CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGE

Vol. 9, No. 1 SPECIAL ISSUE October 1989

Afghan Refugees

When Duke University Professor and Afghan scholar Louis Dupree was asked a year ago to edit a special issue of *Refuge* on Afghanistan, he immediately set to to work on this project with the help of his wife, Nancy Hatch Dupree. The issue was beginning to take shape when Louis Dupree died of lung cancer in March of this year. Now that the project has been completed, we are dedicating the results to his memory.

Louis Dupree: In Memoriam

by Anders Fänge

There is a story about Louis Dupree. Once, in the early eighties, during a discussion about Afghanistan in the State Department, an expert on the Soviet Union said that the Afghans will lose this war because there has so far never been a case in history where the Soviets have left a country once they have put their hands on it. His argument was simple. The Soviet Union was a superpower with all its resources and the biggest war machine the world had ever seen; Afghanistan was a backward country, one of the poorest, with no army, a divided resistance, little organization, and so on. Louis was there and he objected. He told the man: "Perhaps you know the Soviet Union, but it is obvious that you don't know the Afghans. If you did, you would also know that they will not give up, that they'll go on fighting whatever the odds, they will continue to resist until the Soviets are forced out of their country."

He said the same thing on numerous lectures around the world, in articles and interviews, in every possible fora where he could make his voice heard. Even during the worst years, between 1984 and 1986, when the Soviets tried to bomb Afghanistan back to the Stone Age, when they attacked furiously in a last desperate attempt to crush the Afghan spirit of resistance, when many of us who supported and believed in the Afghan cause did not dare to hope any more; even then he never expressed a single doubt that the Afghan people would reach victory in the end.

Of course, there were a lot of people who said that Louis certainly knew a lot about Afghanistan, but his analysis emanated more from feelings than from facts. I was one of them, and I was wrong. Louis was right, because he had, above all,

Continued on page 2

IN THIS ISSUE:

one thing in common with the Afghans, which was crucial in his profound and unique understanding of them; just like them he was not a quitter. Just like the Afghans he was a fighter.

Now he has left us, attacked from within by that dreadful disease. But I refuse to believe that he gave up. I am convinced that he fought until that stage where no fights are possible any more, where you are left alone with your creator. He died the same way he had lived. He came a long way. He saw the Soviets leaving, but he did not reach his own personal victory, which would have been to see his beloved Kabul once again. The Afghan people, and we who are working to help them, have lost one of our best friends and staunchest supporters. We will miss his deep knowledge and good advice, his stories and jokes, the spirit he created around him. But, above all, we will miss his straight-forwardness and honesty, his habit of calling things for what they are; because Louis Dupree never hesitated to call a cat a cat and a pig a pig, to the satisfaction of many and to the dismay of those who deserved it.

There are too few Louis Duprees in this world and now there is one less; the world is a poorer place.

Anders Fänge *started as a reporter in Afghanistan in 1981. He has been the Director of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan — one of the oldest and today the biggest crossborder humanitarian agency working in Afghanistan — since 1983. He was also one of the founders of the Agency Co-ordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) and is now its Vice-Chairman.*

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Refuge is dedicated to the encouragement of assistance to refugees by providing a forum for sharing information and opinion on Canadian and international issues pertaining to refugees. It is published four times a year by the Centre for Refugee Studies. It is a non-profit, independent periodical supported by private donations and by subscriptions. It is a forum for discussion, and the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of its funders or staff.

Subscription rates for one year are $20.00 in Canada and US $25.00 overseas. Please enclose payment with your order.

Logo design:
Dreadnaught Co-operative Inc., Toronto

Layout: ***PAGES*** plus

Second Class Mail Registration N° 5512 ISSN 0229-5113

The Current Situation

Most Members of the Citizens Commission on Afghan Refugees who visited Pakistan previously accepted the widely held view of governments and the general population that: "the regime in Kabul will probably fall soon after the Soviet withdrawal".

Obviously, the conventional wisdom was wrong and it now appears that the fighting will continue on for an indeterminate time that some speculate will last for years unless there is a negotiated settlement between the government in Kabul and the Interim Government based in Peshawar. Here it should be pointed out that one member of the Commission, Robert Cranborne, did *not* concur with this assumption. In an article in the *Spectator* (August 6, 1988), he points out that the Geneva accords provided an agreement for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but did not contain provisions that would guarantee peace. He discusses the "fiendishly complicated political situation" and opines that the existing parties are not likely to become more effective and that the West should encourage the commanders "to take power into their own hands".

As a consequence of the continued fighting, substantial numbers of Afghan refugees, largely from the Jalalabad area, continue to flee to Pakistan. During my stay, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, announced that 800-1,000 new refugees are now arriving daily in Pakistan. Others have cited a figure of 70,000-75,000 new refugees since November 15, 1988. I visited one of the refugee camps for new arrivals, the Shindand Camp near Hangu. There were an estimated 8,000-10,000 refugees living in tents, under a glaring sun, on a wind-swept dusty plain. Many of the tents had been blown down by strong winds, and could not be reconstituted because of defective poles. Safe water and food had to be brought in by truck. The provision of basic health care was inadequate. I was told that ten children had died the previous day and was shown several fresh graves. Throughout my visit the refugee elders pleaded with me for additional help. An obvious point to be made is that programmes for refugees in Pakistan must not yet be de-escalated. To the contrary, additional support services are urgently required by the new arrivals.

The above comments have been excerpted from James C. Strickler's "Report of Visit (5/22-5/28/89) to Peshawar and Hangu Pakistan", dated June 16, 1989. The author is is a Member of the Citizens Commission on Afghan Refugees.

Canadian Aid

According to Government of Canada sources, about $300 million has been provided to Afghan refugees between 1980 and 1988 through the United Nations and the Government of Pakistan. It is mostly in the form of food commodities. While this may sound like a lot of money, given the magnitude and duration of this refugee crisis, it is not. It works out to far less than one cent per day per refugee.

Government-to-government aid was also withdrawn in 1980. That is still in effect. In 1988, however, Canada restored aid through NGOs to Afghanistan. Only about $2 million has been provided (through NGOs) inside Afghanistan during the whole war thus far.

Louis Dupree: A Tribute

by M. Nazif Shahrani

Afghanistan's natural and human resources have been devastated by the more than a decade-long direct and indirect military aggression by the Soviet Union against her small, traditionally non-aligned, Muslim neighbouring state in Central Asia. The displacement of over five million Afghans as refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and another two and a half million displaced from rural villages and small provincial towns into the capital, Kabul, and a few larger urban centres inside the country, is but one consequence of the war of resistance by the peoples of Afghanistan. The Soviets have now withdrawn their troops from Afghanistan, but their aggression against the people of Afghanistan and their colonialist policy of domination continues unabated. Their war by proxy goes on with greater intensity, using new and more lethal weapons. The Russians have unleashed a powerful international media campaign to present their withdrawal from Afghanistan as evidence of a change of policy and proof of their peaceful intentions in Afghanistan. In reality, however, the Soviets have introduced new and more sophisticated means of pursuing the goals they could not accomplish by direct intervention.

During the entire struggle, Afghans have fought bravely and recorded many important military victories against their powerful enemies. However, they have failed to achieve the same level of success in effectively presenting their case to the world community through the media so as to properly expose the moral bankruptcy of the Soviet policies in Afghanistan. With the premature demise of Louis Dupree, a strong and very effective voice of the Afghan cause in the scholarly as well as journalistic community, the difficulties of maintaining strong and powerful media campaigns may be further aggravated.

Professor Dupree, often referred to in academic circles as the Dean of Afghanistan Studies, was a pioneer in the field. His research and publishing career on Afghanistan spanned some forty years, beginning in 1949, when he participated in an archaeological excavation in Southwestern Afghanistan as a Harvard graduate student, until his death, due to lung cancer, on March 21, 1989. Louis Dupree, a trained archaeologist, directed the American Archaeological Mission in Afghanistan (1959-1971), and was also a member of the American Universities Field Staff (1959-1983) covering Afghanistan and Pakistan. In his capacity as an AUFS researcher and teacher he spent many years living in Afghanistan, travelling to the most remote parts of the country, studying and reporting on many aspects of the contemporary heterogeneous Afghan society, culture, economy, and politics. His monumental and encyclopaedic book, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973; updated 1980) presents a lasting legacy of his commitment and valuable service to students and researchers for generations to come.

Louis Dupree published tirelessly both in academic journals and the public media, writing on a wide variety of themes, peoples, regions, issues and events of consequence in Afghanistan. As such, all scholars of Afghanistan owe him a significant intellectual debt. Louis's contribution to Afghanistan studies was by no means limited to his published works. His direct personal support, and enthusiastic encouragement of all researchers interested in Afghanistan studies, especially Afghan students and scholars, was unparalleled. He was a jovial, genial, energetic and provocative scholar with an uncommon sense of dedication to "his friends, the Afghans" and to Afghan affairs. He shared the grief of the Afghan nation during the last decade of Soviet intervention, and he never faltered in the belief that the Afghans would not submit to brute force. He continued to study Afghanistan, together with his wife and research companion Nancy Hatch Dupree; they were intimate observers of the plight of the Afghan refugees in neighbouring Pakistan, and outspoken advocates in the international arena. The fact that just a few weeks before Louis's death the defeated Red Army was in the last phase of its final departure from Afghanistan must have given him some satisfaction. At this critical phase in the struggle for regaining the right of self-determination by the peoples of Afghanistan, the loss of Louis Dupree's active voice in support of the Afghan cause is irreplaceable. However, the *jihad* must go on without Louis, and the challenge of repatriating and rehabilitating the refugees, and reconstructing and developing Afghanistan must be faced. In this process Louis's knowledge and insights, and his passion for Afghanistan, will be sorely missed.

