CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGE

Vol. 11, No. 4 May 1992

A Special Issue on Refugees from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern Europe

From the Editor's Desk:

Refuge has been published four times a year for over ten years. With this issue we are pleased to announce that we will be publishing ten issues a year. We will publish only one issue for July-August and there will be no December issue. The reasons for this are twofold.

First, this fall we began to publish a new periodical called *Soviet Refugee Monitor* (the title quickly became obsolete) as part of our larger early warning thrust to pinpoint emerging areas of refugee flows. We also began plans for an initial publication of *China Refugee Monitor* and planning for an *African Refugee Monitor*. The proliferation of publications was just too difficult to manage and we decided to incorporate them all into *Refuge* as an expanded, more frequent (effectively monthly) publication.

We have set up editorial advisory boards to oversee the special issues dealing with the various areas; each area of the world or problem area will have a guest editor. With this issue, we will also be mailing (as a free gift and part of your old subscription) a copy of *Soviet Refugee Monitor*.

Of course, we have had to raise our subscription rates. But for only double the price you will be receiving two and one half times more copies of the magazine - ten instead of four. We will also be able to keep you more current. Our next special issue for June will deal with environmental refugees.

We retain our policy of trying to bring to the attention of the wider community the results of academic research in the refugee field. We trust you will continue to learn and benefit from our expanded program of publications for *Refuge* and will renew your subscription from the summer of 1992.

Howard Adelman

IN THIS ISSUE...

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REFUGE

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Our thanks...

Centre for Refugee Studies (CRS) thanks Immigration and Employment Canada, CIDA, Ford Foundation, B'nai B'rith and private donors for actively supporting the research and the publication of *Refuge*.

Letter to the Editor:

I just received the March 1992 issue of *Refuge* on African Refugees. I am delighted with it, and especially with the emphasis upon Africa.

I have just returned from visiting refugee camps in Kenya. The trip was organized by Church World Service which staffs the Joint Voluntary Agency Office in Nairobi. We visited camps with mixed ethnicity and those with only Somali refugees. Since we left, the influx of Somalis has continued and increased unabated as you undoubtedly know.

Your issue is timely, thoughtful, and important. Thanks for the good work.

Lucia Ann McSpadden, Ph.D.
Refugee Concerns Coordinator
The United Methodist Church
California-Nevada Annual
Conference, San Francisco, U.S.A.

CALL FOR PAPERS

SPECIAL ISSUE ON

SOMALI CRISIS

The Centre for Refugee Studies intends to publish a special issue of its periodical *Refuge* on the Somali crisis.

The issue will primarily be dealing with the following topics:

- the roots and causes of the present crisis
- the country's disintegration and the mass exodus of refugees
- the refugee situation and support of the international community
- an assessment of the present situation of the Somali people inside and outside

Papers are now being invited on these issues, but other areas could be also considered.

Procedure and Deadline:

A 200-word abstract should be sent to the editor by end of May '92 and the deadline for submission is June 30, 1992.

The paper length may not exceed 15 pages (double spaced).

Please send two copies of each paper. Submissions may also be sent on disc or by E-mail.

For further details please contact:

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YUGOSLAV REFUGEES, DISPLACED PERSONS AND THE CIVIL WAR

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Background

Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991. That was the date of the "collective thanatos"[1] which led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As a result of German pressure, the European Community, followed by a number of other states, recognized the independence of the secessionist republics on 15 January 1992 and buried the second Yugoslavia.[2]

Although the Western media have now shifted their attention to the former Soviet Union, where other similar and potentially even more dangerous ethnic conflicts are brewing, that is not because genuine peace has been established in former Yugoslavia. To the contrary: blood continues to flow among the civilian population and among military and paramilitary personnel. As I write, the war is spreading to Bosnia and Herzegovina and threatens to turn into a disaster of far wider scope than the war in Croatia. The conflict has already claimed 3,083 civilian victims according to Croatian sources. The Yugoslav Army has confirmed about 1,279 dead soldiers. But it is reliably estimated that from 10,000 to 30,000 people have been killed in all and another 30,000 people are reported missing.[3]

The estimated number of refugees ranges from 600,000 to over 1 million.[4] This is the third mass migration of Yugoslavians since 1939. The first consisted of people fleeing persecution in the Second World War and the mainly involuntary internal migration and emigration of Yugoslavians in the immediate post-war period. The second mass population movement was a legal labour migration, mainly to various West European countries as part of the "guest worker" programme of the 1960s and 1970s. It was a unique case among the socialist countries. The present tragedy can only be compared to that of the Second World War; from an international perspective, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) compares it in scope, scale of atrocities and consequences for the population, to the Cambodian civil war.

In three ways, analyzing the refugees' situation contributes to our understanding of issues beyond the human tragedy of the people themselves. First, it demystifies the genesis of the Yugoslav conflict, which is often reduced to a matter "ethnic hatred." It shows that the separation of populations along ethnic lines, while favoured by the power elites of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, only intensifies existing problems or creates new ones. Second, it draws attention to a category of refugee for whom "political refugee" status does not apply and therefore underscores the need to grant these people more security and protection than they have so far enjoyed. Third, given the relatively small number of refugees who have fled abroad compared to the number who have sought refuge within the boundaries of former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav case may also help de-dramatize the East/West invasion scenarios which predict disruptive mass movements caused by political and ethnic violence or ecological catastrophe in the countries aligned with the former Soviet empire.

The Demographic Structure

The 600,000 to 1 million displaced persons referred to above come from Croatia, whose total population is 4.7 million (see Figure 1). Moreover, most of these people come from a relatively small area – the front line, which is now under the control of the Yugoslav Army and Serbian forces. This means that in the course of six months, an average of at least 100,000 people were forced to leave their homes *each month.* Vast areas have been devastated and depopulated.

In general, the destinations of the refugees are the larger urban centres – notably the capitals of the republics, but also such regions as Vojvodina and Istria. About 300,000 refugees have sought shelter in safe areas of Croatia. Over 160,000 have fled to Serbia (including Vojvodina), around 100,000

Table 1: Number of Displaced Persons by Region of Destination, Yugoslavia, 31 December 1991 and 10 February 1992

	31 Dec/91	10 Feb/92	Percent Change
Croatia	311,000	321,966	3.5
Serbia proper	90,414	99,993	10.6
Vojvodina	59,822	61,390	2.6
Kosovo	1,169	1,519	29.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina	100,000	92,094	-7.9
Slovenia	23,000	16,000	-30.4
Montenegro	7,000	7,450	6.4
Macedonia	2,050	2,400	17.1
Total	**594,455**	**604,812**	**1.7**

Source: International Red Cross

to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 23,000 to Slovenia. As Table 1 suggests, the most recent events – increasing tensions and hostilities over the future of the multiethnic republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – have now established a reverse trend: refugees have been leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina at a rate of several thousand a day. In only one day, 29 March 1992, 6,000 refugees crossed the bridge connecting the Bosnian town of Bosanski Brod with the Croatian town of Slavonski Brod, transforming the latter, with its 55,000 inhabitants, into a large refugee camp.[5]

