



CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

REFUGEE

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Special Double Issue

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The Jewish Refugee Experience

The contributions in this issue stem primarily from *Refugees in Canada — The Jewish Experience: A Case Study*, a symposium organized by the Jewish Student Federation and the Refugee Documentation Project at York University on November 11-14, 1985. Its purpose was to examine, through a series of lectures and panel discussions on Jewish refugees, the complexities of the refugee phenomenon.

In a forum about refugees, prime consideration is usually given to resettlement challenges: What difficulties do refugees have to face? What kind of help are they able to receive? How do they adapt to a new environment? These questions remained key issues at the symposium. But the event was also designed to study a specific refugee experience within a broader context. This was done both in terms of the general historical, political, cultural, racial and economic factors accounting for Jewish refugee migration, and against the specific background provided by Canada's uninspired past immigration policies and attitudes towards Jewish refugees.

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Yeshiva students in Camp 1, Isle aux Noix (Fort Lennox), Quebec. (Courtesy of Rabbi Erwin Schild).

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The past will always remain an inexhaustible source of lessons to improve the future. The *Refugees in Canada* symposium attempted to educate the general public about the plight of refugees by exploring some critical aspects of Jewish refugee migration. In the process, *Refugees in Canada* also strived to deal with experiences which could serve as examples or guidelines to other recent refugee communities eager to find in Canada a better place to live. In this respect the present issue attempts to preserve the spirit of the symposium.

Alex Zisman

CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES REFUGE

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Opening Remarks

Harry Arthurs, President of York University

I would like to welcome you all to York University and, on behalf of the University, to say that we are very honoured and pleased that this discussion will be going on this week. Amongst the adjectives that people use to describe the Jewish community, at least two recur frequently: one of those is "scholarship" and the other is "a passion for justice". Scholarship is well represented by our distinguished moderator, Howard Adelman, and our two speakers, Michael Marrus and Irving Abella, both of whom have earned important reputations not just within the Jewish community but throughout the entire Canadian and indeed international academic community. They are two leading figures in the writing of contemporary history and we are very pleased to have both of them here this evening.

The other half of my short list of characteristics of the Jewish community, the concern for social justice, I hope will manifest itself as discussions progress over the next few days. When refugees arrive, of course, their first start must necessarily be to establish themselves, to make a new home for themselves, to make a new life for themselves. And at the juncture it seems to me they have two options, either to continue to be preoccupied with their own condition or fate or to reflect upon the experience that they have just gone through and to take out of it some large lessons that may have application for others. I think, historically at least, to the credit of the

Jewish community, that it has always adopted the second of those two options. It has tended to translate its own refugee experience into a series of more universal concerns for the fate of people who themselves are experiencing oppression, who have to uproot themselves and translate themselves into a new country and a new life.

The experience of doing that, as the earlier wave of Jewish refugees found, was not always an easy one. Countries that people went to — and this country in particular — were not as open, not as hospitable, not as fair, not as just as they ought to have been if they had even lived up to their own ideals. And this sense of how countries fail to live up to their ideals, and fail to appropriately greet and treat people who have come to live in that country, sensitized the Jewish community, certainly in the early stages of its history here. There was a need to make sure that there was a just society and one which would be welcoming and supportive of other groups as they arrived.

I hope that that second theme will be explored tonight and on subsequent occasions throughout this series, as we learn how the particular gets translated into the universal, and especially how the Jewish experience comes to have real salience for other groups that come a little later in time. I am sure that these will be most interesting speeches and I certainly look forward with you to hearing them.

The symposium *Refugees in Canada — The Jewish Experience: A Case Study* was sponsored by:

B'nai Brith Hillel Foundations of Canada; Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Programme, Canada Employment and Immigration Commission; Israel Discount Bank of Canada; Jewish Immigrant Aid Service (JIAS); Toronto Jewish Congress Endowment Fund.

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Population Movements in Eastern Europe and the “Final Solution”

Root Causes: The Case of Jewish Refugees from Hitler and the Nazi Holocaust

Despite the hundreds of volumes that have been written on Jewish refugees from Hitler and the Nazi Holocaust, historians still have difficulty fitting Hitler's “Final Solution” of the Jewish Question into the larger framework of the Third Reich. Was the anti-Jewish course of Hitlerian policy set, from a very early point, for the ultimate goal of mass murder? Was “World Jewry” such a constant preoccupation, requiring continuing efforts, even at the expense of other German goals? Or did the Nazis’ murderous impulses evolve, notably under the impact of the war in Russia, to reach their genocidal conclusion only when that conflict reached its height? Did some particularly demonic ideological force drive the machinery of death forward, even at its lowest levels? Or was Nazi Germany less affected by the pathological hatreds of its leaders than is sometimes allowed?

Scholars grapple with these questions, and as they do so we are able to see more clearly into the dark recesses of Hitlerian criminality. We can continue to anticipate clarification from the study of Nazi Jewish policy, as research uncovers new administrative documentation and probes the workings of the Third Reich at the local level. My own effort here is to look at the matter from a different angle — prompted by my study of refugee movements on the European continent.

Seen from this vantage point, the decision to murder all of European Jewry is linked to an even wider demographic project undertaken by Nazism — the achievement of *Lebensraum*, or living space, written and spoken about by Hitler since the early 1920s. A look at Nazi policy in Poland, the first stage of that gigantic undertaking, may provide a key to understanding how European-wide mass murder became a fixed objective of the Third Reich.

In both rhetoric and the fundamental principles involved, the Jews were intimately a part of Hitler's foreign policy objectives. His most important goal, articulated from the earliest point in his career, was to build a vast new pan-German Empire, intended to achieve the purest expression of Aryan civilization and to last for a thousand years.

There were two strategies to achieve this end. First, Germany had to absorb extensive territory in Eastern Europe, to set the empire properly on its economic and biological foundations. Inevitably, this involved a conflict with Soviet Russia, a state crippled, Hitler thought, by its “Judeo-Bolshevik system”.

Second, to protect the racial fabric of the new order, Hitler encouraged vast population movements: non-Germans, especially Jews, had to be ruthlessly excluded from the territory of the new Reich; at the same time, pure Germans, or *Volksdeutsche*, wherever they lived, were to be brought within the fold, particularly in the new German territory carved out in the east.

Nazi Jewish Policy, 1933-39

Historians have stressed the Nazis’ failure to clarify their Jewish policy in the earliest period of Nazi rule, emphasizing the lack of any clear planning or operational consistency in their anti-semitic programme. During the first five years under Hitler the radical impulses associated with the brown-shirted Storm Troopers alternated with a more cautious approach, fearful of severe repercussions against Germany, particularly in the economic sphere, that might result from too violent a move against the Jews.

Gradually, by means of a purge of the civil service, the Nuremberg Laws, and the confiscation of Jewish property, the Jews of Germany were marginalized,

isolated from their fellow citizens and reduced to impoverishment. Jewish emigration emerged as one objective, but by no means the exclusive goal of German policy.

All this began to change during the latter part of 1937 and throughout 1938, accompanying important shifts in the structure of the Third Reich. Briefly, this was an important turning point in the fortunes of the Hitlerian order, when the Nazi system had finally achieved sufficient solidity in economic and political terms to launch a new wave of radicalism at home and abroad. In a variety of spheres, Nazi policy-makers emerged from behind the conservative screens that had obscured the goals of the movement.

Hermann Göring, who became Economics Minister, accelerated the Aryanization of Jewish property. Other policies completed the isolation of German Jewry. And following the carefully orchestrated riots of *Kristallnacht*, in November 1938, the Nazi leadership placed new emphasis on getting rid of the Jews.

Henceforth Jewish emigration, and if necessary forced emigration, became a primary goal of the regime. Surveying the Jewish question in January 1939, a foreign office official observed that the “ultimate aim of Germany's Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living on German territory”. All signs at home were now positive. True, potential receiving countries were sealing their borders against “the undesirable Jewish intruders.” Yet eventually this difficulty would be solved, probably through some international agreement to solve the Jewish question. The main task of German policy was to keep up the emigration pressure.

Of approximately 525,000 Jews in Germany in 1933, nearly 150,000 managed

to leave by the beginning of 1939. Roughly another 150,000 left in the next two years. As the number of those trying desperately to escape accelerated, however, so also did the number of Jews at risk. In March 1938, with *Anschluss* — the Nazi absorption of Austria — some 200,000 more Jews were brought within the Nazi domain. Tens of thousands more Jews came with the incorporation of much of Czechoslovakia at the beginning of the following year.

Yet despite these daunting setbacks, the Nazis pressed ahead with their emigration policy. Placed in charge of Jewish persecutions by the Führer, Hermann Göring commissioned Reinhard Heydrich, head of Germany's huge SS police apparatus, to accelerate departures by all possible means. Heydrich in turn designated Adolf Eichmann, a zealous specialist operating from Vienna, to quicken the pace.

Meanwhile, in a series of negotiations with British and American representatives, German officials groped toward the "international solution" to which the Nazis were committed. Berlin suggested a variety of schemes by which great masses of German Jews could be dispatched from Germany with a small proportion of their property. Washington and London played the Germans along, hoping to encourage more orderly departures, yet anxious not to assume any new burden of assistance to the refugees. So matters stood when war with Poland broke out in September 1939.

Lebensraum in Eastern Europe, 1939-41

Given the Nazis' attention to the Jewish matters before hostilities began, it is interesting that the Jewish issue played no role in the opening of hostilities against Poland. The Jews did not figure in the planning of *Fall Weiss*, code word for Germany's attack on her eastern neighbour, and the Jews were remarkably absent from the motivation that underlay Hitler's first moves in the Second World War. All this stands in significant contrast, by the way, to the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, in June 1941 — an important point to note for those who consider Hitler's central strategic aim to have been a "war against the Jews".

