CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

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Canadian Policy, Global Apartheid and African Development

Canada no longer practises racial discrimination towards African migrants and refugees. Growing numbers of refugees from Africa have been accepted into Canada as refugee claimants. Nevertheless, in addition to data supporting these two conclusions, Yohannes Gebresellasie offers a plethora of data to show that Canada discourages the resettlement of African refugees in Canada and would prefer that they settle elsewhere. Relatively few refugees (compared to the actual number in Africa and elsewhere) are able to make a refugee claim in Canada and fewer still are accepted.

Gebresellasie's article offers further evidence to support Anthony Richmond's thesis that the West is moving towards a nonexodus approach to immigrants and refugees from the Third World. Richmond contends that there is a deliberate effort to recreate apartheid on a global scale. He also predicts it will fail.

Gebresellasie also briefly discusses the aid provided for resolving conflicts that produce refugees and for assisting in refugee settlement and repatriation and concludes it too is inadequate. Mohamed Ali Arkow looks at the possibility of aid as a way of dealing with refugee-producing conflicts that are products of rapidly increasing population, environmental degradation, inappropriate technologies and consumer demand for new products produced by the West. Arkow advocates a system of appropriate technology transfers rather than more loans, which would impoverish African countries even further.

But what assurance do we have that these technology transfers will be beneficial? In any case, I have just returned from an OECD meeting in Madrid on migration and development; evidence suggested that in the short and medium term, development exacerbates rather than stems migration flows. Will the resulting response be global apartheid as Richmond predicts, fears and deplores, or is this too pessimistic a conclusion about the inadequate efforts to cope with conflicts and refugees?

This is futurology about probable outcomes of different courses of action. But values as well as forces also have their effects. We must understand the forces at work predisposing certain outcomes. We must also decide our normative priorities in dealing with these forces. Norms can influence the weight and effect of various forces. Given our best understanding of the factors at work, it is our values and decisions that will give those forces a direction. ■

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Canada's Response to Black African Immigrants

Yohannes Gebresellasie

Black Africans are nontraditional immigrants in Canada. Canada's traditional immigrants were from Europe and the United States. Prior to 1900 there were two major migrations of persons of African descent, who left the United States for Canada. "After the American War of independence, many United Empire Loyalists came to Canada with their slaves."[1] Also, approximately 3,000 blacks who had fought for the British settled in Nova Scotia. In 1833, the government of Upper Canada passed an act that gave some rights to blacks. The act stated that "Negro slaves from the United States (in Canada) will not be extradited except for crimes of murder, larceny, or similar crimes of violence."[2] As a result, about 40,000 to 50,000 blacks found sanctuary in Canada. After 1900, however, Canadian policy strongly discouraged nonwhite immigration. Even as late as 1950 blacks were "inadmissible unless they fell in the preferred classes or were the spouses or minor children of Canadian residents."[3] When Canada abandoned its discriminatory immigration policy in 1967, black African migrants, particularly those with higher education and professional skills, were able to enter Canada as long as they could compete along the same standards with European or American immigrants.

Until then most immigrants who managed to enter Canada were of European descent, many of them from Great Britain. The records of de facto refugees who entered Canada from 1947 to 1967 list none of African origin, although some may have been included under the category of "Others." From 1968 to 1973, 207 African refugees came from the following countries: Egypt (8), Libya (3), Malawi (6), South Africa (3), Tanzania (18) and Uganda (169). In 1972 Canada accepted some 6,000 Ugandan Asians. According to Dirks (1977, 244), those Ugandan refugees

> spoke English, possessed above average education and were considered to be self-reliant. In addition the majority of those applying to enter Canada easily qualified for admission under normal immigration regulations. These people, therefore, were the type Canada's immigration policy sought to attract. The only procedures and service programs which distinguished the Ugandan Asian movement from normal immigration patterns consisted of the dispatching of an immigration team to Kampala where no officials were normally posted, and the transporting of refugees to Canada initially was at government expense. Once in Canada, the refugees found themselves treated for the most part like any other immigrant with respect to government services.

During the 1970s immigration from Africa to Canada more than doubled compared to the 1950s and 1960s (see Table 1).

Northern African countries have been major sources of immigrants to Canada during the 1960s. Those countries encouraged emigration for people whose skills were not essential; this was considered one solution to domestic economic problems. In the 1970s more and more immigrants came to Canada from eastern African countries to escape political conflicts in the Horn of Africa. For example, Idi Amin's dictatorship in Uganda led to the expulsion of Ugandans, and conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Tigray caused thousands to leave their countries to seek safety elsewhere.

During the 1980s and 1990s, socioeconomic and political conditions in Africa have increased the number of refugees from one million in 1970 to the

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current figure of approximately five million. This represents 1 percent of the total African population. The majority of African refugees are from the Horn of Africa. Refugees from this region are the second largest concentration of refugees anywhere, exceeded only by the estimated five to six million Afghan refugees who fled from the civil war in their country to camps in Pakistan and Iran.

Canada's Response to African Refugees

From the earliest days of the United Nations, Canada has played an important role in promoting peace and stability around the world and helped to create various humanitarian organizations, such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, in order to help countries resolve their problems with displaced persons. Canada gave landed immigrant status to more than 160,000 eastern European refugees in the postwar years and encouraged the international community to work together to resolve the refugee crisis. Generally, the Canadian government has followed a liberal internationalist approach with regard to migration that reflects a humanitarian perspective to the problem of refugees and displaced people within the constraints of its domestic socio-economic and political objectives.

The 1976 *Immigration Act* recognizes Canada's international obligation to refugees, the displaced and the persecuted. In that regard, Canada has welcomed significant numbers of displaced people from all over the world. When Canada introduced the refugee class in 1976, Africans refugees were mainly from Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti and Uganda. An analysis of the Immigration and Refugee Board statistics for the year 1991, shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5, indicates that there were claims from virtually every country in Africa and those fleeing persecution have been generally given protection.

Canada has made financial contributions to help solve the African refugee crisis within the continent of Africa as opposed to resettling them in Canada. Canada's contributions to UNHCR (approximately $3-4 million annually) are provided by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); however, policy decisions are made by the Office of External Affairs in conjunction with CIDA and Canada Employment and Immigration.

The overall Canadian contribution to Africa is minimal compared to Canadian investments in South Africa. Some humanitarian organizations, such as Christian Aid, argue that industrialized countries, including Canada, should be more responsible in seeking solutions to refugee problems. One solution is increasing financial aid to international and nongovernmental agencies and the other is accepting more refugees from Third World countries.

Table 1
African Migration to Canada (1950-79)

Year	Volume
1950	213
1951	313
1952	698
1953	902
1954	755
1955	548
1956	1,079
1957	2,970
1958	1,355
1959	843
1960	833
1961	1,088
1962	2,171
1963	2,431
1964	3,874
1965	3,196
1966	3,661
1967	4,608
1968	5,204
1969	3,297
1970	2,863
1971	2,841
1972	8,308
1973	8,307
1974	10,450
1975	9,867
1976	7,752
1977	6,372
1978	4,261
1979	3,958
Total	**105,018**

Source: Employment and Immigration Canada, *Immigration Statistics*, 1980.