Far fewer people have sought shelter abroad than in Yugoslavia itself.[6] That is because people know their chances of receiving political asylum are practically nil. In Germany, for example, only about one percent of Yugoslavian asylum seekers in 1991 actually received asylum. In the fall of 1991 most of the Yugoslavs who entered various European countries as tourists remained underground until the decision adopted by most of the countries to 'tolerate' their presence for the time being was made public. The recent Swiss decision to repatriate 14,000 Yugoslavs "because their lives were no longer in danger," has been criticized by the UNHCR in Geneva. In Germany, the target country of most Yugoslav asylum-seekers and refugees not requesting asylum (estimates of the number of such people vary from 50,000 to 150,000), the decision not to repatriate them was taken at a conference of Ministers of the Interior of the Länder on 8 November 1991. The decision applies to refugees from Croatia and to deserters from the Yugoslav army. Refugees are granted financial aid whether they apply for asylum or not.[7]

Fig. 1: Refugee Movements in Yugoslavia



The main receiving countries are neighbouring Hungary and the countries where Yugoslavs previously went as migrant labourers. One may reasonably assume that newly arriving refugees in the latter countries are greeted by already-established friendship and kin networks. In France, visa requirements were imposed in 1986 for Yugoslavs and that has deterred the inflow of refugees. Elsewhere in Western Europe, Yugoslavs, together with Romanians, rank first in number of asylum applicants.

Among migrants within former Yugoslavia, women and children under fifteen years of age represent two-thirds of the refugee flow.[8] (Men were either drafted into the military or are hiding and therefore do not appear in the official figures.) For an entire generation of former Yugoslavia's youth, this has had disastrous effects on their critically important period of childhood development.

The war zone from which the refugees come was an ethnically mixed area for centuries (see Figure 1). Villages tend to be predominantly Serb or Croat, depending on the region. But in urban areas, Croats, Serbs, Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians lived as neighbours and intermarried. Thus, before the war, Vukovar had 40,000 inhabitants, 43 percent of whom were Croats, 37

percent Serbs, 7.3 percent Yugoslavs, 1.6 percent Hungarians and 3.5 percent other ethnic origins.[9]

In front-line towns such as Vukovar, Daruvar, Pakrac, Beli Manastir, Osijek and Petrinja, the proportion of "Yugoslavs" (people who refused to define themselves as Serbs, Croats, etc.) was increasing constantly until the 1981 census, when it was around 20 percent. The proportion of Yugoslavs fell to 15 percent in 1991 due to nationalist propaganda and subsequent ethnic polarization. The war and the ensuing displacement of persons created further polarization and ethnic homogenization: Croats fled mainly to Croatia, Serbs to Serbia and to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Clearly, people who spoke one language, shared the same culture and intermarried could only be separated by such violent methods.

Assuming that most of those who found shelter in Serbia, and at least half of those who found shelter in Bosnia-Herzegovnia, are Serbs, one arrives at a total of 200,000 to 250,000 Serbian internal refugees. Knowing that the number of Serbs in Croatia was around 600,000 according to the 1991 census, this means that one-third of the total Serbian population of Croatia is in exile. This underestimates the actual number, however, because it takes into account only the official UNHCR figures. One would also have to include deserters from the military and paramilitary forces, refugees abroad and missing persons in order to arrive at a total figure. In any case, these huge numbers highlight the grotesqueness of the Yugoslav army and Serbian government assertion that "the Federal Army's intervention was meant to 'protect' the civilian population of Croatia." In reality, the military intervention served only the purposes of Tudjman and Milosevic: it separated ethnic populations, especially where they were geographically and socially mixed and "purified" the newly-created ethnic states.

Since people did not live in isolated, ethnically pure enclaves, the situation has been a disaster, in particular in binational families – and in some front-line towns fully half of all families were ethnically mixed. Among the many families who resisted separation along ethnic lines, the war produced thousands of stateless persons, with no place to go and no place to go back to. Wherever they reside, Serbia or Croatia, such people are now considered potential enemies, "traitors against the nation." One person from a mixed marriage whom I interviewed reported that:

> *I have always been closer to my mother. I felt Croatian, Catholic, I even went to church. But I have now repeatedly been told that I cannot stay in Croatia and keep my job – not even with a single drop of Serbian blood in my veins. The situation became unbearable, so I left for Belgrade where I thought I would be better accepted; but there I was an 'Ustascha Croat.'*

This person eventually applied for asylum in Germany.

The fate of such refugees demonstrates the fallacy of ethnic solutions to the Yugoslavian problem. There are about three million Yugoslavs – one eighth of the whole population – who are unable to accept ethnic citizenship in place of their Yugoslav citizenship, either because they come from mixed marriages or because they have lived in different parts of Yugoslavia and have established close ties with people throughout the country.[10] No solution is foreseen for these "leftover Yugoslavs," no one represents them in peace talks, there is no one to guarantee their human rights, which are constantly violated or under threat. Their situation brings to mind Hannah Arendt's statement that "one glance at the demographic map of Europe should be sufficient to show that the nation-state principle cannot be introduced into Eastern Europe."[11] In Yugoslavia, multi-ethnicity was a way of life. As one of the first expressions of their sovereignty, the nation-states that have emerged in its place have denaturalized people, stripping them of their citizenship: people born in Slovenia and Croatia have to apply and provide proof of their blood origin. Amidst all the nationalistic euphoria, non-nationalist expressions took much longer to get articulated. It was only in February 1992 that the Civil Resistance Movement was created by people from various parts of former Yugoslavia to protect the rights of people who come from ethnically mixed families and identify themselves as Yugoslavs.

Motives for Flight

Outbursts of hatred and violence did not cause the war, as has usually been assumed. Rather, hatred and violence are the war's by-products. The war revived memories of Second World War massacres. But that was after almost half a century of peaceful coexistence and the widespread disregard of nationality and religion. The use of Goebelsian propaganda in a steady, aggressive media war was necessary to disrupt that situation.

Several surveys drive home the point. The most recent one was conducted in Serbia among 650 refugees from Croatia, who originated in 52 ethnically heterogeneous communities. Two-thirds of the respondents came from minority groups in their communities. Some 86 percent of them had ethnic origins that differed from those of their neighbours, while 96 percent had established friendships and 66 percent had family relations with members of other ethnic groups. Fully 60 percent denied the existence of national divisions or of national intolerance in their communities and 77 percent had not had personal conflicts with members of other ethnic groups. Only 5.5 percent gave evidence of a continuous atmosphere of ethnic division and intolerance. Only 1.2 percent were able to give evidence of personal conflicts with members of other ethnic groups and a mere 0.8 percent were able to give evidence of collective forms of such conflict. The situation described by these data started changing during the first free multiparty election campaign in Croatia in 1991. Relations with friends, neighbours and even family relations deteriorated.

When asked about the reasons for their flight, most respondents replied

"fear." People who left their homes as early as the spring of 1991 more frequently mentioned direct attacks and ill treatment in general than those who left later. People who fled later expressed a more general fear for life as the war spread and indiscriminate artillery attacks escalated in frequency.[12]

Return?