M. Nazif Shahrani *is an Associate Professor of Anthropology and Middle Eastern Studies at UCLA, and a Co-Director of the Centre for Asian Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan.*

Canadian Foreign Policy

In 1980, Canada de-recognized the Kabul government. In 1988, External Affairs, in a letter to Human Concern International stated: "Canada does not recognize the present government [of Afghanistan] as it has no legitimacy".
In 1986 and 1987, at annual United Nations debates on Afghanistan, then Canadian ambassador Stephen Lewis gave extremely strong speeches, using numerous human rights reports. He quoted from the UN's own Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan about the "evidence that genocide has been committed against the Afghan people by the combined forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union."

The Canadian Response to Afghanistan

by Jane Thomas

Afghanistan has produced half the world's refugees and the largest refugee population in the world: about 5.5 million. A refugee population is, of course, problematic in itself; however, it is only a symptom of other problems. "The world's largest refugee population" is indicative of the country-wide nature and severity of the problems inside Afghanistan.

This paper draws attention to the non-government response to the Afghan crisis. Given the international humanitarian image which Canadians have, and our track-record demonstrating our capability and willingness to help in crises as well as in longer term development, the non-government organization (NGO) response to Afghanistan is severely abnormal — less than half of one per cent of all financial assistance! Only one Canadian relief agency has been present on the scene! Less than two per cent of Canada's intake of refugees is Afghan! Only one Canadian has been employed to work in Canada on the crises! Maybe twenty Canadians have seen the crisis first hand! None of the agencies which exist solely to educate Canadians about the developing world have programmes on educational material on Afghanistan on a regular basis and most have never included any material. How can this happen when most Canadians know there is a major war and a superpower had invaded? The Afghans are the largest refugee population in the world! How can such an obvious need go unaddressed?

Before attempting to explain why the Canadian response has been so limited, it is relevant to describe my own involvement. In 1984, completely by chance, I was assigned to Pakistan as a leader in the Canada World Youth exchange programme. There, with Pakistani counterparts, we began looking at Pakistan's development history, concepts, problems and successes. Although Afghanistan was not on the CWY agenda, its relevance rapidly became apparent. Further, many Afghans were asking, "Why is it so hard to emigrate to Canada?" I was also "discovering" the whole refugee situation and was shocked. Despite having been involved with a number of Third World agencies back home, learning about different world situations, development issues and social justice, no one had ever mentioned the fact that there were so many. When I went to Pakistan, I wondered why I had never heard of the Afghan refugees.

Seeing the refugee camps spread out as far as the eye could see and for hundreds of kilometres, I began seeking Canadian relief workers to educate me and answer my questions. I could not find any! All officials said, "There are no Canadian relief agencies or Canadians here." I found no evidence of any Canadian help. Then, as now, Canada and Canadians are considered absent.

Back home in Canada, I thought, this cannot be true. I still had certain expectations of Canadian humanitarians. We go out and help everywhere, don't we? Thus began the research now summarized in the boxes. It proves that the officials were not exactly correct. Canadians have helped a little, but very little.

At about the same time I began speaking nationally, with a concentration in Ontario and Alberta. I gave slide/talk presentations at universities and held discussions with numerous Third World social justice and development organizations, church groups, general audiences, the media and so on. As I have continued to study the Afghanistan situation, I made thousands of contacts in Canada attempting to elicit understanding and help. For five years I have also listened to the Canadian perception of what is happening in Afghanistan.

All of my experience made me question whether I should adjust my expectations of Canadian humanitarians downward to be realistic. But I also wanted to change things, inspied every time I saw "global justice" or "social justice" on a letterhead or in a pamphlet.

Generally speaking, I have found that the only place empathy for the Afghans is expressed is in the general public. The least interest and empathy seems to be with the NGOs, and that is odd because only they exist officially to care about such things.

But in all areas of the public and the NGO community, there is an anti-Muslim bias. Information from the Soviet perspective is very common. Except for Afghans in exile in Canada and a handful of others, I have not encountered a single Canadian connected with any NGO who appears to have made an attempt to understand the popular resistance movement — its ideas or ideology. Many apparently have never even grasped that it *is* a popular resistance movement, and, because the ideas of the resistance are not known, they are assumed to have none.

Only two Canadian organizations, the Afghan Association of Ontario and Human Concern International, have taken a pro-active stance in favour of the resistance and condemned the Soviets and the Kabul regime.

By far, most Canadian NGOs have remained completely silent. Although numerous case examples could be presented, the following four are representative of attitudes revealed in internal or private discussions. It must be emphasized, while remaining unnamed, these cases involve "top of the line", widely known and respected Canadian organizations.

Canadian NGOs

In 1986, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, the umbrella group of Canadian non-governmental organizations, published a directory of Canadian NGOs, "engaged in international development". Three hundred and sixteen agencies are listed. This number represents one of the highest per capita number of Third World oriented NGOs in the world.

Agency functions cover a wide range of activities; providing financial, material, technical and personnel assistance in developing countries as well as carrying out social justice, development and public education programming on the various countries in Canada. Solidarity and refugee settlement agencies were not included.

Case 1

A few months after my return from Pakistan I was hired as the co-ordinator of a Centre which exists to educate Canadians about Third World problems. The hiring committee told me I was being hired for my administrative skills and to be a spokesperson on Afghanistan. The committee expressed concern that the Centre had developed a quite "far left" image and my speaking on Afghanistan "would lend political balance to the place". When word leaked out amongst a core of the Centre's membership and community that I was being considered for the open position, the protests started. The protests were based solely on one article I had written for the local daily newspaper. It had simply summarized the observations I had made on the Afghan refugees in Pakistan only a few months before. The protesters now blamed the Centre for encouraging "anti-Soviet propaganda", that I was lying and exaggerating about what was happening in Afghanistan. The Board of Directors of the Centre decided to ignore the protests and hired me anyway.

But the outside harassment continued over the following year. Attempts were made each time I gave public presentations to discredit what I said, even though all that I talked about was what I had witnessed. Soviet literature and audio cassettes began appearing on my desk with messages that I "should get to know the truth." Articles or notices I had written for educational purposes would sometimes disappear. Materials on the refugees I placed in the Centre library were quietly removed. At social events, there were verbal attacks, almost always, by people from other Third World development agencies who attempted to down play the Afghan situation. "There are no death squads in Afghanistan like there are in El Salvador. No chemical weapons are being used. What about the way they treat their women? The number of refugees is just an exaggeration by Pakistan to get more CIA help." These were typical remarks. After a year of this discrediting and pressure not to speak, I asked the Board to clarify my mandate. Was I to speak on Afghanistan or not? After a long meeting together with Board and staff, the conclusion was no. "The community around the Centre does not, after all, really understand what the Centre is trying to do". I resigned.

Case 2

I met with the director of a highly respected NGO known for its public education work on justice and the subject of refugees. Its literature suggests a wide-open mandate for any refugees, but they had done no research or public education work on the Afghans. The subject had never been touched. Although this man had a fair amount of knowledge and sympathy for the Afghans, he explained his agency's rationale for not touching the subject. "We are just convincing the public there isn't a communist under every rock in Central America. If we start talking about Afghanistan, we'll just confuse the public." Later, apparently recognizing a responsibility, they included Afghanistan, amongst other countries, in a new educational kit on the root causes of refugees. While most of the information was fair, a concluding statement included misleading and outrightly false information, and reinforced the negative stereotype of the Afghans and their cause.

Case 3

I met with the representative of a church-based organization concerned with human rights in Asia. I was told, "No, we've never published anything on Afghanistan." They "would not likely do so either." His rationale was that Amnesty International already was reporting on Afghanistan so he saw no need to. "But", I protested, "you are the specialists in Asia. I know your reputation. A big and important sector of Canadians relies on you to tell them what is happening. They wouldn't necessarily hear from Amnesty. If you don't mention Afghanistan, they could think there are no problems there." Was it religion? This organization reports to Christians,but the Afghans are Muslim. He said no, that was not at all the matter, and pointed out reporting done on other non-Christian situations. The more we discussed the Afghanistan situation, the more it showed why this organization had not provided leadership. His information was an almost word-for-word repeat of the

NGO Afghan Involvement

Between 1980 and 1986 a total of seven Canadian NGOs had contributed to Afghan refugees a total of about $10 million, but by 1986 only three were still contributing (Salvation Army, the Canadian Red Cross Society and Human Concern International). The Afghanistan Medical Relief Organization (AMRO) of Kingston continued to bring wounded Afghans to Canada for treatment. All other contributors had ceased their support in 1984 or before. Only one of the seven, Human Concern International, had ever been physically present and operating in the refugee camps in Pakistan or inside Afghanistan. The others contributed through partner organizations who were present.

Spokespeople for Afghanistan

Spokespeople on Afghanistan are exceedingly rare. There are basically only three functioning as such in Canada, the presidents of the Afghan Association of Ontario and the Afghan Medical Relief Organization (AMRO) of Kingston and the author of this paper. Outside of Ontario, there are none, except for a few Afghans in Montreal and Edmonton who have on special occasions spoken out.