In September 1939, Hitler was enraged at the Poles' refusal to concede territorial adjustments on their western frontier and to acknowledge German hegemony in East Central Europe. To his assembled generals at the Berghof in late August, he declared his goal to be the elimination of Poland as a functioning society. Hitler assured his commanders that no pity should be shown, and no hesitation over means should be tolerated. Murder, apparently, would be widespread. According to one account, it was on this occasion that the Führer made one of his first, chilling references to genocide:

Chenghis Khan had millions of women and children killed by his own will and with a gay heart. History sees only in him a great state builder. What weak Western civilization thinks of me does not matter. . . I have sent to the East my "Death Head Units" with the order to kill without mercy all men, women, and children of the Polish race or language. Only in such a way will we win the vital space that we need. Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?

From the start, therefore, the Polish campaign was linked not to the Jewish question but to another of Hitler's fundamental goals: the carving out of *Lebensraum*, or living space, in the East.

Racial issues were closely interrelated with this geopolitical objective, however, as soon became apparent. Immediately following their devastating victory over the Poles, the Germans made the first geopolitical moves toward the achievement of their ends. Conquered Poland was divided in two. The northern and western parts, including Danzig, West Prussia, Posen, and Eastern Upper Silesia, were incorporated into the Reich (the bulk of these regions forming the new *Reichsgaue* of Danzig-Westpreussen and the Wartheland). The rest, known as the *Generalgouvernement*, was placed under the authority of a German governor, Hans Frank, responsible directly to Hitler.

The Nazi plan was to subject the incorporated provinces to the most intense Germanization, to eliminate all impure racial elements. The *Generalgouvernement*, to which the latter were to be

sent, was to become a vast work camp, an immense repository of unskilled labor to serve the needs of the enlarged German state.

This grand design called for vast shifts of population. Taking charge of this effort was Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer SS who had the dominant voice in the incorporated territory. In October, as soon as the guns fell silent, Hitler authorized Himmler to institute a Reich Commission for the Consolidation of Germandom (*Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums*), a powerful bureaucracy to coordinate the Nazi's population schemes. Under Himmler's direction, vast numbers of people, Jews and non-Jews, began to move in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe.

Crucial to the Germanization of the incorporated territories was the effort to bring hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans from wherever they lived in Eastern Europe to settle in the new eastern marches of the Reich. Hurriedly improvised in the autumn of 1939, this gigantic transfer of people also came under the aegis of Himmler's new *Reichskommissariat*, moving *Volksdeutsche* from Poland, the Baltic states, the Soviet Union, and Rumania.

In practice, these supposedly voluntary transfers of Germans westward from Eastern Europe were often little different from the Nazis' forcing of Poles in the other direction. Foreign correspondents were banned from the scene. Villages were sent on long treks to railway junctions, often without the slightest desire to "return" to a Reich they had never seen.

In the year after the conquest of Poland Himmler's *Reichskommissariat* noted nearly half a million German evacuees uprooted. During the entire course of the war about 1.25 million Germans were moved, of whom fewer than 500,000 were ever settled on farms. Most were simply moved from one resettlement camp to the next until the end of the war.

More important from my standpoint here is the movement in the other direction. To make way for the German settlers — whom the Nazis liked to think of as sturdy, independent agriculturalists — masses of local inhabitants were forced to the east — largely to be

deposited in Hans Frank's *Generalgouvernement*. Himmler's priorities underscored at the same time his concern to rid the Reich of particularly undesirable elements. All Jews, estimated at over 500,000, were to be removed from the incorporated territories. "Anti-German Poles" were another target group; so too were "persons of Polish-Jewish mixed blood". Polish intellectuals, and all those who might constitute the leadership of a future Polish nation, were similarly to be sent eastwards — those, that is, who had not already been murdered.

At first, Himmler's dynamic initiatives seemed to confirm the dumping-ground status of Hans Frank's preserve. Unannounced, train after train brought evacuees into the *Generalgouvernement*, causing immense logistical problems. Convoys arrived in freezing weather, without food, and without any preparation at their point of termination. By the end of the first year of occupation, no less than ten per cent of the entire population of the *Generalgouvernement* were turned into refugees. German officials simply did not know what to do with the flood of new arrivals, deemed by Himmler to be the refuse of the Third Reich.

Repeatedly, Frank protested the arrival of so many refugees and, in February 1940, personally delivered his complaint in Berlin — apparently to no avail. Jews, Poles and other "undesirables" continued to arrive on his doorstep. At the end of March, however, Frank joyfully announced the Führer's promise that his domain would one day be made *Judenrein* and eventually cleansed also of Poles.

Jewish Refugees and the German Lebensraum

When it came to the Jews there was a particularly striking gap between Nazi theory and practice in the months immediately following the defeat of Poland. There was no doubt that the Nazis maintained their concern to settle sooner or later with their hated enemies, and their resolution to rid Europe eventually of the Jews showed no signs of abating. Within the conquered Polish territory, Jews often headed the list of the "undesirable elements."

Occasionally, the Nazis spoke of an as yet ill-defined "final aim," usually implying that its formal definition would await the end of the war. As a stock formulation the term "final solution" may have first appeared in June 1940, as a "territorial final solution", and it was increasingly used in the spring of 1941. By "final solution" the Nazis implied a vast process of deportation and emigration, in which the Jews would leave Europe en masse. The top priority was to eliminate the German Jews; then the others would follow.

Yet despite this long-range objective, Jews did not figure significantly in the vast deportations from the incorporated territories to the *Generalgouvernement*. To be sure, large numbers of Jewish refugees had spontaneously moved east in order not to remain in the territories incorporated into the Reich. In the earliest "wild resettlements" of the autumn of 1939, Jews seem indeed to have constituted an important part of the uprooted migrants. Thereafter, however, relatively few were sent.

For one thing, the Germans turned more and more to the Polish peasant population, preferring to transfer eastwards people whose homesteads could be conveniently occupied by a farm community of *Volksdeutsche*. As the German demographic project became more carefully organized, it appeared unreasonable to move the urban Jewish population before the rural Poles.

In addition, because of its uncertain status within the Wartheland, the decision was made not to undertake any deportations from Lodz, which happened to be the largest concentration of Jews outside the *Generalgouvernement*.

Driven by ideological imperatives to seek and prepare for a definitive answer to the Jewish question, yet blocked by practical problems from reaching their goals, the Nazi leadership strove for interim solutions. On September 21, 1939, Himmler's deputy Reinhard Heydrich issued a *Schnellbrief* to *Einsatzgruppen* leaders setting the stage for anti-Jewish activity in the newly-conquered Polish territories. He made reference to a top secret ultimate goal, or *Endziel*, that could not be defined at present, and drew attention to an immediate programme of concentrating the Jews in cities, at railway junctions, obviously in

preparation for their ultimate deportation. Councils of Jewish elders, later known as *Judenräte*, were to be set up in each Jewish community.

Local SS commanders thereupon took the initiative to establish these concentrations, usually closed off as ghettos, over the following months, extending into 1941 and even longer. During the next two years, a vast process of uprooting began, which constituted an unprecedented calamity for the Jewish population — overshadowed subsequently by the horrific mass murder in Nazi death camps. To facilitate future movement, refugees were packed into teeming ghettos in the poorest and least adequate portions of cities in both the incorporated territories and the *Generalgouvernement*. Everywhere, the Nazis cleared Jews from the countryside and forced them into towns where the ghettos were established. Evidence suggests that at least a million of Poland's three million Jews were torn loose from their homes as a result.

Within each ghetto, the crush of deportees made life impossible. Warsaw housed 90,000 Jewish refugees when its ghetto gates were closed in November 1940; the Nazis forced even more into the city, however, so that they numbered 130,000 in the spring of 1941 — about one-third of the entire Jewish population.

Within the ghettos overcrowding contributed to spectacular mortality rates. Typhus, dysentery, tuberculosis — all took their toll. The Jewish Councils' elaborately organized public welfare operations constantly broke down because of inadequate resources and the endlessly rising tide of need. The arrival of new refugees constantly exacerbated the situation. Not infrequently newcomers quarreled with residents of longer standing. Invariably, the refugees were at a disadvantage. New arrivals camped in schools, synagogues, and the few other public buildings within the ghettos.

Along with their periodic raids on the Jewish population for labourers, the Germans proceeded systematically to starve the ghetto inmates — a task made easier by their concentration in tightly enclosed areas. Raul Hilberg estimates that between 500,000 and 600,000 Jews died in ghettos and work

camps as a result of Nazi policies — about one-fifth of Polish Jewry. And this was *before* the Nazis' Final Solution.

Territorial Options

During 1939 and 1940, a handful of Nazi leaders took initiatives to break out of the straightjacket placed upon the Jewish question by the practical problems of administering newly conquered Polish territory. While some focused on the concentration of Jews in ghettos, awaiting the moment when a solution would present itself, others sought to hasten the moment when real progress could be made.

Among the most ambitious of these was Adolf Eichmann, the mastermind of Jewish emigration in the prewar period, whose office was a small cog in Heydrich's vast SS police bureaucracy. Eichmann seized upon his SS chief's and Hitler's declared approval of the idea of deporting Jews across the demarcation line with the Soviet Union into Russian-held territory in Poland. In order to realize this objective, Eichmann determined to mass Jews beforehand in a huge Jewish colony in a desolate, marshy region south of the city of Radom near the town of Nisko.

Beginning in October 1939, convoys of Jews arrived in the reservation from the Reich, Bohemia and Moravia, and the newly incorporated territories. The deportees suffered dreadfully from the lack of any serious preparations; bewildered refugees staggered from the trains after a horrendous journey and were told to build themselves a homeland. The result was a catastrophic mortality rate, and the deaths of many thousands.

Some German officials protested to Berlin, finding themselves inconvenienced by Eichmann's ill-planned disruption of their localities; Hans Frank too raised objections, fearing the advent of even more Jews in his domain. Himmler called the project off after a short time, likely having decided to put all available deportation energy into removing Polish peasants and settling incoming *Volksdeutsche*. Once more, Nazi hopes for an imminent breakthrough on the Jewish question were frustrated.

