not to confuse this type of repatriation with the return of refugees to the country from which they have fled, I prefer using the term "irredentism," borrowing it from Anthony Smith (1983).¹ This type of migration raises new questions in at least three areas.

First, when irredentism occurs, the analysis of a receiving country's immigration policy needs to include the im-

linked to national defence in the never-ending Arab-Israeli conflicts. Similarly, the Greek government was happy to receive Greeks from Russia in order to stem the "shrinking of Hellenism" caused by the declining birth rates in Greece and the assimilation of Greeks abroad (Heitman, this issue). Thus the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed a coordinating service to propose a comprehensive plan for the reception of Soviet Greeks, including setting up hospitality centres, reception villages and housing projects (Kokkinos 1991). However, in other countries, due to the weight of economic pressures, conationals have not been so well received. In Hungary the

As a distinct form of international migration, massive repatriation of ethnic minorities to their ancestral lands poses new questions for researchers of international migration.

initial wave of Transylvanian Hungarians produced profound sympathy among their conationals in Hungary, who offered these refu-

gees warm reception and generous aid at the governmental and nongovernmental level. However, housing shortages, high inflation, unemployment and strained social services have put a stop to this policy of open reception (Noelte 1992). Similarly in Bulgaria, even though nationalist groups consider Bulgarian refugees arriving from Moldova and Tadjikistan to be of strategic importance in the areas where Turkish populations are concentrated, the new government perceives these migrants as a burden, given its political and economic problems (Iordanova, this issue). In Russia there is no official policy to deal with refugees to date (Orlova, this issue; Ryvkina and Turovskiy 1993). But certain measures, such as domicile registration, are taken to regulate the movement of refugees within Russia by channelling them to underpopulated and underdeveloped areas where their chances of subsistence are very dim (Basok and Benifand, this issue). At the same time,

portance of nationalist sentiments, attachments and their relative role vis-à-vis other factors. On an emotional level, it is difficult for the governments of receiving countries to turn down people with whom they share ancestry. But on a practical level, new arrivals may exacerbate existing problems in these countries: new postcommunist governments are plagued with sky-high inflation, shortages of goods and unemployment; Germany is facing economic problems caused by reunification with East Germany, making the arrival of ethnic Germans from Russia and eastern Europe undesirable (Salitan 1992, 102), and Israel is experiencing tremendous hardships in finding jobs and housing for masses of Soviet *olim*. Those countries, with nationalist priorities welcome ethnic "brothers and sisters" despite any economic hardships they may inflict on the receiving country. A clear example is Israel, where increased Jewish presence in the region is welcomed because it is

Tanya Basok is a professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Windsor, Ontario.

nationalist groups have formed committees to provide support for their conationals who are forced to return to Russia by discriminatory policies in the former Soviet republics.

Some governments, hoping to slow down the irredentist process, prefer assisting their conationals to rebuild their communities in the countries where they reside. In 1990 and 1991, the German government received over 500,000 ethnic Germans, two-thirds of whom were from the former Soviet Union (*World Refugee Survey* 1992), and at the present time the German consulate in Moscow is receiving almost 20,000 applications

der Stalin. The Georgian government argues that Meskhetians should not be allowed to return because there is no land for them, the economy is too weak to support them, and the migrants have lost their Georgian culture and identity (Jones, this issue).

Irredentism as a form of international migration raises a second issue—the impact of conationals' irredentism on ethnic minorities in the receiving countries. Settlement of Soviet *olim* on the occupied territories was met with hostility by Israel's Palestinian population. The arrival of ethnic Bulgarians has put Bulgaria's Turkish population on guard

hosts to see them as different. Thus, for instance, Soviet Jews found that they were different from the *sabras* (Israel-born Jews) and Jews who came to build Israel before them (Horowitz 1989). Similarly in Greece, Pontic Greeks from Russia found that they were perceived as Russians and not as Greeks and consequently they were socially marginalized (Vergeti 1991; Voutira 1991). Empirical research will allow us to outline those conditions in which cultural differences are ignored in order to define a migrant group as a part of "us," and those circumstances under which slight cultural differences are exaggerated so that new arrivals are seen as "them." ■

Irredentism as a form of international migration raises a second issue—the impact of conationals' irredentism on ethnic minorities in the receiving countries.

monthly. To discourage the out-migration of Russian Germans, the German government is prepared to send financial aid to build the German Autonomous Republic in the Volga region (Orlova, this issue). Similarly, the Bulgarian government has sent aid to promote Bulgarian ethnic culture in Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia (Jordanova, this issue). Even Israel has realized that it cannot continue inviting the one to five million Soviet Jews in the former Soviet Union to "repatriate." Therefore, with the help of American Jewish organizations, Israel has been providing aid to revive the Jewish culture and religion in the former Soviet Union.

In all the above-mentioned examples, nationalism has played a role in facilitating the immigration of conationals. However, nationalist sentiments can also prevent members of some minority groups, who are defined as different from the host, to return to the territories from which they were originally forced to leave.

The case in point is that of Georgia, which rejects the territorial claims of Muslim Georgians (otherwise known as Meskhetian Turks) who had been expelled from Georgia to Central Asia un-

(Jordanova, this issue). The return of thousands of Russians stirs up nationalist sentiments and jeopardizes other ethnic minorities, such as Tartars, Georgians, Armenians, Central Asians and Jews who are living in Russia.

Finally, an interesting topic for future research is the social integration of migrants who have the same ethnic background as the hosts. Social relations between the migrants and their hosts will depend in part on the extent to which the former have been able to maintain their ethnic culture and language in the country where they resided, and the extent to which these have changed in the receiving country. As in the case of Pontic Greeks, the Pontic dialect is different from modern Greek, making it difficult for the migrants from the former Soviet Union to integrate into the new society (Vergeti 1991). Alternatively, cultural and linguistic affinity would facilitate the integration of new arrivals. However, other circumstances may mitigate against their full integration. Studies in the field of ethnic relations (see Barth 1969, for instance) have led to conclusions that cultural and linguistic similarities are not sufficient to ensure acceptance of migrants if there are economic or political reasons for the

Note

1. Anthony Smith defines "irredentism" as those nationalist movements that aim to unify all conationals in one state. For him, the drive behind this movement comes from those who already reside in this state and who wish to strengthen it and, in many cases, expand its boundaries by adding the territory on which their separated kinsmen reside, if this territory is adjacent to theirs (Smith 1983, 222). The sense in which I use this term is similar to Smith's in terms of results (with a possible exception of the annexation of new territories), but the impetus for this movement in many cases that I discuss comes more from those outside their ancestral lands than from those already living there.

References

- Barth, Frederic. 1969. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- Horowitz, Tamar, ed. 1989. *Soviet Man in an Open Society*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Kokkinos, Dimitris. 1991. "The Reception of Pontians from the Soviet Union in Greece." In *Journal of Refugee Studies* 4, no. 4:312-14.
- Noelte, Earl. 1992. "Reflections on Hungary." In *Refugee* 12, no 4:4-6. (October).
- Ryvkina, Rozalina, and Rostislav Turovskiy. 1993. *The Refugee Crisis in Russia*. Toronto: York Lanes Press.
- Salitan, Laurie P. 1992. *Politics and Nationality in Contemporary Soviet-Jewish Emigration, 1968-89*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Smith, Anthony. 1983. *Theories of Nationalism*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1983.
- Vergeti, Maria. 1991. "Pontic Greeks from Asia Minor and the Soviet Union: Problems of Integration in Modern Greece." In *Journal of Refugee Studies* 4, no. 4:382-94.
- Voutira, Effie. 1991. "Pontic Greeks Today: Migrants or Refugees?" In *Journal of Refugee Studies* 4, no. 4:400-20.

The Third Soviet Emigration, 1948-91

Sidney Heitman

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, more than one and a half million citizens of the U.S.S.R. have emigrated to the West in a unique and unprecedented movement called the "the Third Soviet Emigration." Notwithstanding the political and international importance of this exodus, it is not well known or understood today because it has not been adequately studied until now. This article is intended to improve our understanding of the Third Soviet Emigration by examining its background, evolution and dynamics.

Introduction¹

Since the end of World War II, more than one and a half million citizens of the U.S.S.R. have emigrated to the West in a unique and unprecedented movement called the "Third Soviet Emigration." In contrast to preceding waves of refugees from war and revolution, the Third Emigration has been a legal, organized and sustained movement of mainly three national minorities—Jews, ethnic Germans and Armenians. Jews have resettled mainly in Israel and the United States, Germans in Germany and Armenians in the United States.

The origins of the exodus go back to the early postwar years, but the vast majority of emigrants left after 1970, when the Soviet government relaxed for a time its historic antipathy to its citizens' free movement. Emigration was sharply restricted between 1980 and 1986, but in 1987 the exodus revived and attained unprecedented levels, while new groups besides Jews, Germans and Armenians joined the flight, altering its composition, dynamics and patterns of resettlement. These changes resulted from changes in emigrants' motives for leaving and in the policies of the U.S.S.R. and the countries of destination towards them, which not only transformed the movement after 1985 but continue to shape post-Soviet emigration today.

The Third Emigration is of wide interest because of its profound significance for the emigrants and its political importance for the U.S.S.R. and the West. For the emigrants, the movement has been literally life-altering. Not only have

they successfully escaped from conditions they considered inimical to undertake the hazards and hardships of emigrating and resettling in foreign places, but they have, for the most part, successfully established new lives and identities in the free and open West. At the same time, the exodus has played a major role in internal Soviet politics and foreign policy, particularly since the advent of detente.

Throughout the 1970s, the levels and composition of Soviet emigration quotas were widely viewed as a barometer of East-West relations and a measure of Soviet compliance with its human rights obligations under a number of international agreements the U.S.S.R. has signed. Between 1980 and 1989, the question of emigration figured centrally in negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and the West over such major issues as nuclear arms control, mutual trade and exchanges, and the resolution of regional conflicts, with progress towards resolving them directly linked by the West to the Soviet record on emigration. Since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., post-Soviet—or so-called "fourth wave"—emigration continues to be a major concern of both the successor states and the West and cannot be properly understood without an awareness of the movement that preceded it. Notwithstanding its interest and importance, however, the Third Emigration is not as well known or understood as it should be because it has not been thoroughly studied until now. Virtually nothing has been written in the former U.S.S.R. on what has been a taboo subject until recently, and though there is a large body of Western literature dealing with various aspects of the movement, these works are limited in scope and of uneven

quality and reliability. As a result, important questions concerning the exodus have few or no answers, and the significance of recent changes in the movement and their implications for the future are not adequately understood.²

The purpose of this article is to provide a better awareness of the Third Emigration. It is based on research in libraries, archives and private collections in the United States, Europe and Israel, and on information provided by various Western specialists, officials and informants. Though new information on the subject is now becoming available, most of this study was conducted before the breakup of the U.S.S.R. and had to depend primarily on non-Soviet sources of information.

Of the many questions raised by the Third Emigration, this article is concerned for the present with its history, dynamics and consequences. Specifically, it deals with four aspects of the movement, namely (1) the background and special character of the Third Emigration; (2) the evolution of the exodus from its origins in 1948 to the dissolution of the Soviet state in 1991; (3) the causes and dynamics of emigration; and (4) Soviet emigration policy and its determinants.

Background and Character of the Third Emigration

At the outset, certain unique characteristics of the so-called "Third Emigration" need to be clarified. First, it should be noted that the term itself is a misnomer, for the exodus of Soviet Jews, Germans, Armenians and others since World War II is not the third such movement but the first. This is not simply a semantic distinction, but one of substance and importance.

Professor Sidney Heitman was a professor of History at Colorado State University and a member of the editorial advisory board of Refuge.

From the inception of the Soviet regime to the present, some twenty million persons have migrated from the U.S.S.R. in a series of movements of various types. To place the Third Emigration in historical perspective, Table 1 lists thirty-one selected out-migrations involving around thirteen million persons and ranging from the flight of refugees, the

repatriation of citizens of other countries, the transfer of populations resulting from geopolitical changes and forcible expulsions to voluntary emigration per se (see Table 1). Two of these external population movements have come to be known in the Western literature of Soviet history as the "first" and "second" emigrations—namely, the flight of 1.5 mil-

lion refugees from the revolutions of 1917 and its aftermath, and of two million displaced persons during World War II (see items 1 and 10, Table 1).

Why these two refugee movements are called "emigrations" when they do not fit the usual conception of a historic emigration per se is not clear. Nor is it clear why they have been given consecutive numerical designations even though they are separated by twenty years and by other migrations. It is also not clear why the exodus of Jews, Germans and Armenians since 1948 is called the "Third Emigration" as though it has some sequential or functional relation to the other two, which it does not. The fact is that the so-called Third Emigration is not like any other movement but is unique and unprecedented and therefore the first such exodus since 1917. If it has an affinity with a preceding emigration, it is with the exodus of Jews, Germans and others from the Russian empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but not with those after 1917. This distinction is important because it raises questions concerning the causes, dynamics and consequences of the so-called Third Emigration that do not arise with other movements. Notwithstanding the inaccuracy of the term, however, I will use it herewith the provisos noted rather than coin a new term that would confuse the issue further.