Canadian-Produced Educational Resources

Only two Canadian produced resources, which could be considered educational, exist. One is a documentary film produced by Stornoway Productions of Toronto, called "Witnesses: Afghanistan the Untold Story", the second is a small incluion in an NGO kit on the root causes of refugees, which explians why the latter is unsuitable.

Soviet or pro-Soviet literature which I, too, had read by then; news releases from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, publications from *Izvestia*, Progress Books and the newspaper of the Communist Party of Canada, the *Tribune*.

Case 4

When the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan were signed the media raved about them as a major UN accomplishment. As Canadians had not followed the talks from the resistance side, the massive injustices, unworkability and devastating effects which the Accords would have, were not widely known or understood. I approached a national umbrella group of some one hundred organizations concerned with refugees world-wide and in Canada. An important function of this group is to watch and analyze political situations as they affect refugees, and mobilize Canadian opinion and responses. A national conference of this group was coming up and it was urgent and timely that the Canadian leaders in refugee causes be informed on the creation of yet more problems for the world's largest refugee population, so that at the very least, blame would not be misplaced.

Anticipating being put on the agenda to speak about the Accords, I approached the president of the organization explaining that the faults of the Accord were caused by the resistance being excluded from the talks and their demands ignored. For years they had demanded that the negotiation process be changed as well to provide a negotiated political (non-military) settlement. The Accords had abandoned the Afghan people to the regime already committing genocide. At most, I hoped this organization would not be mislead by the media again, condemn the Accords and the Kabul regime and understand why.

The president's response was to give me a newspaper article about an abuse carried out by some Muslim men against a Muslim woman in India. She said, "If this is anything like what will happen in Afghanistan by 'fundamentalists', I will have nothing to do with them." It apparently had never occurred to her how prejudiced and irrelevant this occurrence was to Afghanistan, two countries away. This president, known to be a humanitarian of the highest order, would never dream of associating events in different Christian-dominated countries, say events in El Salvador with those in Peru. And would never judge a whole country by the actions of a few, let alone a few in an entirely different country. Nothing was ever mentioned to the membership. There was, of course, no learning and no condemnation.

These cases are not at all unique. Many others could be cited. They represent part of the vicious circle that has interfered with an appropriate Canadian response. If Canadian humanitarians at the highest level are silent, have a prejudice themselves, make no effort to know the story from the victim's side, have suppressed or avoided it or have chosen to know the story from the oppressor's side, then there is no wonder that there is confusion and a lack of public response. Other parts of the vicious circle are:

- Canadian news editors and producers handle the news completely unethically. In 1984 the Kabul regime declared a news black-out, threatening journalists caught reporting independently with imprisonment, execution or both. Since this news black-out everything reported from Kabul is, by law, under government control. But the Canadian news providers fail to mention this restriction and help create the totally distorted picture (that Kabul is the victim instead of the victimizer). Those who oppose the regime have virtually no access to the media. Without an informed and active segment of "watchdogs" in Canada, the media goes uncorrected and the completely distorted picture continues.
- Exceedingly few Canadians have been to Pakistan or Afghanistan to see and hear the resistance's side of the story. Only very few Afghans have been allowed to come to Canada. They are located mainly in one city (Toronto). Only one organization specializes in sponsoring Afghans, the Afghan Association of Ontario, and they sponsor family members only. Major sponsorship problems continue. Not a single organization lobbies on their behalf. Since the number of Afghans is kept low, they have barely an effective

Afghan Materials in Resource Centres

At least 32 Canadian NGO "learner centres" exist specifically and solely to educate Canadians about the developing world and to collect audio-visual and print resources. In these audio-visual collections, there are none on Afghanistan. In eight of these centres almost all print resources on file were from the Soviet perspective. None have included Afghanistan in regular programming and most have never included it once.

NGO Afghan Aid

To put the contribution into context, according to a study conducted by the North/South Institute (Bridges of Hope?), Canadian NGOs raised approximately $280 million in 1984-1985 and that was matched by the government of Canada for a total of $525 million. This went to NGO efforts in many countries. In the same year, which co-incidentally is considered to be the most severe year of the war in Afghanistan, the Canadian NGO contribution to the Afghans was a maximum of $2 million (part of the above $10 million), or less than half of one percent of the total Canadian NGO financial activity.

Canadian Immigration Policy: 22 Afghans per Year

United Nations estimates there are about 5.5 million Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan. They are roughly 50% of the world's refugees and the largest population of refugees in the world. From this number Canada has selected about 2% of it's own refugee intake. Between 19804and 1988, statistics issued in "Refugee Perspectives" by Employment and Immigration, show that a total of 90,800 refugees have been selected by Canada. One thousand nine hundred and ninety six of those are Afghans.

voice, which in part answers the original Afghan question: "Why is it so hard to emigrate to Canada?"

- Canadians reject cold war politics, and are unwilling to offend the USSR. Canadians see Afghanistan as a superpower conflict and do not appreciate the fact that, to the Afghans, the conflict is instead a personal and national struggle.
- In Canada there is the perception that Afghanistan is only yet another American-backed war. Thus, associations are made between the Central American Contras and the mujahidin, when there is no resemblance whatsoever.

Volunteers/Staff Overseas

The Canadian Council fo International Co-operation directory shows Canadian NGOs with a total of at least 7,688 personnel and volunteers overseas. With only one Canadian agency present on the scene — Human Concern International —, exceedingly few Canadians have ever worked in or visited Afghanistan. As HCI employs mainly Afghans, the highest number of Canadians at any given time, working for a Canadian NGO on location, is three. Including Canadian journalists, probably not more than twenty Canadians in total have worked or visited Afghanistan.

- A limited world-view is held by some Canadians, believing that everybody and everything in the world is either pro-Soviet or pro-American, left-wing or right-wing. With this limited view, Afghanistan has been written-off as a right-wing cause. No one seems to imagine or accept other possibilities when the Afghans see their cause as a third way: a state based on Islamic ideals. Add to this the lack of understanding of Islamic movements and Afghanistan is doubly written off. Who are we to think the choice of a nation is unacceptable?
- Public reluctance to do anything which might offend the USSR, blurs functions and influences of humanitarianism, socialism and pro-Sovietism. The "left", in its varying degrees, is in the middle. But "left" in Canada, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, has lost its stated meaning and gone under the Soviet wing. How else can all the materials with a Soviet perspective be explained in the collections of "social justice" organizations? Or why is it that opinions expressed are so often anti-resistance? If, as Canadians prefer to believe, socialism is supposed to mean putting people, their quality of life and justice ahead of everything else (and *not* blinding and silencing pro-Sovietism), then why has the "left" not followed even one of their leaders or their counterparts in other countries?

The sole, truly commendable thing that Canada has done for the Afghans has been done by the best known socialist and surely one of the most widely respected Canadians, former UN Ambassador, Stephen Lewis. At United Nations annual debates, Lewis dropped all concern for bureaucratic, diplomatic, polite language and scathingly criticized the USSR and Kabul referring to "the evidence that genocide has been committed against the Afghan people by the combined forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union". Lewis's speeches made headlines in Canada, but even from within his own fold there was no follow-up. This is especially enigmatic because European socialists have responded more like Lewis, but have gone even further: taking pro-active stances for the mujahidin.

There is only one clearly identifiable and national sector of Canadians which has demonstrated financial and moral support for the Afghans from the beginning of the war to date: Muslim communities in all provinces. Within their own communities there has been a considerable amount of volunteer effort and donations, contributed through the Council of Muslim Communities in Canada and Human Concern International.

Staff in Canada

One hundred and thirty NGOs employ 6,489 personnel in Canada. When the Canadian Council fo International Co-operation directory was published in 1986 none of the 316 agencies had any staff working on Afghanistan. Not until 1987 was the first Canadian staff member hired to work specifically on Afghanistan in relief, development and public education areas (the author of this paper, by Human Concern).

Afghanistan is a skeleton in the closet. To a certain extent I sympathize with those leaders who have remained silent. Even saying the word "Afghanistan", in some circles, is met with hostility, suspicion or disparagement.

The Canadian response to Afghanistan is an opportunity to raise questions about ourselves as humanitarians, our influences, conscience and ethics. If we will not acknowledge the faults of a superpower, or both superpowers, can we acknowledge our own shortcomings? Still, there is a way to put the Canadian humanitarian dedication to justice, law abiding nature, apparent neutrality on Afghanistan and glasnost to work in possibly the finest act of humanitarianism and justice: begin the process to bring the USSR to trial for crimes against humanity in Afghanistan.

Recent Developments

In 1986, the International Development and Refugee Foundation (Council of Muslim Communities in Canada), through partner organizations stationed in Pakistan, began assisting the Afghans. In 1988 a new organization was formed in Montreal and set up an office in Pakistan to provide assistance: Comité Afghan de Solidarité. In 1988 Care Canada announced plans to begin working with the Afghans, but withdrew the plan in 1989.

Jane Thomas *is the former Director of Public Education for Human Concern International and the author of the booklet "Afghanistan: War and Development" Ottawa: Human Concern International, 1989). Free copies are available from Human Concern International, Box 3984, Station C, Ottawa, Canada K1Y 4P2, tel. (613) 234-4585. She also compiled the information appearing in the boxes throughout this issue.*

Aid in Afghanistan: Limitations and Possibilities

by Anders Fänge

When Louis Dupree last Christmas Eve asked me if I would like to contribute an article about Afghanistan to a forthcoming issue of *Refuge*, I was honoured and accepted the offer willingly. Louis suggested the title "ACBAR and SWABAC: a Unique Experiment in NGO co-ordination".

