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CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES

# REFUGEE

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## CHILEAN EXILE The Uncertainties of Return

by Claudio and Marcela Duran

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*"So, really human beings are made of flesh, soul and a passport" . . . (Chilean saying in exile)*

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On September 11, 1973, a military coup led by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Augusto Pinochet, overthrew President Salvador Allende. The level of violence that occurred as part of the military takeover was of a kind never before experienced by Chileans. The repression seemed to have no boundaries and no laws. Many thousands were executed, killed in confrontations, made to "disappear", sent to concentration camps and tortured. Almost everyone among Allende's supporters felt threatened.

It is not surprising, then, that thousands of Chileans filled nearly every embassy in the hope of protecting their lives, their freedom, or their families. In the few months following the coup, tens of thousands of Chileans left their homeland to become established in many different countries for (what they expected

to be) a short time.

Now, more than ten years later, these thousands continue to live in exile. Although the military regime has slowly started to reopen Chile's doors, only a small proportion have been allowed to return. Between 1982 and 1983, 3,000 individuals went back.

The increased possibility of being able to return, but low actual number of returnees, adds to the already strong tensions Chilean exiles feel about their future. From those tensions, a creative culture of exile has arisen, illustrated by the so-called "New Chilean Song" played by several folk groups and mainly by Quilapayun and Inti-Illimani (the former based in France and the latter in Italy) who have spent the last ten years playing and singing all over the world, including most of the big cities in Canada.

One of their songs, called "I Return", has become a sort of "exile anthem":

I return at last without humiliation,  
not asking to be forgiven, but, not forgetting.

Man is never really vanquished:  
his defeat is always brief;  
it is a stimulus that moves  
the vocation of his struggle.

For the land that sends him into exile  
and the land that receives him in exile  
will tell him that, after all,  
he suffers the pains of all nations.

Chilean exiles also share a political commitment. Political participation has been high, consistent, well-organized and tied to political activities in Chile itself. However, their political participation and their culture of exile have complicated the difficulties of adjustment in the countries of reception.

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## REFUGE

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## To Our Readers

We invite our readers to submit news items or information for publication in *Refuge*.

## Letters

### To the Editor

Please allow me to introduce myself to you: my name is G. William Rubagumya, an attorney in the state of Texas in the USA. I am originally from the country of Rwanda via the refugee camps of Uganda and I have been in the USA for the last 7 years. As you may have guessed, my concern is with the refugees that I left behind both in Uganda and other surrounding countries. Myself and other Rwandans in this country have formed a nonprofit organization, The Tutsi Relief Foundation Inc., whose main purpose is to aid in any way possible, but with primary emphasis on education and relocation of those who are able to adapt to the changed environment.

My purpose for writing is to introduce the organization to you and to solicit assistance in finding homes and educational aid for our youth who would otherwise be denied these basics of life by circumstances beyond their control. The Foundation is now attempting to secure scholarships from various schools.

I must say that the Canadian official who was in charge of the Embassy in Kampala acted with such concern in 1982 and we believe that his actions were the difference between life and death for many of our people, and Canada seems to be the only nation that is actively and genuinely interested in the Rwandese' issue. We commend you all and hope that the leadership there will retain that humanitarian touch in the future.

G. William Rubagumya  
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### To the Editor

We in the Immigration Section of the Canadian Embassy in Buenos Aires always read with great interest your periodical "Refuge". A substantial part of our own workload involves refugees and we are always keen to learn of refugee developments and issues around the world.

Given the usual excellence of your publication we were therefore surprised to note a significant error in the editorial comments which preceded the text of the address of the Canadian permanent mission in Geneva to the UNHCR Executive Committee.

The refugee report to which Ambassador Alan Beesley made reference was of course not written by the Agha Khan, but rather by his uncle, Prince Sadrudin, who was the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees before Poul Hartling assumed this responsibility.

This must surely be only one of many letters you will receive concerning this error, however while the Agha Khan has effected many worthwhile activities on his own, surely his uncle's beneficent activities should not be included among them.

Colleen L. Cupples  
First Secretary and Consul  
Canadian Embassy, Buenos Aires

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### To the Editor

An unfortunate misunderstanding has arisen in the printing of my article on the Guatemalan refugee situation in Mexico (Dec. '83), as the result of some errors of fact and judgement made by the editors of *Refuge* and my own over-

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sight in not checking more carefully the edited copy sent to me. The misunderstanding is particularly evident in the commentary by Howard Adelman who in his attempt to compare my material with that of Jeremy Adelman presents a very different perspective to the reader from the one I had communicated in earlier exchanges.

The editors who left out important self-explanatory source references from my originally submitted account (presented at a seminar on the subject held at the York University Documentation Centre on Oct. 18/83) assumed incorrectly that my main source of information was COMAR, the official public Commission for Aid to Refugees. Having worked for many years in Latin America I should know what are reliable sources of information, particularly when it relates to such a sensitive and complex political issue as the refugee phenomenon in Mexico. As indicated in my original version and earlier correspondence with Howard, one of my principal sources of information was not a public source but a national vol-

untary body, i.e. the General Secretariat of the Mexican Coordinating Committee of Aid to the Guatemalan Refugees - sponsored by the National Council of Roman Catholic bishops. Their reports were based on an impressive ongoing documentation of refugees' personal testimonies, and a monitoring network of refugee movements. These were corroborated for their accuracy by data I obtained through my personal interviews with refugees and numerous front line Mexican volunteer workers in the settlement areas near the Guatemalan border, as well as research accounts and analysis from academic personnel at the National University of Mexico. I had no contact with the government affiliated COMAR.

In addition to the above, I wish to call attention to a judgement implied in the editor's commentary that I seem to be more concerned with the refugee flow into Mexico than the plight of the displaced indigenous population in Guatemala. My focus in the article on the Guatemala refugees within Mexico should not necessarily imply such an in-

ference. It is also implied that I somehow wanted to exonerate the official Mexican position toward refugees, which seems to be contrary to the spirit of the article. In assessing the total Mexican response to refugees from Central America one has to differentiate clearly between the official position placed within a precarious political, social and economic context and the generous response from Mexican voluntary organizations and private individuals in spite of the Mexican official position.

The editor is correct in pointing out that Mexico is still a non-signatory to the U.N. Convention on Refugees. Further enquiry, by Ottawa UNHCR officials with their Geneva head office, on my behalf, indicates that Mexico can be expected to become a signatory within the next 12 months. Negotiations are apparently going on at executive levels within the Ministry responsible for external affairs.

*Hubert Campfens  
Faculty of Social Work  
Wilfrid Laurier University*

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## Deportation of Guatemalans

Dear Friends:

The attached letter from the Minister of Employment & Immigration gives an encouraging answer to the concerns you and I have expressed.

It seems, though, that we ought to keep up our encouragement to the Minister to send no more Guatemalans back to Guatemala involuntarily.

*The Reverend Dan Heap, M.P.  
House of Commons  
OTTAWA, Ontario  
K1A 0A6*

• • •

Dear Mr. Heap:

As I promised, in answer to your question in the House on December 14, I have examined the question of deportation to Guatemala to determine whether persons removed to Guatemala from Canada face any danger on their return. First of all, I would like to confirm that the numbers involved are smaller than

reported by voluntary groups. Only 14 Guatemalans have been removed from Canada this year. The 56 refugee claims rejected on first review so far in 1983 will not result in further removals for some time because of the protracted review and appeal procedures available to these claimants.