Table 2:
African Immigration Compared to Total Annual Immigration to Canada

Year	Total	African	%
1966	194,747	3,924	2.0
1967	222,876	4,596	2.1
1968	183,974	5,205	2.8
1969	161,531	3,347	2.1
1970	147,713	2,858	1.9
1971	121,900	2,816	2.3
1972	122,006	8,428	6.9
1973	184,100	8,360	4.5
1974	218,465	10,381	4.8
1975	187,881	9,950	5.3
1976	149,429	7,631	5.1
1977	114,914	6,322	5.5
1978	86,313	4,270	4.9
1979	112,096	3,959	3.5
1980	143,366	4,332	3.0
1981	128,741	4,891	3.8
1982	121,268	4,516	3.7
1983	89,323	3,669	4.1
1984	88,515	3,584	4.0
1985	84,640	3,581	4.2
1986	99,788	4,822	4.8
1987	153,078	8,600	5.6
1988	162,266	9,424	5.8
1989	192,088	12,214	6.4
1990	212,975	13,426	6.3
Total	**3,683,993**	**155,106**	**4.2**

Source: Statistics Canada, 1990.

Table 3:
Initial Hearing Data for African Refugee Claimants in Canada
Period: January 1 to December 31, 1991

Country of Origins	Claims Concluded	Withdrawn	Not Eligible	Credible Basis Yes	Credible Basis No
Algeria	222	5	0	186	31
Angola	36	0	0	36	0
Benin	1	0	0	1	0
Botswana	1	0	0	1	0
Burkina-Faso	4	0	0	4	0
Burundi	0	0	0	0	0
Cameroon	8	1	0	6	1
Cen. African Rep.	1	0	0	1	0
Chad	5	0	0	5	0
Congo	3	0	0	3	0
Djibouti	9	0	0	8	1
Egypt	50	1	0	42	7
Ethiopia	751	1	0	747	1
Gabon	7	0	0	2	5
Gambia	2	0	0	2	0
Ghana	1,119	23	0	1,078	90
Guinea	26	1	0	22	3
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	10	0	1	7	2
Kenya	124	1	1	115	7
Lesotho	1	0	0	1	0
Liberia	54	0	0	53	1
Libya	52	2	0	49	1
Madagascar	3	0	0	3	0
Malawi	4	0	0	4	0
Mali	113	0	0	112	1
Mauritania	2	0	0	2	0
Mauritius	3	0	0	3	0
Morocco	22	2	0	14	6
Mozambique	0	0	0	0	0
Namibia	0	0	0	0	0
Niger	10	0	0	10	0
Nigeria	570	8	0	529	33
Rwanda	20	0	0	20	0
Senegal	12	0	0	10	2
Seychelles	433	0	0	432	1
Sierra Leone	7	0	1	4	2
Somalia	3,687	4	0	3,657	26
South Africa	43	2	0	38	3
Sudan	222	0	0	221	1
Tanzania	23	1	0	20	2
Togo	17	0	0	17	0
Tunisia	12	1	0	6	5
Uganda	30	0	0	28	2
Zaire	380	1	0	375	4
Zambia	11	0	5	6	0
Zimbabwe	1	0	0	0	1
Total	8,111	54	8	7,880	239

Source: Immigration and Refugee Board, news release, February 11, 1992.

Table 4:
Full Hearing Data for African Refugees in Canada
Period: January 1 to December 31, 1991

Country of Origin	Claims Concluded	Withrawn	Refugee Status Yes	Refugee Status No	% Accept
Algeria	103	12	48	44	52.2
Angola	33	3	15	6	71.4
Benin	2	0	1	1	
Botswana	1	0	1	0	
Burkina-Faso	1	0	1	0	
Burundi	2	0	2	0	
Cameroon	10	1	3	5	37.5
Cen. African Rep.	3	0	0	2	
Chad	5	0	3	1	75.0
Congo	3	0	1	1	
Djibouti	8	0	5	2	71.4
Egypt	20	1	9	11	45.0
Ethiopia	557	13	395	71	84.8
Gabon	1	0	0	3	
Gambia	8	1	0		
Ghana	714	64	233	285	45.0
Guinea	14	2	7	7	50.0
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	1	0	
Ivory Coast	6	0	2	2	50.0
Kenya	124	2	90	32	73.8
Lesotho	0	1	0	0	
Liberia	36	3	19	14	57.6
Libya	34	1	22	9	71.0
Madagascar	0	1	0	0	
Malawi	5	0	1	4	20.0
Mali	98	1	58	31	65.2
Mauritania	3	0	3	0	
Mauritius	0	0	0	0	
Morocco	15	2	6	9	40.0
Mozambique	1	0	0	1	
Namibia	0	1	0	0	
Niger	2	0	0	2	
Nigeria	283	24	72	160	31.0
Rwanda	12	1	11	0	100.0
Senegal	3	2	0	3	
Seychelles	254	6	196	33	85.6
Sierra Leone	5	0	3	2	60.0
Somalia	4,059	54	3,672	292	92.6
South Africa	46	1	21	26	44.7
Sudan	177	4	150	21	87.7
Tanzania	8	1	1	8	11.1
Togo	8	1	3	4	42.9
Tunisia	8	0	7	1	87.5
Uganda	37	1	27	11	71.1
Zaire	262	3	207	40	83.8
Zambia	8	1	1	5	16.7
Zimbabwe	1	1	1	0	
Total	6,980	209	5,298	1,153	82.1

Source: Immigration and Refugee Board, news release, February 11, 1992.

Table 5:
Refugee Claim Data for Major Refugee Source Countries from Africa
(January 1 to December 31, 1991)

	Country of Origin	Claims Concluded	With-drawn	Convention Refugee Status Yes	No	% Accepted
1.	Somalia	4,059	54	3,672	292	92.6
2.	Ghana	714	64	233	285	45.0
3.	Ethiopia	557	13	395	71	84.8
4.	Nigeria	283	24	72	160	31.0
5.	Zaire	262	3	207	40	83.8
6.	Seychelles	254	6	196	33	85.6
7.	Sudan	177	4	150	21	87.7
8.	Kenya	124	2	90	32	73.8
9.	Algeria	103	12	48	44	52.2
10.	Mali	98	1	58	31	65.2
	Top-10 total	6,631	183	5,121	1,009	83.5
	Others	349	26	177	144	55.1
	Total	6,980	209	5,298	1,153	82.1

Source: Immigration and Refugee Board, news release, Feb. 11, 1992.

Conclusion

Canada's immigration policy with regard to blacks in general and black Africans in particular is a recent development. Growing numbers of refugees were accepted for humanitarian reasons, which increased the number of non-traditional immigrants or refugees in Canada. At present, Canada is facing one of its greatest challenges in terms of refugee claimants from Third World countries. Is Canada doing its part in sharing the refugee burden? Is its policy just or discriminatory towards certain groups?

Canadian immigration policy did not encourage resettlement of Africans. The entry of Africans to Canada has always been restrictive, even after the "White Canada Policy" was abolished. The African immigration to Canada averaged only about four percent of the total immigration to Canada.