A second distinctive characteristic of the Third Emigration is that it proceeded for more than forty years despite the fact that it ran contrary to Soviet policy concerning free movement by citizens of the U.S.S.R. and in the absence of a legal right to do so. To emphasize these points, it is useful to cite two authorities on the subject of Soviet emigration. Alan Dowty, a specialist on international migration, has written:

Soviet opposition to emigration ... grows out of historical traditions of isolation and immobility and basic aspects of Marxism in the Russian setting: the focus on state power and the collective interest, the call for mobilization of the entire public, the sense of being besieged by a hostile world, the belief that departure is an act of betrayal, the instinctive closure of com-

Table 1: Selected Migrations From the U.S.S.R. Since 1917

Migration Movement	Estimated No. of Persons	Time Frame
1. Russian refugees from revolution civil war and famine	1,500,000	1917-22
2. European refugees from the same	250,000	1918-22
3. Polish refugees, displaced persons and repatriates to Poland	1,500,000	1918-25
4. German emigrants escaping forced collectivization	5,600	1920
5. Jewish refugees and displaced persons	33,500	1921-25
6. Jewish emigrants	70,000	1922-41
7. German Mennonite, Lutheran and Catholic emigrants	21,000	1923-26
8. Swedish repatriates	900	1928-29
9. Germans transferred from Soviet territory under terms of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact	396,000	1939-41
10. World War II Russian refugees and displaced persons	2,000,000	1939-45
11. Karelian Finns transferred to Finland	415,000	1940-44
12. Ukrainian displaced persons	150,000	1941-45
13. Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian refugees and displaced persons	2,300,000	1941-47
14. Swedish repatriates from Estonia and Latvia to Sweden	6,000	1942-43
15. Ingermanlanders transferred to Finland	18,000	1943-45
16. Germans expelled from East Prussia	500,000	1944-45
17. Poles transferred from prewar eastern Poland to postwar Poland	4,000,000	1944-47
18. Czechs and Ukrainians transferred from Volhynia and Carpatho-Ukraine to Czechoslovakia	63,000	1945-47
19. Repatriated prisoners of war and captive forced labourers	unknown	1945-?
20. Defectors, escapees, self-exiles, binational spouses, exchanged spies and prisoners, etc.	unknown	1945-?
21. Jews transferred to Poland	50,000	1946
22. Jewish legal emigrants	789,400	1948-91
23. Germans transferred from East Prussia and Memel	3,000	1950-51
24. German legal emigrants	563,400	1951-91
25. Armenian legal emigrants	87,600	1956-91
26. Polish repatriates (including 14,000 Jews)	250,000	1956-59
27. Spanish repatriates	5,500	1956-60
28. Greek repatriates	5,500	1956-79
29. Korean repatriates	3,500	1963-79
30. Pontic Greek legal emigrants	37,300	1979-91
31. Evangelical and Pentecostal legal emigrants	25,700	1984-91

Sources: Benjamin Pinkus, "The Emigration of National Minorities from the USSR in the Post-Stalin Era," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1983): 3-36; Eugene M. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); and Z. Alexander, *Immigration to Israel from the USSR* (Tel Aviv: Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, 1977).

munication with the outside, the reservation of foreign travel—as in the time of Catherine the Great—as an elite privilege. As elsewhere in post-World War II Eastern Europe, it was reinforced by war losses, a declining birth rate, labor shortages, and ethnic considerations.³

Nonetheless, since 1948 more than one and a half million Soviet citizens were permitted to emigrate legally to the West. Writing in 1975, George Ginsburgs, a specialist on Soviet constitutional law at Rutgers University School of Law, explained this apparent anomaly as follows:

To appreciate the problem properly, one must bear in mind that, in Soviet Law, a citizen does not possess a right to emigrate at will. To be sure, the concept of emigration is not unfamiliar to Soviet authorities. Thus, the Regulations on Entry into the USSR and Exit from the USSR ... of 19 June, 1959, no. 660, specify that exit from the USSR of Soviet citizens is permitted on the strength of passports for travel abroad or substitute documents accompanied by an exit visa furnished by the union of Republican Ministries of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic missions of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the union and Autonomous Republics, and their organs, depending on the official position of the interested citizen, his passport category, and location at the time of issuance of the visa.... Exit visas are issued in accordance with the established procedure on the basis of a written petition from the individual citizen desiring to go abroad on private business. Special instructions for the application of these Regulations, with respect to the issuance of documents and visas by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its subordinate agencies, were to be issued by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in consultation with the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and its affiliates in the Republics and Autonomous Republics was to depend on rules laid down by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Committee on State Security and the Ministry of Defence.

The obvious implication of the directive is that exit from the USSR, even permanent residence is both possible

and legitimate—whenever the competent institutions approve a personal request to that effect. The last word, however, rests with the administrative authorities, and without their consent, the application must fall. What is more, the Regulations do not indicate what criteria govern the whole process, presumably leaving these to be defined by the aforementioned supplementary departmental instructions, but meanwhile furnishing the average citizen wanting to depart from the USSR no clue as to how the system is supposed to operate, what type of official treatment his bid might encounter, and what results he can expect.

Hence, where, on a number of occasions, an opportunity to leave the USSR has been granted to specific categories of Soviet nationals, the episodes have duly been viewed as unique concessions and not symptomatic of any public recognition of the inherent freedom of the individual to emigrate. Inasmuch, then, as Soviet law has sanctioned the emigration of various people over the years, the phenomenon represents, and locally has always been perceived as, an incidence of political dispensation constituting a special privilege conferred on the interested party by the organs of the state and not something that a person can claim unilaterally independently of or in opposition to the regime's express wishes.⁴

The 1959 regulations were revised twice—once in 1970 and again in 1986. The 1970 revisions, adopted in anticipation of a substantial increase in Jewish emigration, added fees and charges to the emigration process, but did not alter the provisions of the 1959 regulations. The 1986 modifications, issued on the eve of a meeting of the signatories to the Helsinki accords of 1975 in Vienna to review compliance with their human rights provisions, also changed no basic provisions of the 1959 regulations, but only simplified and streamlined some of the emigration procedures. Thus, until recently, emigration historically has been a privilege dispensed or withheld by the Soviet government at its discretion in an arbitrary, unpredictable and ambiguous manner. The departure of more than one and a half million Soviet citizens for the

West since 1948, therefore, is a legal aberration rather than a norm, permitted by the authorities because of perceived benefits to the state at various times, not because of a commitment to basic human rights. In May 1991 a new law was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., making emigration a legal right for all Soviet citizens, but its status was ambiguous for a long time because its effective date was deferred to January 1993.

A third distinctive characteristic of the Third Emigration is the fact that the privilege of leaving the U.S.S.R. has been granted until recently almost entirely to only three groups of citizens based on their ethnic identity, namely Jews, ethnic Germans and Armenians. Recently Pontic Greeks and Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians have also been permitted to emigrate, but their numbers are small compared to the others. It should also be noted that even when these groups were permitted to leave, their departure was officially justified as special cases involving repatriation or family reunification so as to sidestep the antipathy to emigration per se and to avoid establishing a precedent of free movement that others might seek to follow. Thus, until the adoption of the 1991 law on foreign travel—and even since then—emigration has been disguised by the Soviet authorities and treated as a unique concession to only selected Soviet citizens for reasons and in ways that will be seen below.

With these distinctive characteristics of the Third Emigration in mind, the discussion now turns to the evolution of the movement from 1948 through the end of 1991.

Evolution of the Third Emigration

Viewed in historical perspective, the Third Emigration has passed through four stages since its inception, each marked by changes in the numbers, ethnic composition, motives and destinations of the emigrants, on the one hand, and in the policies of the Soviet government and the countries of resettlement towards them on the other (see Table 2).

The first stage (1948-70) was one of relatively low levels of emigration dur-

ing which only 59,600 persons, or 4 percent of the 1,507,600 total emigrants who left the U.S.S.R. through the end of 1991, emigrated over a span of twenty-three years for an average annual exodus of 2,600 persons. The second stage (1971-80) was one of greatly expanded emigration, during which nearly one-fourth of the total emigrants left the Soviet Union (347,300 persons, or 23 percent) for an annual average of 34,700 persons. The third stage (1981-86) saw a sharp reduction in emigration when only 44,100 persons left the U.S.S.R., or 2.9 percent of the total, for an annual average of 7,300 individuals. The fourth period was one of unprecedented levels of emigration, during which more than one million persons emigrated between 1987 and the end of 1991, or nearly three-fourths (70.1 percent) of the total, for an annual average of 211,300 emigrants.

After 1991 the numbers, composition, destinations and other aspects of the movement changed greatly, reflecting the deep changes that swept the former Soviet Union and raising questions as to whether these developments were essentially an extension of the fourth stage of the Third Emigration or the start of a new and substantively different "fourth wave" of Soviet emigration.

Table 3 summarizes the results of the resettlement of Soviet emigrants from 1948 through the end of 1991. It should be noted that until the research for this article was undertaken, there was no composite tally anywhere of emigrant

destinations such as the listing presented in Table 3. During the first stage of the exodus, all Jewish emigrants went to Israel, except for 14,000 Polish Jews who were permitted to return to their homes in Poland. During the second stage, only two-thirds of them resettled there, the remainder going mainly to the United States. In the third and fourth stages, increasing numbers of them chose the United States over Israel (see Table 3).

Overall, between 1948 and 1991, 518,600 Jews (65.9 percent) resettled in Israel, 223,900 (28.4 percent) in the United States and 46,900 in other countries (5.9 percent).

All German emigrants resettled in West Germany between 1948 and 1989, except 1,000 persons who went to the GDR in the 1980s, but who were integrated into the unified Federal Republic in 1990. Armenians resettled in France, the United States, the Middle East, Greece and elsewhere, while Evangelicals and Pentecostals went mainly to the United States and Greeks to Greece. Table 3 lists and analyses these resettlement patterns.

Causes and Dynamics of Emigration

Turning to the causes and dynamics of Soviet emigration, the discussion deals with each of the emigrant groups in turn.

Jewish Emigration⁵

On the eve of the rise in Jewish emigration in the early 1970s, there were an

estimated two million Jews in the U.S.S.R. consisting of three main groups—Asiatic, Western and so-called "core" or "heartland" Jews. Asiatic Jews lived in Central Asia and the Caucasus region, where they observed traditional cultures and religious practices. Western Jews, who were more numerous and lived in territories annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II (the Baltic region, eastern Poland and Bessarabia), also followed traditional culture and religion and were, moreover, strongly Zionist. The largest group was the core or heartland Jews, who had lived in European Russia since 1917 and were by 1971 largely Russionized, secular and integrated. Small groups of Jews lived elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. (such as in Birobidjan), but most emigrants came from the three main groups.

Soviet Jews in 1971 were overwhelmingly urban, well educated and disproportionately represented in professional, scientific and creative occupations, which made them valuable to the Soviet authorities, but did not shield them from discrimination and persecution. Despite their circumstances, however, they had learned to adapt, for there could be no thought of leaving the U.S.S.R. and no place to go even if it had been possible to do so.

To be sure, between 1948 and 1970 several thousand elderly and infirm Jews were permitted to join relatives in Israel as a result of pressure from the Israeli government, and 14,000 Polish Jews

Table 2: Soviet Emigration by Stages, 1948-91

Period	Jews	Germans	Armenians	Greeks	Evang. and Pentecostal	Others	Period Totals	Proportion of Total (%)	Annual Average
1948-70	25,200	22,400	12,000	—	—	—	59,600	4.0	2,600
1971-80	248,900	64,300	34,000	—	—	—	347,200	23.0	34,700
1981-86	16,900	19,500	6,400	1,300	—	—	44,100	2.9	7,300
1987-91	498,400	456,800	35,200	36,000	25,700	4,600	1,056,700	70.1	211,300
Totals	789,400	563,000	87,600	37,300	25,700	4,600	1,507,600	100.0	
Proportion of Total (%)	52.4	37.3	5.8	2.5	1.7	0.3	100.0		

Sources: U.S. Department of State; embassies of Israel and Germany and Greek Press Office, Washington, D.C.; Internationale Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte, Frankfurt/Main; Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society; and Armenian informants.

were repatriated to postwar Poland as part of the massive population transfers following World War II (see Table 1), but these were exceptional cases that did not alter the official proscriptions on voluntary emigration per se. The rationale of family reunification set a precedent, however, that was later invoked by the Soviet authorities to justify emigration by Jews and others in the 1970s.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s three factors changed the status of Soviet Jews. One was the rise of a virulent new wave of official persecution in the U.S.S.R. that caused alarm within the country and alerted the West to the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union.

The second was the stunning Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, which stirred Jewish pride and consciousness throughout the world, including the U.S.S.R. The third was the advent of detente, which led to a relaxation of East-West relations and of internal Soviet political controls.

These developments encouraged at first a few and then a growing number of Soviet Jews to apply to emigrate to Israel on the grounds of family reunification recognized earlier by the government and supported by several international human rights agreements the U.S.S.R. had signed. Surprisingly, the Soviet authorities were amenable and relaxed the ban on leaving the country for thousands of Jews who ostensibly sought to rejoin relatives from whom they had been separated by the war and its aftermath.

The first to leave were from the Soviet periphery—Asiatic and Western Jews, who went to Israel not only to escape persecution but also out of religious and Zionist motives. From the mid-1970s onward, however, a growing number of core Jews joined the exodus, not only to avoid discrimination but also to find better personal and economic opportunities in the West. These emigrants increasingly “dropped out” in Vienna and other transit points en route to Israel and resettled mainly in the United States, where they were offered sanctuary as political refugees.

When detente broke down in the early 1980s, the Soviet government sharply reduced Jewish (and other) emigration until 1987, when emigration levels rose again, attaining unprecedented levels. By this time most Jewish emigrants were clearly economic migrants who chose to resettle mainly in the United States, until the American government imposed immigration limits in 1990, diverting them then to Israel. Table 3 shows the cumulative results of these shifting patterns of resettlement.

German Emigration⁶

The two million ethnic Germans in the U.S.S.R. on the eve of the exodus of the 1970s were, like the Jews, a dispersed, alienated national minority with a history of persecution under the tsars and Soviets. Descendants of colonists invited to Russia by Catherine the Great and Alexander I in the late eighteenth and

early nineteenth centuries, they consisted of two main groups—the Volga Germans and Black Sea Germans, named for the regions where they settled.

For a century after their arrival, the colonists flourished, enjoyed favours and exemptions from the state, and grew in numbers. In the late nineteenth century, they experienced economic reverses and lost their privileged status, forcing thousands of them to emigrate to the New World (paralleling the flight of Russian Jews and others from Russia). Those who remained suffered successive catastrophes during World War I, the revolutions of 1917 and the civil war and famine that followed, as well as Stalin’s collectivization drive and terror in the 1930s.

There was a brief respite in the 1920s during NEP, when a Volga German republic and several autonomous German districts were created, in which a vigorous national cultural and religious life flourished for a time. Ethnic Germans also participated in Soviet politics and held important posts in the Communist party.

World War II ended all organized German life. When the Nazis invaded the U.S.S.R. in 1941, Stalin accused the Soviet Germans of treason and ordered them deported to the east. Six hundred thousand Volga Germans were sent to forced labour camps in Siberia and Central Asia and confined under inhuman conditions. Their autonomous units

Table 3: Destinations of Emigrants by Nationality, 1948-91

Years	Jews			Germans			Armenians		Greeks Greece	Evan. & Pent.		Others U.S.
	Israel	U.S.	Other ^a	FRG	GDR	U.S.	France	Other ^b		U.S.	Canada	
1948-70	11,200	—	14,000	22,400	—	—	12,000	—	—	—	—	—
1971-80	156,300	83,400	9,200	63,300	1,000	34,000	—	—	—	—	—	—
1981-86	8,200	7,800	900	19,500	—	6,400	—	—	1,300	100	—	—
1987-91	342,900	132,700	22,800	456,800	—	34,400	—	800	36,000	25,400	200	4,600
Totals	518,600	223,900	46,900	562,000	1,000	74,800	12,000	800	37,300	25,500	200	4,600

^aOther places where Jews have resettled include Canada, Europe, Latin America and Oceania.

^bOther places where Armenians resettled include the Middle East, Greece and the Netherlands. Sources: See Table 2.

were abolished, their property was confiscated and their cultural and religious organizations were closed. The Black Sea Germans were overrun by the Nazis before they too could be deported, and 250,000 of them were evacuated by the German government, resettled in Poland and incorporated into the Third Reich. After the war, all but 100,000 of them were forcibly returned to the U.S.S.R., where they were deported to the labour camps in the east.

Though the end of the war ended the pretext for their internment, the Germans were confined to the camps for another decade and released only in 1955 as a result of West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's intercession on their behalf. They were permitted to resettle in southwestern Siberia and Central Asia, but they were prohibited from returning to their former homes or seeking restitution for lost lives and property. In 1964, the Soviet government granted them an amnesty absolving the Germans of the wartime charge of collective treason, but the restrictions remained in force. Their circumstances gradually improved thereafter, particularly their economic status, for their diligent labour in agriculture and industry was highly valued and well rewarded by the Soviet regime.