Most of the refugees who took part in the survey – 61.3 percent – expressed the desire to return home. Only 9.4 percent said they would not return and 29.5 percent did not know. The greatest readiness to go home was shown by peasants, who also had the fewest escape options and were the first victims of criminal attacks and massacres by troops.

The UNHCR is presently preparing a detailed plan for the repatriation of refugees to areas which will be under the control of the UN protection forces (UNPROFOR) and which are now occupied by the Federal Army and Serbian Forces. It is assumed that the returning population will be the same as the population that fled. However, in many cases refugees either do not have anywhere to return to because their houses have been destroyed or they still do not know what shape their houses are in. Many have lost their families and need support to find new meaning in life. In addition, most refugees still fear for their safety if they return. The official and unofficial messages from their regions are crystal clear: refugees can expect to be arbitrarily branded as traitors or war criminals, to be victims of revenge by the extremist gangs and paramilitary formations which nobody has so far been eager to take to court for war crimes. It is therefore unlikely that the protection of basic human rights would be better guaranteed in the regions under UNPROFRO supervision. This situation prevents easy repatriation.

On the other hand, refugees are also under increasing pressure in the places where they have found temporary shelter. Over 80 percent of all refugees are being taken care of by friends and relatives. The rest are in collective shelters. A $24 million aid package provided by UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO) targets 500,000 Yugoslavs displaced in their own country by war and covers primarily food parcels, medical help, drugs and logistics.[13] Nonetheless, receiving families are decreasingly able to shoulder the rest of the burden, in particular in poorer parts of the country such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.[14] The new Serbian law on refugees contributes to their insecurity: according to its article 18, refugees can be stripped of their status and sent back "when the situation changes." This means that the Serbian government, which conducted an undeclared war in order to "protect the Serbian population outside Serbian borders," could decide to repatriate Serbs in the same way as Switzerland, claiming that there is no longer any danger to life in their areas of origin.[15]

Deserters

In October 1991, M. Milenkovic, a Yugoslav soldier from Serbia, committed suicide. He could not choose between becoming a "traitor" by abandoning the front line and killing his compatriots.[16] In Serbia he became the symbol of the growing resistance to the war among potential draftees and civilians in general.

Strong anti-war feelings were widespread even before the beginning of hostilities. According to one survey conducted 25-29 July 1991, only a small minority of people in most major cities claimed that war was "the best means of preserving state or national honour." Only 1 percent of respondents in Ljubljana, 4 percent in Belgrade and 10 percent in Zagreb thought that people should volunteer for the army if the local governments decided to start a war.

By the end of 1991 it was estimated that around 100,000 young men had fled to Western Europe in order to avoid being drafted by the Croatian National Guard and that about 150,000 escaped mobilization by the Yugoslav Federal Army by crossing the borders. In Serbia some 10,000 cases of desertion or of failure to respond to mobilization are being prosecuted.[17] In most cases, resistance to the war among recruits has been passive and silent, but there have also been cases involving the mass desertion of several hundreds or thousands of recruits, of public demonstrations and of spectacular acts like that of a soldier who drove his armoured car from the Slavonian front to the centre of Belgrade and parked it in protest in front of the Serbian Parliament. Although in principle deserters risk the death penalty, so far only a few soldiers have been punished by the military.[18]

As early as August 1991 pacifists in Belgrade publicly called for men to refuse mobilization and for soldiers to desert. Their statements ran counter to official war propaganda and to traditional warrior attitudes which are even now represented in public opinion and among parliamentarians: there were even proposals in the Serbian parliament for a bill that would forbid return to all those who left the country because of the war. This proposal did not win the necessary majority and was defeated. However, parliament also rejected the counterproposal: an amnesty bill that would guarantee safe return and no sanctions against deserters.[19]

Conclusion

The "return of nations" in Eastern and Central Europe, the creation of new ethnically homogeneous nation-states, demands a very high price for its realization. Can the Yugoslav tragedy serve as a sufficient warning to others? Nationalism, the credo of the power elites in former Yugoslavia – the "supreme stage of communism" as Adam Michnik mockingly called it – has transformed into victims precisely those in whose name and for whose "benefit" the war has allegedly been fought: the civilian population. Thousands have died, thousands more have become invalids, hundreds of thousands are refugees in what used to be their own country. That is the tragic legacy of the latest war in the Balkans. ▩

(Footnotes on page 8)

THE BIRTH OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA? Some Reactions to the Rise of Nationalism

Alexander Benifand & **Tanya Basok**

Centre for Refugee Studies, York University — Sociology/Anthropology, University of Windsor

In general, it is not easy for a new publication to survive in the former Soviet Union without receiving substantial subsidies. Dozens of new newspapers have gone bankrupt due to the high price of paper, bureaucratic bottlenecks and other problems. Yet nationalist newspapers do not seem to have experienced serious problems. They continue to grow. The Russian Society of Cooperation with Compatriots Abroad, for instance, produces 100,000 copies of their weekly newspaper, *Russkii Vestnik*. This newspaper is circulated by subscription and is also sold in the street. The magazine, *Molodaya Gvardia*, which can be purchased by subscription only, has a circulation of 300,000.

State authorities have done virtually nothing to stop the spread of these and other mass-circulation publications, partly because it is extremely difficult for them to control production and circulation. In the first place, the true nature of a nationalist publications is often concealed when it is registered with the City Council's Committee on Publications. Descriptions submitted with applications can be so vague that officials find it difficult to detect the publication's real nationalist objectives. Moreover, once the publication receives a permit, there is no follow-up to insure that its contents correspond to the original description. True, the St. Petersburg City Council has created a Committee for the Defense of Freedom of the Press and the Mass Media which, among other things, is intended to control the spread of nationalist newspapers. But this committee has no staff, no money, and no clear mandate.[1] Second, even though there is a law which criminalizes activities that incite ethnic conflict, it has not been enforced.[2] Many agents of social control are inactive because the communication links between the militia and security organs have been broken.[3] Third, even if the District Attorney were to shut down some newspapers, they could easily reappear under different names. This strategy is already being used by some organizations. For instance, an openly antisemitic newspaper, *Moskovski Traktir*, is simply a reincarnation of an earlier publication, *Russkoe Voskresenie*, which was in turn the reincarnation of *Voskresenie*. The Russian National Liberation Movement is behind all three publications.[4] While Russian state authorities are unable to control antisemitic organizations and the hate literature they produce, a number of people have raised their voices in opposition to the rise of nationalist forces, their growing popularity and the fact that they act with impunity.