In Guatemala, the problems are well known. Unemployment is 40 percent and repression by official organizations and para-military groups has produced flagrant violations of human rights. Naturally, returning anyone involuntarily into this milieu is a very serious matter. Our record in this regard bears out our concern. Fully 75 percent of refugee claims from Guatemalans have been accepted this year on first review and an additional 8 percent of refusals were approved when examined on purely humanitarian grounds. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has acknowledged that, in our approach, we have not only fulfilled our legal obligations, but have exceeded

them. The question is, because of general danger, as is the case with El Salvador, should everyone be offered de facto protection regardless of the merit of his claim.

In this regard, the situation is not so clear. The picture of violence and of widespread economic dislocation argues in favour of this approach. On the other hand, reports from the area also suggest that apolitical people have nothing to fear on return if they have not spoken out or worked against the Guatemalan government.

To deal with this dilemma, I have ordered a full review of the immigration implications of the situation in Guatemala. In the meantime, I will ensure no further deportation orders are handed down. I expect to be able to report further by the end of January.

*John Roberts  
Minister  
Employment and Immigration Canada*

## Chilean Exiles

Continued from p. 1

Ten years have elapsed since Pinochet's coup. Chilean children in exile have been born, grown into adolescents and into adults during this period. It is the children especially who experience a divided consciousness. Their concerns and experiences differ from those of their parents, adding another dimension to the tension.

To go back or not to go back; that is the question facing Chileans now; it is already a reality for Argentinian exiles. Chile does not yet offer the possibility of repatriation for many. But that opportunity is expected to come in the future. And the weight of the impending decision hangs heavy in the air in many homes.

How does a family organize the process of "going back home"? What do parents tell children who have accompanied them through exile? The parents may want to go home, but the children have adjusted to the countries of reception.

Jaun Pablo Letelier in an interview with *Hoy* Newsmagazine stated, "Exile is different for every member of the family, particularly for the younger ones or the ones who were born outside Chile — for these are the ones more under the direct influence of their parents. Some young people feel that they have to pay for something their parents did and they show their resentment. In our family, we remained very close to each other and this bond grew when our father was murdered. But we are by no means a typical example. Exile has accentuated a diaspora of brothers, parents and their children. This is perhaps one of the subtleties hidden in the sorrow of exile: the annihilation of family groups, the separation and (sometimes) the destruction of families."

Reactions among youngsters of families who have already returned differ among teenagers who are the children of former political leaders and those youngsters who feel alienated from the "Chile" experience. A grandchild of Salvador Allende and the sons of Orlando Letelier (the former Chilean Ambassador to the United States who was assassinated in Washington, D.C. in 1976 by the Chilean Secret Police) all feel a moral commitment to live in Chile. As children of exiles, many of

## CHILEAN EXILES

Venezuela	80,000
Spain	18,000
France	15,000
Canada	12,000
Italy	12,000
Sweden	9,916
Australia	9,000
Argentina	5,000
West Germany	2,500
Switzerland	2,500
Belgium	2,000
United States	2,000
East Germany	1,500
Holland	1,032
Austria	1,000
Denmark	800
Norway	700
Bulgaria	600
Algiers	500
Mozambique	500
Romania	500
New Zealand	500
United Kingdom	450
Hungary	300
Yugoslavia	300
Soviet Union	250
Luxembourg	120
Panama	100
Czechoslovakia	100
Poland	100
TOTAL	179,268*

\*These figures were assembled by a team of journalists of the independent Chilean weekly newsmagazine, *Hoy*. Some countries with a high number of exiles, such as Cuba, Ecuador, Finland and Mexico, are missing from this list. We have been unable to obtain figures for these countries. Further, the figures gathered by *Hoy* do not include Chileans who have emigrated as a consequence of the military regime but mainly for economic reasons.

them had to learn to soothe the wounds inside their families.

In the ten years of Chilean exile, the scars of the past have left wounds that are now surfacing in adolescent neurosis, school failure, etc. There are innumerable cases of fear-ridden and distraught children — images of soldiers threatening or punishing their parents in front of them haunt their memories. Other children feel insecure as they see their unsettled parents longing for the distant land which the children can no longer remember nor understand.

What will *return* signify for all these young people? It is difficult to predict. For some, it may mean the very real possibility of putting the missing pieces of the puzzle of their lives together; this may bring them peace. For others, the older ones, it may allow the opportunity of finally making very real personal decisions in terms of living in the land of their choice. The decisions that these young people must make add to the tension experienced by Chilean exiles.

To return or not to return. Will we be given permission? When? Will our children want to come? Will they come? Will they stay? Will they be happy in Chile? Will we?

*Claudio and Marcela Duran are Chilean exiles living in Toronto. Claudio is a professor of philosophy at York University and Marcela works for the North York Board of Education.*

## UNHCR Appointment

The Branch Office in Canada of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees takes pleasure in announcing the appointment, effective January 15, 1984, of Miss Nanda Na Champassak as officer in charge of information and public relations.

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# Refugees from Suriname

by Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg

*The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington published a brief report on the situation of human rights in Suriname in October 1983 following a visit of a special commission in June of that year. The report questions the government's expressed intention to allow for the expression of popular will or to permit freedom in the media. The Commission concluded that serious violations of important human rights occurred.*

*The International Commission of Jurists in Geneva also published a report entitled "Human Rights in Suriname" which concluded that "the chain of events since 1980 demonstrates an escalation in the military authority's disregard for the rule of law, which is set aside whenever they consider it necessary for the consolidation of their position." This characteristic report provides background information to the creation of refugees from Suriname in the Netherlands.*

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## Introduction

The lack of political responsibility by the weak Surinamese governments is demonstrated through the absence of interest in the migration of 25% of the population to the Netherlands. Increasing social unrest gave rise to an uninterested and uncaring attitude towards the migration of professionals, technicians, and skilled workers since the fifties: in the sixties and seventies, the so-called crisis strata and socially explosive elements of the society followed. Moreover, after the 1980 military take-over by non-commissioned officers, the power elites developed strategies to encourage migration of so-called "destabilizing" countrymen. A massacre in December 1982 by the nearly three-year old leftist junta led to the involuntary migration to the Netherlands of more than one thousand persons of several ethnic groups.

These migrants consisted mainly of politicians (of the left and right among whom were some disgraced ex-members of the military government), academics, students, teachers, administrators, trade union leaders, entrepreneurs and journalists. Many of these civilians are spokesmen, representatives or associates of political parties, religious organizations, labour unions and other professional organizations that in November 1982 urged general elections and the return of the army to their barracks. They form a category apart in Holland and are loosely organized in several bodies (which connect them

with their homeland) among which the National Liberation Council is the most prominent. In the past 14 months of their existence, many Surinamese refugees have been engaged in a struggle for survival. Those who have found jobs and housing accommodation appear to lose their direct interest and involvement in the liberation movement.

## Surinamese in the Netherlands

The former colonial powers have often served as places of escape in times of uncertainty and persecution in newly independent nations. With reference to Suriname, some specific characteristics have to be taken into account which explain the continuation of an exclusive Dutch orientation. Two important characteristics are the Dutch language and educational system, which isolate Suriname from the Western Hemisphere. Within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Dutch Antilles, which are located in the Caribbean Sea, are the exception. Thus, a concentration of Surinamese on some of these islands is not surprising.

However, even before independence in 1975, it is estimated that 20% of the Surinamese population was living in Holland. Many Surinamese migrant families in Holland have served for two generations as reception centers for thousands of Surinamese facing problems in their home country. Furthermore, the changing political elites and power aggregates have often caused

many migrants to remain temporarily in Holland.