Last Christmas was a time of hopes and expectations. The Soviets were just about to complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan, and most of us believed that the war would soon be over. TV crews and journalists thronged all over Peshawar, preparing themselves for the big scoop, when the last Soviets would leave Kabul hanging from the last helicopter. The international aid apparatus was gearing up its heavy machinery, although "Operation Salaam", the UN body which had been established seven months earlier with the purpose of co-ordinating aid to Afghanistan, had difficulties in getting its feet planted in the field. The Agency Co-ordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), an umbrella organization in Peshawar encompassing over 50 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the Southwestern Afghanistan and Baluchistan Agency for Co-ordination (SWABAC), a sister organization with a membership of 15 NGOs based in Quetta, had been created with the purpose of co-ordinating the work of the NGOs. They had also problems in getting their practical act together. Nevertheless, the air was filled with enthusiasm and a kind of pioneering spirit: meetings succeeded meetings and everyone in the aid community was discussing problems related to the anticipated repatriation of the refugees and the rehabilitation of the country. We were all in for a very big job and the eyes of the world were upon us.

However, since last Christmas a lot of things have happened, others not. To mention a few; the Red Army did leave Afghanistan, but the war did not cease. Instead of peace came the battle for Jelalabad, and instead of repatriation a multitude of new refugees poured over the border. The TV crews and the journalists disappeared, but the aid workers are still here. They continue their work; at a slightly slower pace, with a little less enthusiasm and, perhaps, a more sober view towards the future. Nevertheless, it was a period of learning. The UN and its agencies learned a little about the peculiarities of Afghanistan and the NGOs learned how to do the paper work in order to get funds from the UN. We also learned that it is very difficult to co-ordinate 70-odd NGOs and that ACBAR and SWABAC were not quite as unique as we had believed them to be, that other efforts of co-ordination between NGOs had been carried out elsewhere.

So, when the time finally came to write this article, I felt that the title which Louis had suggested was somewhat out of date. Besides, the only thing which is really unique in this specific context of aid is Afghanistan itself, and that any effort aimed to understand the problems of the NGOs and the rest of the aid community in Afghanistan has to begin with Afghan society itself and, especially, the profound change in the political conditions which started with the Communist coup d'état in April 1978. That is why the title was changed, and I am quite certain that Louis would have agreed with the change.

The Limitations

We always tend to look upon the world through glasses coloured by our own political and cultural experiences. To an extent it is unavoidable , but the problem increases undoubtedly the higher up in the bureaucracies we get. The closer to heaven, the less understanding of what actually is going on, of the problems and the specific conditions in a certain environments. In this regard, Afghanistan is no unique case. The misconceptions are many. One, which concerns aid, is the belief that it is somehow possible to execute conventional, large-scale and massive aid operations in Afghanistan. That is not the case. However, this is not the same thing as to say that it is impossible to organize humanitarian aid efforts at all. Aid operations are carried out right at this moment and it has been done by NGOs since the beginning of the war. The crucial point is to understand both the limitations and the possibilities of aid in the extremely politicized environment of Afghanistan.

The War

To start with the most obvious, the war not only created the need for a large international aid effort through the immense destruction it has brought upon the land and its people., but it represents, at the same time, one of the most fundamental obstacles to any such large-scale operation. War is an anathema to humanism . In any armed conflict, especially when it has been as uncompromising and as long as in Afghanistan, there is a strong tendency among the contending parties to give priority to their own political interests at the expense of the interests of the common man.

Consequently, since the war has divided Afghanistan into two antagonistic parts, there are two ways to get aid into the country, and both of them are limited. One is to work through Kabul, from where it is possible to reach those living in the cities and in the immediate vicinities of the cities. The other is to organize aid from Pakistan in co-operation with the resistance, which dominates the main part of the rural areas.

A Mosaic of Powers

The second essential obstacle arises from the far-reaching changes in the socio-political conditions which has taken place during the war. Its main characteristic is the destruction of state authority and the subsequent fragmentation of political power.

Historically, Afghanistan was characterized by a balance between the state and more or less broad power groups based on traditional concepts. The popular uprising which followed the Communist coup d'état in 1978, which accelerated after the Soviet invasion, signified the total collapse of state control and its replacement by a multitude of local units which later coalesced into a few loosely united regional power groups comprised of mujahidin (resistance fighters).

The political parties of the resistance have never, in spite of several efforts, been able to fill the gap and act as a central authority for the areas which are under their control. They have been too preoccupied with factional quarrels and too dependent on foreign powers, especially Pakistan. With one exception, they are too badly organized to provide an alternative, and this is also true of the "interim government" which was established in the beginning of 1989.

Newly-arrived observers mistakenly equate the political parties based in Pakistan with the resistance inside Afghanistan. They forget that the political party is an almost totally new concept in Afghan political life, at the most not more than 25 years old. There are certainly variations between the parties; some are relatively more efficient, some less, but in general they do not function like centralized political parties in the West. They exercise a limited control of the resistance inside the country. The local or regional commanders are, in the end, their own masters, who independently take care of their own matters and play their own political games. As a result, most party leaders do not even try to direct them.

There are all sorts of commanders inside Afghanistan: traditional and modern; fanatics and open-minded; educated and illiterates; corrupt and honest; smart and stupid. Some organize their people to carry out reconstruction work, establish clinics and schools, clean irrigation channels, provide seed and fertilizer. There are groups loosely linked together through ethnic group, clan or tribal loyalties, while others function, quite simply, within their own extended family. Then, there are commanders who, in co-operation with other commanders and traditional power groups, rule over large areas in which they have established functioning administrative systems with thousands of disciplined, well-organized mujahidin. Most commanders are against the Kabul regime, but a few leap back and forth between the mujahidin and the "government".

Finally, there are "Peshawar commanders", an honorary title given to former commanders who have not trampled Afghan soil for the last five years and who often make a living from cheating aid agencies in Peshawar.

Undoubtedly, the commanders are the strongest and at the same time the most unpredictable political force in Afghanistan today. They exemplify the fact that the Afghan resistance is both united under the banner of Islam, but also fragmented between ethnic, tribal, religious and political allegiances. They are the product of the war and their power increased throughout the war. On the other hand, they will not cease to exist when peace comes. For some of them, the future might bring influential positions in the establishment which will arise out of the war. A few will revert to banditism, but, hopefully, the great majority will continue to be responsible Afghan citizens, working with traditional local groups in the villages. Gradually, local groups will have to cope with an emerging central authority, provided that such an authority can obtain the formal approval of the local groups. This, however, will not necessarily mean that the commanders will hand over their weapons, dissolve their groups and happily return to the life they enjoyed before the war. They have been used to running their own affairs for ten years, and they will not voluntarily give up these prerogatives.

Thus, the second conclusion is that the fragmentation of political power significantly limits the possibility of carrying out conventional large-scale aid operations. In concrete terms this means that the aid community does not have one counterpart but, rather, hundreds of them. Moreover, this situation will probably continue for the foreseeable future, even if there is a government established which has even a nominal acceptance of the Afghan people.

Destruction and the Lack of Human Resources

After ten years of war, Afghanistan and the Afghan people have suffered enormously. Figures like five million refugees, more than a million dead, and an agricultural production which in 1987 had decreased to 52% compared to 1978, not counting abandoned farms, give strong evidence of a total war effort largely directed against the civilian population. There are no statistics available on infrastructure, but reports, as well as the above-mentioned figures, indicate widespread and serious devastation.

The brain drain has reached critical proportions. Huge numbers of Afghan intellectuals have been imprisoned, tortured, killed or just simply vanished. Thousands have sought refuge in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and in the West, and still others have been preoccupied with military or political tasks. Refugee students trained in the educational system of the Kabul regime do not meet elementary standards. Aid agencies, therefore, have great difficultiy in finding trained Afghans for positions in administration or any kind of project work, even in the current situation of relatively low levels of aid.

The third conclusion is, consequently, that the destroyed infrastructure and the lack of human resources severely restrict the handling of big amounts of relief goods as well as the now much needed build up of administrative and project implementation capacity.

The Possibilities

Limitations and difficulties do not exclude possibilities. International aid in wartime Afghanistan has been carried out mainly through NGO crossborder operations from Pakistan. Kabul was not considered as an alternative because of political as well as practical considerations. NGO work has gone through several stages, but for the purpose of this article it can be divided into two periods; from the beginning of the eighties until the summer of 1988, and from that time onwards.

1980-1988

Crossborder assistance started just after the Soviet invasion with the French Doctors being the first on the scene. They were closely followed by Austrians, other French organizations, Swedes, Norwegians, the British and Dutch. NGOs from different Islamic countries were also involved early, and when the US Government in 1985 established a humani-

tarian aid programme in Afghanistan, American NGOs followed.

With a few exceptions, the organizations were new and politically-oriented in the sense that they took an open stand against the Soviet invasion. Many had no former experience in relief, not to mention development, which meant that programmes during the first years were rather unsophisticated. On the other hand, thanks to their freshness there was never any shortage of ideas. Successful solutions were often unconventional and not hampered by routine opinions, nor by an excessive load of administrative work. Their strength was engagement, unconventional methods and a pragmatic down-to-earth approach. Their weakness lay generally in poor administration, a lack of technical capacity and an exaggerated feeling of their own importance, resulting in co-ordination difficulties. However, it would be unfair to attribute the last-mentioned trait only to NGOs.