Whereas just a few months ago the mass media were silent about the threat such nationalist organizations pose, now some journalists sound alarmed. For instance, A. Prodkopalov, a *Komsomolskaya Pravda* correspondent, attended a meeting of the National Socialist Union (a fascist organization) and warned his readers that "no one took Hitler seriously" either. In his view, what makes the National Socialist Union particularly dangerous is that its three commercial enterprises offer it a substantial material base enabling it to hire loyal staff and pay them a salary as much as twice that earned by the average worker.[5]

The activities of the Russian Liberation Movement (ROD) have drawn the attention of several journalists.[6] The objectives of this movement are: (1) to replace the present government by an exclusively Russian government; (2) to close the borders; (3) to grant citizenship to ethnic Russians only; (4) to create an exclusively Russian militia, security force and mobile military force. The latter could intervene quickly in case Russian minorities are attacked in other sovereign states of the former Soviet Union. The Republic of Russia they envision would include only Russian territories and exclude those which presently constitute non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation. The use of the swastika as their symbol clearly identifies them as Nazis. In his article on ROD, Murashko warns of the danger of being under the totalitarian rule of an "ambitious nationalist" force.[7] For I. Tkachenko, the rise of such movements is an indication of the "revival of animal instincts."[8]

O. Basilashvili, a Deputy of the Russian Parliament, wrote an open letter to the St. Petersburg District Attorney which was published in *Smena*. He drew attention to the dramatic increase in the activities of "national-patriotic movements" in St. Petersburg which, among other things, claim that it is sinful to socialize with Jews, who "desire Russian blood." Basilashvili cited the law which prohibits activities provoking ethnic violence and asked the District Attorney to explain his failure to take measures against the organization.[9]

A number of journalists also ridicule the antisemitic press. M. Petrov, for instance, analyzes a number of nationalist newspapers, such as *Russkie Vedomosti, Russkoe Delo, Russkii Vestnik, Nasha Rossia*, and *Otechestvo*. *Russkie Vedomosti*, for instance, is an ultra-nationalist newspaper published near Moscow. Its editorials include

such titles as "The protocols of Zion" and "The Jewish question and its final solution." Other newspapers discussed in Petrov's piece publish similar articles.[10]

In the popular magazine, *Ogonyok*, Mark Deich, Radio Liberty's Moscow correspondent, attacked a number of antisemitic newspapers and journals, such as *Russkoe Voskresenie, Molodaya Gvardia, Russkoe Delo, Pamyat* and *Volya Rossii. Russkoe Delo* regularly accuses all Jews of being organized in a Mafia and of being "enemies of the people." It also mentions that it is not accidental that the February Revolution coincided with the Jewish holiday of Purim and the October Revolution with the birthday of the Jewish leader Trotsky. In *Volya Rossii*, one Soloukhin openly called for the destruction of all Jews. Deich warned in his article: "The history of the 20th century has clearly pointed out how easily the power of a few mad people over the minds of their fellow-citizens can turn a normal country into a schizophrenic state. ... Unfortunately, our present leaders fail to understand such simple facts while searching for 'good democratic elements' in *Pamyat*."[11] The editors of *Ogonyok* appealed to the state to take measures against "the plague which poses a threat to unfortunate Russia. ... If we suppress it today we won't give a new Hitler a chance to emerge."[12]

The voices that have been raised against the spread of nationalism and its mass media are still very few. Until and unless these voices grow louder and force state authorities to respond, antisemitism and nationalism will offer false solutions to large masses of people who have become disenchanted with their present political leaders. ■

Notes

1. T. Zazorina "On pugaet, i im ne strashno" ("He scares but they are not afraid"), *Smena* (13 March 1992).
2. The only exception was the prosecution of Smirnov Ostashvilli, who was one of the instigators of the pogrom against Jews in the Moscow Writers' Union House.
3. "Udarim po terroru ekspertnim sovetom" ("Let's attack terrorism: an expert's advice"), *Vechernii Sankt Peterburg* (31 January 1992).
4. P. Kholobaev "Moskovskii Traktir: tol'ko dlya evreev" ("Moskovskii Traktir: For Jews Only"), *Komersant* (6 February 1992).
5. A. Podkopalov "Natsisti raz'ezhayut poka na elektrichkakh" ("Nazis are still taking trams"), *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (8 February 1992).
6. Yu. Murashka "Kto sozdayot respubliku Rus?" ("Who is creating the republic of Russia?"), *Sankt Peterburgskie Vedomosti* (11 February 1992); I. Tkachenko, "Bezobidnaya svastika ili muzhskaya sut' RODa" ("Innocent swastika or the masculine nature of ROD"), *Smena* (28 January 1992); Yu. Murashka, "Zrelie muzhchini reshili sozdat' respubliku Rus" ("Mature men decided to create the republic of Russia"), *Sankt Peterburgskie Vedomosti* (28 January 1992).
7. Murashenko, "Who is creating the Republic of Russia," *op. cit.*
8. I. Tkachenko, "Innocent Swastika," *op. cit.*
9. O. Basilashvili, "Pochemu Molchit Zakon?" ("Why is the law silent?"), *Smena* (15 February 1992).
10. M. Petrov "Russkie otveti na evreiskie voprosi" ("Russian answers to Jewish questions"), *Chas Pik* (6 February 1992).
11. Mark Deich "Uzelki na 'Pamyat'" ("Tie a knot on 'Pamyat'") *Ogonyok* (51: 1991): 6-8.
12. Editor's Note, *Ogonyok* (51: 1991): 8.

Continued from page 6

Yugoslav Refugees ...

Notes

1. This expression was used by Branko Horvat in his communication at the meeting "Das Europäische Jugoslawien," *Reichstag* (Berlin: 13-14 September 1991).
2. This conflict was an unprecedented welcome opportunity for Germany to demonstrate its unwillingness to further tolerate the discrepancy between economic and political power.
3. *Borba* (24 March 1992).
4. *Yugofax* (3 February 1991).
5. Die Tageszeitung (30 March 1992).
6. *Vreme* (6 August 1991).
7. Whether the applicant for this privileged treatment is considered to be from the territory of Croatia, or whether only Croatians are considered to be beneficiaries, is unfortunately left to the arbitrary decision of the local authorities.
8. *UNHCR Update* (3 December 1991).
9. *Danaa* (6 August 1991).
10. Silvano Bolcic, "Citizens sans frontiers," *Yugofax* (28 December 1991).
11. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979): 270.
12. Zdenka Milivojevic "Research on displaced persons from Croatia, 1991," paper presented at a conference on Mass Migrations in Europe (Vienna: 5-7 March 1992).
13. *UNHCR Update* (3 December 1991).
14. *Yugofax* (3 February 1992).
15. *Vreme* (23 March 1992).
16. *Grobnica za Miroslava Milenkovica* (Belgrade: 1991).
17. *Vreme* (23 December 1991).
18. Sentences meted out to deserters in recent court cases in the towns of Zajecar and Kraljevo, Serbia, range from 1000-10,000 Dinar fines to 30 days of prison. *Borba* (24 March 1992 and 31 March 1992).
19. *Vreme* (23 March 1992).

SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION AT A CROSSROADS

Sidney Heitman
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Soviet Jewish emigration is at a crossroads today. Conditions that have impelled more than three-quarters of a million Jews to leave the USSR during the past 45 years have radically changed in recent months, altering the character and dynamics of the exodus and raising important questions concerning its future. Will the current flight of Jews continue, will it grow, or will new developments in the Soviet successor states and elsewhere slow the exodus or end it altogether? Whichever course is taken, what will its consequences be for the emigrants, the former USSR, and the West?