Canada's financial assistance has been channelled either directly to host governments or to UNHCR or other international governmental and humanitarian agencies. Canada has supported a number of UNHCR's policy issues with regard to Africa, which included encouraging voluntary repatriation, resolving conflicts, assisting countries in reintegrating refugees and collaborating with organizations such as the Organization of African Unity. As a member of the international community and a defender of human rights, Canada has a responsibility in helping to resolve the displacement of migrants or refugees and fulfilling its international obligation in humanitarian aid. It is also to Canada's advantage to see peace and stability maintained in Third World countries because they may become Canada's major trading partners in the future. ■

Notes

1. Gerald Dirks, *Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference Or Opportunism* (Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), 22.
2. Ibid., 23.
3. Rhoda Howard, "The Canadian Government's Response to the African Refugee Problem," *Journal of African Studies* 15, no. 1 (1981): 103.

U.S. Refugee Approval Rate by Region and Selected Nationality, Fiscal Year 1992*

	Total Claims	Percentage of Claims Decided	Accepted
Total	144,840	88.1	89.1
By Region			
USSR	68,341	99.3	96.6
East Asia/Pacific	33,319	99.7	95.6
Africa	13,830	58.4	77.8
Latin America/ Caribbean	6,403	63.4	61.4
Eastern Europe	6,966	66.7	54.9
Near East/S. Asia	16,181	65.0	53.8
By Country			
Afghanistan	5,189	56.9	49.2
Albania	2,838	69.6	56.9
Bulgaria	365	75.9	42.5
Burma	60	100.0	50.0
Cambodia	58	98.3	84.2
Cuba	4,858	65.5	69.7
Czechoslovakia	66	36.5	100.0
Ethiopia	7,361	60.1	71.6
Haiti	2,159	84.0	1.2
Iran	4,731	76.8	50.3
Iraq	6,260	62.8	60.5
Laos	6,249	100.0	97.8
Liberia	1,507	47.4	89.2
Mozambique	30	43.3	7.7
Poland	772	17.4	100.0
Romania	2,893	77.4	92.5
Somalia	3,264	83.5	90.7
South Africa	37	64.9	79.2
Sudan	447	30.2	88.9
Uganda	542	35.2	46.1
USSR	68,341	99.3	96.6
Vietnam	26,848	99.6	95.2
Zaire	534	18.7	97.0
Subtotal	142,716	88.0	90.5

*Preliminary figures.

Note: The total includes all nationalities. Nationalities for whom fewer than a total of ten cases were approved or denied are not included in the country-by-country tally.

Source: Adapted from *Refugee Reports*/ December 1992, U.S. Committe for Refugees, Washington, DC.

Open and Closed Borders: Is the New World Order Creating a System of Global Apartheid?

Anthony H. Richmond



What do the above words have in common? From a sociological perspective, these are all actions, structures and institutions associated with forcible isolation of people who are different. Because of the differences, they are perceived as having actual or potential conflicting relationships. Distancing is used to deal with the conflict. When separation is imposed by a dominant group upon a less powerful one, the conflict is only temporarily resolved. In the long run the opposition is generally exacerbated. Restitution and retribution may be delayed for generations, but the power struggle continues.

It may seem shocking that apparently contradictory concepts such as "apartheid" and "asylum" should be juxtaposed, yet they have much in common. Literally, the word "apartheid" simply means "apart*hood*" (cf. neighbour*hood*)—that is, the separation of people into different areas. The term "asylum" (literally meaning nonseizure) originated with the church's refusal to allow wanted criminals and others sought by the authorities to be forcibly removed from the altar. Later the term was applied to mental hospitals, sanitoria and other institutions, where anyone who might contaminate others, disturb the peace, or in some way come into conflict with the general public, could be kept apart. Totalitarian states have long used the device of exile or forcible confinement in prisons or hospitals as a means of dealing with dissidents and political enemies. Thus "asylum" acquired a dual meaning. On the one hand, it is a way in which a more powerful or majority group segregates "others" who do not conform or who are seen as threatening. On the other hand, the asylum offers sanctuary and some protection for the minority or outcast, who might otherwise face the ultimate form of separation, that is, death.

The principle of separation as a means of social control is widely used and has a long history in Canada and elsewhere. The expulsion of the Acadians from the Maritimes in 1756, the separation of Upper and Lower Canada, the creation of Indian reserves and, in some provinces, the formation of separate school systems for Catholics and Protestants, are all examples of the principle of separation being used as a device to reduce tension and maintain control. When South Africa introduced its system of African reserves (later called Bantustans or Homelands) it was following a well established precedent in colonial history. The English "Pale" in France and Ireland, the partition of Ireland and later India (establishing Pakistan and later Bangladesh), and the division of Cyprus, all are examples of the political application of the principle. The so-called "ethnic cleansing" of areas in former Yugoslavia is the latest example and one that comes close to genocide. Serbian, Croatian and Muslim peoples, who have lived together for centuries, are being separated by military force in an attempt to create homogeneous ethno-religious areas, expanding the power and territorial control of fanatical nationalist leaders. Numerous civilian casualties and vast refugee movements are the result.

Residential segregation by ethnicity and religion created the ghettoes of European cities and eventually led to the Holocaust. In the United States, the emergence of separate residential areas (black ghettos) and separate schools for blacks and whites is another example. In 1954, the American Supreme Court found separate schools and colleges for Afro-Americans "inherently unequal" and therefore unconstitutional, but, despite busing, de facto residential and educational segregation have persisted. In some cases, electoral boundaries have been redrawn in order to emphasize ethnic homogeneity, thereby giving a spurious legitimacy to residential segregation. In determining the legitimacy of any case of ethnic segregation, it is necessary to consider the extent to which it is

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voluntary, on both sides, or how far it is a result of coercion and domination by one group over another. The latter is nearly always the case.

As far as immigration is concerned, the question is are we creating a system of *global apartheid,* based on discrimination against migrants and refugees from poorer developing countries? Or are we simply acting rationally to protect the integrity of our social systems and harmonize our immigration policies? Will the emerging "new world order" ensure justice and equality of treatment for immigrants and refugees, or will it create a system that gives privileges to some and deprives others of their rights? In order to determine whether it is accurate to describe present trends as contributing to "global apartheid," it is necessary to summarize the key elements in the South African experience concerning external and internal migration, in the context of state-legislated apartheid in that country.

Apartheid in South Africa

When the Nationalist party came to power in South Africa in 1948, building on existing forms of discrimination and segregation, it proceeded to create the system that came to be known as "apartheid." In defending the South African *Group Areas Act* in 1951, then President Dr. Malan argued that it was essential to keep the groups apart in order to maintain "racial peace" (Richmond 1961, 81-137). An integral element of the system was the control of internal migration, combined with the selective immigration to South Africa of people who were racially defined as "European." Forty-four years later, the system is gradually being dismantled, although South Africa is a long way from institutionalizing equality, democracy and racial integration.

Apartheid failed for a number of reasons, among which were the internal contradictions and conflicts within the system itself. Revolutionary change could only be contained by the use of excessive force, with consequent loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the world and its own people. Internal resistance to oppression was reinforced by pressure from outside the country. Externally imposed economic sanctions were used to symbolize disapproval of the regime and to provide leverage for reform.