To organize programmes for humanitarian assistance in a crossborder situation involves a whole range of problems usually not found in more normal situations. The fact of being stationed in one country while carrying out aid in another, particularly another ravaged by war, means that most processes related to project implementation are much more complex and cumbersome. Communication is not a question of hours, but of days and even weeks. You just do not jump into your car, drive out to the project, knock at the door and spend a few hours with the field personnel. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Pakistani government has never officially acknowledged the existence of crossborder aid operations.

A specific difficulty is the absence of a centralized counterpart. NGOs have tried to solve this problem by establishing, whenever possible, direct links with local and regional authorities inside Afghanistan, i.e., in most cases the commanders. Most often it has been done with the co-operation of the political parties in the resistance, though sometimes dissatisfaction rises over the fact that the aid is not controlled by them.

A decentralized approach has been the most successful. Because conventional planning has not been conducted except in a very flexible way, it has been possible to take fast decisions in the rapidly changing environment so as to seize every opportunity as it shows up. It goes without saying that it has been a long process of trial and error which, among other things, has resulted in an accumulated and profound knowledge about conditions in wartime Afghanistan.

Despite weaknesses, NGOs proved during 1980-1988 that it is possible to manage relief in the rural areas of Afghanistan. Their primary motivating force was a commitment to the Afghan people.

The Arrival of the UN

Since the Kabul regime occupied the chair of Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly, the UN initially considered itself unable to support aid operations in areas controlled by the resistance. This changed when the Geneva Accords stipulated the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Shortly after the Accords were signed in April 1988 the UN Secretary-General appointed Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan as the Co-ordinator of all UN assistance to Afghanistan, and in June Prince Sadruddin launched an appeal for Afghanistan in which the figure $1,116 billion was mentioned as needed for aid during an initial period of 18 months.

The NGOs in Peshawar were skeptical concerning the size of the amount; voicing reservations about the lack of an implementation capacity. Nonetheless, they were also influenced by the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal and in August 1988 ACBAR was formed in Peshawar by roughly 40 NGOs working either in Afghanistan or among the refugees in Pakistan. Soon thereafter SWABAC, a sister organization with about 15 NGOs, came into being in Quetta. The main purpose of both organizations was to co-ordinate NGOs for the purposes of preparing for an eventual repatriation of the refugees and a reconstruction of Afghanistan.

For the NGOs working crossborder, the co-operation with the UN and its different agencies was a new experience, but in general, cooperation has been above expectations, although more or less well-founded tensions temporarily occur.

A Changed Situation in Afghanistan

Radical changes have occurred in Afghan rural areas. Huge areas, which during the nine years of Soviet occupation had been subject to armed conflict, are pacified. The terror of war falls now upon the population in the cities, while in the countryside life goes increasingly back to normal. From the Peshawar horizon the most noticeable change, perhaps, has to do with the conditions in communications. One does not travel or transport goods with horses or other pack animals any more. One goes with trucks or pick-ups, and places, which it took weeks to reach, are now reached in a day or two.

The result is that Afghan rural areas, to an extent no one could dream of only a year ago, have opened up for travel, trade and aid operations. The NGOs, with support from the UN, can now offer more assistance in the rehabilitation of agriculture, repair of irrigation systems, roads, buildings and so on. New and certified wheat seed are brought, veterinary as well as plant protection services are offered. Efforts to establish health care systems have become easier. A successful expansion of the aid work has taken place, which makes it most alarming to hear signals from some Western governments about holding back on funding. It is difficult to predict the future, but we know one thing for certain: the Afghan people will be in great need of help for the foreseeable future. The fact that the war continues is not an argument against, but rather in favour of, that presumption.

A Model for the Future

So far, the main channel for the UN-agencies into Afghanistan has been support for projects run by NGOs. There is a need for refining the process and clearly defining roles. As long as there is no effective central authority in Afghanistan, it is consistent that the NGOs, with their more pragmatic approach, relatively larger flexibility and greater experience of field conditions, take the main burden of actual project implementation. It is also consistent that the UN takes a more forceful part, not only in issues like supplies, technical and financial support, but in co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation. This will not only push NGOs to correct their mistakes and upgrade their performances, it wil l also teach UN personnel about conditions in the field.

The conclusion is simple; the UN needs the NGOs and vice versa. But, most importantly, the people of Afghanistan need them both.

Problems and Prospects of Repatriation

by Peter Rees

The Great Return

The largest number of refugees in recent history is waiting on the borders of Pakistan and Iran to return home. Over five million people wish to return to a country devastated by ten years of war.

Think, if you can, of being a displaced person; living outside your own country, under conditions that are far below those meagre conditions in which you lived before; bringing up your family in a situation of need and dependence. And the prospects of returning to your village? Your house and all its contents are destroyed, your fields have not been cultivated for ten years, your oxen to plough the land have vanished, the school in which your children studied is destroyed, your neighbours upon whom you depended face similar problems or are dead, all your savings in terms of cattle, livestock, jewelry, or cash are expended. And you now need to rebuild all these things, but you are destitute.

What would you do?

The agency I work for has spent the last five years trying to help those who wish to stay in Afghanistan. We see suffering and human degradation throughout the country: people surviving well past the stage of apparent impossibility. Often they must choose the unwanted option of becoming refugees.

Other countries have faced similar problems, though never in my experience on the scale of Afghanistan. In most other countries it has been possible to provide assistance packages for human survival, to assist people in their own villages. In Afghanistan this is not possible in most areas. Neither Afghan society nor Afghan geography facilitate the introduction of internal relief.

In many, probably most, parts of Afghanistan it is geographically, politically, ethnically, and logistically impossible to provide internal relief. Relief agencies, bilateral donors, and the UN face a problem that has never been faced before. All the experience gained in other relief operations cannot apply to Afghanistan. We are all beginners facing the largest return of refugees ever witnessed in this century. In addition, we face land mines, the destruction of a whole country, destitution beyond comprehension — and five million refugees.

What can be done?

Conceptual Policy

While there can never be a single solution to the problems of Afghanistan, it is important to develop an overall strategy. Over the past year, especially since the signing of the Geneva Accords (April 14, 1988), a gradual evolution of a policy affecting refugee return has been developed between relief agencies, bilaterals, and the United Nations.

If it is understood that people cannot be assisted in their own country after return, the primary objective must be self-sufficiency upon return.

With such a large refugee community, it is important to look at the problems from a national or macro level. Food production in the country represents close equivalency to population. There have been some food imports into the country over the past ten years, most significantly from the Soviet Union, but generally food production supports the present population. The resident population cannot make up the food deficit for probably three years at best, needing a fifty percent increase in present production to feed those presently outside the country.

Therefore, if refugee return has to be self-reliant, and present food production is fifty percent below requirement, a satisfactory return must be based on an increase in national food production.

Areas of Increased Food Production

Options exist:

- Traditional areas of cultivation can be brought back into use.
- New areas of cultivation can be developed.
- Disease control can increase yields.
- Pest control can increase yields.
- Increased traction on farms can improve production levels.
- Fertilizers can improve yields.
- Improved seeds can improve yields.

But what do these options mean?

There are a host of problems that affect choices. Without facing these problems, some opportunities will not be so easy. To list an important few:

- It requires a stable government to introduce a development strategy that would have the resources and skill to bring barren land under cultivation.
- Pest and disease control are not traditional aspects of Afghan farming, at least not to the level required to dramatically affect yields. The use of fertilizer is a comparatively recent form of yield increase in many parts of Afghanistan.
- Mechanized traction is also historically limited to a few areas of Afghanistan.
- Irrigation systems have been reduced by approximately fifty percent over the last ten years due to war damage and lack of maintenance, and, at the same time, antipersonnel mines have been sluiced into these irrigation canals by rain, hampering rehabilitation work.
- Many of the traditional *mirabs*, those responsible for the distribution of water supplies, are refugees.
- The planting seed used at present by farmers has suffered by genetic degeneration over the past ten years, and most new seed has had insufficient testing time to be distributed in a wholesale manner until in-country tests have provided longer term results.
- Many roads essential for the distribution of the required agricultural inputs either have never existed, or have been damaged and require essential repairs.
- Returning refugees, despite proving highly resilient, may need assistance between planting and harvesting of crops.

And above and beyond all this, the war continues across the country. Indeed, this is the most essential point. While the resident population is still very much at war, and the increased food production for returnees has to come from *them* before a refugee return is possible, there can be little hope for a quick return of this vast refugee community.

Despite this gloomy picture, much is already being done to prepare Afghanistan for at least a limited return of refugees. In 1988 approximately US $25 million went into Afghanistan for relief projects through voluntary agencies. More and more of this assistance is used for irrigation repair and food production programmes. In late 1988 UNHCR, under the auspices of the UN Coordinator's Office (Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan), some US $3.5 million were provided to experienced relief agencies for projects to increase food production.

Feelings and attitudes throughout Afghanistan have become more and more positive towards rehabilitation, especially since the withdrawal of Soviet troops, due to the realization that the war might end. There have been new allegiances formed to create new village or district councils to co-ordinate relief operations. When all seemed so difficult, the Afghan approach to problems has begun to overcome apparently insurmountable problems once again.

To date there has been very little return of the refugee population; indeed those who have returned have often been forced to leave again because of Afghan government shelling or aerial bombings. There have been some signs, however, that this food production strategy will prove realistic and effective.