The events that have led Soviet Jewish emigration to this juncture are well known because they have been widely reported in the press. Their ramifications for the movement are not as well understood, however, because they have not been studied until now. This article examines the changes in recent Soviet Jewish emigration and assesses their implications for the future.

Soviet Emigration Until Now

The recent changes in Soviet Jewish emigration can be best understood if they are viewed in historical perspective — that is, against the background of the movement's evolution until now. Since the exodus began in 1948, more than 778,000 Soviet Jews have emigrated to the West — two thirds of them to Israel, nearly one-third to the United States, and the remainder to other countries (see the table). Between 1948 and 1989 the number of emigrants averaged fewer than 10,000 persons annually. As a result of Gorbachev's reforms, however, the level rose to unprecedented heights in 1990 and 1991.

Until 1990, the emigrants' motives for leaving were threefold. Religious and Zionist Jews to wanted to "return" to Israel, while others left to escape persecution and discrimination or to seek freedom and a better life in the West. By 1990, these reasons for leaving began to change. Most religious and Zionist Jews had left the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev's reforms ended official antisemitism, introduced democracy and religious freedom, and liberalized emigration. However, his policies also led to political disintegration, economic disarray, ethnic conflict and the rise of grassroots antisemitism.

Seeking to escape the economic and political disorder and fearful that they would be made scapegoats for it, unprecedented numbers of Jews rushed to leave the USSR. Whereas in 1987 only 8,200 Jews had emigrated from the USSR, in 1988 the number rose to 19,400, in 1989 to 72,500, and in 1990 and 1991 to 201,300 and 186,000, respectively. Because in 1989 the United States had set a quota on immigration from the USSR of 50,000 persons annually, the vast majority of 1990 and 1991 emigrants went to Israel, where they could resettle without limit (see the table).

Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948-1991

Period	Number of Emigrants	Annual Average	— Destinations — Israel	U.S.	Others[a]
1948-89	391,000	9,300	191,900	170,800	28,300
1990	201,300	—	181,800	6,500	13,000
1991[b]	186,000	—	145,000	35,000	6,000
Total	778,300	—	518,700	212,300	47,300

[a] Other places include Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and countries in Europe and South America.

[b] Figures for 1991 are estimates because precise data were not available at the time of writing in early 1992.

Sources: Israeli Embassy, Washington, D.C.; Israeli Consulate General, New York; Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS); and U.S. Department of State.

Current Soviet Jewish Emigration

Today Soviet Jews are in an unprecedented position of being able to choose whether to leave the former USSR or to stay and take advantage of the new reforms. Both choices have attractions but also shortcomings. What they decide to do will depend upon the outcome of two contending sets of forces. One set of forces impelling them to leave includes the threat of economic collapse, deepening political disintegration and growing antisemitism. They also fear that there may be a return of repressive authoritarian regimes or that access to Israel may somehow be restricted.

Many observers see only these negative forces and predict a massive exodus in the near future of virtually the entire Soviet Jewish population. What they overlook or minimize, however, is the fact that there are also

other powerful forces encouraging Soviet Jews to remain in their homeland. These include optimism about the future because of the recent democratic reforms, a revival of Jewish religion, culture, and community life,[1] and the public condemnation by several leading political figures of past persecution of Jews and assurances of a secure place for them in the new successor states. There is also much resistance to leaving the former USSR because of a strong attachment Soviet Jews have to their homeland, the difficulty of parting with friends and relatives, and a reluctance to pull up roots, leave satisfying positions and accustomed life styles, and undertake the hardships of starting anew in foreign places. Moreover, they are now able to travel abroad freely, making it unnecessary to emigrate in order to avail themselves of opportunities in the West.

Finally, there is mounting concern over the severe shortages of housing and suitable jobs in Israel and the growing tensions in the Middle East. Many Jews who have already emigrated are today urging friends and relatives in the former Soviet Union to postpone leaving or forgo it altogether because of daunting problems for new immigrants to the Jewish state which the Israeli government appears to be unable or unwilling to resolve, and there has even been a small return flow of disillusioned emigrants back to their places of origin.

One result of the conflict between these two sets of forces is that although 1990 and 1991 were record high years of Soviet Jewish emigration, the number of emigrants fell far short of the 400,000 to 500,000 persons annually the Israeli government had hoped for, setting back its plan to resettle one million Soviet immigrants by 1995. The reason for the shortfall was that many individuals who could have left chose not to do so. According to Israeli authorities Soviet Jews today hold 200,000 entry visas and one million invitations to move to the Jewish state, meaning that virtually the entire Jewish population reported by the 1989 Soviet census (1.4 million persons) could emigrate if they chose to.[2] Most of them, however, are reportedly "sitting on their suitcases," in the words of one observer, awaiting the outcome of developments at home, in Israel, and in the West before deciding what to do.

Prospects for the future

Thus, contrary to a widespread belief that the vast majority of Soviet Jews urgently want to leave the former USSR and will do so soon, the fact is that they have viable options today. They can choose to vacate the former USSR *en masse*, which would mean the end of the historic Jewish presence there; remain and accommodate themselves to the emerging social and political order, which would put an end to mass Jewish emigration; or find a compromise between the two. Judging by the recent past, the course they will take will depend mainly upon future developments in the former Soviet Union and Israel.

If conditions in the successor states worsen, most Jews will undoubtedly emigrate to Israel, regardless of the problems there (unless the United States or other Western countries liberalize their immigration policies, which is highly unlikely). If, however, circumstances improve in the former USSR or deteriorate in the Jewish state, many if not most Soviet Jews may decide to remain where they are indefinitely.

These are only surmises, of course, for there is no reliable information concerning the intentions of hundreds of thousands of diverse and physically dispersed individuals with many generational, occupational and philosophical differences. What is certain is that the course they choose will have profound consequences for them, for Israel and for the West. If most Soviet Jews remain in the former USSR and rebuild their religious and cultural life there, it will mark the start of a new historic era in the annals of Soviet Jewry. If most of them move to Israel, however, it will profoundly alter Israeli society, culture, and politics.

Thus, Soviet Jewish emigration stands at a historic crossroads today from which two or three divergent paths lead out. Which one will be followed cannot be known, but whichever it is will have momentous import for the future. ■

Notes

1. According to the Va'ad, the Soviet Jewish umbrella group, there are more than 350 Jewish religious, cultural, educational, and social organizations and scores of new or restored synagogues and temples in the Soviet successor states today, with the number reportedly growing rapidly.

2. Estimates of the "actual" number of Soviet Jews range as high as three million persons, depending upon how Jewish identity is defined and who is doing the estimating. Soviet census figures reflect only self-reported ethnic identification, but many Jews, like members of other disadvantaged Soviet minorities, obscure their nationality or are uncertain of it because of assimilation and intermarriage.