White South Africans are outnumbered by a ratio of six to one within the republic. They are an affluent and politically dominant minority who enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of middle-class Canadians, while the majority of the African population have average incomes that are only one-tenth of those of whites. This inequality has been maintained by systemic discrimination beginning with the *Labour Regulation Act* in 1911 that regulated the recruitment of labour and the *Native Lands Act* of 1913, which created the "Reserves," later to be described as "Homelands," confining the African population to 13 percent of the total area of the country. Subsequent legislation, up to and including the *Abolition of Influx Control Act* in 1986, regulated the movement of people into urban areas. Other measures included the *Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act* in 1945, the *Population Registration Act* in 1950, which required everyone to carry racially-classified identification, the *Group Areas Acts* in 1950 and 1966, and the *Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act* in 1951. Added to these were a series of measures entrenching the dominant economic and political power of the white population by denying full citizenship and the franchise, suppressing political opposition and restricting access to education and social rights (Adam 1979).

The selective immigration of white settlers to South Africa was encouraged, in part to compensate for the demographic imbalance between white and nonwhite and to provide a source of skilled manpower. An immigrant to South Africa had to be "readily assimilable by the white inhabitants" and not a threat to "the language, culture or religion of any white ethnic group," according to the minister of Immigration (Couper 1990). In fact, more than one million immigrants of European ethnic origin were admitted to South Africa between 1945 and 1985. At the same time, South Africa forced into exile many opponents of apartheid and hunted down Mozambican refugees who crossed the border, deporting those they caught (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1991, 53).

Notwithstanding these measures, the South African economy is dependent on a supply of temporary workers both from within and outside the country. Agriculture, mining, manufacturing and domestic services all rely heavily on migrant workers. These are drawn from neighbouring countries, such as Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, as well as from the "Homelands," such as Transkei, Ciskei, etc. Such migrant workers were confined to separate townships or to hostels away from the white areas. A third of the black population is now urban, but has no security of tenure. In 1981 it was estimated that 74,000 blacks commuted daily from "Homelands" into white areas to work, and a further 1.5 million worked for longer periods as contract labourers (Glavovic 1987, 47).

The South African situation gives rise to numerous external refugees and internally displaced persons. Opponents of apartheid were often obliged to flee to Swaziland or other neighbouring countries to avoid persecution. Compulsory removal to "Homelands," factional disputes within Bantustans and between tribal groups, together with squatter camps made up of those seeking employment, have created "internal refugees," whose numbers may range from

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hundreds of thousands to millions (Mabin 1987, 80-85). Despite some changes to the system, it seems that current trends represent "relatively insignificant changes from past apartheid policies" (Robertson 1987, 116). Meanwhile, the African National Congress is pressing the all-white government to introduce more radical reforms that will enable the nonwhite majority to participate democratically in the political process.

Racism outside South Africa

However, as apartheid in South Africa is gradually giving way to political reform and social change, the rest of the world appears to be moving in a different direction. In eastern and central Europe, following the collapse of the Soviet empire, nationalism and irredentism have revived, causing widespread violence. "Ethnic cleansing" provides the ideological rationale for civil war in the former Yugoslavia. The idea that only one dominant racial or ethno-religious group should be allowed to occupy a particular territory is precisely the meaning of apartheid. When military force is used to bring about such territorial separation, killing or displacing hundreds of thousands (possibly millions) of people in the process, it is no exaggeration to speak of "apartheid."

Faced with the prospect of mass migration from poorer to richer countries, from those where governmental systems have collapsed to those with more stable political environments (and with huge refugee flows from Bosnia-Herzegovina) coordinated efforts are being made to stem the potential flow into western Europe. The legislation used and the regulative institutions created have a remarkable similarity to those that South Africa adopted to control the movement of people from outside and within its borders. Furthermore, the ideological justifications used to defend these measures echo those adopted by the dominant white minority in South Africa to defend their actions in imposing the system of apartheid on the nonwhite majority. As well as explicit racism and claims to "superiority," they include an obligation to limit intertribal conflict, the need to preserve ethnic identity, expressions of religious fanaticism, the defence of existing cultural and social institutions, state security, the maintenance of law and order, preservation of economic privilege and the need to regulate and manage population movements. These themes, which were constantly repeated by defenders of the South African system, are now recurring in the rhetoric of those who wish to restrict immigration into western Europe, North America and Australia.

People in most countries exhibit an ambivalent attitude towards questions of race, ethnicity and migration. On the one hand, the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the Commission on Human Rights condemn apartheid and, on the other, they note an upsurge in racism, discrimination, intolerance and xenophobia in many parts of the world (*Human Rights Newsletter*, October 1990 and April 1991). In Europe and North America neo-Nazi and other right-wing extremist groups are gaining support. Recent riots in Los Angeles and lesser outbreaks of violence in Toronto serve to remind us how volatile interracial situations are. Public opinion surveys in many countries reveal a backlash against immigration and growing support for reactionary political parties. In France, the *Front National*, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, mobilized 15 percent of the popular vote in recent elections, and demonstrations against nonwhite immigrant workers are a frequent event, as are antiracist marches (Singer 1991; Husbands 1991). In Germany, a tenfold increase in racist attacks (from 200 to 2,386) was reported in 1991 (Cruz 1992). There was a further escalation of ethnic violence in Germany in 1992, much of it instigated by neo-Nazi "skinheads," targeted towards asylum applicants, Gypsies and other foreigners, including long resident Turkish workers and their families. The government reacted by proposing stricter controls over immigration and an amendment to the constitutional right to asylum. The Republican Party in Germany proposed mass repatriation of foreigners and the confinement of accepted refugees in camps away from cities.

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Immigration Controls

There is a worldwide trend towards stricter immigration controls and attempts to limit the flow of refugees and asylum applicants. It is part of a growing nostalgia for a simpler world in which people felt secure in homogeneous communities where neighbours shared "traditional" values. It is also a reaction to the insecurity felt by many faced with a rapidly changing global society. This is evident in the growth of racism, xenophobia, religious and ethnic conflict in various countries, including those that have traditionally been receptive to both political and economic migrants. Politically, it is expressed in the coordinated efforts of countries in western Europe, North America and Australia to deter asylum applications and limit mass migration to these regions. There is a growing fear in Europe concerning the possibility of mass migration from east to west and an equal concern about the potential flow from south to north, including those from Mahgreb territories of the southern Mediterranean and Africa to France and Germany.

The reunification of East and West Germany reduced the Federal Republic of Germany's dependency on immigrant workers while, at the same time, leaving the country vulnerable to mass migration from east and central Europe, as well as from the former Soviet Union. Under the German constitution, "ethnic Germans," from wherever they may come, have privileged rights of entry and

of citizenship, although long-time residents of the country, who are not of German descent (including their children born in Germany) are denied similar privileges. Recently, new immigration legislation was introduced in Germany that will severely restrict the number of asylum applicants accepted and allows the government to segregate them in camps. Britain introduced an asylum bill that will require refugees to be fingerprinted, restrict access by asylum applicants to public housing, permit deportation when an asylum claim has been refused, and require airlines or other carriers to ensure that travellers have visas to enter or even to pass through the United Kingdom en route to another country.