Significant migration to Holland began in the 20th Century and became visible after the 1940's, when more members of well-to-do Creole and Jewish families left for Holland, followed in the 1960's and 1970's by members of other ethnic groups and representatives of other socioeconomic strata.

Since the 1970's, the Dutch government has tried to establish migration policies to stop this influx of Surinamese and to promote return migration. It was believed that Surinamese migration to the Netherlands was typified by a so-called "follow-up" migration; that is, the migration process itself is facilitated by social networks of families and communities that extend across national borders in the Netherlands. This implies that once a key member of the family has settled abroad, the other members will eventually follow. The Surinamese government believed that return migration was connected to social welfare projects, with special attention to the elderly. Thus, they believed that the implementation of return-migration policies for key family members, such as parents, would also stimulate other persons in the family to migrate back to Suriname. The validity of this theory has never been proven and living conditions were not significantly improved after independence.

It is also possible that migration was seen by certain politicians as a mecha-

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## Suriname Refugees

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nism to rid themselves of "trouble makers" in the country. This implies that a negative attitude existed toward return migration policies. The increasing economic depression in the 1960's and the rise of racial conflicts between Surinamese and Dutch in Holland are, in our opinion, two crucial factors that caused the former colonial power to promote strong return migration policies. The systematic delay in the operationalization of these policies by the Surinamese government is probably an important and contributing factor that negatively influenced the Suriname-Dutch relationship before 1980.

During the independence negotiations in 1974-75, it was agreed that people would be able to travel freely between Suriname and Holland until November 1980. Before that time, those who returned to Suriname with a Dutch passport would automatically become Surinamese after a two-year stay in their country. A policy to prevent further migration to Holland was implemented in 1980.

Beginning in November 1980, those Surinamese who stayed longer in Holland (as for a vacation period), were required to have a working permit with adequate housing accommodation as a precondition. Moreover, a visa was required to enter the Netherlands. However, many Surinamese continued to visit their relatives in Holland during the holidays. A special agreement on the unifying-of-dependents again created many disputes because of the complicated family social networks in Suriname. Holland indeed was a second home for many Surinamese and in many cases, Surinamese became 'shuttle migrants' who did not belong to either country. This is very true for professionals and academics who were almost all trained in the Netherlands.

Against this background, one can understand how after the December 1982 massacre, Holland was the most important escape route for Surinamese. At that time, the Dutch embassy softened their entrance blockade for humanitarian reasons and even offered facilities for dependents of those killed by the

junta.

## Dutch refugee policies

Since Holland is a signatory to the UN convention on Refugees, the Dutch government recognizes refugee status within its migration laws. The relationship between the violation of human rights and involuntary migration is recognized. The receiving country aims at guaranteeing the refugees ('grootst mogelijke') fundamental rights and freedoms (Treaty 1951). With regard to Surinamese refugees, it is important to note the statement delivered by the deputy secretary of the Ministry of Justice: "Because of special linkages with Suriname, the Ministry of Justice deviates from the rules in not demanding refugees to present a request for asylum in the first receiving country. For that reason, Surinamese who entered Holland via Miami or French Guyana were not refused." Furthermore, "Surinamese who were in trouble because of the brutal events in December 1982 can obtain a visa within 24 hours and leave directly thereafter."

However, Surinamese who entered Holland after the massacre are considered foreigners, despite the specific relation that exists between The Netherlands and Suriname. Once in Holland, a maximum three month visa can be renewed for another three months. This implies that those who did not ask for a permit to stay earlier, or those who could not or did not wish to take such a decision with regard to their departure to Suriname, can afford to legally stay three extra months. If, however, after two periods of stay on a visa in Holland, the person decides not to leave for Suriname, a permit to stay and a request for asylum is required. Regarding decisions to grant asylum, "fear of persecution" or "threatening of security" (bedreiging van de veiligheid) are considered to be crucial criteria. The general policies are not based on a continuation of stay for economic motives. There are no special receiving and guiding facilities (opvang en begeleidingsfaciliteiten) for the refugees from Suriname. In general the following procedures are applied:

- A stay in The Netherlands on a visa offers no facilities, and specifically no

Suriname, an ex-Dutch colony, is situated on the N.E. coast of South America and shares borders with Guyana, Brazil and French Guyana. Its surface is 163,820 sq. kilometres. The country had 354,860 inhabitants in 1980 and 397,607 inhabitants in 1972, which means a decrease of 24,747 (6.5%) contrary to an increase of the population of 12% between 1964 and 1972.

After its independence in 1975, Suriname became a republic and adopted in the House of Parliament the Constitution, which was abolished after the military coup in February 1980. Since March 1982, the country has had a temporary Constitution, known as the General Decree All, promulgated by the leader of the "Revolution" Commander Bouterse, L.T. Col. The state of emergency has created problems in the interpretation of this temporary Constitution. The best illustration is the dispute concerning freedom of the press in the country.

Based on the IV General Population Census of 1972, the Surinamese population is composed of the following:

Hindostani (Indian Descendents)	37%
Creoles (descendents of Africans more or less ethnically mixed)	31%
Javanese (Indonesian descendents)	15%
Marcoons	10%
Chinese, Amer-Indians, Europeans and others	7%

Source: De IV Algemene Volkstelling, 1972 (IV General Population Census)

## NON-DUTCH MIGRATION BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS AND SURINAME

YEAR	IMMIGRATION	EMIGRATION	DIFFERENCE I-E
1977	2,662	604	2,058
1978	5,211	523	4,688
1979	16,060	737	15,323
1980	16,989	978	16,011
1981	3,152	1,246	1,906
1982	2,015	1,033	982

On January 1, 1981, 25,000 persons were in the Netherlands coming from Suriname (not-Dutch). The numbers of persons, coming from Suriname with a Dutch nationality is estimated at 115,000.

Source: Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), Maandstatistiek van de Bevolking.

benefits are available.

- Surinamese, who obtain a permit to stay or those who are allowed to wait for such a decision in Holland, can receive benefits based on a document known as "circulaire inzake bijstand aan vreemdelingen."

- Surinamese with refugee status (A- or B-status) are eligible for benefits and are offered housing facilities.

Those who obtained the A-status can even receive a government scholarship, known as "rijksstudietoelage". Surinamese involuntary migrants, who entered Holland after the massacre of December 1982, can be placed in the following categories according to Dutch refugee policies:

a. Refugees with a formal status (A-status) Facilities: housing, benefits, study grant. (rijks-studietoelage)

b. Refugees with a formal status (B-status) of: Facilities: housing, benefits (bijstand), financial aid.

c. Refugees on humanitarian criteria. No formal refugee status, facilities limited to financial aid.

d. Refugees without any specific status. Formally tourists on a visa with a permit to stay a maximum of 6 months.

e. Surinamese refugees of Dutch nationality. All facilities normally offered to Dutch.

f. Military refugees. Those who have a permit to stay can join the Dutch army after naturalization.

g. Surinamese who returned to their country with the aid of the Dutch government (return migrants) and may become unemployed because of the postponement of Dutch development aid. No special policies. Treated as normal cases.

h. Surinamese without manifest escape motives (duidelijke vluchtmotieven). (Tourists on a visa).

### **Involuntary Migration: a response on violence and oppression**

Between December 1982 and March 26, 1983, 4107 Surinamese applied for a visa at the Dutch Embassy in Suriname; 1444 visas were compiled. Of the 1444 persons with a visa, 125 requested a permit to stay in Holland and 45 persons obtained this permit. (Sept. 1983). It is important to note that 65% of those who tried to escape to Holland after the massacre were unable to do so because the Dutch embassy refused to deliver them a visa. Moreover, only 45 (0.03%) who successfully obtained a visa received a permit to stay in Holland. (Sept. 7, 1983). It is true that 125 persons requested a permit to stay, but the increased fear and uncertainty in Suriname does not indicate that the majority

of people who left the country in December preferred to return home. It is probable that most of these people had no choice: they could either leave the Netherlands or go into hiding.