Another, much more ambitious effort

to realize a final solution flourished briefly after the defeat of France in the summer of 1940. With the expectation that Great Britain too would soon be crushed, and that a peace treaty would soon be signed with France, the German bureaucracy began to buzz with a new idea for relieving all Europe of its Jews. At the foreign office this time, an ambitious official manning the Jewish desk, or *Judenreferat*, brought forward a scheme widely aired in the 1930s — the establishment of a Jewish colony on the island of Madagascar.

Franz Rademacher began a serious feasibility study on several options for solving the Jewish question, among them the possibility of sending all West European Jews to the desolate island in the Indian Ocean. Heydrich himself then took up the idea of Madagascar, pushing it forward as a way of preserving his own SS pre-eminence in the field of Jewish emigration. In early July, as the research of Christopher Browning indicates, the idea reached Hans Frank in the *Generalgouvernement*, where it was gratefully seized upon as a relief from threatened future importation of Jews.

Through the summer, top Nazi officials seem to have genuinely embraced the scheme. Several plans went forward. Eichmann and one of his subordinates, Theodore Dannecker, envisioned that the four million Jews then under German control would eventually be sent — at a rate of one million per year. Rademacher sounded out experts in geography and demography, concluding that the scheme was possible.

Unfortunately for the bureaucrats involved, however, the basic conditions necessary to begin operations failed to materialize. No peace treaty with France was forthcoming, and no victory over Great Britain was won. The island remained therefore out of German hands, and sea access to it remained dominated by the Royal Navy. At the end of 1940, the plan was on the shelf.

The Final Solution

As a result, the Germans faced another winter with the Jews. Millions more were under direct German control as a result of the great victories in 1939 and 1940. Emigration possibilities appeared increasingly unrealistic. Territorial solutions inside and outside Europe had

failed.

Despite the assurances that he had received from Berlin, Hans Frank continued to receive specifically designated shipments of Jews. He made a strong case to the Nazi leadership that the *Generalgouvernement* could not be the dumping ground some originally intended it to be. Its already high population density, abysmal food supply, and general economic crisis all made this impossible.

For several months more, until the latter part of 1941, Nazi Jewish policy remained officially committed to the idea of mass migration and expulsion. Then, during the course of the Russian campaign, code-named Barbarossa, a new "final solution" took shape: the Nazis determined to deport Jews from everywhere in Europe to specially designated killing centres in Poland where they would all be murdered.

What accounts for the change? It is difficult to assess fully the reasons for this shift in the Nazis' stated objectives, given the paucity of written directives and plain language addressing a crime of this magnitude. Certainly, the change was a part of a general radicalization of Nazism during Barbarossa and conformed to the pattern that Hitler had defined for that campaign.

It was a *Vernichtungskrieg*, a war of destruction, conceived as a struggle to eradicate once and for all the entire "Jewish-Bolshevik system", seen as fundamentally at odds with Nazism. But in addition, I would like to suggest, this shift to mass murder stemmed from problems posed by the accumulating masses of Jewish refugees in Nazi-occupied Poland and Russia, problems that reached a critical point under the impact of war.

At this point I enter the realm of speculation, as I fear all historians must to some degree when it comes to pinpointing the origins of the decision for European-wide mass murder. But it does seem to me that the accumulating frustrations of several years of aborted plans for a final solution came to some sort of head as the fighting in Russia raged. Massive killings of Jews accompanied that campaign from the start, following upon orders issued to the *Einsatzgruppen* before fighting began. Hundreds of thousands of Jews were

slaughtered. Consistent with the apocalyptic expectations for the outcome of the war, the Führer seems to have advised his followers that the decisive moment had come for the resolution of the Jewish question.

At the end of July, buoyed up by the first successes of the *Wehrmacht*, Göring issued his famous order to Heydrich to prepare "a total solution (*Gesamtlösung*) of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe". We cannot be certain what precisely was understood by "total solution" at that point, and it seems entirely plausible to me that emigration or expulsion of large masses of Jews still remained the overall conception.

Remember that Hitler and his generals expected sudden, dramatic success. The Red Army was going to be defeated in a matter of weeks. Russia would be prostrate. Presumably then Hitler would be able to deport or expel Jews into the great empty spaces of what had once been the Soviet Union — as various Nazis had proposed from time to time.

But, instead, the Russian campaign presented Hitler with a catastrophic setback. For once, the *Wehrmacht* did not meet its objectives. The fighting became more difficult with the autumn rains, the siege of Moscow, and the well-ordered Soviet retreat across the freezing Russian countryside.

The Jews, under these circumstances, became more bothersome than ever. Even with killings on a spectacular scale, the Nazis daily had more Jews on their hands. Their concentration in ghettos continued, and large numbers were being assembled at railway junctions ready for the long-awaited expulsions. Soviet territory, into which Jews might be dispatched, remained a battle zone, however. Most important, it became evident in the autumn of 1941 that the war would continue into the following year.

About this time, as news from the battlefields was becoming worse and as the Nazis faced even more frustration on the Jewish issue, orders seem to have gone out to prepare for mass killing on a European-wide scale. On October 23, in a striking reversal of emigration policy, Himmler ordered the exits closed even for German Jews. Deporta-

tions from Germany to the east began a few days before. SS teams visited the sites and began to prepare the first death camps — Chelmno and Belzec.

At the end of November, Heydrich sent invitations to Nazi Jewish experts across Europe to participate in a conference at the Berlin suburb of Wannsee on the "total solution". Emigration, as Heydrich made clear to that meeting, was now finished as a policy. Murder had taken its place.


While the exact process by which this shift took place is likely to remain elusive for historians, I would suggest that it is useful to see the matter in the general context of Nazi population policy in Eastern Europe. Looking at the Final Solution this way makes several things clear. First, it is evident that the Jewish issue was but a part of a gigantic scheme for the demographic transformation of the European continent — the construction of *Lebensraum* alluded to in the pages of *Mein Kampf* and ever after a fundamental objective of Nazism. The Jews were to be eliminated from the Reich and perhaps from all of Europe, but other groups were also undesirable, and their removal was necessary in order to settle millions of ethnic Germans on the newly expanded soil of the Reich.

Second, it would be a mistake to assume that the Jews were a constant and continually urgent preoccupation of

the Führer and Nazi policymakers. In the period immediately after the conquest of Poland, indeed, top Nazis showed that they had other issues on their minds, and even other priorities in the racial-political field. It was much more important to remove Polish peasants from the incorporated territories in 1939 and 1940 than to concentrate on Jews.

But finally, it seems undeniable that the Jewish issue was of central, fundamental importance to Hitler and the movement he created. While the Jewish issue could be put on the shelf for a time, it was never forgotten. While the Nazis were prepared to postpone a settling of accounts with the Jews, it was always taken for granted that there had to be, one day, a final solution. In the end, quite unlike the case with the Poles, every Jew had to go — including old men, women, children and tiny infants. By whatever means, whether by a distant Jewish colony, emigration, massive expulsions, or murder, this particular problem cried out for an answer, and could not be put off indefinitely. In this strictly limited sense, the Nazi approach to Jewish issues was different from all other questions they faced.

Michael R. Marrus is Professor of History at the University of Toronto and author of *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*.



Summer shot taken at Camp N, Sherbrooke, Quebec, with an illegal pinhole camera. (Photo by Marcell Seidler).

Racism in Canadian Immigration Policy

Part One: The History

Up to April 10, 1978, to talk of racism in Canadian immigration policy is over generous to the Government of Canada. Rather we should talk of racism as Canadian immigration policy.

The Canadian Immigration Act of 1910 quite boldly gave Cabinet power to prohibit immigrants belonging to any race. The wording changed from time to time but the power remained intact from 1910 to 1978. In 1919 the law stated Cabinet could bar immigrants of any race because the immigrants were deemed undesirable "owing to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of life and methods of holding property and because of their probable inability to become readily assimilated".

One example of the use of this power was a March 14, 1919 Order in Council to prohibit immigrants of the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian or Turkish races, except with the permission of the Minister of Immigration. That prohibition was different from the enemy alien prohibition. There was a separate prohibition on entry for those who had been enemy aliens during the war. The March 14 prohibition was strictly racial.

Another example, again from 1919, was the power invoked to prohibit the landing in Canada of Dukhobors, Hutterites, and Mennonites.

The Asian race was prohibited from entry in 1923. Exceptions were made for farm labourers and domestics. As well, a Canadian male could sponsor an Asian wife and their children under eighteen. In 1930 exceptions for farmers, farm labourers and domestics were taken away. All that remained was the exception for immediate family. This Asian prohibition lasted until 1956. At that time it was replaced by agreement with the Governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, limiting entry from each of these countries to 150 from India, 100 from Pakistan and 50 from Ceylon annually, in addition to immediate relatives of Canadian citizens. In 1958 the figure was changed to 300 from India. The limitations remained in effect till 1962.

The Government did not need the

positive prohibition in order to prevent citizens of particular countries from entering. It could and it did restrain admission to nationals of certain listed countries. Nationals of all other countries were, by implication, prohibited. The 1954 immigration regulations limited admissions to citizens of the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, the U.S. and France. Citizens of these countries had to have sufficient means to maintain themselves until they secured employment.

In 1956, citizens of the other countries of Western Europe were added to the list, provided the person came to Canada for governmental placement or the government had given approval of his employment. People from Europe, the Middle East, or the Americas, could come if they had extended family here. Others could come, notably those from Africa and Asia, only if they had immediate family here.

The prohibition by implication lasted until 1962. In that year a general entry requirement was applied to everyone. Anyone could come if he could show he was able to successfully establish himself in Canada. Even with this change, preference was given to people from Europe, the Middle East or the Americas who had extended family here.

Besides the power to prohibit explicitly and implicitly, the Immigration Act contained power to restrict according to race.