However, they resented their continuing disabilities and the prohibitions against restoring their prewar status and property. Fearful of renewed persecution, some Germans sought to assimilate into Soviet society, while others joined dissident movements. Still others, however, inspired by the example of Soviet Jews who were emigrating to Israel in the early 1970s, also sought to escape the U.S.S.R. by returning to their "historic homeland" in West Germany.

Like the Jews, during the 1950s and 1960s several thousand Germans had been permitted to emigrate to the Federal Republic under pressure from Bonn. To disguise the exodus and prevent setting a precedent for general emigration, the Soviet government justified it on the grounds of "repatriating" former German citizens and the reuniting of families separated by the war. By 1968, these early transfers came to an end when rela-

tions between Moscow and Bonn cooled (see Table 1).

In 1969-70, the issue of Soviet German emigration arose anew. Willy Brandt, the new chancellor of West Germany, inaugurated a new *Ostpolitik* and used the rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. to press for, among other things, freer emigration by Germans. At the same time, a group of Volga Germans who had been rebuffed in an effort to have their prewar autonomous republic restored, despaired of improving their lot in the U.S.S.R. and sought to emigrate en masse to West Germany. With the thaw brought about by *Ostpolitik* and detente, Moscow sought West German favour and opened the gates of emigration for Soviet Germans as it was also doing for Jews. Between 1971 and 1980, a total of more than 64,000 Germans emigrated from the U.S.S.R.—more than a tenfold increase over the preceding decade. After 1980 the erosion of detente led to a sharp decline in German (as well as Jewish and Armenian) emigration, but after 1987 the exodus revived and attained unprecedented levels. By the end of 1991, a total of 563,000 had left the U.S.S.R. since 1948, all of them resettling in West Germany (see Tables 1 and 2).

Armenian Emigration⁷

The causes of Armenian emigration are distinct from those of Jewish and German emigration (though not unrelated) because the status of Armenians in the Soviet Union in the 1970s was unique. Since 1920, when a short-lived independent Armenian republic was annexed by the Soviet Union, there has been a nominally sovereign Armenia in the U.S.S.R. According to the 1979 Soviet census, 4.15 million of the world's five million Armenians lived in the Soviet Union, 70 percent of them in their own national republic. Within the Armenian S.S.R., Armenians comprised 90 percent of the population, spoke their native tongue, and observed their cultural, national and religious customs with a high degree of freedom, compared to other ethnic minorities in the U.S.S.R. They also governed themselves, albeit under the guidance of the Communist party, in which native Armenians held high of-

fices; until recently, the Armenian S.S.R. was one of the most prosperous republics in the Soviet Union. There were also many well-educated Armenians who boasted a rich cultural legacy and ranked high in scientific, creative and intellectual achievements.

Why then did thousands of Armenians seek to leave the U.S.S.R.? At first, the impetus for emigration came not from native Armenians but from immigrants to the Armenian S.S.R. during the postwar years who had answered a call by the Soviet authorities to former nationals and others to return and help rebuild the country. Among those who arrived between 1946 and 1960 were 250,000 Armenians living in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and the Americas. Though they had never lived in the U.S.S.R., they considered Soviet Armenia their historic homeland and religious centre and were attracted by Soviet promises of generous aid and hospitality.

Instead of housing, jobs and assistance, however, they found a backward, undeveloped country peopled by uneducated and impoverished peasants who spoke a different dialect and were openly hostile to the newcomers. They were forcibly billeted in the homes of resentful natives or makeshift shelters; their money and other valuables were confiscated; and they were barred from desirable positions in the economy and administration by jealous local officials, notwithstanding their education and skills. When they protested the breach of faith, thousands of them were imprisoned or exiled.

As a result of their treatment, the immigrants remained apart from the local inhabitants, nursed their grievances and looked for an opportunity to return to the West. Though they made important contributions to the postwar economic boom that transformed the sleepy Caucasian republic into a modern, productive region and profited in the process, they knew they could do better in the West and awaited a chance to leave.

Such an opportunity arose in the 1950s for 12,000 Armenians, who had immigrated from France, when the French government pressured the Soviet government to permit them to return to

their former homes. Anxious to accommodate the French at the time, Moscow permitted the petitioners to leave on the grounds of "repatriating" former citizens of another country so as to avoid the official proscriptions against emigration per se.

This movement ended by 1960, but those Armenians who remained awaited an opportunity to follow, which arose when the Soviet government eased requirements for emigration for Jews and Germans in the early 1970s on the ostensible grounds of family reunification. Armenians could also qualify for family reunification because they left members of their large extended families in the West when they emigrated to the U.S.S.R., and they began to apply in growing numbers for the right to leave. Surprisingly, the Soviets allowed them to join the Jewish and German exodus, and Armenian emigration peaked in 1980 with 14,000 persons. Immediately thereafter, the wave declined along with Jewish and German emigration, but, like the two other groups, the number of Armenians who left the U.S.S.R. rose again after 1987 (see tables 1 and 4). Except for the group that went to France, most other Armenians resettled in the United States.

Beginning around 1985, two other groups joined Jews, Germans and Armenians in emigrating from the U.S.S.R.—namely Pontic Greeks and Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians (sometimes referred to collectively, though inaccurately, as "Soviet Baptists").

Pontic Greek Emigration⁸

The 1989 Soviet census reported 344,000 Pontic Greeks living in fourteen union

republics of the U.S.S.R., but unofficial estimates place the number today at 500,000 to one million. These Soviet citizens are descendants of Greek colonists who settled the southern shore of the Black Sea (*Euxine Pontusin* in ancient Greek) during the eighth century B.C., where they were overrun by successive waves of invaders. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were persecuted by the Turks and fled across the Black Sea to Russia. Many Pontic Greeks supported the Bolsheviks in 1917 and were rewarded with three autonomous units, in which Greek cultural life flourished until the 1930s when Stalin brutally exiled them to Central Asia and resettled them among hostile Muslim populations. According to some estimates, a third of a million Greeks perished during this time. *Perestroika* and *glasnost* improved the status of the Pontic Greeks, but they were so alienated by then that the decline of the Soviet economy and the rise of ethnic conflict in the U.S.S.R. in the late 1980s impelled them to leave the country in emulation of the Jews and Germans; like them, they were one of the few national minorities with a native "homeland" outside the Soviet Union, though they had left it more than two millennia ago.

The Greek government gladly interceded on their behalf and received them as "repatriates" because it was anxious to stem the "shrinking of Hellenism" resulting from declining birth rates in Greece and the loss of ethnic identity among Greek communities abroad. During the early 1980s only a few hundred Pontic Greeks succeeded in leaving the Soviet Union, but in 1988 the number

grew to 1,365, in 1989 to 6,791, and in 1990 to 14,300. Since then, approximately 15,000 immigrants have been received in Greece annually (see tables 1 and 4). Greek officials anticipate that 100,000 additional Pontic Greeks will emigrate over the next several years and possibly more if conditions in the former U.S.S.R. continue to deteriorate.

Evangelical and Pentecostal Emigration⁹

The second group to join the exodus around 1985 was comprised of Evangelicals and Pentecostals, members of a conservative branch of Russian fundamentalist Christianity. An estimated half million of them live in the U.S.S.R. today, where they work mainly in agriculture and industry. At various times they have been persecuted, particularly by Stalin and Khrushchev. In the 1980s, several developments converged to initiate their emigration from the U.S.S.R. One was their lingering resentment over past mistreatment, distrust of the Soviet government despite the relaxation of political repression by Gorbachev, and a fear that his liberal reforms would be followed by a new wave of repression predicted in their sacred beliefs.

Another was a conviction that the U.S.S.R. would be severely punished by God for its sinfulness, and they wanted to leave before this calamity occurred. Some Evangelicals and Pentecostals simply wanted to escape the atheistic influences of Soviet society and to live and worship freely, despite the adoption of a new law providing for religious freedom in the U.S.S.R., which they did not trust.

Against this background, three events led directly to efforts by the Evangelicals and Pentecostals to leave the U.S.S.R. One was the conclusion of the Helsinki accords in 1975, which committed the Soviet Union as a signatory to comply with international norms of human rights, including freedom of movement. The second was the example of Soviet Jews and Germans who were emigrating to the West in increasing numbers in the 1970s and 1980s. The third was the notoriety given to the "Siberian Seven"—the Pentecostal Vashchenko family who took refuge in

Table 4: Annual Soviet Emigration, 1987-91

Year	Jews	Germans	Armenians	Greeks	Evangelical & Pentecostal	Others
1987	8,200	14,500	3,300	500	50	50
1988	19,400	47,600	10,900	1,400	50	40
1989	72,500	98,100	10,800	6,800	14,000	70
1990	201,300	148,000	6,800	14,300	4,200	2,600
1991*	197,000	148,600	3,400	13,000	7,400	1,800

*Data for 1991 are approximate. Sources: See Table 2.

the American embassy in Moscow in 1978 and who were permitted to emigrate to the United States six years later. Encouraged by their success, in 1985 several Pentecostal families obtained photocopies of *vyzovs* (invitations) used by Soviet Jews for emigration to Israel and brazenly applied to emigrate to the Jewish state at the Dutch embassy in Moscow, which served as a proxy for the Israeli embassy, since the U.S.S.R. had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War. Curiously and inexplicably, their petitions were approved by the Dutch, Israeli and Soviet authorities, and they left the U.S.S.R. officially as part of a Jewish contingent. When they reached Vienna, where transit was provided for Jews en route to Israel, they asked to go as refugees to the United States instead and were admitted by the American government under its then liberal asylum policy.

From 1985 to 1988, only 100 Evangelicals and Pentecostals left the U.S.S.R., but in 1989 the number grew to nearly 14,000 as the Dutch, Israeli, American and Soviet governments continued the charade, the first three out of humanitarian motives, the U.S.S.R. for still unknown reasons. When new restrictive U.S. immigration regulations went into effect in 1990, however, the number of Evangelicals and Pentecostals admitted to the United States declined along with those of Jews and Armenians, but between 1985 and 1991, 25,700 Soviet Christians succeeded in leaving the U.S.S.R. (see Table 2).

Soviet Emigration Policy¹⁰

Turning to the question of Soviet emigration policy, what has this policy been over the forty-five years of the movement, and how and why has it changed since 1948? Why were some groups but not others permitted to leave the U.S.S.R. despite official opposition to free movement? What similarities and differences have there been in the Soviet government's treatment of the several emigrant groups and what accounts for these similarities and differences?

Important and interesting as these questions are, the fact is that there are no

precise answers to them, for the Soviet leaders have never publicly explained their policies, reasons for which must be inferred indirectly from other evidence. Broadly speaking, certain parallels and similarities may be seen in the treatment of the three main emigrant groups at various times, suggesting that Soviet policy towards them was determined by broad general factors rather than by special considerations depending upon the nationality involved, as it has been claimed by some authors, particularly those dealing with Jewish emigration.

For example, during the first stage of the Third Emigration (1948-70), Soviet policy towards all three groups was the result of foreign intervention—from Israel on behalf of the Jews, from West Germany on behalf of the Germans, and from France on behalf of the Armenians, as it has been seen. Despite ideological and political opposition to emigration, the Soviet government allowed a modest exodus of the three groups in order to placate these governments, but disguised its capitulation and prevented setting a precedent by justifying the departures on the grounds of family reunification or repatriation, as mentioned earlier. Influencing these decisions was the fact that the 1950s and 1960s were a time of dislocation and massive postwar population transfers, into which the exodus of a few thousand Jews, Germans and Armenians merged without undue official concern. Moreover, in the case of Jews and Germans, most of the emigrants were elderly or infirm persons of little value to the Soviets—and, indeed, liabilities as pensioners.

During the second stage of the movement (1971-80), three common factors also appear to have influenced Soviet policy towards Jewish and German emigrations, though quite different considerations underlay policy towards Armenians. The common factors affecting Jews and Germans were certain internal Soviet developments, the actions of Western governments on behalf of the two emigrant groups, and the influence of Western public opinion.

One internal Soviet development was the relaxation of political controls that paralleled detente with the West af-

ter 1971. This was manifested in part by the liberalization of emigration for Jews and Germans, many of whose questionable claims to family reunification were winked at by the authorities. A second internal development was a new assertiveness and activism on the part of prospective Jewish and German emigrants, who staged daring demonstrations, presented petitions and demands, and openly courted foreign support from various governments and public figures. The Soviet government reacted to this unaccustomed defiance with surprising moderation and permitted increasingly large quotas of emigrants to leave throughout the seventies, as seen. At the same time, the United States (which supplanted Israel as the main champion of the Soviet Jews) and West Germany used various forms of coercion and blandishments to persuade Moscow to liberalize emigration.

The relations between the U.S.S.R. and the West during the 1970s has been widely discussed elsewhere and need not be reviewed here. Suffice it to say that Western measures included, among others, the offer or withholding of trade and technological exchanges; the linkage of Soviet conduct concerning human rights to the resolution of other international issues; and public exposure of political repression in the U.S.S.R., to which the Soviet government was sensitive in those years.

The third factor was the impact of Western public opinion, to which the Soviet leaders appeared to be responsive for a time. Though its precise effect is difficult to gauge, there is reason to believe that wide press coverage of the issue of human rights in the U.S.S.R. in general and of emigration in particular; activities of Western supporters of the emigrants, including demonstrations before Soviet embassies and confrontations with visiting Soviet representatives; parliamentary declarations and denunciations; public reminders of Soviet obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki accords; and even criticism by European communists all helped to persuade the Soviet leaders to liberalize emigration policy between 1971 and 1980.

With the erosion of detente after 1980, however, the Soviet authorities became indifferent to their "image" in the West and Western public opinion ceased to exercise an influence. With the emergence of a reformist policy under Gorbachev, however, Western public opinion again began to figure importantly in Soviet internal and foreign relations, and a liberalization of Jewish and German emigration followed, as mentioned earlier.

While these factors help to account for Soviet policy towards Jewish and German emigration, they do not explain Armenian emigration. Unlike the Jews and Germans, the Armenians had no foreign country or lobbyists in the West working on their behalf. On the contrary, the international Armenian diaspora deplored emigration from the Armenian S.S.R., which it considered its national homeland and religious centre and wanted to see strengthened. Why then did the Soviet authorities permit thousands of Armenians to leave during the 1970s in the absence of the forces that shaped their policy towards Jews and Germans?

There is no answer to this question, for even members of Armenian communities in the West cannot explain it. Only possible reasons have been suggested. These include Moscow's benign neglect of Soviet Armenia; a desire by the Soviet government and Armenian officials to be rid of troublesome elements; an attempt to dispel the impression that the Soviets had "caved in" to Western pressure on behalf of Jews and Germans by permitting another nationality "eligible" for family reunification to leave; efforts by the Soviet leaders to court Armenian goodwill at home and abroad to encourage tourism and the hard currency it earned as well as foreign investment in the Armenian S.S.R.; and concern over the strategic importance of Armenia in the event of a conflict with neighbouring Turkey or a flare-up of the volatile Middle East.

Whatever the reasons, Soviet policy towards Armenians changed after 1980, as it did for Jews and Germans, and emigration levels declined from the high point reached in that year (see Table 1).