Sources

Sidney Heitman, "Jews in the 1989 USSR Census," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, 20, 1, 1990;

— "The New Soviet Emigration Law: A Balance Sheet," Analysis (Institute of Jewish Affairs) 5, July 1991;

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— "Soviet Emigration in 1990: A New 'Fourth Wave'?" *ibid.*, 21, 3, 1991;

— "Soviet Emigration Under Gorbachev," *ibid.*, 19, 2, 1989;

— "The Third Soviet Emigration," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, 18, 2, 1988;

— *Soviet Refugee Monitor*, 1, 1, November 1991.

This article is also based on reports in *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Jerusalem Post* and *Forward*.

(Continued on page 14)

THE EMIGRATION POTENTIAL OF ROMANIA

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The Social Characteristics of Potential Emigrants from Romania

Last fall I had the opportunity to spend one week in Bucharest and meet Romanian researchers studying migration. From them I learned that since the revolution in December 1989 more than 4 million passports had been issued and for the first time in decades citizens are allowed to keep their passports at home and travel whenever they want. For obvious reasons, most Romanians are enthusiastic about travelling abroad. The question remains, however, whether particular groups or strata are especially keen to emigrate.

A recent survey carried out under the auspices of the Erasmus Foundation helps shed light on that issue. The fieldwork was done in 1991 on a stratified representative sample of 1,264 respondents. Two of the survey questions may be considered indicators of emigration potential:

(1.) If you had a chance to choose which country you want to live in, would you choose [name of country]?

1 - definitely
2 - probably yes
3 - probably not
4 - by no means/absolutely not

(2.) Do you think that if you had lived in a western country

1 - you would have got on better?
2 - it would have been the same?
3 - it would have been worse?

The responses to the first question indicate that every tenth Romanian thinks about emigration in positive terms, while two out of ten are uncertain. The remainder do not want to emigrate. The responses to the second question show that every second Romanian expects that he or she would have had a better life in the West.

While those who are ready to emigrate are very likely to believe they would have a better life in the West, among those who do not want to emigrate there are many who also assume that living in the West would offer them a better life. Specifically, 10 percent of Romanians are *potential emigrants* in the sense that they are ready to move to the West and feel they would have a better life there. Another 10 percent of Romanians are *ambivalent potential emigrants*, unsure whether they want to emigrate but certain they would have a better life in the West. An additional 31 percent of Romanians do not want to emigrate even though they know they would have a better life in the West. We may refer to this third group as *reluctant dreamers*. Finally, 49 percent of Romanians are confirmed *non-emigrants* who neither want to leave Romania nor believe their lives would be better elsewhere.

The potential emigrants are mainly male urban dewellers who are young and relatively well educated. The sharpest differences between potential emigrants and the total sample are in terms of age and urbanism. While 27 percent of the sample are under 30 years of age and 55 percent are of urban origin, the respective figures among potential migrants are 43 percent and 70 percent.

Table 1 shows the relationship between social status and mobility, on the one hand, and each of the four groups identified above, on the other.

Table 1 Group Type and Social Status/Mobility
(n=911; percent in brackets)

	Social Status/Mobility Type					
	1. Stable upper	2. Upwardly mobile upper				
	3. Stable Middle	4. Upwardly mobile middle				
	5. Stable working	6. Downwardly mobile				
Group Type	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Potential emigrants	15	26	35	12	5	13
	(15)	(18)	(9)	(11)	(6)	(14)
Ambivalent						
Potential emigrants	7	18	39	9	6	10
	(17)	(12)	(10)	(8)	(7)	(11)
Reluctant dreamers	37	49	136	38	17	27
	(37)	(33)	(36)	(33)	(21)	(30)
Non-emigrants	31	54	167	55	55	40
	(31)	(37)	(45)	(48)	(66)	(44)
Total	100	147	377	114	83	90
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)

(chi-square = 37.169, d.f. = 15, p = .0012)

The author is grateful to the Erasmus Foundation for permission to analyze data from their survey. This preliminary analysis is part of a larger work written for a project on Austrian and Hungarian refugee policies organized by the Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences, Vienna.

Comparing the percentages across the top row, we see that the groups with the greatest emigration potential are the upwardly mobile upper class and the stable upper class. The groups with the least emigration potential are the stable working class, the stable middle class and the upwardly mobile middle class. The downwardly mobile of all classes occupy an intermediate position, although they are closer to the groups with greater emigration potental. We may conclude that emigration potential is associated with upper class position and, to a lesser degree, downward mobility in all classes.

Table 2 sets out the relationship between group type and religion. Our sample is divided into two groups — those who are of Eastern Orthodox background and those who are not. Again inspecting the percentages across the first row, it clearly shows that non-Orthodox people are the most likely to want to emigrate. Since the non-Orthodox are likely to be of non-Romanian ethnic background — Hungarians, Jews, etc. — we may infer that social marginality is associated with high emigration potential in Romania.

In sum, my major conclusions about the sociodemographic determinants of emigration potential are:

• If the 10 percent of the Romanian population which in 1991 seemed ready to emigrate would actually do so, then Romania would lose many of its most mobile and resourceful people.

• The sociodemographic ideal type of the potential Romanian migrant is young, male, urbanized, highly-educated and upper-class.

• It also seems that ethnic and religious minority status increase the likelihood of wanting to emigrate.

• Results of the survey, too complex to present in the space available here, show, paradoxically, that people with close community ties are the least inclined to want to emigrate. This may be interpreted in two opposing ways. First, it may be that appropriate incentives could mitigate the desire of potential emigrants to leave. On the other hand, this finding might also signify the potential for chain migration: close ties may serve as the social mechanism encouraging early emigrants to later draw their Romanians friends and relatives to new homelands.

Negative Socio-Political Attitudes and Romanian Emigration

Apart from sociodemographic factors, attitudes can also influence emigration potential: political values, level of satisfaction and of fear, trust in the state, etc. We shall see that the more negative one's attitudes towards Romanian society, the stronger one's desire to emigrate.

Let us begin with respondents' attitudes toward the economic situation. There is hardly any difference among generations in desire to emigrate. Slightly more than half the population feels that their economic circumstances are worse than their parents' situation was at the same age. Non-emigrants are somewhat more dour than the average, which shows that most people believe that emigration is not the way to halt economic deterioration.