The Immigration Act of 1906 stated that Cabinet may provide as a condition to permission to enter Canada that immigrants shall possess money to a prescribed minimum amount, which amount may vary according to the class of the immigrant.

That power was first used in a racist way in 1908. A January 1908 Order in Council required \$25 for everyone. A June 1908 Order in Council increased the minimum dollar requirement to \$200 in the case of all Asiatic immigrants, other than those for which there were special regulations or arrangements. That exception covered

China and Japan. The recital to the regulations said the language and mode of life of immigrants from Asia render them unsuited for settlement in Canada when there are no colonies of their own people to ensure their maintenance in case of their inability to secure employment.

The 1910 Act gave Cabinet powers to provide as a condition of admission to land in Canada that the immigrants shall possess in their own right money to a prescribed minimum, and the amount could vary according to race. That power lasted till 1956.

In 1914, under the 1910 Act, Cabinet again passed an Order in Council that no immigrant of any Asiatic race would be permitted to land in Canada unless the immigrant possessed in his own right money to the amount of \$200.

This regulation became the subject of some bizarre litigation that went all the way to the British Columbia Court of Appeal. Munshi Singh appeared at the Canadian Port of Vancouver in May of 1914 a few months after the Order in Council had been passed. He had only \$20 with him. He was detained and ordered deported on the basis that he was of an Asian race and had less than \$200 with him. Munshi Singh appealed this order to the Supreme Court and to the Court of Appeal of B.C. He lost at both courts.

McPhillips, J.A., in a long judgement in the Court of Appeal, said, among other things, "the better classes of the Asiatic races are not given to leave their own countries. . . and those who become immigrants are. . . undesirables in Canada". "Their ways and ideas may well be a menace to the well being of the Canadian people".

"The Parliament of Canada. . . may well be said to be safeguarding the people of Canada from an influx which it is no chimeria to conjure up might annihilate the nation. . . introduce Oriental ways as against European ways. . . and all the results that would naturally flow therefrom".

"In their own interests their proper

place of residence is within the confines of their respective countries in the continent of Asia, not in Canada, where their customs are not in vogue and their adherence to them here only gives rise to disturbances destructive to the well being of society. . .”

“Better that people of non-assimilative . . . race should not come to Canada, but rather that they shall remain of residence in their country of origin, and do their share, as they have in the past, in the preservation and development of the empire”.

Besides the power to prohibit and the power to require financial requirements by race, there was a third power that was neutral on the face of it, but discriminatory in intent. The Immigration Act from 1908, up till 1978, gave Cabinet the power to impose a continuous passage rule.

The Governor in Council used this power to pass an Order in Council, in 1914, prohibiting the landing of any immigrant who came to Canada otherwise than by continuous journey from the country of which he was a native or naturalized citizen with a through ticket purchased in that country or pre-paid. At that time, it was impossible to purchase in India or prepay in Canada for a continuous journey from India to Canada.

Munshi Singh, who was ordered deported because he had only \$20 rather than \$200, was also ordered deported because he had not made a continuous journey from India. He stopped at Hong Kong first. The Court of Appeal ruled that Mr. Singh was validly ordered deported under that provision too.

Aside from the general immigration acts, with their racial provisions, there were a whole series of Chinese immigration acts that were directed particularly against persons of Chinese origin. Chinese immigrants did not just have to have money in their pocket. They had to pay it over. The Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 required each Chinese immigrant to pay \$50. That figure was increased to \$100 in 1900, and \$500 in 1903. In 1923, Chinese immigration was prohibited altogether.

The entry to or landing in Canada of persons of Chinese origin or descent was prohibited, irrespective of allegiance or citizenship. The only excep-

tions were diplomats, Chinese born in Canada, merchants and students. That statute remained on our books till 1947. At least in form, if not in effect, the most extreme form of racism in immigration was directed against the Japanese, during and after World War II.

Regulations passed under the authority of the War Measures Act did not merely restrict entry of Japanese from abroad. They provided for the deportation of Canadian citizens of Japanese descent who had been born in Canada. Every natural born British subject of the Japanese race 16 years of age or over resident in Canada who had made a request for repatriation could be deported to Japan. The wife and children under 16 of any person for whom the Minister made an order for deportation could be included in the order. Any request for repatriation would be deemed final and irreversible after a fixed delay.

In other words, a natural born Canadian could be ordered deported if he had requested to be sent to Japan, and if he subsequently changed his mind. His family could be sent to Japan, whether they had made a request or not.

This regulation was challenged before the Supreme Court of Canada and the Privy Council in England on appeal, on the ground that Canada could not deport citizens born in Canada. It could only deport aliens. Both courts ruled that Canada had the power to deport its own citizens.

The final historical instance of racial discrimination in immigration I will mention is the discrimination against the Jews. Harold Troper and Irving Abella recount in chilling detail the determination of the immigration authorities to keep out every single Jew, fleeing first Nazi persecution, then the Holocaust, and finally the aftermath of the Holocaust.

Let me just point out to you the distinctive legal feature of this prohibited immigration. What was different about it was that there was no law. There was no Jewish Immigration Act like the Chinese Immigration Act, prohibiting immigration altogether. There was no regulation like the regulation about Mennonites, saying that Jews were not suitable for Canada. There was no head tax against Jews, like the earlier Chinese immigration acts, requiring Jews to pay so much per person for

entry. There was no financial requirement like that for Asians, requiring that Jews have so much in their pockets before they were allowed entry. There was no requirement neutral on its face, but discriminating in effect, directed against Jews, like the continuous voyage requirement directed against Indians.

One could search the laws in vain for discrimination against Jews. Yet the discrimination was incontestable. It was done not through exercise of express powers, but through abuse of powers. Whatever the immigration requirements were, Jews could not meet them. The law allowed for entry of families with sufficient capital to establish farms. But Jewish families with capital were not allowed entry.

Immigration was headed by an avowed antisemite, Fred Blair. He transferred the responsibility for processing Jewish applicants from other government offices to his own where he personally scrutinized each application, deciding its eligibility. But in virtually every case the answer was “no”.

The Jewish experience, from the perspective of racism in immigration law, is illuminating. The Jewish experience tells us that you do not need laws to have racial discrimination in immigration. All you need is unlimited discretion. An unsympathetic public, or unmotivated public leadership or racists in office are enough to lead to racism in immigration even with laws neutral on their face.

This lesson is particularly relevant now, because all racist appearances in our immigration laws have disappeared. The present Immigration Act has as one of its obligations “to ensure that any person who seeks admission to land is subject to standards of admission that do not discriminate on the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion or sex”.

The power to prohibit entry by race is gone. The power to impose a financial requirement by race is gone. The continuous passage rule is gone. Yet the danger of racism remains.

David Matas, a Winnipeg lawyer, is Legal Counsel to the League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith Canada. The second part of this paper, which examines present Canadian immigration policy, will appear in the next issue of Refuge.

North America and the Jewish Refugee Crisis

None Is Too Many, the book I wrote with Professor Harold Troper, began fortuitously. We received from a student at the Public Archives of Canada two documents. The first was a telegram, dated June 5, 1939, addressed to the Prime Minister of Canada, Mackenzie King. It read very simply, "Please take us in. Canada is our last chance. If you say no, you will be signing our death warrant." And it was signed, "The Passengers of the ship *St. Louis*". This was of course the famous Voyage of the Damned, the boat full of a thousand German-Jewish refugees who had been packed on board by the Nazis, their only possession being an entry visa to Cuba; everything else had been taken away from them.

When they got to Cuba, of course, the Cuban government forbade them entry. For the next few weeks they sailed up and down the coast of South and North America, looking for a place to land. Every country said "no", the Americans even sending out a Coast Guard vessel to make sure that the ship did not get close enough to shore so that a Jewish passenger might slip overboard and swim to safety.

It turned out that the last opportunity to save the passengers from the *St. Louis* was Canada. There had been no mention of Canada in the book about the Voyage of the Damned — nor in the movie, for that matter.

The second document from our source in the Archives also sparked our interest. It was a memorandum from the Deputy Minister of Immigration, F.C. Blair, which rejected the admission of these hopeless refugees in stark words. "No country", wrote Blair, could "open its doors wide enough to take in the hundreds of thousands of Jewish people who want to leave Europe: The line must be drawn somewhere." The line drawn, the passengers' last flickering hope extinguished, the Jews of the *St. Louis* headed back to Europe where many of them died in the ovens of the Third Reich.

These two documents shocked us. Had Canada really been so cold-hearted and so callous? It was the first time that we had heard that Canada was involved in any way with the Holocaust. Troubled by this, we began looking

around for information. There are hundreds of articles and books about Canada and the Second World War; there are biographies of Canadian politicians, and books and articles about Canada in the 1930s. Yet, not a word about the Jews. If you look through these various official biographies, and the official records of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Immigration — at least the printed records — you will scarcely find a word about the Jews.

We decided that this was worth checking out, and headed to the Public Archives of Canada to see if there was a story behind these two documents. What we found shocked us, and undoubtedly has shocked many Canadians who have read our book. And not only shocked them, but perhaps shamed them. And, more importantly, forced them to ask some questions about their country.

We are all Canadians and are proud to be Canadians. We are proud of our heritage and of our traditions. And we are extraordinarily proud of our myths. And if there is a pervasive Canadian myth, it is that we are a country of immigrants, a country with a long history of welcoming refugees and dissidents, of always being in the forefront of accepting the world's oppressed and dispossessed. Racism, bigotry and antisemitism, most Canadians like to believe, are European or at least American in origin, and play little part in the Canadian psyche, Canadian tradition or Canadian history. We believe we are a country of vast open spaces, of immeasurable wealth, a country that has always been in the forefront of accepting those proverbial huddled masses yearning to be free.

Yet, the recent literature in Canadian history — not only *None Is Too Many*, but also books about our treatment of other groups, Chinese, Japanese, Eastern Europeans and Indians — has, I think, punctured a hole in this myth. No longer can Canadians sit smugly in judgement of others without taking into account their own record.