Notwithstanding the European Economic Community's abolition of internal border checks in January 1993, Britain, Ireland and Denmark have expressed reservations and indicated exceptions. The U.K. intends to retain frontier controls for all non-EC nationals, including those entering Britain via other EC countries. A limit of three months' stay will be placed on non-U.K. nationals entering the country. Britain is one of the twelve European countries that signed the Dublin Convention in June 1990. Neither this, nor the related Schengen Agreement, have yet been ratified by all the countries involved, although their provisions are expected to come into force in 1993.

Schengen and Dublin Conventions

The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 by Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and Luxembourg. When the subsequent Dublin Agreement is ratified, it will apply to all twelve EEC members. The agreement provides that persons with valid documents, who can show that they have sufficient means to support themselves during their stay and to return to their country of origin, will be allowed entry, but only if they are not considered a "threat to public policy, national security or international relations of the Contracting Parties." Once admitted, they may travel freely within the EEC, subject to any limitations that Britain or other dissenting countries may impose. In order to enforce the regulations, the countries in question may take any necessary steps to verify documents, and may use mobile units to exercise surveillance at external borders. Every contracting party is obliged to supply the others with information concerning individuals requesting admission (including asylum applicants) and this information may be computerized.

As well as extending the provisions of the Schengen Agreement to all countries in the EEC, the Dublin Convention also deals specifically with the question of asylum applicants and determines who is responsible for processing them. It reiterates the 1951 Geneva Convention's definition of a refugee, as amended by the 1967 New York Protocol. In order of precedence, the state responsible for hearing an asylum application is either the one that issued a residence permit or an entry visa; when no visa is required, the state that first admitted the person into the Community territory is responsible. The other states of the Community are bound by the decision of the one that processes the application.

Critics of the Schengen and Dublin agreements note that there is no recognition of the growing numbers of cases of de facto humanitarian refugees, who may not meet the 1951 Convention definition. It is felt that the effect of visa requirements, entry regulations and carrier sanctions will be to deter or exclude many legitimate claimants and those trying to escape war-torn countries. It will also increase the traffic in forged documents. Third country nationals (i.e., non-EEC citizens) resident in the EEC will find their right to travel and to work in other countries restricted. These agreements must also be considered in the context of increasing cooperation, within and between European countries and others in matters of international policing and security. The Trevi Group is an intergovernmental body that coordinates efforts to combat terrorism and organized crime. Among the measures it has recommended, and that are being widely adopted, are uniform documentation of travellers, the fingerprinting of migrants and asylum applicants, the creation of a computerized database and information exchange on criminals, deported persons and persons non grata, training of police officers and border guards for surveillance, and the harmonization of legislation governing immigration and security measures at borders.

It is probably not a coincidence that many of these measures have been incorporated into the new Canadian legislation on immigration (Bill C-86). Canada is one of the sixteen states participating in the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia. Described as "informal," these consultations enable governments to be kept informed of developments in other countries and facilitate the harmonization process. The participating states acknowledge the value of cooperation, endorse the principles established in the Dublin Convention, and seek to intensify cooperation in combatting illegal immigration. The aim is to adopt a concerted approach that will also include the countries of eastern Europe, so that they will adopt policies that correspond with those in western Europe.

Critics of the Schengen and Dublin agreements note that there is no recognition of the growing numbers of cases of de facto humanitarian refugees, who may not meet the 1951 Convention definition.

Canada's new *Immigration Act* enables this country to harmonize its immigration law and practice with that of other countries. As in the McCarthy era in the United States, "guilt by association" with allegedly subversive organizations or a criminal record, however minor, will be sufficient to exclude potential immigrants and asylum appli-

cants. Asylum applicants will be fingerprinted and the use of forged documents will be grounds for exclusion. Immigrants may be required to work in particular places and to remain in such employment for two years after arrival, as if they were indentured. Business immigrants and investors will be given top priority for admission. Officials will have greater control over numbers admitted annually in various categories. As at present, the extensive use of temporary employment visas will enable the government to limit the number of people allowed to settle permanently. None of these measures, in themselves, appears particularly draconian. However, the combined effect will be to give considerable advantage to the wealthy and well educated over "your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free." The delayed reaction of Canada and many other countries to the prolonged plight of refugees in Somalia and other regions of Africa, compared with the response to those in former Yugoslavia, suggests that the "huddled masses" should preferably be white, if they are to receive much help at all. The United States (in the Bush and Clinton administrations) has applied a double standard in its treatment of Cuban as compared with Haitian asylum applicants. "Fortress Europe" is matched by "Fortress North America."

Conclusion

We are living in a global society, although we still lack effective world governmental institutions. Nevertheless, the most economically developed and affluent countries are banding together to protect their privileged position in much the same way that Afrikaners and others of European descent sought to maintain their dominance in South Africa. Europeans and those of European descent in the Americas and Oceania are outnumbered in the world in a ratio of four to one. This leads to fear that they will lose their power and territorial control, as the peoples of Africa and Asia restructure their economies and participate in a global postindustrial society where mass migration is the norm. As the senior legal adviser to the UNHCR has stated, even if the developed countries "were prepared to betray the very values on which their societies are based, by building new iron curtains and Berlin Walls around their common territory, the human flood would still find its ways" (von Blumenthal 1991). In other words, a system of global apartheid is bound to fail.

What then is the alternative? The director of the agency for Intergovernmental Consultations echoes the view of many experts that uncontrolled, large-scale international migration threatens social cohesion, international solidarity and peace (Widgren 1991). Coordinated efforts to deter irregular movements, encourage voluntary repatriation, harmonize immigration and asylum policies, and promote economic development in the Third World are seen as essential. But the economic, political and social costs of effective measures to deal with root causes are enormous. They would involve long-term developmental assistance, large-scale planned migration and concerted efforts to promote human rights and equality, in sending and receiving countries alike. Contrary to the view that economic growth will itself remove the need for migration, it must be recognized that the emerging global economic and social system is one in which population movements will continue to increase rather than decline. A comprehensive non-exodus approach, such as that advocated by the Intergovernmental Committee and its advisers, will be self-defeating. Global apartheid will collapse as surely as the South African version has done. In the postmodern world we must all learn to live with ethnocultural diversity, rapid social change *and* mass migration. There is no peaceful alternative. ■

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Development in a Fragile Environment: The Case of Somalia

Mohamed Ali Arkow

Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa (see Figure 1). The total land area is 637,140 square kilometres, most of which is rangeland. The Somali population is estimated at 7,595,000 (Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Centre 1989). Rangelands are not suitable for agriculture because of low precipitation, extreme temperatures or soils that are shallow, rocky or infertile (Stoddart et al 1975).

Land Use

Nomadic pastoralism is the major land-use system in Somalia. Nomadism is a survival strategy in response to drought and a fragile environment that provides insufficient resources for the people and their herds. In some areas this system is supplemented by trading activities and opportunistic farming practices (Hoben 1988). Agropastoralism—which is a zero input, low output, shifting cultivation system—is practised in the southern interriverine zone, eastern Gedo, the coastal plains of central Somalia and the northwestern region of the country.