Whether they are asked about the recent past, the present or the future, potential emigrants are much more critical than others of various facets of Romanian society. The sharpest difference emerges when people are asked to consider the future. For example, when their negative attitudes towards the future of work and the economy were measured, potential emigrants scored 178 percent higher than ambivalent potential emigrants, 242 percent higher than reluctant dreamers and fully 426 percent higher than non-emigrants. Similarly, when Romanians are asked about the pace of change in the economy, potential emigrants were much more likely to view the pace of change as "too slow" (see Table 3-I). In the light of these findings it is not surprising that potential emigrants also registered lowest on a scale of satisfaction with the Romanian government (see Table 3-II). Where 10 indicates total satisfaction and 1 indicates total dissatisfaction, non-emigrants scored 7.1 and potential emigrants 3.6. These findings round out our profile of the ideal-type Romanian emigrant, who, in addition to possessing the sociodemogrpahic characteristics outlined above, is the most deeply dissatisfied member of a deeply dissatisfied citizenry. ■

Table 2 Group Type by Religion (n=1,131; percent in brackets)

	Non-orthodox		Orthodox	
Potential emigrants	30	(21)	88	(9)
Ambivalent potential emigrants	30	(21)	77	(8)
Reluctant dreamers	34	(24)	315	(32)
Non-emigrants	47	(33)	510	(52)
Total	141	(100)	990	(100)

(chi-square = 52.584, d.f. = 3, p = .0000)

Table 3: Attitudes by Group Type

I. Economic Change Too Slow
(in percent; n=1,048)

II. Politically Satisfied
(10-point scale; n=1,078)

	I.	II.
Potential emigrants	72	3.6
Ambivalent potential emigrants	71	3.7
Reluctant dreamers	56	5.4
Non-emigrants	37	7.1
Average	50	5.9

THE EMIGRATION POTENTIAL OF RUSSIA AND LITHUANIA: Recent Survey Results[1]

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A recent public opinion poll indicates that nearly seven million residents of Russia want to leave the Soviet Union forever. The poll, based on face-to-face interviews conducted in February 1991 among a randomly selected sample of 811 adults in Russia and 509 adults in Lithuania, also suggests that Lithuanian residents are only half as eager as Russian residents to leave their republic. Lithuanian resistance to emigration is based largely on a more optimistic assessment of that small republic's economic and political future.

Respondents in both countries were asked whether they would like to go with their families to one of the developed Western countries and, if so, for what length of time. As can be seen in Table 1, some 4.6 percent of the residents of Russia said they want to leave forever —proportionately, nearly twice as many as Lithuanian residents. Calculated as a percentage of Russia's population of 147.4 million, that amounts to about 6.8 million residents wanting to emigrate permanently. More Russian than Lithuanian residents want to go to the West for shorter periods of time too.

In both republics the desire to emigrate permanently varies with the age, optimism, gender, educational level and residence of respondents. The Russian and Lithuanian residents most likely to want to emigrate permanently are under 45 years of age and share a pessimistic outlook on their republic's economic and political future. The tendency to desire permanent emigration is also slightly stronger among men, the better educated and residents of urban centers (see Table 2).

The main reason why Russian residents are keener than Lithuanian residents to emigrate permanently lies in the gloomier economic and political prospects of Russia. Thus, Table 3 shows that when asked whether their republics will be completely undeveloped or highly developed economically in five years, 67.6 percent of the Lithuanian residents, but only 41.3 percent of the Russian residents, gave an optimistic reply. Moreover, while fewer than a tenth of the Lithuanian residents could not answer that question, over a fifth of the Russian residents found it difficult to

Table 1 "Would you like to go with your family to one of the developed countries of the West for some months? a year or two? five to ten years? forever?" (in percent)

	Some Months	1-2 yrs.	5-10 yrs.	Forever
Lithuania	48.3	21.4	7.3	2.4
Russia	61.2	30.3	13.1	4.6

Table 3 "What do you think the level of economic development of your republic will be in five years?" (in percent)

	Russia	Lithuania
Developed (optimistic)	41.3	67.6
Undeveloped (pessimistic)	37.8	24.7
Hard to say, no answer	20.9	7.9
Total	100.0	100.2

Table 4 "What in your opinion will the political system of your republic be in five years?" (in percent)

	Russia	Lithuania
Democratic (optimistic)	36.8	80.8
Dictatorial (pessimistic)	31.4	9.1
Hard to say, no answer	31.7	10.2
Total	99.9	100.1

Table 2 Percent answering "yes" to emigration "forever"

		Russia	Lithuania
Age	<45	6.5	3.7
	45+	2.0	0.5
Political outlook			
	pessimistic	8.4	2.6
	optimistic	4.1	2.4
Economic outlook			
	pessimistic	8.9	2.9
	optimistic	3.7	1.8
Gender			
	male	5.5	2.5
	female	3.8	2.2
Education			
	elementary	4.4	0.8
	secondary	4.4	3.4
	higher	4.9	0.0
Residence			
	provincial	4.0	1.2
	urban	4.8	2.9

say what their economic future might be. Even more striking is Table 4. When asked whether the political system of their republic will tend toward dictatorship or democracy in five years, fully 80.8 percent of the Lithuanian residents were optimistic that democracy would win out. Only 36.8 percent of the Russian residents felt similarly. And three times more Russian than Lithuanian residents were so uncertain about their future they were unable to answer the question.[2]

What makes these figures dramatic is that recent radical changes in Soviet emigration law will help push the wish to emigrate into the realm of reality. A new emigration law was approved by the Soviet Parliament on 20 May 1991. It comes fully into effect on 1 January 1993. Emigration, formerly restricted largely to Soviet citizens of Jewish, German and Armenian origin, will soon be an option available to virtually all citizens.

The new law is highly controversial in the Soviet Union. Liberals view the emigration law as a means of securing most-favoured-nation trading status from the United States, promoting human rights and ending the isolation of Soviet citizens from the outside world. Conservative opponents of the law argue that it will result in a brain drain of some eight million people. While the poll results add some credibility to the conservative estimate, once the new emigration law is fully implemented the number of Soviet emigrants will depend chiefly on the willingness of Western countries to accept Soviet immigrants. Controversy over the desirability of Soviet emigration will then be exported to the West. ■

Notes

1. Abridged from Tanya Basok and Robert J. Brym, eds. *Soviet Jewish Emigration and Resettlement in the 1990s* (Toronto: York Lanes Press, York University, 1991). The data analyzed in this article were collected and kindly made available by Szonda-Ipsos, Ltd., Budapest. However, Szonda-Ipsos is in no way responsible for the analyses and interpretations offered here, which are solely the responsibility of the author.

2. While the optimism that swept Russia in the aftermath of the failed coup probably changed this picture temporarily, it is unclear whether the buoyant mood will endure one winter of shortages in basic foodstuffs.

Continued from page 10/ **Soviet Jewish Emigration...**

Scholarly studies of Soviet Jewish emigration include:

Tanya Basok and Robert J. Brym (eds.), *Soviet Jewish Emigration and Resettlement in the 1990s* (Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1991).

Robert O. Freedman (ed.), *Soviet Jewry in the 1980s; The Politics of Anti-Semitism and Emigration and the Dynamics of Resettlement* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989).

Dan N. Jacobs and Ellen Frankel Paul (eds.), *Studies of the Third Wave: Recent Migration of Soviet Jews to the United States* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981).

Wolf Moskovich, *Rising to the Challenge; Israel and the Absorption of Soviet Jews* (London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1990).

Yaacov Ro'i, *The Struggle for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948-1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Laurie P. Salitan, *Politics and Nationality in Contemporary Soviet-Jewish Emigration, 1968-89* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

Ronald Sanders, *Shores of Refuge: A Hundred Years of Jewish Emigration* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1988).

Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym, *Soviet-Jewish Emigration and Soviet Nationality Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

See also publications of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the 35's Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry, and the Israeli Consulate General, New York.