What our history books until recently did not mention and what few Canadians talked about, perhaps because they did not know or even worse did

not care, is that of all the democracies, of all the Western nations, of all the immigration countries in the world, our Canada had arguably the most appalling record in providing sanctuary to European Jewry at the time of its greatest need. Our Canada, which in 1956 took overnight some 40,000 Hungarian refugees, which in the 1960s and 1970s took thousands of Czechs and Ugandan Asians, which up to the present has resettled almost 100,000 Vietnamese refugees, could find no room in our bosom for more than a handful of the tormented Jews escaping the Nazis, looking for life, desperately looking for a haven.

What we discovered in the Archives were files full of letters from Jews desperate to escape the Nazis. One of the first we found was addressed in 1939 to the Immigration Department, and it read:

Gentlemen,

In great distress and need, a refugee family addresses itself to you for help and rescue. Our distress, particularly that of our children, a nine-year-old boy and a seven-year-old girl increases daily and there is nothing left for us but suicide. In our desperation we appeal to you for a permit to enter your country. Surely there are people left in this world, people who will have pity on us, people who will save us. My wife will refuse no work. We will farm, we will keep house, we will do anything in order to enter your country. Please do not let our cry for help go unheeded. Please save us before it is too late.

It was signed, Jacob and Cecilia Stein.

This letter is an example of the thousands that poured into the Department of Immigration and into various Jewish organizations throughout this country. There were requests for admission from doctors, bankers, lawyers, mathematicians, scientists, merchants, capitalists, people with money, precisely the people we needed in Canada in the 1930s to help us get out of the economic morass we were in. This was unlike any immigration group that had ever applied to this country before. We were being asked to accept the best that

Europe had to offer. This was the cream of European society. Those countries which did accept them benefitted enormously. Unfortunately, these people were Jews and Jews were not accepted in Canada in the 1930s.

And to each of these letters the response from the Department of Immigration was the same to the one appended to the letter from the Steins. It read:

Dear Sir,

Unfortunately, though we greatly sympathize with your circumstances, at present the Canadian government is not admitting Jews. Please try some other country.

And, of course, for the millions of Steins there was no other country.

Why was Canada so obsessive about keeping Jews out of our country? Obviously it was a time of depression and no country wanted to accept large numbers of job-hungry immigrants. But other countries suffered far worse from the Depression than did Canada and accepted far more. The answer to why Canada was closed to Jews was because the Canadian government made a definitive decision. Canada, it said, had enough Jews. It did not need any more.

If you think back to the Canada of 50 years ago, it was a Canada unrecognizable to those of us born since the Second World War. It was a Canada permeated with racism, bigotry and antisemitism.

These were particularly overt in the province of Quebec, where the Catholic Church led the onslaught against the Jews. Weekly, Jews were denounced from pulpits as "trouble makers, Christ-killers, evil, malevolent people who cheat and exploit". Catholic newspapers, the official newspapers of the Church in Quebec, denounced the Jews as exploiters, as the devil incarnate. Almost every French newspaper portrayed the Jews as cheaters, as parasites spreading insidious diseases. French-Canadian leaders, especially those in Parliament, carried petitions to the House warning the government that any action which would allow any number of Jews into this country would meet with deep and unremitting hostility in the province of Quebec. There were movements in Quebec to boycott

Jewish businesses and Jewish public officials and to prevent Jews from coming into Canada.

But anti-Jewish prejudice was not limited to Quebec. In English Canada, according to a report by the Canadian Jewish Congress commissioned in 1938, which was never released because it was so frightening, there were massive quotas and restrictions. This report stated that few of this country's principals and teachers were Jewish; that banks, insurance companies, large industrial and commercial interests did not hire Jews; and that department stores did not hire Jews as sales people — they could work in the back but they were not allowed to serve customers. Jewish doctors could not get hospital appointments.

Dear Sir,

Unfortunately, though we greatly sympathize with your circumstances, at present the Canadian government is not admitting Jews. Please try some other country.

Indeed, there was a great scandal which has been largely forgotten. In 1934, when a certain Jewish intern graduated first from the University of Montreal, he was hired as the first Jewish intern at a Quebec Catholic hospital, Notre Dame. The moment Dr. Samuel Rabinovitch began his tour of duty, the interns at his hospital went on strike and began picketing the hospital, refusing to work with a Jew. Eventually he was fired, the University of Montreal agreed to further restrict the enrolment of Jewish students and the hospital agreed never again to hire a Jewish doctor.

And typically and symbolic of what it was like in Canada for a young Jew, the young doctor left the country as did so many thousands of other young Jews who could not get jobs here, and became a distinguished research professor in the United States, winning countless awards. We lost thousands of Rabinovitchs because we had no room in our society in the 1930s and 1940s for Jews.

In this country in the 1920s and 1930s

there was not one single Jewish full-time professor at any university. If you think about the great names in law, science, medicine and music throughout the world, you could see what we were missing. Our universities in this country were *Judenrein*. When we were offered German Jews — many of them famous researchers — and we were offered them free, because the Carnegie Foundation would pay the salary of any Jewish immigrant who was hired in a Canadian university — scarcely any were hired, with the notable exception of Gerhardt Herzberg, our one Nobel laureate in science, who was not Jewish but had married a Jew. Canadian universities argued that since they were not hiring Canadian Jews, why should they hire foreign ones. The Congress report also said that it was impossible for Jewish nurses and architects and engineers to find jobs in their fields and they often succeeded in getting jobs only when they changed their names and adopted Christian ones.

If Jews found it difficult to find jobs, it was perhaps even more difficult for them to find a place to live or to vacation, because there were restrictive covenants put on properties throughout Canada which forbade them from being sold to Jews. There were signs in various resorts and beaches which forbade the Jews from vacationing. Here in Toronto there were two beaches at either end of the city, in the west end and the east end, beside the one highway at that time coming into Toronto, the Lakeshore. Prominently displayed right off the highway were signs which read, "No Jews or Dogs Allowed". "Restricted". Those were signs of the times in Canada in the 1930s. There was also some violence as Jew and anti-semitic confronted one another on the streets of Toronto, Winnipeg, Montreal and Vancouver, including the famous Christie Pits riots here in Toronto which have gone down in the folklore of the Jewish community.

Why was Canada so antisemitic? What explains this racism? Well, there are all sorts of reasons. It was the time of the Depression, people were looking for scapegoats, and invariably the search for a scapegoat ended up on a Jewish doorstep. Jews were seen as trouble-makers because they were prominently represented in left wing movements, thus prompting many malevolent Ca-

nadians to believe that all Jews were communists.

In addition, Canada had been open to immigrants for three decades. Between 1900 and 1930 we took millions of unlettered aliens. The Jew was a symbol for these because he tended to live in cities and tended in the eye of the Canadian nationalist to represent the mongrelization of Canada. For many, the Jew was a symbol for what was happening to their country — and they did not like it. So antisemitism, in the word of one distinguished academic, was simply a form of Canada nationalism. Obviously, some hated Jews for religious reasons: Jews had killed Christ, had refused to repent, and therefore they were damned.

To me there was one reason that stands out, and still stands out to some extent today. And that is a feeling amongst our elite, the people who form opinion for society — journalists, government officials, teachers — that the Jew did not fit into their concept of Canada. Canada to them was to be a country of homesteaders and farmers, and despite what the Jews were doing in Palestine at the time, turning a desert green, these people did not believe that Jews could become farmers. And those immigrants who did not farm were expected to go into the woods, mines, forests, smelters and canneries or join construction gangs to build and fuel the great Canadian boom. And, again, most Canadians felt that Jews did not fit this pattern. Most Canadians thought of the Jews as a city people in a country attempting to build up its rural base. They were peddlars and shopkeepers in a country that wanted loggers and miners. They were seen as people with brains in a country that wanted people with brawn. They were seen as people with strong minds in a country that wanted people with strong backs. The extent of antisemitism, of course, explains why this country turned its back on the Jews of Germany and Europe throughout this period.

Our policy towards Jewish refugees did not change once the war began. Of the hundreds of thousands of Jews who escaped the onrushing Nazi army, of those thousands who made their way to Spain and Portugal and to the Low Countries and even to Japan, Canada

accepted between 1939 and 1945 a grand total of 500. What is astonishing to note is that in a period of a few months one man, Raoul Wallenberg, saved five times as many Jews as Canada did between 1933 and 1945.

Nor did the story change once the war ended. Between 1945 and 1948 Canada was booming; it needed workers. Industry after industry came to the government pleading to be allowed to go into the Displaced Persons (D.P.) camps and recruit workers. We were supplying much of the wherewithal for Europe's survival; food, goods, machinery. The government agreed. Any company, any industry that came to the government, was allowed to go into the D.C. camps and to bring out as many workers as it wanted with one exception: it would not be allowed to bring in any Jews. Jews were not yet acceptable in Canada, even after the war.

There was a public opinion poll taken at that time, in which Canadians were asked right after the war, knowing full well that the country would have to be opened up to immigrants, "What type of immigrant do you not want in this country?" At the top of the list, not surprisingly, I guess, were the Japanese, since Canada had just finished the war in Japan. But right behind the Japanese as the immigrants least wanted by the

Canadian people were the Jews. Way down the list were the Germans. So that even though the newsreels and the newspapers were still full of the bestial activity of the Nazis, Canadians preferred almost anyone to the Jew.

Our story, and perhaps Canada's "Jewish problem", ends in 1947 with the creation at the United Nations of a Jewish state. Until 1947 the Canadian government was afraid that it would be inundated with Jews if it opened up its doors; but once there was a Jewish state, the Canadian government knew the Jews would have an alternative, they would have somewhere else to go. One of the reasons Canada in 1947 breaks for the first time with Great Britain at the United Nations and votes for the creation of a Jewish state, I would argue, is precisely to be rid of the obligation of opening its doors to large numbers of Jewish refugees.