The main reason for the cutback undoubtedly was the breakdown of detente, and the resumption of Armenian emigration after 1987 was presumably due to the thaw under Gorbachev, as was the case with Jews and Germans (see Table 4).

The motives of Soviet policy towards the Pontic Greeks, Evangelicals and Pentecostals are as obscure as those towards the Armenians. It is known that the Greek government intervened on behalf of the Pontic Greeks, while the United States actively supported the Christians, and it can only be assumed that there was no reason for Moscow to refuse their emigration in modest numbers and risk alienating Washington and Athens as long as it did not encourage others to leave.

Summary

The discussion has traced Soviet post-war emigration from its origins through the end of 1991, analysing its causes and dynamics and exploring Soviet emigration policy. Beginning in 1992 the momentous changes that brought about the end of the Soviet Union also effectively ended the Third Emigration per se. Out-migration from the successor states of the former U.S.S.R. continued apace after 1991, of course, but the causes, composition, patterns, dynamics and directions of the exodus changed so radically that it no longer resembled the movement until then. Indeed, Western writers began to allude to the start of a new "fourth wave" of post-Soviet emigration in 1992 that was expected to dwarf the Third Emigration and inundate Europe with a horde of refugees who would be joined by a massive flight of others from eastern Europe.¹¹

This flood has not materialized thus far, though some observers believe it may yet do so if conditions in the former Soviet Union or eastern Europe deteriorate beyond a point of tolerance. In any case, the distinctive features of the Third Soviet Emigration and the forces that brought it into being and sustained it for more than four decades no longer prevailed after 1991.

This article has sought to illuminate the course and dynamics of the move-

ment while it was an active, influential force in Soviet and international affairs and to place it in its proper historical context. It also provides an indispensable background for understanding the continued, albeit altered, flow of population from the Soviet successor states and the possible course of this migration in the foreseeable future. ■

Notes

1. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Robert J. Brym of the Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, who provided invaluable suggestions and read and commented on the text of this article.
2. For a detailed treatment of Soviet emigration and an extensive bibliography on the subject, see Sidney Heitman, *The Third Soviet Emigration: Jewish, German, and Armenian Emigration From the USSR Since World War II* (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale studien, 1987).
3. Alan Dowty, *Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 68.
4. George Ginsburgs, "Soviet Law and the Emigration of Soviet Jews," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, 3, no. 1 (1973): 4.
5. The literature on Soviet Jewry and Jewish emigration is voluminous. This section is based on various published accounts, including A. Alexander, *Immigration to Israel from the USSR* (Tel Aviv: Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, 1977); Joel Cang, *The Silent Millions: A History of the Jews in the Soviet Union* (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1969); Robert O. Freedman, ed., *Soviet Jewry in the Decisive Decade, 1971-1980* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1984); William Korey, *The Soviet Cage: Antisemitism in Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1973); Thomas E. Sawyer, *The Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979); and Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym, *Soviet Jewish Emigration and Soviet Nationality Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
6. This section is based on various published and unpublished sources, including *30 Jahre Lager Friedland* (Hanover: Niedersächsischen Minister für Bundesangelegenheiten, 1975); CDU/CSU Group in the German Bundestag, *White Paper on the Human Rights Situation in Germany and of the Germans in Eastern Europe* (Bonn: CDU/CSU Group, 1977); Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen im Zarenreich: 200 Jahre deutsch-russischer Kulturgemeinschaft* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag Anstalt, 1986); Adam Giesinger, *From Catherine to Khrushchev: The Story of Russia's Germans* (Saskatchewan: Marian Press, 1974); and Sidney Heitman, *The Soviet Germans in the USSR Today* (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale studien, 1981).

7. This section is based on information from informants and the following sources: Michael J. Arlen, *Passage to Ararat* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975); Robert Mirak, *Torn Between Two Lands: Armenians in America, 1890 to World War I* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) and *The Republic of Armenia*, vols. 1 and 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 1982); Claire Mouradian, "L'immigration des Arméniens de la diaspora vers la Russe d'Arménie, 1946-1962," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, no.1 (1979), and *De Staline à Gorbachev, histoire d'une république soviétique: l'Arménie* (Paris: Editions Ramsay, 1990).
8. This section is based on information provided by the Greek embassy in Washington, D.C., and on the following published sources: "Greece Prepares for Soviet Migrants," *The Financial Times* (London) (January 7, 1990), 2; "The Pontians Are Coming," *Athena* (Athens) (February-March 1990), 223; "The Descent of Tens of Thousands," *Athena* (Athens) (February-March 1990), 339-340 "Foreign Ministry, Red Cross on Pontian Resettlement," *The Daily Bulletin* (Athena News Agency) (March 10, 1990); "EC to Consider Aid for Pontian Resettlement," *The Daily Bulletin* (Athena News Agency) (April 5, 1990); "Council of Europe Loans Announced," *The Daily Bulletin* (Athena News Agency) (April 6, 1990).
9. This section is based on information provided by Dr. Kent R. Hill, executive director of the Institute on Religion and Democracy; Serge Duss of World Relief; and William C. Fletcher, University of Kansas, and on W. C. Fletcher, *Soviet Believers: The Religious Sector of the Population* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1981), and *Soviet Charismatics* (New York: P. Lang, 1985); Kent R. Hill, *The Puzzle of the Soviet Church: An Inside Look at Christianity and Glasnost* (Portland: Multnomah Press, 1989); and Walter Sawatsky, *Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II* (Scottsdale: Herald Press, 1981).
10. Soviet and international politics in the post-World War II period have been reported widely in the press and in a large body of writings on the subject that do not require citation here.
11. See, for example, "Winter Wanderers: Europe Braces for Immigrants from a Hungry and Chaotic Soviet Union," *Newsweek* (December 15, 1990), 34-36; "Donations Gladly Accepted," *Time* (December 19, 1990), 59; "West Europe Braces for Migrant Wave from East," *The New York Times* (December 14, 1990), 6; "Moscow Predicts 1.5 Million Will Move East," *The New York Times* (January 27, 1991), 4Y; "The Russians Are Coming," *The Economist* (October 20, 1990), 11-12; and Leon Aron, "The Russians Are Coming ... and the West Needs an Immigration Policy That Makes Sense," *Washington Post* (January 27, 1991), C1.

Meskhetians: Muslim Georgians or Meskhetian Turks? A Community without a Homeland

Stephen F. Jones

Historical Background

Meskhetians are an ethnically heterogeneous group of peoples, including Islamicized Georgians, Meskhi Turks, Kurds, Turkmen, Khemshins and Karapapakhs. This group of peoples adopted the name Meskhetian after they were expelled in 1944 to Central Asia and Kazakhstan on Stalin's orders. The term comes from the region in southern Georgia where they lived before their expulsion. After expulsion from their homeland and more recently from their place of exile in Central Asia, the Meskhetians are in serious danger of losing their identity completely.

Meskheti is a mountainous region located on the Georgian-Turkish border, which originally extended almost as far south as Erzerum in present-day Turkey, but is now confined to Georgia's southern regions.¹ The original settlers were the Meskhi, a Georgian tribe that became Christian in the fourth century along with other Georgian groups. Until the sixteenth century, the region, known as Samcxé-Saatabago, was culturally and politically part of Georgia. Occupied from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries by the Ottoman empire, most of the inhabitants, including the Armenian Khemshin, adopted Islam. In 1829, the northern part of the region (now in southern Georgia) became part of the Russian empire. By the time of the Russian revolution, the area was occupied by Gregorian and Muslim Armenians, Eastern Orthodox and Catholic Georgians (the latter known as "the Franks"), Georgian Muslims (Sunni), Kurds and Karapapakhs. In the 1920s, Soviet authorities established Turkish language

schools for the inhabitants, and in the 1926 census, the majority Muslim population, though ethnically originally Georgian, was classified as (Azerbaijani) Turkish. Later they were reclassified as Azerbaijani, but in 1944, on the eve of their deportation, classified as Turks from Turkey.²

The Deportation

In 1926, "Turks" in Meskheti numbered 137,921; in 1944, the number deported, which included other Muslim groups such as the Kurds and Khemshins settled in the region, was approximately 110,000. The inhabitants of over 220 villages were rounded up in one night and packed into cattle trucks for the long journey into exile in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Over 50,000 perished from hunger and cold on the way or shortly after arrival. They were dispersed in collectives and state farms according to labour needs, which led to the breakup of many families and village communities. Until 1956, they were under "special settlement control," which entailed registering at the special commandant's office twice a month. The Meskhetians were never officially accused of collaboration like the other exiled North Caucasian peoples who were deported at the same time, but they suffered the same restrictions on their civil rights.³

There are various hypotheses as to why the Muslim Meskhetians were deported. The commonly accepted view is that they were removed in preparation for Soviet plans to annex parts of northeastern Turkey.⁴ One author suggests that the deportation was directly linked to historical Armenian claims for Turkish territory, and that the Soviet intention was to incorporate the region into a Greater Soviet Armenia.⁵ The Soviet government claimed East Anatolian provinces on behalf of both Armenians and

*Stephen F. Jones teaches at Mount Holyoke College
in South Hadley, Massachusetts, U.S.A.*

Georgians from 1945-53. A third hypothesis not considered before touches on the role of Lavrentii Beria, who was in charge of the deportation. In the 1930s, he launched a Georgianization campaign against Ossetians and Abkhazians living in Georgia. The "ethnic cleansing" of Meskheta, which was followed by the resettlement of native Georgians in the region, may have simply been the most violent part of Beria's campaign to "Georgianize" Georgia. It is interesting to note that large areas of territory that formerly belonged to the exiled North Caucasians were annexed to Georgia in 1944-45.

Meskheta Identity

The common fate of these peoples in exile led to a Meskheta consciousness closely identified with a feeling of *turkluk* or "Turkness," although many still classify themselves as Georgian Muslims rather than Meskheta Turks. An angry letter from a Muslim Meskheta addressed to the Georgian government in 1991 suggested that the term "Meskhi Turks" was a false one invented by the Tsarist authorities to denationalize the Georgians.⁶ After 1956 when the Meskhetians were granted passports, most were entered as Azerbaijani or Turks. The 1989 census counted 216,000 "Turks" in the U.S.S.R., most of whom are Meskhetians. Approximately 70,000 are classified as "Azerbaijani" and live in Azerbaijan. The Meskhetians themselves claim a total of 350,000. The vast majority are employed in rural occupations. After their expulsion from the Fergana valley in Uzbekistan in 1989, most Meskhetians were relocated to Azerbaijan (40,000), Belgorod, Kursk, Smolensk, Krasnodar, Stavropol and North Caucasian regions. In all, there are currently 74,000 registered Meskheta refugees.

Meskhetians classified as "Turks" speak Turkish as their first language (84.7 percent in 1979). Forty-six percent claim a good knowledge of Russian. The Meskhetians never acquired territorial autonomy, but from the early 1920s until 1935-36, instruction in local schools was in Turkish. Thereafter, it was in Azerbaijani. Initially, Meskhetians were

permitted to use the Arab alphabet. From 1930, it was switched to the Latin form and in 1935 to Cyrillic. While in exile, they had to learn whatever local language was used for instruction. They were poorly integrated in Central Asia. Most Meskhetians are Sunni Muslims, although small numbers of Meskhetians who were not deported in 1944 remain Christians. Since the Meskhetians' expulsion, the region has remained ethnically and religiously mixed, with large numbers of Armenians, Azerbaijani and Georgians living there.

Although the vast majority of Meskhetians are Muslim and speak Turkish, there is still confusion about their identity. Since the nineteenth century, there was a close association between religion and nationality, and by the turn of the century, most Meskheta Muslims considered themselves more Turkish than Georgian, despite their Georgian names.

The majority of Meskhetians today, most of whom were born outside Meskheta's borders, call themselves "Meskhi Turks." But a significant minority, in its campaign to return to Georgia, continues to identify itself as Georgian Muslim. Meskheta solidarity has been undermined by a recurring conflict between those who take a pro-Turkish orientation as against those who maintain their "Georgianness."

The Campaign to Return

In 1956 the Meskhetians' punitive "special settler" status was lifted, but unlike the Greeks who were expelled from Georgia in 1948, they were not permitted to return to Georgia. Between 1945-68 the Soviet authorities continued their public silence on the Meskhetians. It was not until a decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in 1968 that the Soviet authorities publically acknowledged that the Meskhetians had been deported and gave them the theoretical right to live where they wanted. But at the same time, the decree implied that the Meskhetians had now "taken root" in Central Asia, so there was no need for them to move.⁷

Attempts to take advantage of the right to return Meskhetians were con-

stantly thwarted. Between 1961-69, there were six attempts by Meskheta groups to move back to southern Georgia, but on each occasion they were forcibly expelled. To this day, despite an unrelenting campaign to secure their return, very few Meskhetians have been permitted to do so.

Like the Crimean Tatars with whom they were in contact, the Meskhetians organized their campaign well. Initially it took the form of petitions and meetings with Soviet officials (144 in forty-five years). They organized "meetings of the people" on a regular basis. In April 1968, for instance, 6,000 delegates gathered near Tashkent for the twenty-second gathering.

After the disappointment of the May 1968 decree on rehabilitation, the Turkish Association for the National Rights of the Turkish People in Exile, which was formed by the Meskhetians in 1964, began to coordinate a more aggressive campaign, including demonstrations, appeals to international organizations such as the United Nations and Amnesty International, renunciation of their Soviet citizenship, and attempts to resettle spontaneously in Georgia. At the end of the 1960s, the Soviet authorities began to arrest Meskheta leaders, such as Enver Odabashev (Khozrevanidze), a founder of the Turkish Association for the National Rights of the Turkish People in Exile, and threatened their meetings with Soviet troops. In 1970, after the movement's Sixth People's Assembly, the Meskheta leadership petitioned the Turkish embassy to allow those Meskhetians who wished to settle in Turkey to do so. The Assembly also released a statement in which they argued their right for a separate national Meskheta-Turkish Autonomous Republic or Region.

In the mid-1970s, the Meskhetians linked up with Georgian human rights' activists, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava, and with Helsinki monitors in Russia who began to campaign for their return. Such pressure may have led to the resettlement of approximately 100 Meskheta families to Georgia during the 1970s, though none were allowed to settle in Meskheta.

After the Fergana events, Georgian attitudes towards the Meskhetians changed. Both the Georgian government and former dissidents raised a barrage of arguments as to why the Meskhetians should not be allowed to return: there was no land available, it would mean uprooting Georgian settlers in the region, the economy was too weak to support them, they had lost their "Georgianness" and their presence would only increase interethnic tensions in the republic. A new Georgian nationalism directed at non-Georgians left the Meskhetians little hope for return after 1989.⁸

The Current Situation

For two weeks in June 1989, Uzbeks in the major cities of the Fergana valley, who complained of reverse discrimination and who were resentful of local minority "privileges" led vicious attacks on Meskhetian communities. Over 100 Meskhetians were killed in the riots, had their property plundered, and thousands fled for their lives. The violence spread to Tashkent.