In one area near Kandahar, southeastern Afghanistan, for instance, a small group approached our agency asking for assistance to repair the irrigation system leading to their villages. A group of six villages from their area had been abandoned for many years, the whole population having been forced to leave for exile in Pakistan mainly because 35 kilometres of irrigation channels providing water to their areas had been destroyed.

A group of fifteen families were provided tents, as nearly all the houses in the area had also been destroyed. A daily wage was set (less than three dollars per day) so that this group could start repairs. With the assistance of some of our engineers, they fully repaired the irrigation system in a surprisingly short time and began planting their first crops. As the irrigation system was extended, it became possible to cultivate more and more land, and a steady trickle of refugees started to return. These new arrivals needed no assistance, no rations, no cash, nothing. Now that they had their land back, and food production was possible, they could survive. They will, however, receive some assistance during this year with seed, oxen, and fertilizer, to ensure that the maximum benefit is made of this land.

In other areas plans or actions are under way to repair irrigation, roads, bridges, houses, school, and mosques. Often just the smallest input from the agency is needed to start a whole series of reconstruction activities. The relief agencies are taking the position of catalysts; it is up to the Afghans themselves to organize the work. The Afghan problem needs Afghan solutions; relief agencies must follow this principal. Indeed, if they do not, it is unlikely the Afghans would tolerate them for very long.

These examples may paint too simplistic and rosy a picture of the solutions for Afghanistan. Relief agencies will expand greatly this year, with an increase in interest and, therefore, funding. However, even if all the agencies are put together and it would be assumed that all their programmes would be successful (which is virtually impossible), assistance would still reach less than fifteen percent of the population.

What is to be done for the remainder? There has been much debate over the past months, and as yet no positive consensus has been reached. The most likely solution may be to provide assistance through the private sector. Such a scheme has been called "project marketplace".

Project Marketplace

This war has damaged almost every aspect of the country, but not the private trading sector. Apart from paying local taxes at mujahidin check posts, the traders have been allowed by both sides to carry on business pretty much as usual. This provides important contacts with parts of the country where traditional relief efforts would not have access.

In a situation such as Afghanistan's, this presents an unusual opportunity, both to relief agencies and especially to UN agencies, many of which have mandates making such an approach difficult to come to terms with. Nevertheless, the UN Co-

ordinator's Commission requires them to look for flexible solutions to difficult problems, thus permitting them to consider the evolution of the "project marketplace" concept.

Basically, the idea is to encourage the private sector, at subsidized rates, to deliver required commodities to those in need, financed through either the sale of ration cards or cash for work projects.

One might ask why the profit motive is not working effectively anyway, but alternative opportunities and the risks of war have excluded some essential parts of the market from commodity supply. Thus, agricultural wheat threshers are being sold for high profits in northern Afghanistan, but no food supplies are reaching rural areas around Kabul due to military and political problems.

In some form or another, the private sector will certainly play an essential role in the future economy of Afghanistan and thereby assist refugee return.

There are potential problems, nonetheless. Although the importance of the private sector is well understood, almost all present fuel to feed the delivery system comes into Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. Without fuel Afghanistan cannot survive, but this fuel comes from their present-day enemy, a difficult dilemma on both sides.

In many ways it may seem extraordinary that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the first place, as what little Afghanistan had to offer was already committed to the Soviet Union under very favourable trade terms. There is no apparent way that Pakistan, or Iran after its recent war, can facilitate in any way the national fuel requirements for Afghanistan. There is unlikely to be any logistical or political capacity in either country to even ship the fuel, should the UN or another donor wish to provide fuel. The potential economic and social chaos this could cause in Afghanistan cannot be underestimated.

Another serious problem is the timetable of a military victory. Kabul is the hub of Afghan commerce. Nearly all goods at some stage pass through Kabul, and from there usually through Jalalabad to the south, Kunduz to the north, or Herat to the west. Today all these cities are involved in military conflict. If these essential economic centres are put under seige, or are simply inaccessible due to military activity, the flow of goods throughout Afghanistan will be disrupted, except some supplies coming through alternative access points from Pakistan.

Some of the important goods urgently needed in the future that could well be affected by such a situation are fertilizers and improved seed, as are threshers, tractors, and agricultural machinery, all vital to food production. Also crucial over the next few years will be food supplies of all sorts; cement, rebar, and building materials; oxen, livestock, poultry supplies, animal feed, horses, mules — the list is endless. These items not only need to reach pre-war requirements, but they are going to have to far exceed any previous imports to meet present and future reconstruction needs. The entrepreneurial skills of the Afghans may resolve some of the shortfalls, but the warning, on a national level, is all too apparent.

Summary

The scale of the refugee problem in Afghanistan is unprecedented. With in-country, direct primary assistance impossible in many parts of the country, food production is the major objective for the present. Food production, or a return of refugees in large numbers, is unlikely until there is a political or military solution to the continuing war. While much is being done already, especially by private voluntary agencies, the scope of the problem will require effective solutions from the private sector.

The potential for a worsening situation inside Afghanistan cannot be ruled out, especially if city sieges become military policy and fuel supplies become limited.

To balance this we can rely on the extraordinary resilience and adaptability of the Afghan people.

Interest in Afghanistan is sure to decline, especially with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. With the decline in interest will come a decline in funding, unfortunately just at the time funding will be imperative. With so much to accomplish after so much has already been achieved, let us hope the opportunity for a peaceful and satisfactory resettlement will not be abandoned or restricted while so many wait for help.

Peter Rees, *the Field Director of Afghanaid, has resided in Pakistan since July 1987. This is his tenth year of work with refugees, having previously worked for Laos and Khmer refugees in Thailand for The International Rescue Committee, Save The Children Fund (US), and The Ockenden Venture. He worked for The Ockenden Venture in the UK for four years, being responsible for Vietnamese resettlement and reception programmes.*

Prospects for Afghan Women After Repatriation

by Nancy Hatch Dupree

Introduction and Background

Since the April 1988 signing of the Geneva Accords calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, there has been a flurry of planning for repatriation and reconstruction. Hastily convened teams of "Afghan experts" vie with one another for the anticipated cascades of monies these plans will generate. Few adequately address the special needs of women.

This stems in part from the fact that planners feel intimidated by the heavier than normal restrictions Afghans have imposed on women among the refugee populations in Pakistan, a predictable reaction taken by most beleaguered cultures. In Afghanistan, women traditionally symbolized the honour of family, tribe, and nation; they were also esteemed as perpetuators of Afghan cultural values. Following the installation of a leftist government in 1978 and the subsequent occupation by foreign troops in December 1979, women came to symbolize the honour of the *jihad* (struggle) as well.

While it is true that the *jihad* is being fought in the name of Islam, it is also most importantly regarded as a struggle to maintain national ideals, including the safekeeping of those values entrusted to women. The foreign invaders have been expelled, but resistance efforts continue to depreciate the Kabul regime through the medium of Islam, summarily rejecting all the reforms advocated by the enemy as being un-Islamic. This resurgence of social conservatism is most clearly demonstrated by the tightening of practices relating to participatory roles for women in the public sector.

Greater insistence on the application of *purdah* (seclusion) and wearing of the veil have placed a heavy burden on both rural and urban women. Rural women enjoyed considerable freedom of movement within their kin-oriented villages where the support of their women's networks, together with the mutual respect generated by closely interrelated economic roles with men, fostered self-esteem. Among the refugee populations, these networks have largely broken down, male/female roles have been set apart, and dense overcrowding of peoples of diverse origins has confined women to their homes.

Rural women, therefore, feel frustrated and marginalized; some even express a diminishing sense of self. It would be a grave disservice, however, to suggest that these women feel defeated. Their courage is inspirational. They accept their responsibilities in maintaining the solidity of the family which in Islam represents the basic foundation of the society's well-being. The remarkably few incidents of delinquency or drug abuse among refugee youth attest to the success of women's efforts.

On the whole, these rural women anticipate repatriation with admirable composure. It may be that, after all they have experienced, the future cannot be imagined as any worse than what they have already endured. It may also be that many cannot conceive of what a monumental task lies before them. Regardless, they fret over the delay in returning and fully intend to be part of the rebuilding process. Also, despite restrictions on movement, rural and small-town women have been exposed to many new services, including health, sanitation, potable water schemes, and education for children, which have heightened and broadened their expectations. They will call for these on their return. Their voices should be heard.

There are two segments of urban women to be considered. Middle-class women did not have a tradition of working outside the home. In fact, extra-domestic pursuits for women were thought to bring shame on both the women engaging in them and their male family providers. Many refugee women from these groups, however, have taken advantage of employment opportunities either because of economic necessity or in response to the belief that helping the less fortunate, especially widows and orphans, contributes to the overall efforts of the *jihad*. Working women, therefore, have gained respect in the refugee situation through involvement in valued activities.

These women from mainly educated, mid-income, urban families are candidly pragmatic when they speak of the future. Here their work is respected because it is an important part of the *jihad*. But many members of their families remain in Afghanistan and have no concept of the refugee mentality. Will these members be reconciled to the idea of women producing items for sale or attending workplaces outside the home? Or will they still consider it shameful for women to extend the traditional boundaries of the women's domain? Social pressures will figure prominently in determining what these women may or may not do on their return.