Yet that is precisely what we do. Once Israel is created, once the Jews have a homeland and we know we will be rid of the obligation of accepting large numbers of Jews, because they will be going to Israel, we then send our immigration agents into the D.P. camps to recruit the people who would make the best citizens in this country.

What is also true is that at that time



"They were seen as people with brains in a country that wanted people with brawn." Jewish internees chopping wood at Camp B, near Fredericton, New Brunswick. (Courtesy of Gunther Bardeleben).

Canada, which was closed to the Jews, was open to all sorts of other people whose credentials were acceptable to immigration officials. When the Canadian officials went into the D.P. camps looking for immigrants, they had a hit parade, they knew what ethnic groups they wanted. And number one on the hit parade were those who could prove they were anti-communist. We did not want communists in Canada; this was the height of the cold war. And how did you prove you were anti-communist? You proved you were anti-communist by having fought with the Nazis against the Russians. And so while large numbers of Jews were being turned away, we were accepting large numbers of those — I am not talking only about war criminals — who could prove their anti-communism by having supported the Nazis.

I want to speak for a moment about the American response. The American record towards the victims of the Holocaust has, of course, received far more attention than the Canadian one. It has been the subject of books by Arthur Morse, Saul Friedman, Yehuda Bauer, Henry Feingold, Leonard Dinnerstein and, most recently, Monty Penkower's *The Jews Were Expendable* and David Wyman's *The Abandonment of the Jews*.

All make the case that the world's greatest democracy was unwilling to assist the Jews in their hour of greatest need, and indeed was incapable of understanding the nature of the Jewish catastrophe — although, of course, the United States did far more than Canada between 1933 and 1945, accepting over 200,000 Jewish refugees while Canada took less than 5,000.

Historians all agree that what prompted America's lack of response was the antisemitism and nativism that permeated Congress and the country at the time, the cold indifference of President Franklin Roosevelt to the plight of the Jews, the obstruction and callousness of various key officials in the Departments of State, Immigration and War, the apathy of the media, which carried few stories about the massacres of Jews, the refusal of many to believe the details of the Holocaust despite the enormity of the evidence, the silence of the Christian churches, the academic community and other non-Jewish or-

ganizations, and, finally, the divisions within the Jewish community itself.

The latter — the lack of action by Jews — has been the subject of much historical dispute, as some historians have argued that, had only the Jewish community been more aggressive, then far more could have been done. It seems to me that some of those who argue that the North American Jewish community should have done more are simply trying to save their own consciences and to get their countries off the hook. After all if the Jews themselves did little, could anyone expect the American and Canadian governments to do more? Yet it is a serious charge made by respectable historians and worth examining.

What is astonishing to note is that in a period of a few months one man, Raoul Wallenberg, saved five times as many Jews as Canada did between 1933 and 1945.

From the onset of the crisis Jewish leadership in Canada saw quiet diplomacy as the only tactic which might convince the government to open the doors to a handful of refugees. Regularly and unobtrusively Jewish emissaries tramped off to Ottawa, cap in hand, to lobby with immigration officials and Members of Parliament. They were made promises which were never kept. In fact, in order to keep the Jews quiet, some prominent members of the community were rewarded with special immigration permits to be distributed to a fortunate few. It was a cynical activity but it worked. For the most part, though restive, Canadian Jews remained loyal to the Liberal Party. After all, on immigration matters the Conservative opposition was even worse.

Jewish leaders pleaded with such Jewish organizations as the trade unions, the Zionists and the fraternal societies, to avoid mass meetings, protest marches and demonstrations, because

they feared such methods would alienate the government and create an anti-semitic backlash throughout the country. It was no time, the leaders argued, for what we today would call the "politics of the street". Helpless, the Jews of Canada followed orders, they remained silent. To the very end the Jewish community put its faith in its own leadership and in the Liberal Government; neither delivered.

But even if Canadian Jewry had been more forceful, it would have made little difference. The Canadian Government was committed to keeping Jews out of Canada, and it was not to be deterred in its objective by the tiny Jewish community whether it was noisy or silent. So long as the Churches remained passive — and they did — and the provinces did not say anything — and they did not — there was little domestic pressure on the Government to force a change in policy.

The American Jewish community was of course much more powerful or integrated but scarcely powerful or integrated enough. There were, of course, divisions in the community over Zionism, over strategy, over support of Roosevelt, and a host of other things, which their enemies in government were fully aware of.

Yet, it seems to me, a united Jewish community would have made no difference. The Allies were not going to change their war time priorities simply because Jews asked them to. Nor would the Nazis stop their slaughtering. The rescue of Jews was never formally discussed at any of the war time conferences held in Newfoundland, Casablanca, Teheran, Cairo or even Yalta. For the Allies it was not — and never could be — an issue. And the Nazis, of course, were adamantly determined to destroy Jews no matter the pressures brought on them by the Allies. They were obsessed with the need to solve the Jewish question. A united American Jewish community would have made no difference.

In any case what could the Jews have done? There was no political party they could support which made the saving of Jews a priority; there was no action they could take in the middle of a war without being subjected to charges of sedition, of harming the war effort,

and without poisoning the already pervasive antisemitic atmosphere.

At the very heart of the problem is the question of Jewish power and influence in the 1930s. The possibility of success depended not only on getting the story believed but then convincing decision-makers that action was required.

There is little doubt that Jews did not remotely possess the kind of power required to convince an almost totally unreceptive officialdom that something more was involved in the Jewish pleas for action than what was dismissed by official Washington as "the usual Jewish wailing".

We must not make the historical mistake of reading back into the history of the 1930s and 1940s a condition which only developed later. Because Jews have some influence and power today does not necessarily mean that they had any forty or fifty years ago. In any case there is always a limit to the amount of influence an ethnic group can exercise on policy, especially in time of war.

From what historians know today, the official American resistance to any rescue attempt and the outright sabotage and lying at all levels of the bureaucracy and, most important perhaps, the hostile indifference of Roosevelt himself to the plight of the Jews, were so overwhelming, that the possibility of rescue advocacy breaking through the wall of silence was extremely limited. One should recall that it was not until 1943, after Stalingrad, that Allied leaders could be fairly certain that they, too, would not become Hitler's victims. And, in any case, most Americans saw Japan as a worse threat than Nazi Germany and did not want to be bothered by what was to them a side show.

Fifty years ago the world was divided into two parts — those places where Jews could not live, and those, like Canada, where they could not enter. Fifty years ago the nations of the world were put to the test of civilization and failed. The failure was not one of tactics, but of the human spirit. The Nazis planned and executed the Holocaust but it was made possible by an indifference in the Western world to the suffering of the victims which bordered on contempt. Not one nation showed generosity of heart to those doomed,


not one made the Jewish plight a national priority, and not one willingly opened its doors after the war to the surviving remnant of a once thriving Jewish community. Rescue required sanctuary and there was none. Rescue required concern but there was only apathy. Rescue required commitment, but there was only silence. Rescue required understanding, but there was only hostility.

One of the lessons to be learned by all of this, of course, is of the weakness of democracy. Mackenzie King, the best

politician Canada ever had, knew very well that if there were votes to be won in allowing in Jews, he would have allowed them in. But he knew there were not, so he did not.

If there is anything to be learned from all of this, it is to resolve here and now, as Canadians, in the 1980s, that never again, at any time, for anyone, should none be too many.

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War work in Camp N, Sherbrooke, Quebec, circa September 1941. Internees had to wear clothes with large circles on their backs for easy identification. (Courtesy of Public Archives Canada).

“Refugee!” The Adjustment of Jewish Refugees from Nazism to Canadian Life

The 1970s were years of political and social ferment in French Canada. At that time I was conducting a series of interviews with former refugees from Nazism, most of them Jews, many of them residents of Quebec. As English-speaking Quebecers these men were concerned, as were many Jews, with the rising tide of French-Canadian nationalism and its consequences. The possible resurgence of flagrant anti-semitism was on everyone’s mind. Indeed some of these men, now in their fifties and sixties, had already moved to Ontario, and others were contemplating relocation.

My questions seemed self-evident. After all they had been through under Nazism, was it not doubly hard for *them* to move yet again? Their answers surprised me. It was not difficult at all! Once a refugee, I was told, always a refugee. It was a lesson they had no need to learn twice. For forty years they had been mentally packed and ready. I had encountered the tenacity of the refugee mentality.

Forty-five years ago a group of over two thousand men and boys, German and Austrian refugees from Nazism, were shipped from temporary internment camps in Britain to prisoner of war camps in Canada. For the next three and a half years they remained prisoners or parolees in a country which did not welcome Jewish immigrants. By 1944 half of these men were released to live in Canada — the remainder returned to Britain through frustration, free will or force.

For those who stayed in Canada conditions varied. Students, sponsored by Canadians, fared well and quickly prospered. Others went to work on farms and in factories where they were sometimes exploited and their adjustment was more difficult. All entered Canadian life with the same stigma — “refugee”.

The peculiar circumstances which brought the interned refugees to Can-

ada and the probationary nature of their release from the camps made them wary of fully entering Canadian life.

The only thing that was told to us . . . is behave well and be sure that we don’t make any trouble . . . otherwise we’d be returned immediately. This fear was with us all the time . . . So with that kind of attitude you don’t mingle in politics, you don’t join anything, you don’t do anything wrong.

The interned refugees were hesitant to complain when exploited and were unfamiliar with means of redress. The Nazis had taught German and Austrian Jews that friends could quickly become enemies and so fear and suspicion marked the early years of their adjustment to Canada.

The unusual character of this group of refugees also contributed to their Canadianization. Many had been Jews only in accordance with Nazi racial definitions and they found it easier to lose the dual stigma of “Jewish refugee” through complete assimilation. However, most gravitated to the Jewish community where they discovered that their background gave them minority status.