Many Meskhetians assert that the pogrom was organized by local authorities who were pressured into finding scapegoats for the region's high unemployment and "acute social problems" associated with rapid population growth.⁹ As a result, the Supreme Soviet set up a Commission on the Problems of the Meskhetian Turks, which later that year recommended that Meskhetians be allowed to gradually return to Georgia. The Meskhetians, led by Yusuf Sarvarov, chairman of the Interim Steering Committee of the Turkish Association for the National Rights of the Turkish People in Exile, organized an All-Union conference in Moscow in May 1990. The seventy-eight delegates created an All Union Meskhetian Society that reiterated the call for a return to their historic homeland. Leading Georgian activists announced that only those with a Georgian name, "orientation" and those who could speak Georgian would be allowed to return.¹⁰

Frustrated by the Georgians' refusal to accept them, in August 1990 approximately 800 Meskhetians gathered on Georgia's northern border and an-

nounced their intention to stage a "peace" march to Meskheti through Georgian territory. After negotiations with Georgians, the Meskhetian demonstrators backed down because they feared a violent reaction. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, whose party was voted into power with an overwhelming majority in October 1990, declared in December that Meskhetians were "foreigners" and their arrival could only cause "civil war and heavy bloodshed." The only Georgian party that cautiously supported the Meskhetians' return was the small and uninfluential Iliia C'avc'avadze Society. The Coordinating Committee for the Association of Repatriated Meskhetians, formed in Georgia in 1989, was intimidated into silence during the Gamsakhurdia period. The Meskhetians' pro-Turkish orientation increased and many began to petition the Turkish embassy in Moscow for emigration.

Since the removal of Gamsakhurdia in January 1992 and the arrival of Eduard Shevardnadze to head the new Georgian government, the Meskhetian situation has slightly improved. In April 1992, after negotiations with Georgia, Turkey agreed to resettle 50,000 Meskhetians. The Georgian State Council set up the Commission on the Regulation of the Problem of the Meskhetians, and in May 1992 it called on the Russian government to protect Meskhetian refugees on its territory from threatened attacks by Kuban Cossacks. That same month, Shevardnadze declared that Georgia was prepared to resettle Meskhetians in the republic over a period of fifteen years, although he mentioned no numbers.¹¹

Despite these encouraging signs, it is unlikely the Meskhetians will remain a single community. The dispersion of refugees is a real threat to their survival as a separate people. Apart from the approximately 74,000 refugees in the central regions of Russia, those remaining in Azerbaijan and Central Asia continue to be subject to assimilation pressures. The Georgian economy, despite Shevardnadze's statements, is not capable of taking on the extra burden of thousands of new settlers. However, the Meskhetians' survival to date suggests a tenacity that

may also pull them through this latest national crisis. ■

Notes

1. The current Georgian districts that made up part of historical Meskheti are Adigeni, Aspinza, Axalkalaki, Axalcixe and NinoVc'minda (formerly Bogdanovka), all located on Georgia's southern border.
2. See S. Enders Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, "The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet Central Asia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 17, no. 2-3 (1975):320-40. This is by far the most detailed and best source on the Meskhetians, although it is dated.
3. For sources and figures on the deportation, see Ann Sheehy and Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities," second rev. ed., *Minority Rights Group Report* (London, 1980); *Materialy Samizdata* AC nos. 6568 and 6569, no.3/91; Khalil Gzalishvili-Kochibroladze *Meskhetinskaia Tra-editia (kratkii obzor)* (Na'l'chik, 1983). (Unpublished manuscript in the author's possession.)
4. See Elizabeth Fuller, "Georgian Muslims Deported by Stalin Permitted to Return," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 32/86 (January 14, 1986).
5. This is the hypothesis of S. Enders Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, "The Meskhetian Turks."
6. See Iasin Pashali Ogly Khasanov, "K pravitel'stvu Gruzinskoi Respubliki, k uchennem, inteligentsii i molodezhi, k synov'iam i docheram, k materiam, ko vsemu gruzinskomu narodu" (April 13, 1991). (Unpublished manuscript in the author's possession.)
7. Wixman and Wimbush, "The Meskhetian Turks," 331.
8. For a discussion of the worsening nationality situation in Georgia since 1985, with some reference to the Meskhetians, see Stephen F. Jones, "Revolutions in Revolutions within Revolution: Minorities in the Georgian Republic," *The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR*, edited by Zvi Gitelman (New York: St. Martin's Press 1992).
9. For a report on the events in Fergana, see Annette Bohr, "Violence Erupts in Uzbekistan," and Yaqub Turan and Timur Kocaoglu, "Appeal to the People of Fergana," *Report on the USSR* 1, no. 24 (June 16, 1989): 23-27.
10. "Obrashchenie k Gruzinskomu narodu" *Molodezh' Gruzii* (March 16, 1990).
11. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV)* 92-083, April 29, 1992, 68-69; 92-088, May 6, 1992, 65; 92-090, May 8, 1992, 67; 92-099, May 21, 1992, 99.

Bulgarian Refugees from the Former Soviet Union: A Troubled Return

Kustodinova Iordanova

In recent years, Bulgaria has been a source of unprecedented out-migration for two reasons. First, a large number of ethnic Turks were expelled in 1989 and their emigration is still continuing. Second, political and economic turmoil in Bulgaria have caused a large wave of emigration. In May 1992, Minko Minkov, the director of the Sofia's Demographic Institute, estimated the recent out-migration to be 400,000¹, although he admitted that the actual figures would be known only after a census in early 1993.²

Besides being a sending country, Bulgaria has also gradually become a receiving country for refugees, some of whom from the former Yugoslavia or from Third World countries consider Bulgaria only a temporary stopover in their long journey to the West. However, for others, Bulgaria is a final destination. These are mostly members of the Bulgarian ethnic minority from the former Soviet Union, who have decided to return to the land of their ancestors. Bulgarians are similar to many other minority groups from this region. As noted by Brubaker, there will be increased "pressure on other states with substantial numbers of co-ethnics in the former Soviet Union—notably Poland, Greece, Korea, Finland, Hungary and Bulgaria—to grant 'their' people preferential immigration and citizenship status."³ But little has been done to date by Bulgarian authorities who, due to the country's economic problems, seem reluctant to assist arriving refugees. While the government has been slow in setting up policies and procedures for Bulgarians fleeing from the former Soviet Union, some nationalist groups from the areas with ethnic unrest provide shelter for the newcomers, thus

strengthening the Bulgarian presence in these regions.

Bulgarians settled in Moldova, Ukraine and southern Russia during the five centuries of Ottoman domination, particularly in the nineteenth century. According to the 1989 census, there was a total of 372,941 ethnic Bulgarians in the U.S.S.R. Most of them—233,000—lived in Ukraine. In Moldova there was a residential community of 89,000 Bulgarians in the so-called Budjak area in Southern Bessarabia, between the Prut and Dniester rivers. There were about 33,000 Bulgarians in Russia and approximately 16,000 in Central Asia. Most of the latter, together with other nationalities, were forced to move there from Crimea during the Stalinist era.⁴ There are also Bulgarian communities even at the Far East island of Sakhalin.

In 1991 some scholars began discussing the Bulgarian exodus. Kuzin wrote that even though neither Moldovan nor Ukrainian Bulgarians had direct access to Bulgaria, their journey through Romania was not impossible to imagine, given a perceived or real peril brought about by conditions in the U.S.S.R.⁵ Until now there has been no exodus of Bulgarians from Ukraine. Reports on Ukraine do not mention significant problems experienced by the Bulgarian minority there. Instead, they point to the establishment of basic cultural facilities among ethnic Bulgarians and attempts to harmonize interethnic relations.⁶

However, recent developments in some other areas have driven many people of Bulgarian descent from the troubled territories. These people seek resettlement in Bulgaria. Most refugees flee areas of ethnic clashes in Moldova and Tadjikistan. According to Ivan Doundarov, chairman of the Union of Bessarabian and Tauric Bulgarians, in the first half of 1992 over 200 families arrived from Bessarabia, 2,000 from

Tadjikistan, and another 3,000 families were expected to come from Bessarabia by early 1993.⁷

The situation of Bulgarians in the Moldovan conflict differs from that of the Gagauz minority.⁸ While only 17 percent of Gagauz approve of President Mircha Snegur, as many as 70 percent of Bulgarians approve of him,⁹ yet others have switched their loyalties. Whereas they supported the Moldovan state in the past, they have gradually become supporters of the independent Dniester republic. Some Bulgarians were victims in the June and July 1992 clashes in Bendery, where about 5,000 Bulgarians live. According to some reports, more than fifty Bulgarians were killed in the conflict.¹⁰ The Bulgarian town of Parkani was constantly caught in a cross-fire. This has moved the Bulgarian government to protest¹¹ and to send a 5 million *leva* (about Can. \$250,000) in aid to the town's 11,000 Bulgarian-speaking residents. Furthermore, some Bessarabian Bulgarians have been drafted against their will to fight against other Bulgarians on the Ukrainian side of the Dniester region conflict. Emigration to Bulgaria was seen as a solution to many Bulgarians caught in this interethnic clash.

The current Bulgarian citizenship law dates back to 1968. Eligibility is based on the proof of Bulgarian descent and knowledge of the Bulgarian language. It is difficult for Bessarabian Bulgarians to acquire citizenship, partly because in most cases they have no available documents to prove their Bulgarian origin. Furthermore, they are not sufficiently proficient in Bulgarian. "Until now not a single application for citizenship received from Bulgarians has been approved," reported Nora Dimova in July 1992. She predicted a large refugee wave from the Dniester region, but she observed that the Bulgarian government was not ready to deal with it.¹²

Kustodinova Iordanova is a visiting scholar at the Women's Studies Program, University of Ottawa.

The Bulgarian press has reported that some 8,000 ex-Soviet Bulgarians have applied for Bulgarian citizenship.¹³ Most of them felt sceptical of their chances of receiving it soon.¹⁴ In the meantime, they were not entitled to work and had to depend entirely on the generosity of local people, who themselves were experiencing economic difficulties. The Bulgarian press has also reported that a growing number of students from Bessarabia were studying in Bulgarian secondary and postsecondary institutions. This was seen as a temporary alternative solution to seeking asylum. According a BBSS International Gallup poll that surveyed 1,461 Bulgarians living in Moldova and Ukraine, 64 percent of the respondents believe that Bulgaria cares about them, but only 26.4 percent hope to acquire Bulgarian citizenship, and 56 percent of the respondents have expressed interest in sending their children to school in Bulgaria.¹⁵

"Doomed to oblivion by the pro-Soviet totalitarian regime for many years in the past, Bulgarians living in the former red empire today are getting more and more attention from the state and public circles in Bulgaria," wrote B. Nyagulov.¹⁶ It seems, however, that the state and the public's views about assisting Bulgarians who are fleeing from the former Soviet Union differ significantly. The government seems more concerned about protecting ethnic minority rights of Bulgarians in the former Soviet Union, rather than assisting arriving refugees. The Bulgarian government has signed agreements on guaranteeing the preservation of the Bulgarian culture with Russia (in August 1992), Moldova (in September 1992) and Ukraine (in October 1992). According to some reports, in September 1992 the Bulgarian government decided to create an agency responsible for outlining state policies for Bulgarian refugees.¹⁷ However, given the resignation of the UDF government in November 1992, the two-month-long parliament crisis and the recent appointment of a new government, supported mostly by pro-communist forces, the creation of an effective institution to deal with the problems of refugees might very well remain only a good intention.

At the same time, some public sectors have started demanding a quick radical solution to the growing refugee crisis. There is widespread criticism of the government's failure to respond to refugee issues. At a September meeting of the Independent Public Committee for National Issues, most of the participants expressed concern about Bulgaria's unpreparedness to receive large groups of ethnic Bulgarians.¹⁸ They argued that steps taken to promote ethnic culture in Terakliya (Moldova), Bolgrad (Ukraine), and in Caribrod (Serbia)¹⁹ were inadequate. Rodolyubetz, a group of nationalist Bulgarian intellectuals, is gaining force.²⁰ In November 1992, 2,000 of its members signed a petition requesting that the government grant citizenship to those Bulgarians from Bessarabia and Tavria who wish to apply for it. They insisted that ethnic Bulgarian refugees be admitted to the country and provided with settlement assistance. They also requested that the Ministry of External Affairs negotiate financial compensation for refugees for the properties they left behind and that duty charges be waived for any belongings they may wish to bring into the country.²¹ Velko Valkanov, an independent candidate at the 1992 presidential election and a well-known nationalist who enjoys the support of ex-communists, suggested that refugees of Bulgarian descent be allowed to stay in the country without any restrictions imposed on them as foreigners, and that they be eligible for citizenship. His other proposal included settling them in areas designated by the state.²²

While intellectuals pressure the government into providing recognition of and assistance to Bulgarian refugees, other organizations have tried to help these people. It seems that the nationalist organizations take the problems of the refugees most seriously. In their view, helping ethnic Bulgarians from the former Soviet Union to settle in Bulgaria is not only a patriotic duty but also a way to strengthen the Bulgarian population in areas of tension with ethnic Turks. Newspaper reports indicate that newly arrived refugees from Moldova and Tadjikistan receive assistance from the local population and settle mostly in

areas like Kurdjali, Krumovgrad, Ivailovgrad, Haskovo, Pliska, Shoumen and Dobrich; that is, areas where most ethnic Turks live. At a July 1992 press conference in Kurdjali, Bessarabian Bulgarian refugees noted that the only organization that defended their interests was the extreme nationalist All-National Committee for Defence of National Interests.²³ Similarly in another region with a large Turkish population, Haskovo, members of this organization helped Bulgarians fleeing ethnic war in Dushanbe, Tadjikistan, in August 1992.²⁴ This creates resentment among ethnic Turks. According to Major Ivan Toshev, the presence of ethnic Bulgarian refugees "was met with suspicion by certain political forces." Among them is the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the party of ethnic Turks, which has considerable political clout in the region.²⁵

So while the government has put off resolving the problems of ethnic Bulgarian refugees, nationalist groups have been most generous in offering assistance to them, which may provoke conflicts between the refugees and ethnic Turks, who are returning to Bulgaria after their recent out-migration. It is quite possible that one group of exiles (ethnic Bulgarians fleeing from the former Soviet Union) will be challenged by another group with a difficult exile experience (Bulgaria's ethnic Turks). Bulgarian refugees are allowed to stay in Bulgaria as long as nationalist groups can make use of them to shift the balance in existing ethnic conflicts. However, nothing yet suggests that the Bulgarian government is prepared to promptly deal with the issue of permanent resettlement for these refugees in a way that would protect them from new clashes. ■

Notes

1. Minko Minkov, at a workshop on "Bulgarian Emigration—Legal Issues," Sofia University, May 27, 1992.
2. Interview with Minko Minkov in *Duma* (September 19, 1992), 6.
3. W. Rogers Brubaker, "Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States," *International Migration Review* 97 (1992), 270.
4. Blagovest Nyagulov, "Ethnic Revival or Assimilation? To Presumably Half a Million Bulgarians in the ex-USSR, Life is a Sea

of Trouble," *The Insider* no. 10 (October 1992), 28.