Droughts

Precipitation is the most important factor that determines the timing and duration of the Somali pastoralists' use of a particular rangeland. Rainfall is limited and unpredictable. Droughts occur frequently in Somalia and pastoralists (who comprise 75 percent of the population) consequently move their herds from one area to another to cope with rapidly changing environmental conditions. However, this traditional strategy was ineffective during the Sahel drought in the 1970s. According to Howze (1989), this drought was not particularly harsher than those in the past, but there were more people and animals in need of food and water. During the drought of 1973-74, the military government, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, airlifted thousands of starving people from the north and relocated them to three villages (Dujuuma, Sbalaale and Kunturwaarey) near the rivers of Shabeelle and Juba. Later, the relocated people were organized into agricultural cooperatives. This attempt to change nomadic pastoralists into farmers did not succeed. Two years after the relocation project, most of the males joined the unemployed population in the cities or emigrated to the Middle East, where the job market was booming.

Environmental Migration

Migration due to environmental degradation is not a new phenomenon in Somalia. In the mid-nineteenth century, the leaders of the Marehaan tribe realized that central Somalia could not provide enough water, forage and space for the increasing population and livestock. To find a more habitable environment, the council of chiefs decided to send exploratory teams to Jubaland in the south. The teams returned with information concerning the land and the tribes along the possible migration routes. The council of chiefs evaluated the reports and determined the number of people required to take Jubaland by force. They decided to move in waves. Each wave was comprised of a group of subclans. The first three waves reached Jubaland and began their conquest and expansion. However, subsequent waves of invaders were later discouraged by stories of malaria and other diseases in Jubaland. By the late nineteenth century, the Somalis in the north and northeast began leaving their territories because of deforestation and desertification. The northerners migrated to the Middle East, most of them to South Yemen. People from the northeast migrated to the south and settled in Mogadishu and Kismaayo.

Development and Population Increase

The Somali population was about 3.5 million in 1960. By the late 1980s the population had increased to seven million (Howze 1989). This rapid population growth was due to a high birth rate and low death rate. The birth rate is 47.9 births per 1,000 people, and the death rate is about 23.3 (Howze 1989). The difference of 24.6 is the natural increase for Somalia. The population of Somalia is increasing at a rate of a 2.46 percent per year, discounting the effect of the civil war. Using 1980 as the base year, the projected population of Somalia in the year 2000 (assuming a 2.5 percent rate of growth) will be 9,012,000, and 18,904,000 in 2030 (Howze 1989). This projection predicts that Somalia's population will increase 3.5 times in a fifty-year period.

To keep pace with this increase, the per capita economic development is supposed to grow 2.5 percent annually. To have a real growth, the economy's rate of growth must exceed 2.5 percent. Somalia will not exceed or even match its population growth with real economic development otherwise. Living standards in cities had slightly improved in the 1980s. However, the improvement was achieved by borrowing from developed nations and by incurring a huge national debt.

Soon after independence, Somalia began to promote national development. The first projects involved health and sanitation. Some diseases, such as smallpox, yellow fever, cholera and polio, were eradicated through immunization programs (Howze 1989). The military government's introduction and adoption of Somali as the official language of the country (using the Latin alphabet) facilitated the education of the rural population in health and disease prevention. By 1988 the death rate was reduced to half of what it was in 1960; but

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no meaningful effort was made to reduce the birth rate. Family planning programs were insignificant and had no impact on the population increase.

In contrast, a government-sponsored livestock development program had a far-reaching impact on the relationship between people and their environment. The program included animal health and water development. Diseases such as rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia were eradicated through livestock immunization. Water development was a major component of the government's rural development programs. New wells and boreholes made remote areas more accessible to people and their herds, accelerating the process of sedentarization and creating many more villages. In a few years, large areas around the water sources were overstocked, overgrazed and finally denuded. Many people and animals perished as a result. In the following sections I will discuss central Somalia as typical rangeland, and how inappropriate technology led to more hunger and displacement of people rather than to development and prosperity.

Central Somalia

Central Somalia is located three to eight degrees north of the equator. The region is bordered on the east by the Indian Ocean, and to the west by Ogaden. Central Somalia encompasses an area of 160,000 square kilometres (Holt 1989), and includes the three administrative provinces of Mudug, Galgaduud and Hiiraan (see Figure 2).

The climate is arid to semiarid. The annual rainfall, which is erratic and uneven in distribution, varies from 100 mm in the north to 350 mm in the south. There are two wet and two dry seasons each year. The wet seasons are from March to June and from October to December. The dry seasons are from December to February and from July to September. The monthly mean maximum temperature is 29-32 degrees Celcius, and the monthly mean minimum is 20-24 Celcius.

Central Somalia is a relatively windy area with a strong northeast monsoon from November to March, and a southwest monsoon from May to October. Wind causes most of the erosion in central Somalia, particularly in the agropastoral zone where clearing, weeding and grazing expose the soil.

Central Somalia is a featureless, flat plain. At the Ethiopian border, the elevation reaches 300-400 m. The Shabeelle River flows south through a wide valley in the southwestern part of the region. Sand dunes, a distinct feature of the central rangelands, cover an area of about 4,000 square kilometres (Holt 1989). This means that 70 percent of Somalia's sand dunes are found in the central region. Sand dunes cause economic hardship in the region by covering wells, farms, houses, rangelands, and by blocking roads.



Fig. 1: Somalia (*Source*: Hoben 1988, 193)

Soils in central Somalia are generally sandy, shallow and slightly alkaline (Herlocker 1989). The most common soil types are the *Carro-cad* (white soil) and *Carro-guduud* (red soil). The *Carro-cad* soil is calcareous and its topsoil is composed of fine sandy particles, organic matter and silt. *Carro-cad* is a fertile soil in which cowpea is often cultivated. Because of the topsoil's composition, *Carro-cad* is susceptible to erosion. The *Carro-guduud* is orange-red in colour and less fertile than the white soil. It is shallow with limestone rocks covering the surface. In some areas, the red soil supports a very important, wild plant known as *Yicib*. Clay soil, which is common in the Shabeelle Valley of the Hiiraan province, is alkaline and saline. It is in poor condition due to overgrazing and overcultivation.

Groundwater is the main source of drinking water in the region. In the past, camel trains (*Dhaan*) were used to haul water. It used to be the men's responsibility to lead the *Dhaan* to distant places, sometimes through enemy territory, in order to bring back water for their families. This is still practised throughout central Somalia, except along the east coast, where the government's water development programs were implemented during the 1970s and 1980s. Although the military government solved the problem of water shortage in the east, the subsequent concentrations of people and their cattle caused overgrazing of the rangeland and destruction of the fragile environment.

The population of central Somalia is difficult to estimate because the residents of central Somalia are also residents of western Somalia (Ogaden), but is approximately 1.5 million. Of this number, 750,000 could be considered permanent residents of the region (Howze 1989). Seventy percent of the population practise nomadic pastoralism and the remaining 30 percent are agropastoralists.