Regarding this last category, the Dutch statement, "Surinamese who left their country because of reasons of security, can stay in Holland as long as this is required..." appears to be false. The assertion: "Also Surinamese who are illegal in Holland and who fear persecution if they are sent back, have the possibility to ask for a permit..." may also be misleading. Since the maximum legal stay in Holland was 6 months in September 1983, we must conclude that almost all the Surinamese (92%), except the 125 who requested a permit, left for Suriname or are illegally residing in the Netherlands. It appears that Dutch officials, civil servants (particularly at local levels), are badly informed and/or are not stimulated (by their attitude towards Surinamese refugees) to accommodate refugees. On the other hand, many Surinamese are not familiar with these Dutch procedures and apply for refugee status in an inappropriate manner. Contemporary *razzias* on "illegal Surinamese" and their deportation make the formal statements by the Dutch government concerning refugees debatable.

Although the government appears to be concerned with the plight of the refugees, in reality, discriminating policies were carried out except against the most privileged and educated Surinamese (particularly those educated in Holland) and the top Surinamese professionals. In short, the Dutch government's statements concerning refugees do not recognize the denial of permits to most Surinamese who have tried to migrate to Holland.

### **Profile of the Surinamese Refugees in Holland: An Initial Sketch**

Who are the ones that are referred to as Surinamese refugees? Do they fit the 1980 UN definition of refugees?

An attempt will be made to outline the characteristics that typify this Surinamese migrant category. This provides more insight into several identified and unidentified problem areas from a

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## Suriname Refugees

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humanitarian as well as a policy making perspective. From the available incomplete information, we consider relevant:

- categories involved; age, ethnic background, occupation (military/civic) social-economic position;
- status in Holland; legal, employment, accommodation.

Approximately 400 persons have registered for a political asylum request. A few of them successfully obtained this status. Five categories of refugees who received their formal refugee status can be distinguished:

1) Professionals (academics, journalists, businessmen, politicians etc.), who through their connections can find their way in Holland without the help of the Foundation for Surinames Refugees. They belong to the more privileged category of refugees.

2) Spokesmen and leaders, usually affiliated with labour unions and other interest groups. They have been organized in the Association for the Restoration of Democracy and accused by the military.

3) Commissioned officers of the Suriname army. Together with colleagues who earlier (between 1980 and 1982) left Suriname. This category is represented by the top professional military of the country.

4) Soldiers who escaped from the army. Most of them crossed the east border river and entered into French Guyana. They continued their trip from there to Holland.

5) Students who were involved in demonstrations against the military junta. Most of them are university students.

Of these five categories, members of the first three were the most successful. Soldiers who could show their military call-up received a temporary staying permit. Many students argued that "the re-organization of the University to a People's University within a communistic framework" (as was announced) is not acceptable to them. Most of these students are not registered. It is well known that the Suriname government only permits the transfer of money to students who can prove that they want to study a field not provided by the

### 1980 February MILITARY TAKE-OVER

#### March

The First Military Government.

#### May

Government Declaration on Labour Day (promising):

- elections (general) within two years,
- a law on political parties,
- a new Constitution,
- maintaining of human rights.

#### August

Coup attempt by Marxist-Leninists. Participants arrested.

Deposition of President (Constitutional).

Adjournment of the Constitution.

Abolishment of the House of Parliament.

### 1980 August JURIDICAL TAKE-OVER

Issuance of decree: regulating power of Policy Center.

#### 1981 March

Release of the Communists jailed for the coup attempt in August 1980.

#### December

Proclamation of the Revolutionary Front.

#### 1982 February

Deposition of the P.M.

government of Suriname. Like other youngsters, they are unaware of the procedures and the assistance they can receive to legalize their stay in Holland. Since they also fear deportation to Suriname, many of them prefer to go into hiding. With regard to the ethnic background of the refugees, there are strong indications that the majority are Creoles and Hindustani.

Most of the refugees left Suriname without their dependents. Apart from the youngsters, a large number of refugees now have to deal with families that have split up. Difficulties with the transfer of money from Suriname to Holland make the often unemployed migrants more vulnerable in the Dutch society. The migrants whose depen-

## Suriname: Some

#### March

A two-day take-over by Rambocus and Hawker: promising

- general elections,
- military back to their barracks.

#### April

Installation of the Second Military Government.

#### June

The foundation of a People's Militia consisting of many members of the RVP\* later also PALU\*.)

First trained militaries from Cuba returned to Suriname.

#### October/November

Increasing protest of spokesmen and leaders of interest groups against the oppression.

University staff, administrative and technical personnel and students against the junta.

Open conflict with churches. federation: het A.V.V.S. de Moederbond.

Open conflict with churches Urging an association for democracy and return of the military to their barracks.

#### December

Massacre; 15 spokesmen of the people tortured and killed by the junta.

dents migrated to Holland often face housing problems.

### Future Perspectives

We now know that approximately 1444 Surinamese left their country involuntarily after the massacre of December 1982. Most of these Surinamese entered The Netherlands as tourists; some civil servants were able to obtain a formal permit to leave. We have also discovered that a few of them were successful in finding jobs in Holland but the majority remain unemployed. This implies that in most cases, aid from relatives as well as from Surinamese and Dutch friends is needed in order to survive while exploring job opportunities. Finally, an organizational framework exists which unites refugees who wish to



## Crucial Events in the 80's

University of Suriname closed down by the junta.

Abolishment of the free press.

Prohibition for newspapers and weeklies, and for broadcasting corporations.

*1983 January*

Anti-Intervention Committees (AIC's) in industries and business to identify, locate and fight mercenaries.

Founding of Committees to demonstrate solidarity with the 'revolution' in parastatal institutions and ministries. (with AIC's function).

*March*

Founding of the Youth Militia (Organization to militarize youngsters between 12-16 years).

*April*

Installation of the Third Military Government chaired by a member of PALU.

*May*

Announcements at Labour Day of the extension of the council-network on several levels of policy-and decision-making.

*August*

Announcement of a one-party system. To be proclaimed at November 25, 1983. Support of all interest groups

and political parties expected.

*September/October*

Continuation of replacements of the I and II echelon key positions by RVPers. Decreasing PALU influence.

Announcement of highly qualified ideological training by RVPers (for local and regional level).

\*RVP (Revolutionary People's Party) and PALU (Party of Poor Peasants and Farmers): Both competing Marxist-Leninist parties.

Note: Events related to foreign powers' influence on local circumstances are left out. As such, the suspension of the Dutch and US aid after the massacre (December 1982); the Cuban involvement in the countries domestic affairs (since March 1981); the Brazilian warning of communism and Cubans in Suriname (April 1983); the expulsion of the Cuban ambassador and advisors and suspension of agreements between the two countries (October 1983) are not included in this scheme. The influence of these events on decisions made by the junta is, however, not neglected.

return to Suriname.

What will be the fate of the refugees? The answer to this question is closely related to the question: What will be the future of their country? We do not try to predict future events since the situation is quite complex and there is a lack of information. But we can identify factors relevant for monitoring purposes. In this respect, the attitude of the Dutch government, for economical and political reasons, is considered to be crucial because of its relationship with the junta as well as with refugee organizations that aim for the liberation of the country.