5. Vladimir Kuzin, "Refugees in Central and Eastern Europe: Problem or Threat?" *Report on Eastern Europe* (January 18, 1991), 39.
6. Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 18 (May 1, 1992), 43; Oleg Shamsur, "Ukraine in the Context of New European Migrations," *International Migration Review* 97 (1992), 261.
7. Quoted in Elena Trifonova, "200 Bessarabian Families Immigrate in a Year," *Standard News* (August 15, 1992).
8. See Cassandra Cavanaugh, "Conflict in Moldova: The Gagauz Factor," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 32 (August 14, 1992); Vladimir Socor, "Russian Forces in Moldova," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 34 (August 28, 1992).
9. Alexander Milanov, "Challenge to Our National Maturity," unpublished manuscript, December 1992.
10. Lazar Georgiev, "Brothers and Sisters, in Moldova Bulgarians Are Being Killed!" *Duma* (July 2, 1992), 7; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 18 (May 1, 1992), 43.
11. *Duma* (June 30, 1992), 2.
12. Nora Dimova, "For Several Days Now Bulgarians Are Mobilized in Moldova," *Duma* (July 3, 1992), 1.
13. *24 Hours* (July 6, 1992), 6.
14. Mariana Boyadzhieva, "Bulgarians from the Former Soviet Union Seek Shelter in the Home Lands," *Duma* (September 7, 1992), 4.
15. Mila Geshakova, "Bulgarians of Bessarabia Consider Us the Americans of the Balkans: Results of a BBSS International Gallup Poll with Minorities in the Former Socialist Countries," *24 Hours* (July 6, 1992), 6.
16. Blagovest Nyagoulov, "Ethnic Revival or Assimilation? To Presumably Half a Million Bulgarians in the ex-USSR, Life is a Sea of Trouble," *The Insider* no. 10 (October 1992), 28.
17. *Letter from Bulgaria* no. 14 (September 7, 1992), 3.
18. *Letter from Bulgaria* no. 14 (September 1, 1992), 2.
19. *Duma* (November 20, 1992), 3.
20. *Duma* (November 10, 1992), 3.
21. *Duma* (November 21, 1992), 3.
22. Radka Petrova, "Bessarabian Bulgarians Seek Asylum in Our Country," *Duma* (July 21, 1992), 2.
23. *Duma* (August 13, 1992), 1; *Letter from Bulgaria* no. 13 (August 1992), 3.
24. Boyadzhieva, "Bulgarians from the Former Soviet Union," *Duma* (September 7, 1992).
25. Mitko Bozhkov, "Velko Valkanov Offers a Law Concerning the Bulgarians Abroad," *Duma* (October 6, 1992), 3.

A Sketch of the Migration and Refugee Situation in Russia

Irena Orlova

This article briefly analyses migratory processes in Russia in the 1990s and looks at the following problems:

- the impact of migration on the country's population size and composition causes, effects and composition of migration within the former U.S.S.R.
- the dynamics of emigration and the distribution of emigrants among major recipient countries
- special features of the 1992 emigration
- the impact of emigration on Russia's intellectual structure

Today's migratory processes reflect the general crisis that envelops the Russian polity, economy and culture. Streams of refugees and involuntary migrants are pouring into Russia from the republics of the former U.S.S.R. (the so-called "near abroad"), giving rise to new and unprecedented problems and changing the country's socio-demographic structure. Migration processes have begun to exert a substantial effect on the structure and size of the country's population.

For many years, natural increase was the main factor affecting population growth, although, since the mid-1970s, more people have been arriving in Russia than have been leaving it. Thus between the 1979 and 1989 censuses the Russian net migration equalled 180,000 people annually, but the contribution of net migration to population increase never exceeded 19 percent in a given year.

The picture has changed considerably in the last few years. This is due to a sharp decline in the birth rate and increased mortality. As a result, migration has become a much more important factor influencing population growth. In 1990-91, a third of the total population

increase was due to the net migration balance (see Table 1). In 1992, the inflow of refugees and involuntary migrants more than doubled. Even so, it could not outweigh losses due to lower birth rates and higher mortality rates. Thus in 1992, for the first time since World War II, there was an absolute decline in the size of the Russian population. Between 1991 and 1992 the Russian population shrank by 71,000 people (see Table 1).

Since the mid-1970s people have been arriving in Russia mainly from Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and Kazakhstan. In 1992, the migration wave from the Baltic countries increased by a factor of three. Among migrants, the proportion of refugees is constantly growing. On January 1, 1993 the Ministry of Internal Affairs registered 362,000 refugees—1.6 times as many as in 1991.¹ Russians accounted for 44 percent of the total, Armenians for 18 percent, Meskhetian Turks for 8 percent, Ossetians for 7.9 percent and Azeris for 2.5 percent.

The main motives prompting this tidal wave of refugees and migrants are socio-economic, ethnic and political.² Interethnic relations have become aggravated, nationalist organizations and parties have been galvanized, and discriminatory laws have been passed concerning citizenship and language in the former Soviet republics—all this in the context of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions and political instability. In early 1992, interethnic conflicts were cited as the main motive for going to Russia by 70 percent of migrants from Azerbaijan, 64 percent from Tajikistan, 63 percent from Georgia, 51 percent from Uzbekistan, 50 percent from Armenia, 47 percent from Latvia and 36 percent from Moldova.

In 1992, nearly two-thirds of the migrants from the near abroad who cited the aggravation of interethnic relations as their main motive for leaving were Russians. In addition, fully 78 percent of

Irena Orlova is a researcher at the Russian Academy of Science's Institute of Socio-Political Research in Moscow.

people who abandoned their permanent places of residence *inside* Russia due to interethnic conflicts were Russians. They left the territories of Chechen-Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tuva and North Ossetia.

It has been estimated that the flow of Russian-speaking people from the former Soviet republics and the non-Russian regions of the Russian Federation may result in the involuntary migration of anywhere from 400,000 to two million Russian-speaking people to Russia in the next four or five years. These figures represent roughly a third of the emigration potential of Russian-speaking people in the near abroad.³ Are Russians in Russia ready to receive their compatriots? The clear answer is no. Russia has neither the experience nor the legal basis for immigrant absorption, neither the economic resources nor the will. The machinery for receiving refugees has not yet been devised and official organizations are barely interested in solving the problem. The problem is particularly acute in the already-tense southern region of Russia (North Ossetia, Krasnodar territory, Stavropol territory and Rostov region), where nearly 70 percent of migrants were concentrated in 1992. In those areas, refugees and involuntary migrants compete with local populations in the markets for consumer goods, labour and housing, provoking new centres of ethnosocial tension, this time in the territory of Russia itself.⁴

It would nonetheless be incorrect to offer a simple negative evaluation of the consequences of forced migration. The growth of the able-bodied population could create favourable opportunities for improving the economic activity of regions suffering from labour shortages. Such positive consequences can, however, be realized only if practical steps are taken at all levels to organize the transportation, reception, housing and employment of migrants. To date, this has not happened to any significant degree.⁵ Such processes are developing spontaneously, bringing to naught all possible positive consequences of forced migration to Russia.

Let us turn now to emigration from Russia. Actual emigration rates are now high. The potential is still higher. Estimates of the potential emigration are characterized by a great range of opinion—from half a million to five million in the territory of the former U.S.S.R. in

Table 1

Changes in the Russian Population Due to Refugees and Involuntary Migrants, 1990-92 (in thousands)*

	1990	1991	1992**
Arrivals for permanent residence from:			
the near abroad	937.2	780.7	845.0
all other countries	0.2	0.2	0.2
Departures for permanent residence to:			
the near abroad	669.9	640.9	646.4
all other countries	103.6	88.3	102.9
Change in Russia's population	502.0	161.6	71.6
Net migration balance	164.0	51.6	95.9

*The figures include arrivals and departures for work and study.

** Preliminary estimate

1993. French social scientists have estimated that fully 25 million Russians will pour out of the territories of the former U.S.S.R. to Western countries in the near future. However, this conclusion appears farfetched to the inside observer. According to the Demography Centre of the Russian Academy of Science, only 2 to 6 percent of Russians living in the near abroad intend to settle in the West. Yet 38 to 40 percent of Russians in Moldova, Armenia and Tajikistan, and nearly 20 percent of Russians in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan wish to leave those republics. On this basis, one may conclude that


Table 2:
Soviet-Jewish Emigration and Resettlement, 1990-92

Year	Israel	U.S.	Others*	Total
1990	181,800	6,500	13,000	201,300
1991	145,000	46,000	6,000	197,000
1992	67,500	40,800	43,800	152,100

*Includes Germany, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Latin America, etc.

Source: Sidney Heitman, "Jewish Emigration from the Former U.S.S.R. in 1992," unpublished paper (Fort Collins: Colorado State University, Department of History, 1993), drawing upon data from the Israeli embassy, Washington, D.C.; Israeli Consulate General, New York; Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society; and U.S. Department of State.

Figure 1: Emigration from Russia, 1987-92
By Main Recipient Country (in '000s)



Source: See endnote 7

Russia, not the West, will be receiving the overwhelming bulk of migrants from the former Soviet republics. Survey data analysed by the Commission of the European Community and by a Canadian social scientist corroborate that conclusion. The latter estimated the emigration potential of Russia at 4.6 percent of the population, or 6.8 million people.⁶

Of course, there exists a very great difference between expressing the desire to emigrate in a survey and the realization of that desire. Actual emigration from Russia is estimated not in the millions but in the thousands. In 1992 it reached 102,900 people, exceeding the level of the previous year and nearly reaching the level of the peak year, 1990 (see Figure 1). I estimate that in the near future the level of emigration from Russia will vacillate around 100,000.

Emigration from Russia by Main Recipient States

Current emigration from Russia is largely restricted to Germans and Jews. Indeed, so many people have emigrated from these two groups that they have been substantially eroded as important components of Russia's ethnic structure.

Comparing 1991 and 1992, we see that the number of Russian citizens departing for Germany has nearly doubled. That is because the whole complex of problems associated with ethnic Germans in Russia has not been solved and there is no solution in sight, while Germany has not established any quota for the entry of ethnic Germans. In addition, as we will see, there has been a recent upsurge in the number of Russian Jews going to Germany.

According to data from the Consular Service of the German Embassy in Moscow, nearly 20,000 Russian Germans are now applying for exit visas every month. To weaken this influx of emigrants, Germany insists on concluding an agreement with Russia concerning the "restoration of German statehood" in Russia, by which it means the creation of a German Autonomous Republic in the Volga Region. For the purpose of solving this problem the president of the Russian Federation issued a decree concerning the creation of a Russian-German settle-

ment in the Volga Region. Local administrators have, however, blocked this process, using political instability and the results of a referendum carried out in the region as an excuse.

The second main feature of emigration in 1992 is a decline in the number of Jewish emigrants from 197,000 in 1991 to 152,100 in 1992.⁸ (These and the following figures refer to Jewish emigration from the entire former U.S.S.R.) This decline is due largely to a sharp drop in the number of Jews leaving for Israel, which fell from 145,000 in 1991 to 67,500 in 1992. This decline was due mainly to increased unemployment in Israel and the worsening of the conflict between Palestinians and Israeli Jews. There was also a modest decline in the number of Jews emigrating to the United States from 46,000 in 1991 to 40,800 in 1992. Interestingly, however, the number of Jews going to other countries increased sharply from 6,000 to 43,800. That is largely because Germany began accepting more than 10,000 Rus-

sian-Jewish immigrants per year (see Table 2).

It is difficult to estimate the consequences of emigration for Russia's intellectual and scientific strength, sociodemographic structure and so forth. We may, however, draw some preliminary conclusions on the basis of available data. Some 54 percent of the emigrants who left Russia during the month of June 1992 had higher or technical secondary education. Meanwhile, among migrants within Russia and those coming from the near abroad, persons with such education constituted less than 40 percent of the total.⁹

These figures suggest that Russia is suffering a net loss of intellectual resources because skilled specialists cannot find work under present economic, political and ethnic conditions—or at least they are not satisfied that they can realize their creative potential. Table 3, which gives a detailed occupational breakdown of Russian emigrants for the period June 1-September 30, 1992, the only period for which such data are so far available, adds weight to this view.

At present, the emigration of highly trained specialists is constrained to a certain degree by the growing opportunities for forming enterprises in Russia. A significant number of highly trained specialists are becoming entrepreneurs. However, Western countries are very interested in Russia's intellectual resources. They may be inclined to formulate immigration criteria that will increase the size of the Russian brain drain and, as an unintended consequence, increase illegal immigration of nonspecialists, especially to Europe.¹⁰ ■

Notes

1. Unless otherwise noted, data are from *Information Bulletin N17-1-16/11* (Moscow: State Statistics Board of the Russian Federation, January 14, 1993).
2. This is according to research conducted by the State Statistics Board of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Russia's twenty-three territories. Ninety-two thousand respondents aged sixteen and over who arrived in populated areas of these territories were questioned.
3. This is according to the Long-Term "Migration" Programme of the Russian Federation (Moscow: May 18, 1992), 6.

Table 3: Russian Emigrants, June 1-September 30, 1992, by Occupation, For Individuals over Fifteen Years of Age

	Number	Percent
Engineers and other technical workers	1,223	6.1
Lecturers, teachers, educators	984*	4.9
Medical professionals	750**	3.7
Students of institutes of higher education and technical schools	576	2.9
Economists, accountants, clerks	455	2.3
Directors of enterprises and cooperatives	315	1.6
Researchers	257	1.3
Subtotal: Skilled	4,560	22.8
Workers	6,137	30.7
Pensioners	4,266	21.4
Unemployed	2,509	12.6
Others	1,700	8.5
No information	797	4.0
Subtotal: All others	15,409	77.2
Total	19,969	100.0

*Of these, 65 worked at institutes of higher education.

**Of these, 350 had higher education.

4. *Izvestiya* (November 3, 1992).
5. See, however, Rozalina Ryvkina and Rostislav Turovskiy, *The Refugee Crisis in Russia*, edited by Robert J. Brym and translated by Patricia Patchet-Golubev (Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1993).
6. Robert J. Brym, "The Emigration Potential of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Russia: Recent Survey Results," *International Sociology* 7, no. 4 (December 1992), 387-95.
7. Based on data from the State Statistics Board of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
8. Sidney Heitman, "Jewish Emigration from the Former U.S.S.R. in 1992," unpublished paper (Fort Collins: Colorado State University, Department of History, 1993).
9. *Information Bulletin N17-1-16/4* (Moscow: State Statistics Board of the Russian Federation, January 14, 1993). In June 1992, an additional questionnaire concerning sociodemographic characteristics was included in the departure coupons. Beginning in 1993 this information will be analysed on a quarterly basis.
10. See *The Social and Socio-Political Situation in Russia: Status and Prognosis* (Moscow: Institute of Socio-Political Research, Russian Academy of Science, 1993), 60-61.

Troubled Settlement of Refugees in Russia

Tanya Basok and Alexander Benifand


At present, there are 500,000 officially registered refugees in Russia, although, according to some estimates, the actual number may be as high as a million.¹ These refugees experience significant problems with housing and employment and their movement is limited by *propiska* or domicile registration.