Women also worry about the attitudes of younger men, whose lives have been totally consumed by emotions rising from ten years of war. When the enemy has gone, these women ask, who will be the object of their aggressions? May it not take the form of restricting, or even suppressing, women?

While acknowledging that difficulties will arise, most women concede that their former, purely domestic life-styles will probably seem too confining when they return. They must be offered opportunities which are culturally acceptable.

The second segment within the urban milieu consists of women from progressive technocrat, professional, and élite families who, before 1978, took higher education and public careers for women for granted. These women have been most severely curtailed by the pervasive-



ness of neoconservative attitudes which constrain refugee women through innuendo and outright threats. This has persuaded many professional families to leave for Western countries. The talents of these professional women will be sorely missed, and expanded training of replacements will consequently be of high priority.

During the decade since 1978 there has been some slight modification in attitudes toward women's roles. Initially, even primary education for girls was anathema. Enrollment gradually increased over the years, but the majority continue to drop out on reaching puberty, for education is regarded as central to change — a tool of infidels — and most traditionalists are hostile to any changes in male/female relationships which they assert will result if women are educated. In the past, even some intellectuals who promoted the principle of women's rights as a tenet of Islam would not tolerate liberated women in their own households.

Still, within the last three to four years a veritable explosion in educational and career activities has taken place among young women from educated professional and mid-range bureaucratic families. Although the numbers are small considering the total refugee population and participants by no means enjoy anything remotely akin to educational and career opportunities available in Afghanistan prior to 1978, a discernible momentum carries them forward. They are raring to go, and the energy generated by their anticipation is palpable.

Their progress is still only measurable in terms of individuals rather than the collective female population, and it is not without obstacles. Disputes over the appropriateness of activities for women in the context of Islam continue to erupt, even in classrooms where girls engage in tense debates reflecting feelings of uneasiness caused by current attempts to inject conservative ideals into the moderate segments of Afghan society which have encouraged women to participate in the totality of the society for over half a century. These tensions will be exacerbated on repatriation when the women who remained in Afghanistan and continue to occupy professional positions will necessarily affect policy.

No matter what stance future governments take, there will be an undeniable need for women to take part in the developing economy and polity of a renewed Afghanistan. Ideology will surely remain a factor in reconstruction development, yet the pressing economic and social needs will demand women be given productive roles. To deny them can only victimize the entire nation.

Current Imperatives

To meet these needs Afghan women must not be left invisible. Processes allowing their voices to be heard need to be institutionalized.

This does not mean isolating women's programmes and relegating them to separate bureaucratic agencies. Focusing special attention on purely women's issues would be disastrous in the present volatile situation, for this would certainly attract determined, even violent, opposition from neotraditionalists.

Rather, each reconstruction programme should have its integrated women's component within each sector/phase of repatriation, development, and implementation, so as to maximize women's input — from active planning roles through career enhancement.

Over a million war casualties, a high proportion young males in the prime of life, have robbed the workforce and altered the demography. Women, many single unmarrieds and widows, will predominate and should be prepared to contribute substantially to the national economy. Therefore, in addition to the traditionally acceptable fields of health, education, and child care, skills will be needed in administration, management, business administration, communications, radio programming, computer sciences, construction, engineering, industry, commerce, and agriculture. It is reported that English-language programmes are making a big comeback in Kabul today; they have been enormously popular in Pakistan for some time.

For rural women, programmes should focus on reestablishing the close interrelationships women and men formerly enjoyed through the promotion of such agriculturally-oriented projects as milch cows, sheep, goats, and poultry; fruit and vegetable cultivation and processing; sericulture; etc. A wide variety of cottage industries and handicrafts might also be developed to generate income beyond purely domestic spheres.

It will not be enough, however, merely to provide women with animals and supplies. They too should be included in extension training schemes, particularly in veterinary practices, to reduce the incidence of diseases that currently threatens to take an even greater toll than was customary in the past. Small credit schemes may be necessary. This horrifies unimaginative planners who forget, perhaps, that

time and again women of the Third World have proved to be better credit risks, less likely to default, than men. Implementing such projects will not be easy, but the situation calls for innovative thinking and courage.

For urban women, it must be realized that, initially, separate-but-equal policies may well prevail. Typically, such separate institutions are far from equal, but this does not need to be so if equitable planning, financing, equipping, and monitoring are assiduously promoted. "Separate" need not imply "inferior" — if vigilance is institutionalized. Indeed, given the opportunity, it can be predicted with reasoned optimism that women will excel scholastically over their male peers.

While preparing women for development-oriented roles one should not neglect to note that, for both rural and urban women, motherhood will remain a primary option. Programming should as a result target the physical and social needs of children and mother-child development. This will require training and programming in all aspects of health, but physiotherapy training for women from all social strata is particularly crucial. Women carry most of the burden of caring for the war-related handicapped men, women, and children who number in the unknown tens of thousands.

This further raises the need for community services, much neglected in the past, to make up for the lack of a centralized health infrastructure which will be a long time in materializing.

This discussion serves only to highlight the infinite variety of opportunities which could be opened to women. Whatever the programme, however, designs would best be family/community-oriented, based on traditional women's network models, and implemented locally, avoiding overcentralization. Such approaches offer the greatest, if not the only, chance of successfully providing women a respected place in society while strengthening community cohesiveness. The positive promotion of individual self-esteem in this manner will have a considerable impact on the society as a whole. In order to realize these goals it should be reemphasized that Afghan women must be afforded a fully participatory role in planning. There are many talented women living in Pakistan, but they have no forum. Who are they? Where are they? It is time to seek them out and provide them with an arena in which to articulate goals and exchange ideas.

Involving women in planning is of utmost urgency at this particular moment because many Afghans, moderate and conservative, are sincerely apprehensive about what they call "cultural imperialism": now that the foreign military invaders have been repulsed, other outsiders, no matter how well-meaning they may be, sit poised, ready to engulf the nation with new sets of foreign values. At a seminar on Afghanistan held in Tehran (January 1989) numbers of speakers insisted that all Westerners be totally excluded from Afghanistan when a new Islamic government is installed.

Recent events in other parts of the Muslim world provide ample examples of similar reactions to perceptions claiming Westerners denigrate traditional Islamic values while seeking to impose their own. The best way to allay these fears is to make sure the Afghans formulate their own programmes. Humanitarian agencies can then facilitate implementation.

This approach is all the more important in designing programmes for women, who personify the essence of Afghan culture. Because of divergent outlooks within different segments of Afghan society, planning may have to be organized in a variety of small groups utilizing women's networks associated with various social and political alignments, despite the fact that proponents of centralized planning may view this tactic as hopelessly inefficient.

Working with smaller groups initially will also serve to contend with a natural passivity which tends to characterize educated and trained women, even during normal times. Afghan women have never been militant activists; public activists among women in Pakistan can be counted on the fingers of half a hand. Nevertheless, Afghan women are a strong decision-making force in the family, and Afghan society emphasizes the collective identity of the family. Absence of an overt status does not therefore mean that women lack ideas, talent, or influence within their own spheres. By encouraging women to project themselves more fully, development in general can better be promoted while simultaneously preserving the traditional nature of Afghan society.

Nancy Hatch Dupree *has undertaken research in Afghanistan — and among Afghan refugees in Pakistan — since 1962. Together with Louis Dupree she was involved with Islamic and Arabian Development Studies at Duke University.*

Reports on Afghan Refugees

The Citizens Commission on Afghan Refugees has issued the following reports: "The Challenge of the Coming Afghan Refugee Repatriation: Fulfilling Our Commitments in the Final Chapter of the Afghanistan War: A Report on a Fact-Finding Visit of the Citizens Commission on Afghan Refugees — May 28-June 8, 1988", "The Challenge of the Coming Afghan Refugee Repatriation: Fulfilling Our Commitments in the Final Chapter of the Afghanistan War: Second Report on Afghan Refugees — Visit of October 10-19, 1988", and James C. Strickler, "Report of Visit (5/22-5/28/89) to Peshawar and Hangu Pakistan". Copies available from the International Rescue Committee, Inc., 386 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, USA; tel.: (212) 679-0010, fax: 212 689-3459.

Book Reviews

Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan, editors *Refugees and International Relations* New York: Oxford University Press, 1989

by Lisa Gilad

Refugees and International Relations is a goldmine of information and analysis about the global context of forced migration. Particularly refreshing is the inter-disciplinary character of the book, with contributions by internationally recognized protection experts working within the UNHCR and outside of it, and academics ranging from history to sociology to political science to international relations. This is an excellent source book in the growing arena of Refugee Studies, but it is not a book for the beginner who would have benefitted from a glossary of terms and more detailed descriptions of the root causes of refugee flows.

Space does not permit me to describe each chapter, so I will highlight several of the themes running throughout. Loescher's opening remarks prod the reader to think about the foreign policy implications of the international refugee regime, the emptiness of humanitarian rhetoric when it is not matched by appropriate action, and the necessity for creative responses to the expansion of the refugee problem (see especially chapters by Mtango, Gordenker and Coles). One is left with the impression that it is high time to depart from the narrow confines of the Convention definition of refugee to deal with the protection concerns and basic human rights, including socio-economic rights, of what the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Hocke, calls "extra-Convention refugees", more commonly referred to as *de facto* refugees. Many chapters specify the gamut of restrictive measures used to deter arrivals of *de facto* refugees who are deserving claimants: notably "humane deterrence", first asylum rules, visa requirements, detention practices, and fines against airline carriers for transporting undocumented migrants or asylum seekers (Widgren, McNamara, Helton, McDowall, and Cels). This happens particularly in Southeast Asia, Western Europe and North America. In the West, these measures reflect the endeavour to contain the Third World refugee problem outside of the borders of developed states. Chapters such as those on disaster relief by Kent and on the difficulties of turning refugee assistance into development aid by Cuenod bring into stark relief the problems inherent in the predominant Western focus of physically sustaining refugees in camps or settlements without providing them with the means to create their own support. Refugees suffer from the short-sightedness of donor states.