New developments in the Suriname-Dutch relationship became evident in December 1982 after the massacre when

the Dutch stopped development aid because of human rights violations. Furthermore, the anti-Dutch propaganda perpetrated by international organizations, particularly during the New Delhi Non-Alignment Movement meeting, worsened the relationship. However, since the establishment of the National Liberation Council in January 1983, the Dutch have resisted having a Surinamese government in exile in their country, mainly because of their formal relations with the junta. As a consequence, the movement was curtailed and lost its political impact both in and outside of Holland.

It is possible that the findings of a secret 1981 Defense report discovered by two Dutch journalists concerning the involvement of members of the Dutch

Military Mission in Suriname (published in *Vrij Nederland*) will influence the attitude of the Dutch. It is stated that the Dutch government was *not* informed of the existence of this document. It is now evident that the advice given by investigator Major Koenders (i.e. to do nothing with the findings because of their negative effect on the Suriname-Dutch relationship), is no longer valid. This implies that the Dutch are free to begin a military and criminal investigation. At this time, there are a sufficient number of Dutch and Suriname military professionals available in Holland. Moreover, a number of them confirmed publicly in Dutch television interviews that proposals were made by the Dutch colonel of the Military Mission of the Embassy of the Netherlands to eliminate the top army officers to overthrow the government. Furthermore, from *Vrij Nederland* stated that the involvement of the Dutch officers in the military takeover allowed the Suriname colonel to blackmail the Dutch government. Thus, "Colonel Bouterse needs *only to threaten to make announcements of the Dutch involvement in the coup to have the Dutch cover up the aberrations which also occurred before December 1982.*"

The attitude of the refugees themselves as well as their frame of reference are considered key variables. How long will their team spirit last? And how far is continuation influenced and even frustrated by disappointments because of amateurism, reflecting a lack of know-how? Will their morale decrease because of set-backs of successful infiltration of unreliable elements?

In conclusion, more insight is needed on these key factors:

- The attitude of the Dutch: reflecting the societal embedding of refugees which informs us about the support, or the discouragement of their activities.
- Manpower: in terms of available know-how and support of the Surinamese community in Holland.
- The attitude and frame of reference of the refugees, which is so strongly tied to their conceptualization of future perspectives.
- The means: this key variable is not really explored because of a lack of insight into these matters as well as the lack of any information.

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## Suriname Refugees

Continued from p. 9

The thoughts of some leaders in exile are clear: Suriname might become a satellite of the Second World." However, liberation of the country and restoration of democracy should never imply the reestablishment of the pre-1980 status as a satellite of the First World.

## Closing Remarks

From the findings of this exploratory study we have learned that the Surinamese political refugees form a heterogeneous entity. With regard to their future, significant differences in the ideological frame of reference and the attitude toward violence appear to be decisive.

With regard to disputes on the application of political refugee status, this Suriname migrant category meets the requirements as defined in the UN in 1980 since "well founded fears of persecution because of membership in particular social groups or political opinion" is evident. As such, it is in the refugees' interest to explore international options for settlement and to work out contacts with other similar entities.

As a proponent for democracy and human rights, might one expect that the Dutch government (especially after the findings of the 1981 secret CID report)

would reject the junta, and change its policy with regard to Suriname and its refugees as well as make contributions to recover the civil and political rights the Surinamese have lost. There would be solid support for Surinamese refugees and their organizations. Domestic policies as well as cooperation with international organizations should reflect this attitude.

In general, one can say that in societies such as Suriname, where a certain degree of militarization has taken place and where decision making and the political machinery are controlled by a junta or heavily influenced by armed forces, a distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian governments, in terms of human rights and freedoms, is hardly relevant. In such nations, involuntary migration is considered inherent to the transitional process leading to such governments.

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## Extracts from the 34th Session of the Executive Commissioner's Programme of the High Committee

"Draft Principles on the Prohibition of Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements"

- Camps and settlements accommodating refugees shall not be the object of military or armed attacks.
- Military attacks on refugee camps and settlements are in grave violation of existing and fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. They can never be justified under any circumstances and must consequently always be condemned.
- Refugee camps and settlements shall be used exclusively for civilian and humanitarian purposes.
- Military attacks on refugee camps or settlements should be expressly condemned by the international community and all possible action

should be taken in the relevant bodies of the United Nations and other organisations to prevent such attacks or their recurrence.

- States in whose territory refugee camps and settlements are located, shall do all within their capacity to ensure that the exclusively civilian and humanitarian character of such camps and settlements is maintained and that they are protected against military attacks.
- Refugees in camps or settlements have duties deriving from the refuge and protection granted or afforded to them by the country of refuge or the country of asylum. In particular, they shall conform to the laws and regulations of the State of refuge or of asylum, including lawful measures taken for the maintenance of public order. Moreover, they shall refrain from any activity likely to endanger the exclusively civilian and humanitarian character of the camp or settlement.

## Brief Notes: The Standing Conference of Canadian Organizations Concerned for Refugees

Scarborough, Ontario  
December 9-11

1. There was a large attendance, though not equivalent to the heights of the Indochinese refugee movement.
2. There was much broader representation. In addition to the customary church, ethnic, human rights, immigrant aid societies, etc., there were representatives of Tamils from Sri Lanka, Assyrians from the Middle East, Bangladeshis, Ethiopians, Salvadoreans, etc.
3. The Honourable John Roberts, the Minister of Employment and Immigration, though invited, was not expected to come. He found time to attend the wine and cheese reception, however, and indicated in his brief speech that, after concentrating on employment policy in his first three or four months in office, he would now be turning his attention to immigration and refugee issues.
4. Dan Heap, MP for Spadina riding in Toronto and the NDP critic on immigration issues, was in attendance.
5. Raf Girard stated, "The visa requirement is a response to the number of refugee claimants and not the number of illegitimate claims." This statement seems to run counter to the Amnesty International policy that visa requirements should never be imposed on a refugee-producing country where there is no significant abuse.
6. Seventy-five percent of the Guatemalan claims in Canada are accepted.
7. Michael Schelew claimed that there is a practice (contrary to policy according to Raf Girard) of filling quotas for specific areas even when individuals in that area are not in danger.
8. In general, there was a sense of cooperation rather than antagonism between the NGOs and the government, and between the NGOs and the UNHCR in spite of differences on the refugee claim procedures.

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# Academics: Analysts or Messengers of Doom

by Howard Adelman

February 1984

In 1939, refugees were a matter of worldwide concern. The emergence of hordes of refugees in Europe at the same time as countries of resettlement closed their doors was a signal of impending doom as well as an immediate humanitarian problem. One could tell the problem had reached crisis proportions because academics drifted down from their ivory towers to describe and analyze the problem. For the first time, the *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science directed a full issue to refugees.

In 1983, under the editorship of Gilbert D. Loescher and John A. Scanlan, the journal has repeated that heretofore unique event and published a special issue entitled, "The Global Refugee Problem: U.S. and World Response". The impetus for the first special issue was the intensifying persecution of German and Austrian Jews combined with the reluctance of resettlement countries to take them. Canada, for example, as Abella and Troper have so amply documented in their now famous book, *None is Too Many*, assiduously worked to keep Jews out of our country.