In their recent report, Ryvkina and Turovskiy claim that "the domicile registration situation for refugees in most areas is not bad."² Yet their conclusions are contradicted by a number of other analysts.³ According to a researcher with Helsinki Watch in New York, domicile registration has been declared unconstitutional, but the Constitutional Oversight Committee allowed cities to continue this practice in order to maintain public order.⁴ Thus it seems that any city council may use its discretion to decide whether refugees will be allowed to settle in it or not. With respect to Krasnodar in particular, in their August 1992 report, the *Helsinki Watch* notes that:

The Krasnodar region has recently become a magnet for displaced persons escaping ethnic violence in the Caucasus.... In response to this influx of displaced persons, the regional legislative body adopted a resolution that officially banned issuing new residence permits.... Last year the public prosecutor of Krasnodar lodged a protest against the city's ban on issuing new residence permits. Instituted in 1988, the ban is still in effect. City authorities indicate that they do not welcome any interference from Moscow in their internal city affairs....⁵

There are ten million families in Russia who do not have adequate housing. Their waiting list is regulated by domicile registration. According to Tatyana Regent, the head of the State Migration Office of Russia (formed in June 1992),

eliminating the domicile registration will be unfair to these people and can be viewed as a violation of their human rights. At the same time, some regions have been heavily depopulated and underdeveloped and refugees are considered the only hope for their revival.⁶ Thus refugees have been offered domicile registration if they agreed to go to depopulated and agriculturally underdeveloped regions. According to Viktor Prevedentsev, an acclaimed Russian demographer who started studying internal migration in the 1970s, this is against their basic human rights. He explains: "Russians in the ex-Soviet republics live mainly in large cities, for the most part in republican capitals. They are intellectuals engaged in the production, scientific and humanitarian [liberal arts] spheres, or skilled workers. But those who have moved into Russia are being sent primarily into the rural hinterlands of the regions, which have lost their population. The idea is to make them work in agriculture. No greater mockery of people and common sense could have been devised."⁷ But the problem is not only one of adjustment for these urban dwellers or a lack of skills in agricultural production. The problem is that they have not received the financial aid required to start up rural activities and build houses. Lidia Grafova, a journalist and a refugee advocate since the late 1980s, reports that funds allocated to refugees and transferred by the Central Bank to local authorities, are not distributed. Refugees are told that these funds have not been received yet, or that they were going to be used to cover the expenses of the referendum. According to the most recent information, the allocated funds, even if distributed, would cover only the needs of barely 20 percent of the refugees.⁸ Older people are among the most disadvantaged as their old-age pensions are not restored. An elderly refugee from Tadzhikistan reports that their one-time emergency aid was 1,000 rubles per person,⁹ whereas old-age pen-



Tanya Basok is a professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Windsor in Ontario. Alexander Benifand is a visiting research fellow at the Centre for Refugee Studies.

sions in Russia have been raised to a minimum of 8,000 rubles. In Grafova's words, the emergency aid offered to refugees was largely symbolic under the conditions of the soaring inflation in the country.¹⁰

An example of a Russian teacher and her family who fled from violence in Tkvarcheli, Georgia, and who were settled in a rural farm in the Belgorod region, provides an illustration. When they arrived, they did not have housing or any means of subsistence. When they requested assistance from an organization called *Sootchestvenniki* ("Compatriots"), they were told that the 200,000 rubles promised by the government would hardly cover the cost of a house foundation and that they would require additional 2 million rubles to build a house.¹¹ Yet, more aid is not forthcoming.

According to Tatyana Regent, the law on refugees, passed in February 1993 after the December ratification of the UN Convention on refugees and enacted on May 2, 1993, is idealistic and cannot be implemented under the present conditions. She claims that the economic conditions were not considered when the law on the definition of and assistance to refugees was passed and that it is purely symbolic at the moment. She fears that there will be a gigantic inflow of refugees and that without adequate financial means, regional authorities would be inundated. New measures would have to be taken that would undermine the refugee law. The government of Russia has allocated 24 billion rubles for 1993, yet the actual requirement is 180 billion, according to Regent. She concludes that the government is unable to fulfil its obligations to the refugee population.¹²

Refugees settling in smaller towns and rural areas have experienced significant problems in finding jobs. As Ryvkina and Turovskiy report, the unemployment rate of refugees in Russia "is tragically high at about two-thirds of the labour force."¹³ Consequently, there has been a growth in illegal agencies that exploit refugees by 'helping' them find employment under slave-like conditions.¹⁴ Compounding the problem is the social rejection by the local population. As Grafova reports, "On their own Rus-

sian territory, the refugees have heard the same words they heard in the former republics from which they fled—get out of here."¹⁵ Similarly, Ryvkina and Turovskiy report that there have been steadily growing tensions between local populations and refugees. Refugees are perceived in pejorative terms and are often believed to engage in illegal activities.¹⁶ Moscow has become a virtually closed city. The mayor of Moscow has signed an order that requires registration for new arrivals who have their permanent residence outside Russia within the borders of the former U.S.S.R. or who do not have a permanent place of residence. Twenty-four hours after arriving in Moscow, a person will have to present a passport and a form indicating the purpose of the visit and the intended length of stay. (Initially, it can be up to forty-five days, after which an extension is possible up to a maximum of one year.) Staying longer than twenty-four hours without registering carries the threat of a heavy fine. If the purpose of the visit is commercial or involves other income-producing activity not stated on the original registration form, a person can be fined ten times the regular fine or be jailed for up to fifteen days.¹⁷ This regulation gives authorities the right to expel undesirable people from Moscow.

The official draft Constitution of the Russian Federation contains a point about the freedom of movement of its population. Yet Viktor Perevedentsev estimates that it will take twelve years for the transition to take place.¹⁸ Whether such a transition will occur at all will depend on a number of factors, including availability of jobs, housing and consumer goods in Russia.

It seems that, given the lack of housing in big cities and the depopulation and underdevelopment of rural areas, domicile registration is unlikely to be cancelled. Without *propiska* refugees cannot settle in many Russian cities and towns. They are forced to go to those areas that lack adequate infrastructure for decent housing or employment. At the same time, the government is unable to provide financial assistance to develop these regions. As mentioned earlier, often when federal authorities allocate some

funds for refugees, they end up in the hands of local officials. Millions of Russian-speaking minorities in the former Soviet republics are therefore trapped. Many experience an infringement of their rights, yet they are afraid to migrate to Russia, knowing that their basic subsistence needs will not be met and that they may be socially rejected. ■

Notes

1. Andrei Anatoliev, "Prisutsvie Bezhentsev nezhelatel'no" ("Refugees are not Welcome"), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (April 29, 1993).
2. Rozalina Ryvkina and Rostislav Turovskiy, *The Refugee Crisis in Russia*, edited by Robert Brym and translated by Patricia Patchet-Golubev (York Lanes Press, 1993), 19.
3. Ryvkina and Turovskiy's report is based on interviews with twenty-one experts. Of their twenty-one experts, ten are government officials. Unfortunately, the old Soviet-style nomenclatura still occupy most administrative positions in many regions. Even some newly elected or appointed officials often have the old Soviet mentality. There was only one "refugee leader" included in the sample. If the authors had included more refugee representatives from various regions of origin and located in different areas of Russia, perhaps the picture of the refugee situation would be fuller. The study would also have been more balanced if, in addition to officially compiled statistics, the authors had compiled statistics based on independent research.
4. Helsinki Watch, New York (January 1992).
5. *Helsinki Watch* no. 14 (August 1992).
6. Andrei Baiduzhiy, "Tatyana Regent: Russia Cannot Fulfil Its Obligations Towards Refugees," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (April 23, 1993).
7. Viktor Perevedentsev, "Russians Outside Russia: Potential Refugees?" *Moscow News* nos. 2-3 (January 15, 1993).
8. Lidia Grafova, "Molites za nas!" ("Pray for us!"), *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (March 24, 1993).
9. "Khorosho, khots v seno mozhno zarit'sya" ("At Least We Can Sleep in the Haystack"), *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (March 24, 1993).
10. Grafova, "Molites za nas!"
11. V. Klyueva, "V Tkvarcheli razbombili moi dom" ("My House in Tkvarcheli Was Bombed"), *Izvestia* no. 84 (May 6, 1993).
12. Baiduzhiy, "Tatyana Regent: Russia Cannot fulfil Its Obligations Towards Refugees."
13. Ryvkina and Turovskiy, *The Refugee Crisis in Russia*, 19.
14. Grafova, "Molites za nas!"
15. *Ibid.*
16. Ryvkina and Turovskiy, *The Refugee Crisis in Russia*, 21-22.
17. Viktor Belikov, "Moscow Will Register New Arrivals," *Izvestia* (February 20, 1993).
18. Perevedentsev, "Russians Outside Russia: Potential Refugees?"

Who Wants to Leave Moscow for the West? Results of an October 1992 Survey

Robert Brym and Andrei Degtyarev

In 1976, underground author Boris Khazanov wrote that his "generation has grown up with the conviction that it is as difficult to leave the Soviet Union as it is to throw a stone so high that it will not return to the earth."¹ Now, only sixteen years later, Russia may be on the verge of implementing a new emigration law that will, with few qualifications, allow people to move freely out of Russia as tourists, temporary workers and permanent emigrants.

Not surprisingly, Russian and Western observers are deeply concerned about the potential size and implications of this movement. Both sides are in principle keen to ensure freedom of movement in general and freedom of emigration in particular as a basic human right. But in practice many people in the West are afraid of a flood of immigrants at a time of economic recession and growing xenophobia. At the same time, many citizens of Russia are afraid of a brain drain—that is, the departure of large numbers of highly trained specialists.²

Based on the results of a February 1991 survey, one of the authors of this paper has estimated the emigration potential of Russia to be 4.75 to 8.90 million people. Whether or not this potential is realized depends in part on Western states' willingness to accept immigrants. His findings showed that in Russia the desire for democracy was nearly as strong as the desire for economic improvement in motivating some citizens to emigrate. And he emphasized that "it is clearly an exaggeration to characterize potential emigrants as representing sim-

ply a latent 'brain drain' since the desire to emigrate is equally strong among the better- and less well-educated."³

We will explore the brain drain question further in this article. Our analysis is based on an October 1992 telephone poll conducted in Moscow, using a randomly selected sample of 988 city residents. Overall, the margin of error for a sample this size is +/- 3.2 percent, nineteen times out of twenty.

One of the questions asked in the survey was "Is it your intention in the near future to leave for one of the developed countries of the West?" Respondents were permitted to answer yes, no or hard to say.⁴ The wording of the question was admittedly vague. Respondents who want to travel abroad for a few weeks and those who want to emigrate permanently might both be inclined to answer yes. Our interest here does not, however, lie with the total number of people who wish to leave Moscow temporarily or permanently (see Table 1).⁵

	Frequency	%	95% Confidence interval
Yes	65	6.7	+/- 1.6
Hard to say	50	5.2	+/- 1.4
No	850	88.1	+/- 2.0
Total	965	100.0	

Rather, we want to explore the social characteristics of Moscow residents who are inclined to leave the city. That will allow us to determine whether the pool of residents who want to leave represents a potential brain drain of highly educated specialists or something else. (We interpret the brain drain argument to mean that desire to leave Russia varies proportionately with the level of educational attainment.)

Consider first the distribution of intentions to leave Moscow by nationality (see Table 2).⁶ Slavic and Tatar residents of Moscow seem to be much less interested in leaving the city than Jews and others. Thus, among Slavs and Tatars, between 4 and 9 percent expressed the desire to leave. Among Jews and others, 22 to 26 percent said they wanted to leave. There is nothing surprising in this finding, although it is unclear exactly who the "others" are. The Jewish emigration movement from Russia has been in existence for over twenty years. Israel is committed to accepting as many Russian Jews as wish to settle there, while the United States, Germany, Canada and other countries are committed to accepting thousands of Russian Jews annually as well. Owing to these special circumstances, the departure of Jews is much more likely than the departure of Slavs and Tatars.

	Yes	No	Total
Other	7 (26)	21 (74)	28 (100)
Jewish	5 (22)	18 (78)	23 (100)
Belarussian	1 (9)	10 (91)	11 (100)
Russian	49 (6)	739 (94)	788 (100)
Ukrainian	2 (4)	41 (96)	43 (100)
Tatar	1 (4)	20 (96)	21 (100)
Total	65 (7)	849 (93)	914 (100)

More interesting is Table 3, which classifies intentions to leave Moscow by work status.⁷ The picture that emerges from the table is more complicated than the brain drain interpretation. Clearly, the people least likely to want to leave Moscow are pensioners, housewives and workers. Only 1 percent of these people expressed any interest in going to the West. Between 6 and 9 percent of white-collar workers (*sluzhashchii*) said

Robert Brym is with the Department of Sociology, University of Toronto.

Andrei Degtyarev teaches in the Department of Political Science and Sociology of Politics, Moscow State University.

they wished to leave Moscow for the West—6 percent among those without higher education and 9 percent among those with higher education. And fully 16 percent of students said they wanted to leave.

Table 3

Intentions to Leave Moscow by Work Status

(Weighted results; Percent in parentheses)

	Yes	No	Total
Employer	15 (30)	35 (70)	50 (100)
Unemployed	4 (23)	12 (77)	16 (100)
Student	8 (16)	42 (84)	50 (100)
White-collar with university	23 (9)	234 (91)	257 (100)
White-collar without university	9 (6)	140 (94)	149 (100)
Worker	2 (1)	149 (99)	151 (100)
Pensioner, housewife	3 (1)	237 (99)	240 (100)
Total	64 (7)	849 (93)	913 (100)

So far these results seem to favour the view that the higher one's education, the greater the desire to leave for the West. However, 23 percent of unemployed people in our sample expressed the desire to leave Moscow for the West, and most of the unemployed are not highly educated. Moreover, fully 30 percent of private employers said they wanted to leave Moscow for the West, and they are probably not particularly highly educated either. These results do not, therefore, suggest that desire to leave Moscow for the West varies proportionately with educational attainment. Instead, our data suggest that the people who want to leave tend to believe they cannot fulfil their potential in Russia—and they are not just or even primarily people with higher education.

Table 4

Intentions to Leave Moscow by Sector of Employment

(Weighted results; Percent in parentheses)

	Yes	No	Total
State	22 (5)	413 (95)	435 (100)
Mixed	4 (9)	37 (91)	41 (100)
Private	24 (18)	107 (82)	131 (100)
Total	50 (8)	557 (92)	607 (100)

Tables 4 and 5 support our interpretation. We asked our respondents to identify the economic sector in which they were employed.⁸ Table 4 shows that people employed exclusively in the private sector were more than 3.5 times more likely to want to leave Moscow than people employed exclusively in the state sector (18 percent as compared to 5 percent). People employed in both sectors expressed an intermediate level of desire to leave for the West. We may infer that people who want to leave Moscow are inclined to favour privatization of property, and the slow pace of privatization increases the desire of some people to leave Moscow.

We also asked our respondents whether they felt that Russia needs a strong leader to stabilize the economic and political situation.⁹ As Table 5 indicates, people who disagreed with the need for a strong leader are 2.5 times more likely to want to leave for the West than those who agree with the need for a strong leader (16 as compared to 6 percent). People who said they did not care whether Russia had a strong leader expressed an intermediate level of desire to leave for the West. We may infer that people who want to leave Moscow tend to be democrats, and the slow pace of democratization increases the desire of some people to leave Moscow.