Despite the fact that many of these refugees from Germany and Austria worked in companies dominated by Eastern European Jews, they mixed quite easily. The internment process had provided opportunities which most refugees never received and experiences which, many recall in retrospect, permanently altered their perspectives. Most of the internees had come from upper and middle class backgrounds. They now confronted manual labour jobs. If they worked with their hands, often for the first time, so, they soon learned, did the vast majority of the Canadian Jewish community.

What impressed me the most, coming to Canada, is the lack of

the caste system. In Canada I learned very soon that the only thing that counts was money, more or less, to determine your status. Another thing that I admired very much and that I was not used to from Europe was that Jewish people were workers here. That means that it was not a shame here to be an electrician or a plumber or a glazier or whatever. . . Well in my background you wouldn’t dream of it. People would look down on you if you were in a trade. . . This impressed me very much in favour of this part of the world.

At ease in their jobs, most interned refugees were able to make friends with their co-workers. For many it was a whole new lifestyle. “It made me a much better person”, recalled one internee.

All the experiences. Because I was rather spoiled. I came from a wealthy home and, terribly spoiled . . .

First of all, mixing with the working people and seeing their point of view. . . They got a much bigger kick out of life than we did because they took it much easier. . . And I learned to relax a little, which I never did before.

Intra-Jewish tension, between German and Austrian refugees and the larger Eastern European community, receded with contact in the work-place but was never completely absent. Some refugees blamed neglect or indifference in the Jewish community for prolonging their internment. The few released refugees who put on airs of superiority to the largely working class Jewish community caused bitterness in return. In his book, *The Street*, Mordecai Richler recalls the first released interned refugees he encountered in Montreal.

I think we had conjured up a pic-

ture of the refugees as penurious hassidim with packs on their backs. We were eager to be helpful, our gestures were large, but in return we expected more than a little gratitude. As it turned out, the refugees... were far more sophisticated and better educated than we were... They found our culture thin, the city provincial, and the Jews narrow... But what cut deepest, I suppose, was that the refugees spoke English better than many of us did, and, among themselves, had the effrontery to talk in the abhorred German language. Many of them also made it clear that Canada was no more than a frozen place to stop over until a U.S. visa was forthcoming. So for a while we real Canadians were hostile.

Yet these problems evaporated in the work-place.

This was a funny thing, and I gave up after a while to tell people. When I told people I came from Austria, they'd say "Oh, you're a landsmensch of mine. You come from Galicia too." And I tell him no, I came from Vienna. "You come from Austria. So you must come from the same part that I come from." So after a while, I'd say sure. I gave up... I learned how to speak Yiddish. With my German background it wasn't too hard. I got along very nicely.

For the majority of men who successfully adjusted expectations and made conscious efforts to adapt, life in Canada in the 1940s was full of promise.

These men, some as young as seventeen and some in their sixties, had to start their new lives from scratch. The survivors of the Holocaust who followed them to Canada would have similar experiences. No one was going to make it easy for them.

In my mind the injustice of the whole thing still rankles. After all, we were anti-Nazis. We were genuine refugees from German oppression. We lost our families to the Holocaust. We lost our chance for education in Germany. We lost all our possessions. I left Germany with the proverbial ten marks which were used up by the time I

crossed Holland. And we had to start life anew in England, and due to the internment experience we had to start life anew in Canada again, penniless and without support. It has taken practically the whole of my youth and my formative years, I would say to about the age of thirty, before I could actually start to live again... Somehow, between the cooperative efforts of the Nazi government and the British Home Office and the Canadian

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authorities, as far as they prolonged the experience of internment here, somehow our youth was stolen away from us. By the time we came out, mentally, we were already beginning to be middle-aged. We had gone through too much... It's a pity, but that's what happened. It's irreversible; crying about it makes no sense and I have never even talked about it until this very opportunity. Life goes on.

Young as many of them were in years, the refugees released from internment into Canada were no longer youthful. Some were completely broken; most were anxious to pick up the pieces of their lives and many were fueled by an ambition which knew no bounds. There was no longer time to waste. Bitterness, instilled by years of unjust treatment, had to be overcome. After years of uncertainty followed by years of incarceration, the interned refugees deserved time to adjust to Canadian life.

This was not to be. Many had prepared, as best they could, by gaining a fluency in English. Others were wary and unprepared. No one was exactly sure what to expect and experiences differed.

"I found adjustment relatively easy", recalled one ex-internee, "because I stayed in Germany until 1939. So my memories of Germany were not the best... I found the freedom in Canada and the relatively open society as rather worthwhile."

For another adjustment was difficult. "I came from a very small place in Germany... And being a free man and walking around in Montreal, it irritated me that everything was so fast — the traffic. And people were running only after money. Money meant everything. Money and nothing but money. It was shocking."

Indeed adjustment to Canadian life was easiest for two groups — the students and the orthodox Jews. The students found Canadian social contacts in school and through the help of their sponsors.

The orthodox melted easily into the religious community. Yet they, too, an internee explained, had problems.

It was always my impression that English, and perhaps French, was the vernacular of Canadian Jewry. To my astonishment I found out that the older and also middle-aged Jews speak mostly Yiddish... My limited English seems to be a great deal better than many of my Canadian friends'. They, in turn, cannot comprehend how a European Jew cannot speak Yiddish.

Integration into the Canadian Jewish world was one difficulty that all the Jewish refugees faced. Canadian Jewry, divided along organizational, language, and class lines, presented an unusual dilemma to the incoming refugees. The refugees were a group of well-educated and assimilated German and Austrian Jews. Some harboured old-world prejudices. And they were, with the exception of the students, entering a working class milieu dominated by Polish and Galician Jews. Some were told bluntly, "I want you to know that we don't like German Jews".

In return many refugees behaved arrogantly, which only served to further alienate them from the community. Until the war ended and the full extent of the Holocaust was known, feelings of alienation from fellow Jews played

a significant part in the adjustment of these new immigrants.

Yet the overall experience of the refugees as they became integrated into the Jewish community was far from negative. For Germans who needed to learn Yiddish the task was not too difficult. Those truly interested in finding their place among the Canadian Jewish community found no real impediments.

There were certainly surprises. A young student, released to attend Queen's University, heard about a rabbi in Ottawa who had stolen a car, chased women and gambled.

I was so shocked. I was a very innocent young boy and I was so shocked that I wrote to my friends in Camp: "Canada is such a terrible country, even the rabbis are a bunch of crooks". That letter was intercepted by the Commandant . . . So he called Mr. Samuel Bronfman and he said: "Look, we let these fellows come out and immigrate to Canada and look what they write about your community". So Mr. Bronfman called me on the carpet: "Listen, you'd better be cautious in what you write here about Canada".

The refugees found themselves entering a Jewish community which was as interested in helping them as it was in assuring they behaved. In Montreal and Toronto the Canadian Jewish Congress provided loans and clothing, free access to doctors and advice; homes were located, religious needs provided for and Jewish families encouraged to open their homes to the refugees. The help was appreciated. "I found the Jewish community an extremely warm community", explained one refugee fondly. "For the first time in my life the doors opened up to me and I felt extremely comfortable".

Nonetheless, the first years of Canadian life were difficult for some — more difficult, recalled one internee, than he expected.

I really found it a traumatic experience after internment camp coming to Toronto and being *nobody* all of a sudden. There's tremendous trauma attached to being a refugee. My parents were respected people in the commu-

nity. I was always a top student in school. I usually had a whole circle of people around me. . . . And here nobody knew me — "Refugee" — very difficult to live with that kind of thing.

In the years that have passed since internment, none of the refugees have forgotten their experiences. It marked their lives and determined the progress of their adjustment to the Canadian and Jewish communities.

Some of the internees found comfort in retaining their internment camp friends. They had already lost much, but the comradeship of fellow internees allowed them to share experiences that all felt. Every internee might ask: "Why was I protected? Who protected me? How was I chosen? How come the other ones all went to Dachau, Buchenwald and never came out? All my cousins are dead. They cleaned up all my friends. All my friends are dead." And so their fellow refugees became their anchor. "This was my family. These were the people I was closest to. These were the people I understood." For most, marriage, schools and jobs brought new contacts and eased adjustment.

Some who never overcame the despair of internment denied the experience, refusing to socialize with other refugees. "Every once in a while", a reluctant interviewee explained, "I speak to somebody about it and usually I don't sleep for three days, even now. So I'm very hesitant to talk about it. I never think about it. I have it in the back of my mind."

Others openly reflect on their internment experience, sometimes seeing it as part of the common adjustments all survivors of the Holocaust must endure. "Naturally you lost several years of your life", explained one internee. "My whole life didn't develop the way I wanted it to. But these are romantic dreams. . . . You make things do." "I think of it every day of my life", explained another. "Till I die, I will never forget it. I can't."

With time, most interned refugees eased into their places in the Canadian community. For some there is a realization that the internment experience, scarring as it was, saved their lives and opened new horizons.

You feel, in one way, a wasted time — you lost two or three years — on the other hand you are happy to be saved by these circumstances. Millions of people lost their lives. So I regard it as a happy accident to come through the war like this . . . The experience itself wasn't always pleasant. . . . but this is what war is. It displaces people. And if you look around you just can thank your stars you're in a country like Canada.

Indeed many of the refugees succeeded in Canada and their achievements far exceeded anyone's expectations of them. For some this serves to magnify the irony of their internment and intensifies their pride in their achievements. According to several internees, internment and the resulting hardships has created its own motivation to succeed in all they do.

We all received a drive — to make up for the lost years we had as kids. The totally useless two years . . . We had to make up fast, quick and get somewhere and try and recreate the type of life that we remembered as children. . . . it's because we had nobody to rely on. They had to make it on their own . . . We just couldn't afford to fail. We had to succeed. . . . In my particular case every living minute was spent learning and working and producing, at the cost of my teens. I had no youth.

If you have no parents you are thrown on yourself. You can go two ways. One way, you give up. Or — I'm going to make something. I'm going to show them. Even though I may be a dirty Jew and a refugee. . . . I'm just as good as everybody else.