Even when long-range planning is utilized in the case of voluntary repatriation, such as the return movement from Djibouti to Ethiopia in 1983, anything can go wrong — like a drought (Goodwin-Gill, p. 270). In fact, it appears that *un*planned voluntary repatriation by refugees frequently is less problematic than when it is extensively planned by the UNHCR in coordination with the country of refuge and the country of origin. Cuny and Stein's well-crafted chapter shows that refugees will march back home even when it is not safe, without permission of the authorities, without the promise of amnesty and so on (p. 296). Faced with the prospect of years in camps, with dependent approaches to their upkeep, it is not surprising that refugees take such risks, however dangerous.

Several chapters deal with strengthening legal protection for refugees and the obstacles confronted when trying to do so. For example, Mtango details the legal documents which should prevent military and armed attacks on refugee camps, and makes excellent suggestions for developing an instrument which would categorically prevent this inhumane occurrence. Yet his own analysis portrays the probable futility of producing such an instrument without specific sanctions imposed upon states permitting such attacks.

Coles argues that it is time to stop thinking about refugees in a humanitarian mode: "the refugee problem is entirely political, since it concerns an individual's relationship to a polity and the relationship of polities to one another" (p. 394). It appears that the Churches have come to grips with this fact, as Ferris's discussion about the politicization of the Churches's refugee aid roles clearly shows, as does reference to Sanctuary movements in the United States, Britain and Switzerland in other chapters. In regard to the rationale of non-interference in "internal matters", Camus-Jacques implies that it is necessary to stop saying that it is inappropriate to intervene in the dilemmas experienced by refugee women because gender inequalities and subordination belong to the realm of culture — which is suddenly sacrosanct. Refugee women face inordinate protection problems as women; if "interference", hopefully with the support of the women themselves, is required to redress problems, then it is time to get off the fence and do so. There is recent evidence that the UNHCR and its NGO partners are demonstrating movement in this regard.

There are some weaknesses relating directly to the foreign policy implications so well conceived in most chapters. In particular, lack of critical discussion of the relatively new terms "irregular movements" or "irregular refugees" is apparent in several chapters; an important exception is found in the chapter on temporary safe haven where Gallagher, Forbes Martin and Weiss-Fagen refer to Gilbert Jaeger's comprehensive analysis of the underlying premiss of the term "irregular".[1] More striking is the introduction of new terms which obfuscate reality. Bach claims that "Salvadoreans are engaged in spontaneous third country resettlement" because, he says the argument goes, they should have sought protection in Mexico (according to the INS) but instead are seeking asylum in the United States (pp. 320-323). *Re*settlement is associated with refugees who already have refugee status of one form or another; this solution is regulated by Western states which select refugees who meet their immigration criteria, as well as their political and/or humanitarian objectives. Salvadoreans in the United States are asylum seekers or remain "undocumented aliens" because they have

[1] On this point, see James C. Hathaway's article "Burden Sharing or Burden Shifting? 'Irregular' Asylum Seekers: What's All The Fuss?" in *Refuge*, Vol 8, No. 2 (December 1988), pp. 1-2.

good reason not to claim refugee status; they are not "resettled refugees". The refugee lobbies of both the United States and Canada have repeatedly argued that since adequate protection *cannot* be found in Mexico (which is not a party to the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and where the UNHCR has some difficulty in fulfilling its protection functions), then the two countries to the north *are* countries of first asylum. The chapter following Bach's claims as much in its first sentence (Gallagher et al, p. 313). The abysmal record of the United States in respect to the low acceptance rate (2-3%) of Salvadoreans and Guatemalans is closely connected with American foreign policy in the region these refugees are fleeing. It is this point that should have been made strongly in Bach's chapter, particularly in view of the themes of this volume.

This book makes quite clear that when the crux of the problem of ameliorating the root causes of refugee movements is not related to the timidity of states in "interfering" with the internal affairs of other states, it may be, by contrast, interference itself (i.e. American military and foreign policy involvement in Central America): hence the apparent intractability of the problem.

Refugees and International Relations deserves a wide audience: the social and political sciences, immigration and refugee lawyers, refugee aid groups, and the educated public. Yet it is unlikely to reach many readers at $120 (Canadian). I hope that Oxford University Press will consider reducing the price substantially knowing that specialized and important knowledge should be accessible outside of libraries.

Lisa Gilad *is the author of* Ginger and Salt: Yemeni Jewish Women in an Israeli Town *(Bolder, CO: Westview Press, 1989) and* The Northern Route: An Ethnography of Refugee Experiences *(St. John's: ISER Books, forthcoming, spring 1990). She is a Part-time Member of the Immigration and Refugee Board. The views expressed in this review are entirely her own and do not necessarily reflect the views or position of the IRB.*

Steven Cohen
From the Jews to the Tamils: Britain's Mistreatment of Refugees
Manchester: Manchester Law Centre, 1988

by Indhu Rajagopal

Today's refugees are less the detritus of large-scale organized warfare among nations than they are the victims of oppression or persecution which has, in various countries, during different periods and regimes, denied them social identity and individual freedom. Their life stories write a dramatic history of a world rife with bigotted expressions, ethnic, religious, parochial or nationalist. Steven Cohen's *From the Jews to the Tamils: Britain's Mistreatment of Refugees* cuts powerfully through politicians's rhetoric to present directly the experiences of individual refugees.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain's official justifications for its refugee policies show a long-standing and historically continuous adherence to the principle of expediency. Parliamentary politicians's paradoxical statements extol British "generosity" while tightening restrictions and exclusionary provisions against the Tamil refugees. This is reminiscent of the British strictures against European and Russian Jews who sought asylum in Britain to escape persecution in their own countries.

Cohen has struck upon a creative way of proving the burden of his argument. The book unpretentiously examines one of the most important international crises of our times — the refugee problem — from a national policy perspective, but tells the story by reference to the real sufferings of refugees themselves. Comparing Jewish asylum seekers's experiences and the British treatment of them with the plight of Tamil Sri Lankan refugees, the narrative gains power and pathos as it depicts the plight of individual cases culled from newspapers and reports.

Of all the intense issues raised in this slim volume, the one most interesting and most likely to ease the readers's tensions, is the account of the Sanctuary Movement. It could very well supply an answer to those who question why different cultural groups have their own places of worship and other "psychic shelters" (Porter:1972)[1] in their new countries, or who attribute to "immigrant paranoia" the resistance of newcomers to homogenization by the majority culture. The churches or the temples have proven to be last-ditch sanctuaries from the long arm of what the refugees feel to be the arbitrary and "unjust" measures of the state.

Presenting the details of the sanctuary cases provides a balance to the book's relentless criticism of Britain's anti-human rights orientation in its refugee policies: ironically, the fact that such ethnic and cultural institutions can serve as fortresses from within which otherwise helpless refugees could resist the dominant state, serves as powerful testimony to the resilience of the British democratic essence. Both the ruthlessness and the contradictions of the British refugee policies spring from the dominant state's power and legitimacy which are rooted in both historical traditions and dominant social interests; however, somewhere in between there are interstices of "sanctuaries", a refuge for the resisters against the state. A more theoretical analysis of these themes by Cohen would have been welcomed.

Evidentiary sources for this monograph also demonstrate the openness of information in Britain — media, Hansard, legislative process, and institutional infrastructure. However, this book reveals a striking disregard within the system for the need to reconcile individual human rights with authority. The contradictions expose pungently the limitations of British government refugee policies through the twentieth century. Cohen's book is a welcome addition to the sparce publication in the field of refugee studies and adds a policy dimension to the literature on Tamil refugees.

Indhu Rajagopal *is a Professor of Social Science at York University.*

[1] John Porter, "Canada: Dilemmas and Contradictions of a Multi-ethnic Society", in *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada*, Series IV, Volume 10, 1972.

New Publication

Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco, *Central American Refugees and U.S. High Schools: A Psychosocial Study of Motivation and Achievement* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989). This study examines the experiences and psychosocial motivational patterns of young people from El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua in the high school system of a major US urban centre. Suárez-Orozco, an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, San Diego, discusses in this work the high achievement rate displayed by Hispanic refugees.

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A Comparison of Canada and the USA

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The Centre for Refugee Studies at York University and the Refugee Policy Group in Washington, D.C. are convening an international conference to compare Canada and US refugee policies.

The participants in the conference will include both researchers and those involved in policy formation in the United States and Canada. An attempt will be made to pair American and Canadian researchers in the preparation of papers.

The purpose is to focus on a select list of problems which are central to the policy concerns of both Canada and the United States and where they may have been different policies and programmes and/or different research results.

The conference will be organized around general sessions at which prepared papers will be discussed, a parallel series of workshops and meal-time round tables. It is hoped that scholars and policy makers can learn a great deal from a greater understanding of the refugee policies of the two countries.

For further information about this conference please contact Ann Watson at the Centre for Refugee Studies, 234 Administrative Studies Building York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3.