Table 5

Intentions to Leave Moscow by Desire for Strong Leader

(Weighted results; Percent in parentheses)

	Yes	No	Total
Agree	43 (6)	666 (94)	709 (100)
Don't care	3 (12)	20 (88)	23 (100)
Disagree	16 (16)	85 (84)	101 (100)
Total	62 (7)	771 (93)	833 (100)

In sum, the results of our survey show that it is an oversimplification to characterize the desire of some Moscow residents to leave for the West as a brain drain. To be sure, there are highly educated people among those who wish to leave, but there are also many among those who wish to leave who are not so highly educated. They tend to be liberals and democrats. It follows that an accelerated pace of reform is the best way to

decrease the desire of Moscow residents to leave for the West.¹⁰ ■

Notes

1. Boris Khazanov, "Novaya Rossiya," *Vremya i my* 9 (1976): 135-45.
2. For a good review of this problem, see Sarah Helmstadter, "The Russian Brain Drain in Perspective," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Special Report* (August 18, 1992).
3. Robert J. Brym, "The Emigration Potential of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Russia: Recent Survey Results," *International Sociology* 7, no. 4 (1992): 387-95. The quotation is on p. 393.
4. "Est' li u vas namerenie v blizhayshchee vremya vyekhat' v odnu iz razvitykh stran zapada? (da, est'; nyet; zatrudnyayus' otvetit')."
5. We deleted all respondents under the age of eighteen from our analysis. Moreover, we report weighted results to reflect the age and sex distribution of the Moscow population. Because of this, as well as the fact that some respondents did not answer some questions, the totals in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 do not equal 988.
6. Respondents were asked to state their nationality. The permitted responses were a) Russian, b) Ukrainian, c) Tatar, d) Jewish, e) Belarussian or f) other nationality.
7. Respondents were asked to state their occupation. The permitted responses were a) worker, b) white-collar worker with middle school education, c) white-collar worker with higher education, d) employer, e) businessman, f) a pensioner who is not working, g) housewife, h) student or i) unemployed.
8. Respondents were asked if they worked in a state or nonstate enterprise. The permitted responses were a) in a state enterprise, b) in an enterprise with a nonstate form of property or c) in an enterprise with a mixed form of property.
9. Respondents were asked "The opinion has emerged that for the stabilization of the economic and political situation in Russia there is a need for a strong leader. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this opinion?" The permitted responses were a) agree, b) inclined to agree, c) don't care, d) inclined to disagree or e) disagree.
10. We conducted a multiple regression analysis of desire to leave for the West. With 553 respondents providing valid responses, we discovered that $Y = 2.33 + .07(X1) + .10(X2) - .09(X3) - .07(X4)$, where Y = intention to leave for the West, X1 = work status, X2 = nationality, X3 = desire for a strong leader and X4 = sector of employment. All independent variables are statistically significant at the .05 probability level, and the entire equation predicts 9.3 percent of the variation in the desire to leave Moscow for the West. Age, income, marital status and gender were not statistically significant predictors of desire to leave for the West, net of the variables in our regression equation.

Anti-Semitism and Anti-Semitic Organizations in Russia

Alexander Benifand

At Yeltsin's prereferendum meeting with representatives of Russian religious communities, Russia's Chief Rabbi Adolf Shaevich drew attention to increasingly "organized and open" anti-Semitism in Russia. In reply, President Yeltsin claimed that there was no anti-Semitism at any level of the Russian government.¹ However, evidence seems to contradict him. There are numerous examples of anti-Semitism involving government officials at both the federal and local levels. There are different ways in which it is expressed: through the state's failure to curb the activities of anti-Semitic organizations and in some cases through financial support offered to anti-Semitic organizations and publications. Furthermore, nationalist organizations are often headed by members of Parliament or other governmental officials.

According to Igor Gopp, chairperson of the American-Russian Bureau on Human Rights in St. Petersburg, Russia, anti-Western—and particularly anti-American—sentiments are openly and frequently expressed at public fora. Because Jews are associated with the pro-Western orientation, they are viewed as "agents of foreign influence."²

The Russian nationalist forces have started consolidating. Various conservative, nationalist and neo-fascist groups have formed an umbrella organization, the National Salvation Front. Three major blocs can be identified among them: the Russian Nationwide Union, the Russian People's Assembly and the Russian National Sobor. The Russian Nationwide Union, formed in December 1991 on the basis of the Russian parliamentary group, is an organization that defends Russia's territorial integrity. Its leader, Sergei Baburin, is a member of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet. The Russian People's Assembly, formed last

February at the Congress of Civic and Patriotic Forces, adheres to the position of "enlightened patriotism." This organization used to receive support from Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi. The Russian National Sobor had its Constituent Congress last February in Nizhni Novgorod. The cochairmen are a former major-general of the KGB, Alexander Sterligov,³ who is also the leader of the movement known as Officers for the Revival of Russia, and writer Valentin Rasputin. It has sixty-nine branches in all the republics of the former U.S.S.R. The first congress was attended by over a thousand delegates from 117 cities. It openly called for the formation of "red brigades" and the organization of a "movement of Russian national resistance."⁴

These three organizations, headed by members of the Russian Parliament and other governmental organizations, represent the country's most powerful opposition force, which enjoys considerable support from the army, security organs, police and legal institutions. What makes it particularly dangerous is that national patriotic forces, including ultranationalist organizations, count on 70 percent support from among the Russian Army officers. And about two-thirds of the officers would like to have a military-based regime introduced in Russia.⁵ The Russian military has warned of potential massive bloodshed. Senior officers said in a joint statement that "various political forces have started a struggle for influence over their army to reach their own goals."⁶ At a February 20-21, 1993 meeting of some serving and retired officers from the armed forces, the Security Ministry and the Internal Affairs Ministry, Stanislav Terekhov, the head of the militantly nationalist Officers' Union, claimed that the officers in the Russian General Staff and security organs supported their program.⁷ The coalition of the National Salvation Front is not monolithic. Yet at the present stage,

when its members are united by specific negative and destructive goals, they manage to put their disagreements aside. As former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker said with reference to Russian nationalists, whom he views "as a greater danger than Soviet communism," "these extremists would draw their power not from what they stand for but from what they stand against: against the democrats who they argue are destroying Russia; against the capitalists who they argue are selling out Russia, and against the Westerners who they argue are doing both."⁸

Nationalists count on violence and political instability, on the combination of legal and illegal, parliamentary and extraparliamentary forms of struggle. Any means, including the formation of armed forces, are considered acceptable to meet their final objective of taking power.⁹

Ultrnationalist organizations that constitute the National Salvation Front publish more than 100 magazines and newspapers with a circulation of several million copies. They have a radio station and several TV programs.

The publication *Russkoe Voskresenie* (*Russian Resurrection*) has caused such a wave of indignation from the Russian public that its managing editor was detained. Yet shortly after he was released, he put forward his candidacy for city mayor. This was one rare attempt to deal with the spread of hate propaganda that produced no results. In other cases, the authorities do not do anything at all. Similar publications have wide circulation and are freely distributed at public places, but the authorities do not consider such activities illegal. In the words of one human rights activist, "this gives one an impression that the authorities are not protecting the 'right' but the right-wing." He goes on to say "We seem to have a democratic government. Have they moved a finger to stop fascist propaganda? No. The most odious incidents

Alexander Benifand is a visiting research fellow at the Centre for Refugee Studies.

produced no reaction. Naturally, this makes fascists more blunt.... No one can understand why authorities are inactive at best, and at worst supportive of this propaganda inciting ethnic hatred. This is irresponsible and myopic."¹⁰

Two or three years ago, only a few dozen people were associated with Pamyat and other similar organizations, but these organizations now have several million members. According to sociologist Galina Staravoitova, these sinister organizations are supported by 15 percent of the Russian population. The authorities are unable to ban or halt the development of these groups. Yeltsin's attempt to ban the National Salvation Front failed as the country's Constitutional Court claimed his move was unconstitutional. None of the appeals to the country's main prosecutor's office and to local branches to stop promoting racial hatred through nationalist newspapers brought results. This decision gave the green light to other similar organizations and their publications.¹¹

Russian nationalists have developed their own military, which in some cases have acted as vigilante forces.¹² Especially notorious are the Cossacks who enjoy substantial power in southern Russia but who have attempted to take control in Moscow and other parts of Russia. These military groups have ties to the army, national security agencies and criminal mafia, as well as large stores of weapons.

Though there are disagreements between some of these groups, the one thing they share is anti-Semitism. They persecute those who criticize them, as illustrated by the example of Pamyat's attack on the *Moskovski Komsomolets* newspaper. At a dedication ceremony of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum,¹³ even U.S. President Bill Clinton admitted that the Russian blackshirts represent a dangerous force.

Russian nationalism is backed up by the Russian Orthodox church. In his last interview, Father Alexander Men, a human rights activist, warned about the birth of Russian fascism, actively supported by many members of the clergy. He said, "There has been a reunification of Russian fascism with the Russian

church. This is shameful for us believers...." He gave this interview on September 5, 1990 and was murdered four days later. Father Alexander was the first victim of Russian fascism and this was not accidental: those who were behind it saw him as their major obstacle.¹⁴ There is a clear connection between the Russian Orthodox church and nationalism today. Clergymen frequently attend meetings of fascists, "blessing" them with their presence. The most extreme sections of national patriots firmly claim to be Christian.¹⁵

In various regions nationalist forces find support among local politicians. "Today you are the opposition press, but tomorrow you'll be at the helm of power," said Y. Nozhikov, head of the regional administration, at a meeting with the national patriotic organizations of Irkutsk. Last year the Irkutsk regional authorities allocated 150,000 rubles from their budget to support the *Sibir* magazine. At various periods, *Sibir* published anti-Semitic materials. The Irkutsk region administration became the first state structure in the history of Russia to shoulder the brunt of financing anti-Semitic newspapers and books.¹⁶ While anti-Semitism is no longer an official policy in Russia, the state maintains its anti-Semitic stand by its failure to protect ethnic minorities' human rights, including those of Jews.

Notes

1. Wendy Slater, "Yeltsin Meets Religious Leaders" *Radio Free Europe* no. 75 (April 21, 1993).
2. Igor Gopp, personal communication.
3. On March 20, 1993, the All Army Officers Assembly, attended by 255 delegates from nineteen *Krais*, met in Moscow. *Segodnya* reported that a number of conservative political leaders also took part, making a total of approximately 500 participants. Alexander Sterligov, a former KGB general who now heads the nationalist and procommunist Russian National Assembly, apparently gave a keynote speech in which he called upon the army to defend the constitution and to attempt to gain control over the Moscow mayoral election campaign. The assembly adopted an appeal to generals and officers in the army and the internal and security ministries urged them to disobey "anti-constitutional" orders from the president's office. (Stephen Foye, "Reports on Officers' Assembly," *Radio Free Europe* no. 57 (March 24, 1993).

4. *Moscow News* no. 29 (1992).
 5. Major-General Vladimir Dudnik, "What to Expect From the Army at the Referendum," *Moscow News* (February 11, 1993).
 6. "Boris Ducks Bullet," *The Toronto Sun* (March 26, 1993).
 7. *Radio Free Europe* (February 22, 1993). According to Elliott and O'Brien, "Several months ago some people regarded Terekhov's organization, a motley group of disgruntled officers that can claim no more than a few hundred members, as a lunatic fringe. Now commanders worry that Terekhov's anti-reform activities could spread rapidly. Already he and other officers often march at the head of nationalist and communist demonstrations, emblazoned with medals in full military splendour." (Dorinda Elliott with Clinton O'Brien, "We Need Law and Order. The Army Wants Stability, But It Will Not Step In," *Newsweek* (April 5, 1993).
 8. James A. Baker, "The Stakes For Them—and Us," *Newsweek* (April 5, 1993).
 9. V. Ilyushenko, "Trichini," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (April 14, 1993).
 10. *Ibid.*
 11. Lydmila Chyornaya, "Sud vdol' linii fronta" ("Trial Along the Front Line"), *Literaturnaya Gazeta* no. 7 (February 17, 1993).
 12. The Russian National Legion (ultra-nationalistic military forces) is recruiting mortar men for the Dniester regions under its banners in central Moscow. The powers keep silent. All this puts Russia in a dubious situation. Now Russia can be blamed for creating conditions for recruitment of volunteers and thus adding fuel to the fire of ethnic conflicts. The 1907 Hague Convention bans using the territory of neutral states to recruit soldiers (volunteers or mercenaries) to fight in a country at war.
- The Russian Foreign Ministry was first to react. In February it requested the Procurator's Office to take steps in connection with the public recruitment of soldiers, but the office is silent because there is no law banning recruitment in Russia.
- About 30,000 volunteers and mercenaries participated in local wars on the territory of the former Soviet Union since 1990. About 2,000 people participated in the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
- In the near future, volunteers from Russia will still be confronting their compatriots on the front, as was sometimes the case in Abkhazia and Yugoslavia. (Vladimir Gubarev, "Wild Geese," *The Jerusalem Post* (January 25, 1993).
13. "Depravity Lives On, Clinton Warns," *The Toronto Star* (April 23, 1993).
 14. Ilyushenko, "Trichini."
 15. *Ibid.*
 16. A. Krutov, "Local Executive Power Bodies Finance Russian Nationalists," *Moscow News* no. 10 (March 5, 1993).

Refuge

York Lanes Press

Centre for Refugee Studies

Suite 351, York Lanes, York University

4700 Keele Street, North York

Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3

Phone: (416) 736-5843 • Fax: (416) 736-5837

Electronic Mail via Bitnet Address:

REFUGE@YORKVM1

Postage Paid in Toronto, Canada

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5512

Return Postage Guaranteed

In Memoriam Andrew Forbes

We are saddened to learn that Andrew Forbes, who had been undertaking fieldwork on a Canadian International Development Agency project, had been killed by a gunman in Arua in Northwestern Uganda at approximately 11 p.m. Uganda time on Wednesday, May 19, 1993. He was 29 years old when he was killed.

Andrew Forbes was a graduate student in Environmental Studies and one of the first students to enrol in the graduate diploma program of the Centre for Refugee Studies when he was a graduate assistant. He was a research associate when he died. The fieldwork in Uganda would have completed his final requirements for his diploma in refugee studies. It is tragic that, of the first three diplomas to be awarded to the initial eighteen students currently enrolled in the program, one will be awarded posthumously to Andrew Forbes at the graduation ceremonies of the Faculty of Environmental Studies.

Andrew Forbes was a researcher at the Centre for Refugee Studies for the past three years. He was part of the cohort that occupied our small crowded quarters when CRS was located in the Administrative Studies building. He helped organize the First Early Warning Conference of the Centre for Refugee Studies and contributed to other projects. His major work was on sustainable development in relation to repatriated refugees.

Andrew Forbes was a cheerful, upbeat, enthusiastic scholar and researcher dedicated to helping those in need. A memorial service will be held at the Centre for Refugee Studies at 11 a.m. on Thursday, May 27, 1993. The Resource Centre of CRS will be named the *Andrew Forbes Refugee Resource Centre* in his honour. A photograph and commemorative plaque will be placed on the wall to inform future students and users of CRS's resources about Andrew.

Our condolences are extended to his family and friends.