Perhaps it is just this determination — won through suffering, loss and forced immigration — that separates the refugee from other immigrants. For the refugee, the past is never reconciled and the future never certain.

Paula J. Draper was the historical consultant with the Toronto Holocaust Memorial and Education Centre. Her paper is based on her doctoral dissertation "The Accidental Immigrants: Canada and the Interned Refugees" (University of Toronto — Department of Educational Theory, 1983).

Book Review

Michael R. Marrus
The Unwanted:
European Refugees in
the Twentieth Century
Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1985

Throughout history, mankind has migrated, whether from valley to valley or to a distant continent. At times, these population shifts may have affected only a relatively small portion of human society while on other occasions, particularly during the past century, migration has had an impact upon literally millions of people worldwide.

Human migration occurs for many reasons. One cause apparent in the majority of population movements can be attributed to a desire to acquire a higher standard of living and a more pleasing way of life. Indeed, economic factors have been a significant impetus in both compelling people to leave their traditional places of residence or drawing them towards what they frequently believe to be a "promised land".

As strong as the economic motives behind human migrations may be, widespread population upheavals can also be explained by even more basic factors. To avoid officially condoned persecution and threats to life and property, unexpectedly sizable numbers of persons have too frequently felt the need to flee involuntarily from their homelands. To a large extent, it is that portion of European society that has believed it necessary to escape these latter brutal conditions that is the focus of the recently published work under review.

The objective of this comprehensive study is to describe and examine involuntary population movements in Europe that have occurred primarily in the Twentieth Century. The author seeks in this work to point out the causes behind the many movements and addresses the issue of how attempts were made to cope with the many hundreds of thousands of "unwanted" persons by governments and inter-governmental organizations. In each of the situations or cases described, persons in flight sought an

environment or haven free from man made oppression and horror where a more fulfilling way of life could be at least attempted.

In general, the involuntary population movements in Europe discussed in this study resulted from one or a combination of the following factors; rampant, intolerant nationalism, highly developed forms of persecution, and war or the anticipation of imminent war.

The number of involuntary population movements described by the author in substantial detail is almost overwhelming to the casual reader. The effect of the continuous recounting of so many instances of man's inhumanity to man is almost to numb the reader to the enormous tragedy that repeated itself again and again in Europe just in the years between the turn of the century and the end of World War II. A fragmentary list of the situations described would include Jews in Eastern and Central Europe, numerous eruptions in the Balkans, the plight of the Armenians, escapees from revolutionary Russia, persons uprooted as a result of the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the better known cases involving fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain.

To compile this book, the author carried out exceedingly thorough research in a number of countries using a large selection of archival holdings. This finished product, a monument to diligent and industrious investigation, will be of interest to scholars as well as to informed observers of European affairs in this century.

This seemingly endless chronology of humanity, compelled to be on the move, tends at times to become rather dower and gloomy. On occasion, however, the author provides some welcome relief from the succession of tragedies by describing almost anecdotally the characteristics of some of the persons who were uprooted. The account of a former Russian aristocrat, then in his mid seventies, surrendering his small group of anti-communist supporters to the Western occupying armies in Germany in 1945 is almost delightful.

This ambitious study has other attributes. It throws considerable new

light upon one or two of the attempts that ended successfully in saving at least a few European Jews from the Nazis. Similarly, significant information regarding the forced repatriation of Soviet nationals by Western governments following the end of hostilities in Europe is also provided. Moreover, the obvious frustrations encountered during the mid 1930s by James McDonald, the short lived League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany, are examined and enumerated.

Despite the obvious worth of this ably written book, there are some noteworthy shortcomings. Without wishing to dwell unduly upon the issue of refugee definitions, the fact remains that the author unfortunately uses the term "refugee" to cover virtually all mass population movements examined in this study. While admittedly the present UNHCR definition is certainly somewhat narrow and restrictive, it does at least strive to provide a little precision to the term. The sweeping use of the term refugee used in this work detracts from efforts that are being made to clarify the meaning. The word "unwanted" that is used in the book title is certainly a preferable term in the context of the population movements studied here.

The almost endless series of involuntary population movements discussed in the book have been briefly commented upon earlier. The reader would be significantly assisted in appreciating the importance of these migrations if they were grouped together more effectively in some classificatory scheme. Now, the reader is left with the impression that the primary reason any of the forced movements appears in the book rests with the fact that they took place in Europe in this century. It would be preferable to classify the movements by cause or by the impact felt by the reluctant receiving governments. The absence of such a set of classifications is disappointing, indeed.

As comprehensive as this work is in the descriptive sense, it suffers at times from less emphasis upon an analysis or explanation of how and why certain events occurred. For example, while the text amply suggests that strenuous diplomatic negotiations surrounded many of the efforts to resolve problems

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facing the uprooted nationals of many countries, seldom is there a satisfactory focus upon what must have been intriguing intergovernmental deliberations. This is particularly the case with respect to population movements in the Balkans and involving Greece and Turkey in the post World War I era. Some more substantial attention to the negotiating postures of the affected governments would have added a valuable dimension to this study.

These and any other remarks of a similar vein that might be made really only skirt the more important problem associated with this book. Without doubt, the major disappointment arises from the absence of an explicit, conceptual or analytical framework in which to arrange and order the mountains of data so painstakingly gathered by the author. While a simple chronological approach to the various movements is adopted, something a little more helpful in terms of arranging information in patterns seems most desirable. One encounters one appalling human tragedy after another with little apparent attempt to delineate or distinguish patterns of causes. Many of the criticisms expressed above would, in fact, disappear if an appropriate conceptual framework or scheme had been chosen. As it is, the book, while demonstrating able research, does lose at least a little of its potential scholarly impact.

It is not the intent of this review to conclude on a negative note. It needs to be pointed out that the epilogue constitutes one of the most readable and effective portions of the entire book. This succinct section traces intergovernmental activity in Europe in the post World War II era aimed at resolving the refugee and displaced persons situations on that continent. The discussion is both clear and cogent, containing just the essential details. While the author must be warmly congratulated for putting together such a comprehensive, detailed picture of involuntary population movements in Europe, the fact remains that the volume is a little less than it otherwise might have been, owing to the reasons set out above.

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The Annual Report to Parliament on Future Immigration Levels was tabled on October 31 by Walter McLean, Minister of State for Immigration. In his statement to the House, the Minister said: "Canada will increase its growth of government-assisted refugees in 1986 by 1,000, from 11,000 to 12,000, at a time when many refugee-receiving nations are becoming more restrictive.

These refugees will be aided by an additional provision of \$3.0 million to the Adjustment Assistance Programme. An additional \$750,000 is being provided to agencies to provide direct aid to refugees and other needy immigrants. In total, the 1986 plan allows for some 20,000-23,000 humanitarian landings, the second largest plan in the world next to the United States."

GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED REFUGEE ALLOCATIONS, 1985-1986			
	1985	1986	Change
Eastern Europe	2,200	3,100	+900
Southeast Asia	3,700	3,200	-500
Latin America	3,000	3,200	+200
Africa	1,000	1,000	-
The Middle East	800	900	+100
Other World Areas	200	300	+100
Funded Management Reserve	100	300	+200
TOTAL	11,000	12,000	+1,000

News Digest

- Olof Rydbeck, Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) since 1979, retired on 31 October after a long and distinguished career, and has been replaced by Giorgio Giacomelli of Italy. Giacomelli has been Director-General of the Department of Co-operation and Development in the Italian Foreign Ministry since 1981.

- The Refugee Studies Programme at Queen Elizabeth House began in 1982. It brings together host government officials, scholars and professionals with a wide range of persons with specialized knowledge in relevant fields. Queen Elizabeth House offers access to Oxford University's unique library and archival resources, and has long experience in mounting training courses for overseas personnel in administrative and foreign service, and in providing research facilities for Visiting Fellows. The Refugee Studies Programme emphasizes refugee participation, the strengthening of host country institu-

tions and talents of personnel, the need for independent research and evaluation, training and development. *Refugee Issues*, a quarterly series of working papers, is published in co-operation with the British Refugee Council. Applications and enquiries should be addressed to Dr. B.E. Harrell-Bond, Programme Co-ordinator, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, 21 St. Giles, Oxford OX1 3LA U.K.

- The annual subscription rate for *Refugee Reports* has been reduced to \$28.00. Multiple orders are available at \$20.00 each. *Refugee Reports* is a 16-page monthly devoted entirely to refugee issues. It covers national and local programmes to meet refugees' needs, international refugee situations, U.S. legislation, regulations, and litigation affecting refugees, research, statistics, and resources. Subscribers also receive the U.S. Committee for Refugees' *World Refugee Survey* and its Issue Papers series. To subscribe, send a cheque with your name, affiliation, if appropriate, and address to: *Refugee Reports* Subscriptions, Sunbelt Fulfillment Services, P.O. Box 41094, Nashville, TN 37204, U.S.A.

New Publications

* Baker, Reginald P. and North, David S. *The 1975 Refugees: Their First Five Years in America* (Washington, D.C.: New Transcendy Foundation, 1984)

* de Neef, C.E.J., and de Ruiter, S. J. *Sexual Violence against Women Refugees* (Amsterdam: Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, June 1984)

* North, David S. *Alien Legalization and Naturalization: What the United States Can Learn from Down Under*. (Washington, D.C.: New Transcendy Foundation, 1984)

* North, David S. *Refugee Earnings and Utilization of Financial Assistance Programs*. (Washington, D.C.: New Transcendy Foundation, 1984)


* Proceedings of the International Seminar on Refugee Women in Soesterberg, the Netherlands, 22-24 May 1985. (Amsterdam: Dutch Refugee Association, 1985)



*Living quarters, Camp N, Sherbrooke, Quebec. Shot taken with an illegal pinhole camera.
(Photo by Marcell Seidler).*

CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES
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