The crisis is again before us, only now it is worldwide. Once again academics are calling attention to refugees and noting that refugees have become a permanent, not a temporary, problem. Once again there are ethnic conflicts, local conflagrations, disputes over the legal status of refugee claimants in the face of extremely restrictive immigration policies, and well-publicized attempts to share the burden internationally which, research has subsequently revealed, were really attempts to resist the undertaking of relief operations. Was the Honolulu conference on Southeast Asian refugees in the summer of 1983 our equivalent to the Evian Conference in 1938 in which the nations ostensibly talked about resettling the refugees but in reality plotted to prevent resettlement by putting in the spigot?

"Shouldn't we look for root causes instead of providing band-aid relief?" "By helping, are we not compounding the problem by creating a pull factor which attracts refugees to flee from their own country?" So run the arguments. No one notices that these two propositions are antagonistic, one placing the prime responsibility on the source country and the other on the country of resettlement. But they are complementary in that they both undermine relief operations. For if the medicine does not really relieve the problem (and may in fact make things worse), we then have the rationale for throwing out the band-aids. And if we can document the psychological and economic difficulties of the refugees in adjusting to other host countries, doesn't this demonstrate even further that the cure may be worse than the disease?

Academic studies of root causes; the clogging up of the legal apparatuses of host countries so that they break down; failed attempts at international cooperation; and the adjustment problems of resettled refugees: these all may not only be matters of detached research, but also, magical signals adumbrating disaster.

That is why the escalation of academic work is ominous even though it is welcome. That is why I greet the *Annals* second ever special issue on refugees as a matter of major interest intellectually, but also as an ominous event in humanitarian terms.

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The first article, "Identifying the World's Refugees", by the internationally renowned authority on refugee law, Atle Grahl-Madsen, documents the crisis in legal terms. The development of new additional legal protection for refugees has come to a virtual halt in the face of a myriad of international crises and conflicts, rising xenophobic hysteria, increasing protectionism and mass flows of asylum seekers. Grahl-

Madsen reviews the development of progressive legislation since the 1950s (which provided the legal framework for refugee protection) and the recent attempt to narrow the definition of refugee as one method of 'stemming the tide'.

*We can sense in country after country a tendency toward a more restrictive interpretation and application of important provisions, sometimes even a disregard for rules of international law.* (p. 15)

For example, Grahl-Madsen points to Sweden, recognized internationally for its liberality and humanitarian efforts. In the new 1980 Swedish Aliens' Act, the term 'persecution' is so defined as to restrict it to acts of a serious nature aimed directly "against the foreigner's life or freedom". Under such legislation, the benefit of the doubt cannot accrue to the petitioner. There must be direct proof that persecution of the individual is of a very serious nature.

Canada, in Grahl-Madsen's survey, appears to be an exception to the trend. He points to the government of Canada, Office of the Minister of Employment and Immigration report, "The Refugee Status Determination Process: A Report of the Task Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures" (the Robinson Report), for clearly recognizing a refugee as anyone who leaves or stays away from his home country for well-founded fears of persecution whether or not there are also economic motives for leaving.

Grahl-Madsen, after reviewing the different categories of refugees — "convention", "mandate" "B-refugees", "humanitarian refugees" or, as in Canada, "designated class immigrants" (we prefer bureaucratese) — documents the increasing use of legal instruments to stem the tide: the abrogation of visa exemption agreements between states in order to prevent an uncontrollable in-

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## Academics

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flow of asylum seekers; denying asylum seekers the right to work to make refugee life as unattractive as possible; restriction of the movements of refugees (even confining them to camps); and the use of the so-called humane deterrent (that is, reducing the living conditions in camps so that others are deterred from considering flight as an alternative to fear, anguish and misery in their home country).

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In a subsequent article by Astri Suhrke entitled "Indochinese Refugees: The Law and Politics of First Asylum", the use of the humane deterrent in the case of the Indochinese is documented in detail.

Any Canadian would recognize the symptoms. Visa requirements are first suggested to prevent a host of manifestly unfounded claims from one or two specific countries. They are then proposed for a much broader swath of countries without putting in place complementary measures to ensure the protection of refugees. Refugees are no longer allowed work permits under the very reasonable sounding argument that there are too many unemployed Canadians. Fewer refugee claimants are released from the lock up, etc.

As the xenophobic and protectionist tendencies increase, individual countries are increasingly unwilling to stand exposed on the front line. Without broader sharing, the most progressive countries, under international and domestic pressure, are forced to retreat to more protectionist postures; refugee protection is the casualty. Grahl-Madsen's innovative proposal — the internationalization of the refugee status determination procedure and the allocation of responsibility for individual refugees or refugee groups to regional eligibility commissions — is, unfortunately an idea whose time has not come.

• • •

Aristide Zolberg, a professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and an expert on Afghan refugees and regional minorities in advanced industrial countries, has written a fascinating article in which he argues that refugees are a by-product of the creation of modern nation-states. In do-

ing so, he focuses on refugees who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of their membership by birth in specific groups rather than the much narrower group of refugees persecuted for their political beliefs and actions. The state, as a source of persecution, may direct the persecution or tolerate persecution by others by failing to provide adequate protection.

Zolberg asks the question, "Under what conditions do states select certain categories of population as targets for persecution, expelling them outright or creating conditions that provoke them into risky flight?" (p.20) Zolberg suggests that, in fact, refugees may be the more fortunate members of the original target group since the very conditions which make persecution likely are commonly associated with the erection of barriers against free exit. The Baha'is in Iran immediately come to mind.

The argument is straightforward. Following Hannah Arendt, Zolberg argues that the essence of the nation-state is sovereignty. And the litmus test of sovereignty is the control over the emigration, naturalization, nationality and expulsion of individuals within the nation-state. If our rights are not "natural", but depend on the acts of nation-states (that is, on national guarantees, so that charters of rights must be legislated into national statutes and not simply appealed to as part of our natural order), then it is but a short step to assert that such rights are only guaranteed to nationals and for nationals. It follows, therefore, that aliens *ipso facto* have no rights to be represented by counsel, to be present at their hearings, etc. Further, if an individual living within the body politic is defined by that nation-state as an alien, then s/he also has no rights. In industrial societies in which machines displace the value of human labour, larger populations can be a burden rather than a benefit, and states may opt to lose citizens rather than harbour people of different views.

Zolberg thus attempts to point to the dynamics of a political situation as a source of refugee production, rather than to economics or to the sociology of inter-group conflicts and contending interests. If the foundation of the nation-state is a particular national group, ethnic minorities will suffer. If the foundation is religious, religious minorities

become the victims. Refugees are simply by-products of an early stage in the foundation of nation-states, "a concomitant of the secular transformation of empires and of small self-sufficient communities or tribes into a world of national states". (p.30) In order for nations to come into being, communities must be transformed into individuals who feel they share a common national identity. If that process is accompanied by underdevelopment, then authoritarian strategies of state and nation are adopted with a corresponding persecution of certain groups within the population (i.e., ethnic minorities whose loyalty can be doubted because they straddle more than one state, trading diasporas without a homeland, and ethnic groups associated with previous governing elites).

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Unfortunately, not all the articles in *The Annals* share Zolberg's high calibre of intellectual stimulus. Earl Huyck, a sociologist at the Centre for Population Research, who has authored numerous articles on refugees, and Leon Bouvier, Director of Demographic Research and Policy analysis for the Population Reference Bureau in Washington, have pasted together a survey entitled, "The Demography of Refugees", which from the footnote, seems to be based primarily on the research of a doctoral student in demography and statistics at the University of Pennsylvania. But since Donna Shai has not been given any credit in the title, she cannot be assigned any blame.