Central Somalia provides 25 percent of Somalia's livestock export (Ministry of Livestock, Forest and Range 1988). The region has 42 percent of Somalia's goats, 23 percent of the sheep, 22 percent of the camels, and 11 percent of the cattle. Camels and goats are highly concentrated in

the northern and western part of the region. Cattle are more common in the southern part, and sheep are the dominant animals in the coastal plains. While the movement of goats, cattle and sheep is limited within a radius of 20-30 kms, the camels are herded hundreds of kilometres.

Cowpea is the most important crop in the agropastoral zone of the east. Other crops grown in the region include sorghum and maize. Mung beans were introduced in the 1980s. Cotton and sesame are increasingly becoming important cash crops in the south. Peanut is another minor crop. Sowing occurs just before the onset of the wet season. Agronomic practices, such clearing, weeding, sowing and harvesting, are done by hand, using small axes and short-handled hoes. In the Hiiraan province, the use of tractors has expanded in the last twenty years. Cleared vegetation is burned or used as fencing. Intercropping is a common practice in central Somalia. Melons are generally planted with other crops. Sorghum and cowpeas are usually planted together. The agropastoralists allow weeds to grow on the cultivated land during the dry season to save labour and to make the soil less susceptible to wind erosion.

Trees are used for fuel and building purposes, although no attempt is made to plant them. The fuelwood is turned into charcoal and taken to Mogadishu by truck. This commercial activity is especially strong in the Hiiraan province. In 1988, 20,000 tons of charcoal per month was shipped from Jalalaksi district to Mogadishu (Holt 1989). In the two districts of Bulo Burti and Jalalaksi, trees are harvested faster than they can be replaced naturally. Around all watering points of central Somalia, the land is denuded of trees because the people rely totally on wood for cooking, heating and building.

In the southeastern part of central Somalia there is a species of fly known as *Riibi*. The species occupies an area about 500 km by 30-40 km. The ecological factors that restrict the *Riibi* fly to this particular shrubland are unknown. The fly emerges nine days after the first rainfall of the rainy seasons and stays up to forty days, depending on the amount of rainfall. The pastoralists leave the area before the *Riibi* flies hatch and migrate to other parts of the country because the flies kill the animals by bleeding them. Also, the flies can carry camel trypanosomiasis. Sometimes the migrating tribes are forced to enter other tribes' territories, which can incite violent confrontations. The *Riibi* flies play a very important role in the protection of the rangelands. The presence of the flies gives the land a time to rest and the plants a chance to flower and grow without being grazed during a critical stage of their life cycles. When the outbreak of the flies ends and the pastoralists return with their herds, the plants are at a stage when they can tolerate the effect of grazing. In 1988 and 1989, I studied the spatial and temporal distribution of the flies. During the course of this study, the overwhelming majority of the pastoralists favoured the idea of total eradication of the flies.



Fig. 2: Central Somalia

Politically, it is to the advantage of any future government to do so in the country, but ecologically the elimination of the fly will have a far-reaching negative impact on the people of central Somalia and the country as a whole. Although the flies cause a temporary migration, their overall impact is positive for the people and their livestock. After all, nomadism is a land-use system based on migration.

The Eradication of the Tsetse Flies

The *Riibi* flies could not win the respect of the military government as an enemy worth fighting, but the tsetse flies did. In the mid 1980s, the Somali government, with the help of the British government, carried out a campaign of eradication against tsetse flies using insecticides (Ministry of Livestock, Forest and Range 1988). The tsetse flies cause human and animal sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) in many parts of Africa. However, none of the four species of tsetse flies that exist in the country cause human sleeping sickness. The tsetse flies protected the natural environment along the rivers from an ever increasing number of animals without causing human trypanosomiasis. Since the problem facing Somalia was that of deforestation and desertification (not shortage of livestock), I believe it was wrong to destroy the only natural force in place to counter the trend of environmental deterioration. International experts blamed the Somali pastoralists for the declining productivity of the rangelands. In my view, it is debatable whether the pastoralists and their traditional land-use systems destroyed the land, or whether the projects implemented by experts made the environment more fragile and drought prone.

New Needs Without New Means

To assess the impact of any society on the environment, the formula I=PAT can be used as a guideline (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990).

I = Impact; P=Number of people

A=Index of affluence or average consumption of resources per person

T= Technology or index of the environmental disruptiveness of the technology used

Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990) concluded that all nations, rich or poor, have a population problem. In rich nations, the rate of population growth is low, but the multipliers A and T are large. In contrast, the multiplier P is very large in poor nations. The total impact on the environment can be decreased by lowering one of the three factors (P, A or T) as long as the other two do not increase to offset the difference.

Although I do not disagree with the Ehrlichs' conclusion, I do not believe that Somalia has an overpopulation problem. Somalia is the same size as Texas and has one-third of the population. In my view, Somalia is affected by a syndrome that could be called "new needs without new means." After years of European occupation, Somalis have learned to eat what Europeans eat and wear what Europeans wear. As a consequence, the average consumption of resources per person has increased (multiplier A). The Western lifestyle was introduced into the country, but Western know-how and technologies were not. Since Western technology was not available, the use of inappropriate technology (e.g., destruction of forests to obtain charcoal) was inevitable. After independence, Somalia became a net importer of Western products. To buy these products, Somalis had to sell their livestock. Selling livestock had an unexpected negative impact on the environment. Year after year, the imported products became more and more expensive, and Somalis had to sell more of their livestock to buy the same commodities. Consequently, the pastoralists had to increase their herds, causing the land to be overstocked and overgrazed.

In the future, the West has two choices in dealing with countries like Somalia. The first is to share technology with them. The second choice is to give them loans to buy Western products. Debt is already a serious problem for many African countries. Timberlake (1988) quoted a World Bank conclusion of 1984: "unless corrective measures are taken the external resource position of Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to become disastrous in the next few years." The former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, put it in this way: "Africa's debt burden is intolerable. We cannot pay. You know it and all our other creditors know it. It is not a rhetorical question when I ask, should we really let our people starve so that we can pay our debts" (Timberlake 1988). Since these countries will not be able to pay their debts, recolonization could be an attractive alternative for the West. However, in the long run, this will make life harder for both sides. ■

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Book Review

Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United States, and International Migration

Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992

Edited by

Gary P. Freeman and James Jupp

Reviewed by Nobuaki Suyama

Comparative immigration policy is in fashion. A comparative perspective always gives innovative, fresh viewpoints. This book explores the similarities and differences between Australia and the United States, two major immigrant-receiving countries whose official language is English. The title suggests that these countries are not only receivers of immigrants, but that they have been founded and developed by successive generations of immigrants. Although this concept has been popular in the United States, it is a relatively recent one in Australia. This is perhaps because everyone in the "melting pot" is no more or less American than anyone else, although it took a long time to place black citizens on the same footing. On the other hand, Australia started as Britain's penal colony and retained British attitudes. Australians were predominantly "British" and non-British settlers were expected to conform.

The book consists of four parts: the politics regarding intake and control, the economics of immigration, settlement policy and newcomers' social integration. The chapters included are, on the whole, quite good and will be useful to students of comparative politics, immigration and ethnic affairs. However, it is a pity that with the exception of the chapter on microeconomic analysis, the others do not pursue an integrated comparison even though various contributors make occasional references to the other country. Even a chapter jointly written by an American and an Australian (Freeman and Betts) deals with each country's case under a separate heading.