BOOK REVIEW

SOVIET-JEWISH EMIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT

Edited by
Tanya Basok & Robert J. Brym
York Lanes Press, Toronto
Price : $15.95

Reviewed by **Lisa Gilad**

This is one of those books with a misleading title. Let's start with Chapters 2 through 4. These chapters are not only about the context of emigration for Soviet Jews. Heitman's article on Soviet emigration movements from 1948 to the present places Jewish emigration in the context of other major emigrating groups who have been able to utilize and find refuge in their extra-territorial ties: Germans to Germany; Armenians to their brethren; Pontian Greeks to Greece; and evangelical Christians to the Bible Belt. These people belong to groups with particularly wretched histories, but they are far from the only minorities which suffered persecution from Soviet rule. Other persecuted nationalities — some thoroughly assimilated through Russification — have not benefited from outside concern. There is one noteworthy update to Heitman's chapter. He cites improvements in the logistics of departure for former Soviet Jews but claims that they still have to forfeit their citizenship when emigrating to Israel.

By July 1991, this blatant denial of their rights to return to their country of nationality (ironically while returning to their country of nation [Israel]) had been rectified. Since then, Soviet Jews are required to leave with Soviet passports to ensure their right of return. The new Russian Citizenship Act has continued this new-found tradition of continued civil enfranchisement after emigration. Finally, in Heitman's article, Jews and Germans become strange bedfellows — both groups facing increasingly negative attitudes because of 'deserting the ship'

during times of economic and political hardships. As is made eminently clear in later articles, ordinary Russians do not have an escape valve.

Tillman's article on projected internal migration and emigration defines the major sources of ethnic conflict — amongst over 70 known disputes. This article is particularly relevant to the European dialogue on future migration from the Commonwealth of Independent States. Of course, some events have not turned out as expected — not yet anyway. There is not yet a massive outflow of Russians from the Baltics (p. 22) which is unlikely to occur given the economic crisis in Russia, the inadequacy of the Russian resettlement authorities and their preoccupation in settling Russian victims of active persecution from the Caucuses and Central Asian republics, the continuation of the (unconstitutional) permanent residence system, negative attitudes towards returnees — among other compelling reasons not to return. Many Russians voted for the independence of the Baltics, but their empathy level might decrease as Russians will be the first to be fired in the economic crunch to come.

Brym's article on Lithuanian and Russian attitudes towards emigration begs more explanation of the tables. A similar criticism can be levelled at his chapter entitled *"Perestroika,* Public Opinion and *Pamyat."* One was left wondering how with increased democratization in the autumn of 1991, *Pamyat* received its own radio station and the conservative nationalists forces grew so fast with the fall of the USSR. Perhaps the editors can next bring us a volume to understand more about the new nationalist chauvinism. While Jews, far removed from their roots through Russification, no doubt are deeply disturbed by the symbols of Russian nationalist chauvinism, plenty of other minorities must be shuddering as well.

Benifand's article is one of the best in this volume. While there is insight into the past trends driving out Soviet Jews elsewhere in the book, he clearly portrays the 'push' forces of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Anti-semitism in an atmosphere of socio-economic and political upheaval is frightening to those who are seen to be Jews — whether in practice they are or not. This explains why desperate people go to Israel in droves, even though Israel is still ill-prepared for its new absorption tasks.

I'm sure when Israelis read articles like Cohen's on the serious challenges and problems in absorbing the Soviet Jews of the 1990s, many will remember the tents, the disease and the poverty which characterized immigrant absorption of the 1950s. *It could be worse.* But Cohen's article vividly portrays the problems. The article is truly a picture of resettlement. The article on resettlement in Austria is unique in recognizing the cultural and class differences among Soviet Jews who are too often treated as a homogeneous group. The article, however, left me aching to read a "typical biography" — a methodology described but not delivered in this chapter.

One article that categorically did not belong with the section on resettlement was Beyer's excellent analysis of U.S. selection *abroad* in Moscow, Rome and Vienna. We don't see one Soviet Jew, Armenian, or Christian after entry into the U.S. The article belonged to the section on *the context* of emigration which includes the domestic and international politics and economics of the receiving country. For anyone interested in U.S. processing, this chapter is required reading. Only two caveats — Beyer (or the editors) should have explained the term "parole" — anyone outside of the refugee protection arena will puzzle over this term. And he forgets to note the irony of applying the statutory definition in selection in Moscow — that the application of the Convention refugee definition *precludes* applying for refugee status from within the country of alleged persecution. A person must be *outside* her country to meet that definition, whether we like it or not.

Finally, a few comments on Basok's overview of the Canadian arena. She writes about the situation of varied acceptance rates for (former) Soviet arrivals in Canada. A partial explanation might be offered by the kinds of claimants arriving at different ports-of-entry. Ontario receives almost all in-status claimants who are visitors (Soviets only, that is). The Quebec region receives both in-status and port-of-entry during refuelling flights. The Atlantic receives only port-of-entry claimants at Gander, most of whom are not from the centres of power – Moscow and St. Petersburg. In addition, Basok reiterates the ideological bias in favour of refugees from communism. As was indicated as early as April 1990 in my own work, the ideological bias in favour of refugees from communism ceased with the new Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) in 1989. Any reading of IRB statistics will indicate this (see p. 148). Canada might implement its foreign policy objectives through refugee selection abroad, but inland determination has proved reluctant to acknowledge such concerns. Basok also relates Refuge Status Advisory Committee (RSAC) statistics that only 30 Soviets made refugee claims in Canada from 1977 - 1987, most of whom were rejected. In fact, a number of others indicated a willingness to claim but prior to 1 January 1989, were given Minister's Permits because of the severity of the exit restrictions and Canada's cold war concerns. Finally, I thought it was helpful to point out the conflict within the Canadian Jewish community about the 'proper' destination of Soviet Jewish emigration. This internal conflict within the American Jewish community was not apparent in Beyer's article, and I was left wondering *why not.*

In conclusion, this volume contains insights into non-Jewish internal and external migration trends and particularly good data on what happened with Soviet Jewish emigration in the 1980s. It sets the stage for us to understand the 1990s, but the title does not fully represent the contents of this all too short volume. ■

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May 8-9	Crete	• International Refugee Documentation Network	• The Future of the International Refugee Documentation Network
May 26-29	Toronto	• Centre for International and Strategic Studies	• Confidence and Security Building in the Middle East
June 8-14	Blantyre, Malawi	• The Government of Malawi • Centre for Refugee Studies	• First Country Asylum and Development Aid in Malawi
Sept. 25	Toronto	• Hong Fook Mental Health Centre Toronto	• The Mental Health of Refugees
Oct. 2-4	Ottawa	• The Group of 78	• The Movement of Peoples: A View from the South
Oct. 14-17	Vancouver	• Western Social Policy Forum Society of British Columbia Canada	• Refugees in the 90's: National and International Perspectives - Integrating Policy, Practice and Research
Oct. 30 – Nov. 1	Toronto	• Centre for Refugee Studies York University, Canada	• Early Warning
Nov. 11-16	Toronto	• Centre for Refugee Studies and CERLAC, York University	• Promotion of Cooperation among Canada, Mexico and the United States in Protecting the Rights of Refugees and Migrants