The article begins by doing explicitly what Grahl-Madsen so clearly warns must not be done — broadening the usage of the term 'refugee' to make it meaningless by including "environmentally motivated refugees" and "economically motivated refugees". Further, as a necessary condition of being a refugee is included, "the intent of the refugee is to return to his or her homeland once conditions have returned to normal". By this definition the Baha'is resettling abroad, and the Jews who fled Nazi Germany were not refugees.

After this inauspicious beginning, a misleading introduction to the conception of refugees, we are presented with a survey of the contemporary refugee situation which the authors, as a popula-

tion sociologist and a demographer respectively, are presumably qualified to write. Unfortunately, all they have done is adopt, without critical analysis (but with credit), the results published in the 1982 *World Refugee Survey*.

Unlike the 1983 issue, the 1982 version included in its world refugee total individuals who have resettled in Canada, the U.S., Australia, etc., thus rendering an exaggerated count of ten million refugees in 1982. This type of simplistic analysis is repeated over and over again in the survey. For example, on Palestine in the Middle East, the authors state: "The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 absorbed most of Europe's remaining Jewish refugees, but from 700,000 to 900,000 Arabs, whose ancestors had lived for generations in Palestine, lost their homes. As a result of several subsequent Middle Eastern Wars, some 1.9 million Palestinians are refugees today." (pp. 46-47)

There is too much that is misleading in such a short compass to allow this to pass. First, instead of writing that Israel absorbed 132,000 of the 200,000 Jewish refugees remaining among the one million total of refugees in liberated Europe, the authors juxtaposed resettlement of European refugees with the creation of Palestinian refugees. Nothing is said, until the next section, of the absorption of three to four times as many Jewish refugees from Arab lands. And Arab countries are not listed as refugee senders. In effect, the misleading belief that Europeans dumped their refugee problems on the Arabs is reinforced.

Second, why do the authors say the *creation of a state* absorbed refugees? This implies that Israel was *created* to absorb refugees produced by a European problem.

Third, the number of Arab refugees was more or less 700,000, not 700,000 to 900,000 (cf. Abu Lughod's research or my article in *World Refugee Survey: 1983*): the larger figures include Jewish and other non-Arab Palestinian refugees. Further, the definition of refugee was much broader than even these authors provide. Many of the Arab Palestinians displaced were migrants to the area in the previous century whose ancestors had not lived for generations in Palestine. In addition, the population

of Palestinian refugees grew, not primarily as a result of subsequent Middle East wars, but primarily as a result of population growth and the redefinition of Palestinian refugees to include the children born of such refugees. Finally, the 1.9 million figure is accurate only if those who were granted citizenship in other countries (primarily Jordan) and/or who settled abroad are counted in the totals.

Medieval scholars were reputedly adept at arguing over how many angels could be counted on the head of a pin. I do not intend to imitate the modern equivalent of counting the number of errors scholars can make in the short compass of two sentences.

One might suspect the authors of bias but the real source of the problem seems to be incompetence: numerical and analytical errors are caused by the authors' superficial treatment of statistics and facts. With respect to the Middle East, Palestinian perspectives are dealt with as sloppily as Jewish ones. What Middle East authority in the last few years would assert that "the Palestinian refugee issue remains at the heart of any future Middle East settlement"? (p. 47) Self-determination for Palestinians is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli problem; the Palestinian refugee issue is not. The future of the West Bank and Gaza is important; that future will certainly have some impact on the Arab-Palestinian refugee problem. David P. Forsythe, in a later article asserts, "From 1967 more or less and certainly after 1974, diplomacy at the United Nations focused on some form of Palestinian self-determination rather than resettlement". (p. 90)

In another instance the authors assert, "In 1981 and 1982, Canada began admitting more refugees from Latin America and particularly Chile and El Salvador". (p. 52) But the facts are these: in the *Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration Levels 1983*, the 1981 refugee summary indicates only 132 government-sponsored refugees were admitted in 1981 from Latin and Central America — Chile is not even mentioned. And in 1982, the Canadian focus was again on *Central America*, though victims of political oppression from South America were also taken in, largely from Argentina. (In recent years, some Chilean refugees have

begun to return to South America.)

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Leon Gordenker, an expert on international organization who teaches politics at Princeton and is an Associate of the Centre for International Studies, has included an article entitled, "Refugees in Developing Countries and Transnational Organization". He traces institutionalized refugee programs, organizational networks and social service systems to deal with the crisis of huge refugee populations in the developing world linking national governmental, international governmental and non-governmental organizations in a loose association unlikely to be replaced by an integrated mode of organized effort.

• • •

Ronald Scheinman authors the only article of clear advocacy (as opposed to a descriptive or analytical article). In "Refugees: Goodbye to the Good Old Days" Scheinman recognizes that refugees are a fundamental threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state. In this he echoes Zolberg. Scheinman argues that the combination of unmanageable numbers with the large increase of new nation-states, the use of refugee status as a tool of diplomacy by developed states, and a period of economic contraction and rising protectionism have combined to create the present crisis. The problem then is how to deal realistically with protecting one's own national interest while dealing on a humanitarian basis with international and moral obligations to refugees.

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Scheinman joins Grahl-Masden — against the thrust of Huyck and Bouvier — in insisting on maintaining the international legal definition of a refugee. He also proposes linking resettlement efforts to development aid. The latter would assist all displaced persons and ameliorate some of the root causes of forced migration. The message is simple: keep tight one's standards of who is a refugee while extending economic aid to the wider situation which produces economic displacement. The article reiterates the theme of the proposed UN fund for durable solutions and outlines the consequences of past failures in this sphere which compounded the present problem.

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## Academics

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In "The Palestine Question: Dealing with a Long-Term Refugee Situation", the author David Forsythe traces the Palestinian problem as it develops in three stages from a refugee to a self-determination problem. He also places a lot of the responsibility for the scuttling of resettlement efforts on UNRWA's policies and, in particular, its educational program (though the primary responsibility is placed on Arab opposition to resettlement).

• • •

Astri Suhrke, from the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, D.C., who is a specialist in Southeast Asian Studies, is very prophetic in her article entitled, "Indochinese Refugees: The Law and Politics of First Asylum". After tracing the political factors and defining those who fled Vietnam as refugees in the early days and the recent efforts to limit the flow of refugees from Indochina, Suhrke predicts that the ASEAN countries would limit asylum further and explore alternative strategies of response, given the barriers recently erected by the western resettlement countries. (I don't believe anyone predicted that the Thai navy would, in fact, begin to participate in the drowning of refugees if media reports of such occurrences are indeed true. But whatever the truth of the reports, the western media did not respond to the alleged drownings in 1984 as they once responded to the drowning of refugees off the Malaysian coast when the boats were pushed back to sea in Spring of 1979.)

Suhrke's article is pessimistic in tone. She suggests that unless there is some kind of communication and negotiation with the Communist states neighbouring the refugee reception countries, there is little likelihood that humanitarianism will continue to prosper in the face of protectionist policies.

• • •

The editors of the special issue of the *Annals* authored one of the articles, "U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80: Impact on Refugee Flow From Cuba". They correlate American foreign policy with the three phases of mass migration of Cuban refugees to the United States since Castro assumed power. The intake of 125,000 exiles in 1961 presaged, for the U.S., the forcible removal of Castro

by returnees. The airlift of 261,000 Cubans from 1965 to 1973 corresponded with the objectives of the U.S. to weaken the Cuban economy and demonstrate the ideological bankruptcy of the Castro regime. Only the 1980 Muriel boatlift failed to correspond with any U.S. foreign policy objectives. And it was this group of exiles which received a less than enthusiastic welcome. Ronald Copeland, in his article on the Cuban boatlift of 1980, documents in detail the administrative fiasco in the management of the Cuban refugee exodus of 1980.