New Needs Without New Means

To assess the impact of any society on the environment, the formula I=PAT can be used as a guideline (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990).

I = Impact; P=Number of people

A=Index of affluence or average consumption of resources per person

T= Technology or index of the environmental disruptiveness of the technology used

Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990) concluded that all nations, rich or poor, have a population problem. In rich nations, the rate of population growth is low, but the multipliers A and T are large. In contrast, the multiplier P is very large in poor nations. The total impact on the environment can be decreased by lowering one of the three factors (P, A or T) as long as the other two do not increase to offset the difference.

Although I do not disagree with the Ehrlichs' conclusion, I do not believe that Somalia has an overpopulation problem. Somalia is the same size as Texas and has one-third of the population. In my view, Somalia is affected by a syndrome that could be called "new needs without new means." After years of European occupation, Somalis have learned to eat what Europeans eat and wear what Europeans wear. As a consequence, the average consumption of resources per person has increased (multiplier A). The Western lifestyle was introduced into the country, but Western know-how and technologies were not. Since Western technology was not available, the use of inappropriate technology (e.g., destruction of forests to obtain charcoal) was inevitable. After independence, Somalia became a net importer of Western products. To buy these products, Somalis had to sell their livestock. Selling livestock had an unexpected negative impact on the environment. Year after year, the imported products became more and more expensive, and Somalis had to sell more of their livestock to buy the same commodities. Consequently, the pastoralists had to increase their herds, causing the land to be overstocked and overgrazed.

In the future, the West has two choices in dealing with countries like Somalia. The first is to share technology with them. The second choice is to give them loans to buy Western products. Debt is already a serious problem for many African countries. Timberlake (1988) quoted a World Bank conclusion of 1984: "unless corrective measures are taken the external resource position of Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to become disastrous in the next few years." The former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, put it in this way: "Africa's debt burden is intolerable. We cannot pay. You know it and all our other creditors know it. It is not a rhetorical question when I ask, should we really let our people starve so that we can pay our debts" (Timberlake 1988). Since these countries will not be able to pay their debts, recolonization could be an attractive alternative for the West. However, in the long run, this will make life harder for both sides. ■

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Book Review

Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United States, and International Migration

Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992

Edited by

Gary P. Freeman and James Jupp

Reviewed by Nobuaki Suyama

Comparative immigration policy is in fashion. A comparative perspective always gives innovative, fresh viewpoints. This book explores the similarities and differences between Australia and the United States, two major immigrant-receiving countries whose official language is English. The title suggests that these countries are not only receivers of immigrants, but that they have been founded and developed by successive generations of immigrants. Although this concept has been popular in the United States, it is a relatively recent one in Australia. This is perhaps because everyone in the "melting pot" is no more or less American than anyone else, although it took a long time to place black citizens on the same footing. On the other hand, Australia started as Britain's penal colony and retained British attitudes. Australians were predominantly "British" and non-British settlers were expected to conform.

The book consists of four parts: the politics regarding intake and control, the economics of immigration, settlement policy and newcomers' social integration. The chapters included are, on the whole, quite good and will be useful to students of comparative politics, immigration and ethnic affairs. However, it is a pity that with the exception of the chapter on microeconomic analysis, the others do not pursue an integrated comparison even though various contributors make occasional references to the other country. Even a chapter jointly written by an American and an Australian (Freeman and Betts) deals with each country's case under a separate heading.

Birrell discusses a recent development in Australian policy to tighten up the border control to avoid having people circumvent the rules. Miller, as well as Bean and Fix, discusses immigration policy in the United States, which put through two important pieces of tough legislation in 1986 and 1990, although their effect was not as great as expected. These chapters demonstrate that immigration policy makers in developed countries are now on the defensive in the face of migration from the South. On the other hand, Miller writes, "The capacity of the United States to absorb and integrate immigrants has thus far not shown serious signs of weakening, although most Americans clearly want to reduce immigration, particularly illegal migration" (1992, 71). Thus, the United States' failed attempts to crack down on illegal immigrants can be interpreted as a calculated response to negative public attitudes and a concession to capitalist interests.

Some economists say that, while the Australian literature is full of examinations of the causal relationship between immigration and national aggregates, American studies focus on immigration's effects on microcosmic labour markets. Macroeconomic analysis concludes that immigration has little bearing on national demand and supply, such as household consumption, government sector demands, investment and savings. It is widely accepted among Australian economists that immigration doesn't necessarily create unemployment, have a negative impact on real wage growth or exacerbate inflation. Past research in Australia demonstrates that immigration generates only moderate output growth per capita. It is speculated that this small positive effect is derived from migrant skills, economy of scale or technological development.

The microeconomic study concludes that Australia and the United States "demonstrate an ongoing capacity to successfully integrate newcomers into varied and dynamic immigrant societies." More immigrants to the U.S. than native-born Americans are self-employed, but are not as successful as nonimmigrant small-business owners, while immigrants to Australia are no more likely than native-born Australians to be self-employed. Still, their businesses are more prosperous. The data also show that "the average skill level of immigrants has increased through the post-war period in Australia, but decreased in recent decades in the United States." This is a direct consequence of Australia's points system, which focuses on occupational skills, and the United States' emphasis on family reunion and other considerations.

Multiculturalism is Australia's official response to a society that is increasingly less and less British. Non-British members no longer have to feel that they constitute an imperfect segment of Australian society. They can be proud that their unique background complements Australian culture. Although this policy of integrating overseas-born Aussies and first-generation ethnic communities seems good, Castles has a critical look at its socio-economic basis. Both he and Webber demonstrate that there is a correlation between ethnicity and class, and some migrant groups are likely to be disadvantaged in their economic achievement. There is an inevitable tension between universalism and particularism—a desire to be included and to remain distinct. On the other hand, DeSipio and de la Garza assert that the United States' incorporation of foreign-born naturalized citizens "on the basis of individual liberal principles is a defensible alternative to a policy of explicit multiculturalism."

Even though this book covers almost every important aspect of immigration policy, one facet that should have been given greater emphasis is international relations, especially because the book's subtitle refers specifically to international migration. The obvious difference between the two countries is their size in terms of population and their respective rank in international society. The impact of these factors on immigration to each country and their effects on immigration policy making are not sufficiently discussed, although they are occasionally touched upon. Questions like the following should have been raised. Does the United States' commitment to maintaining world order in the postwar period have any relevance in shaping its immigration policy, particularly with regard to refugee admission? Has Australia's position in the Asian-Pacific region influenced its national immigration policy? How can Third World immigration to these two economically-advanced Western countries be placed in the larger context of North-South relations?

A multidisciplinary anthology tends to lack an overall theoretical framework. "The most striking difference between our two cases is that the role of the state in immigration matters has been far more longstanding, extensive, and decisive in Australia than the United States." Then it would have been interesting to integrate the writing around the theme of state-society relations. This could have been discussed from various disciplinary angles. Finally, the reader may be puzzled to find only a few tables and graphs showing immigration data, although other books in the same genre usually have more supporting information. ■

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

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