The Loescher-Scanlan article and the Copeland article demonstrate the inextricable connection between politics and refugee policy. Though refugees are a matter of humanitarian concern, political policies in the United States clearly have a significant impact on defining who is and who is not a refugee and the reception those refugees will receive in America. Whether Vietnamese or Cuban, the attitude to them will differ radically depending on the domestic situation within the United States and on the foreign policy goals of the American administration.

The last four articles of the issue merely verify this principle. Naomi Zucker's article on the Haitians argues that this group was denied refugee status because they fled the dictatorship of an ally, because they were poor and unskilled, and because there was a belief that their acceptance would encourage others to follow. Zucker traces the myriad of methods used to restrict the inflow of Haitian refugees — the so-called humane techniques of humane deterrence. However, the courts have repeatedly found the acts of the United States government to be contrary to the laws of that government. When the United States government began to act in international waters by interdicting boats fleeing Haiti before they could reach the territorial waters of the U.S. (and therefore went beyond the jurisdiction of American courts), this policy became effective even though it may have abused international law.

Arnold Leibowitz's article, "The Refugee Act of 1980: Problems and Congressional Concerns", which fundamentally altered in law the responsibility of the U.S. to international refugees, clearly runs counter to the policies of the administration — policies which moved in the opposite direction

towards control and limitation on refugee inflows. As in Canada (though the rights for refugees to claim status in the country of asylum cannot be eliminated), the debate is conducted over the judicial process and its fairness or political bias. Leibowitz traces the parallel arguments in the U.S. If refugees are cut off from aid when they appeal for asylum, this will act as a strong disincentive for refugees to come. Thus there is a direct connection between economic administrative policy and the policy of ensuring fairness to refugees who seek asylum.

Norman Zucker, in his article on refugee resettlement in the United States, traces the increasing institutionalized role of the private sector by the private voluntary agencies in their resettlement of refugees in the United States. As Leibowitz predicted, and as Zucker documents in detail, the costs of resettlement have indeed become a political and debating issue. However, Zucker gives some background to the debate and notes that the Hungarian resettlement costs could be low because their numbers were relatively small, they had well established ethnic kin and were white Europeans with high labour force participation rates, high skills and few dependents. Finally, their arrival coincided with a period of low unemployment. Since they were also perceived as brave freedom fighters fleeing an evil Communist regime, this assisted greatly in their reception. As mentioned earlier, this was not the case for the last wave of Cuban refugees, though it was for the earlier waves. It is also not the case in the present attitudes to Indochinese refugees, but it was the prevailing attitude in 1975 and '79.

Zucker documents the current federal fragmented mismanagement of the refugee resettlement programs. They have a low economic priority. The shift of attitude against the refugees, with a survival of the fittest doctrine, suggests that refugees should not be coddled but, like anyone else, should have to struggle for their own survival. Their struggle would take place among other refugees who (unlike the Hungarians) are poorly educated, are very remote from an English or western society, are unfamiliar with our culture and often have come through severe trials and tribulations to arrive here. The result is a conflict between benefits for the economically disadvantaged Americans versus

the needs of the refugees compounded by cultural clashes.

Zucker ends on a note of praise. "Refugees infuse vitality into their new communities. They make permanent cultural, social and economic contributions. Refugees, in the final analysis, bring short-term costs and long-term benefits to their receiving communities."

Unfortunately, as all the authors have so well documented, the mood has shifted against that perception.

Barry Stein, in the final article entitled,

"The Commitment to Refugee Resettlement", argues that although the commitment to resettlement as a durable solution has increased significantly since 1975 as a base year, present challenges to that improvement have emerged, as indicated by a sharp drop in admissions. Nevertheless, Stein takes the long view and notes that the numbers have increased overall and the populations being resettled come from economic and ethnic backgrounds that are significantly different from those of earlier waves of refugee resettlement. In the tension between the obligation and need to res-

pond to refugees and the bureaucratic requirement to ensure that operations are effective and admissions to a country are properly controlled with appropriate processing of claimants, the conflict between the controllers and the bleeding hearts is the focus of the present debates on status determination and other issues in the refugee field. In Stein's eyes, though the alarm signals should be raised, the pessimists should not be allowed to take over the interpretation of the development of refugee policy. Nineteen eighty-four is not the same as 1939.

## Baha'i Reports

The Baha'i Faith is an independent religion with 3-4 million adherents world-wide (20,000 in Canada), coming from all ethnic and religious backgrounds. Since the Faith began in Persia (Iran) in the mid 19th Century, it has been regarded as a heresy by the Shiite Muslim clergy who now rule the country and who are outraged by the Faith's modern teachings of equality of men and women, universal education, and the harmony of religion and science.

### Anti-Baha'i Campaign Continues

January 26, 1984 (Toronto, Ontario) Last year's mass hangings in Iran of Baha'i women and the regime's official ban on the practice of the religion in that country, attracted world-wide attention. Now, early in 1984, less spectacular, but equally despicable acts of violence are occurring in the regime's unrelenting, coordinated campaign to force Baha'is to recant their religion and to convert to Islam:

- 250 more Baha'i arrested (throughout the country), including infants and young children, bringing the total of Baha'i men, women and children in Iran's jails to over 700;
- two Baha'is died shortly after being confined in prison; the details of their deaths remain unknown;
- a well-known and widely-respected Baha'i man, Mr. Bahman Dihqani, was killed by a mob in Isfahan; total number of Baha'is killed by the regime since 1978 now stands at 163;
- imprisoned Baha'is who had been dismissed from their jobs because of

their religion are promised their freedom if they pay back all the salary paid to them since beginning their employment, some up to 30 years;

- revolutionary guards are permitted to break into Baha'i homes at any hour to terrorize the occupants and seize any and all personal belongings

Official total as of January 20, 1984 of Baha'is shot, hanged, kidnapped since the beginning of the revolution for refusal to deny their faith, is 163. 10,000 Baha'is homeless, over 700 in prison.

### Ban of Worship and Administrative Activities

September 19, 1983 (Toronto, Ontario) Iranian authorities have launched a new attack on the Baha'i Faith in Iran by officially banning all its worship and administrative activities.

Baha'is may practice their beliefs as private individuals. Any communal activity, however, has now been defined as a criminal act.

Douglas Martin, General Secretary of the Baha'is of Canada, stated that the authorities' suggestion that Baha'is may "practice their faith as individuals" is meaningless in a country where 156 Baha'is, including women and youth, were judicially murdered when they refused to recant rather than accept an offer of freedom if they did so, where Iran's Baha'i children cannot attend schools if they do not deny their Baha'i beliefs, where Baha'is cannot bury their dead or even receive the bodies of their slain fathers, mothers, husbands, wives or children.

## SWEDISH REFUGEE POLICY

A study group of the Swedish Ministry of Labour has published a report with a number of recommendations concerning the selection and care of refugees. Among the recommendations are the following:

1. The passages to Sweden of close relatives (of refugees) will if necessary be paid for by the National Immigration and Naturalization Board (SIV).
2. Compensation should be made available to municipalities for the cost of psychiatric, psychological and social counselling of refugees.
3. The costs of child supervision and day nurseries, family day care and leisure centres should be refunded by the National Board of Health and Welfare so as to cover the net costs incurred by the municipalities after the payment of regular state grants and parents' charges.
4. All persons entering Sweden without first obtaining the requisite permits (though that absolves those who are applying for refugee status) should if necessary be assured by public measures of their upkeep while their permanent applications are pending.
5. The study group advocates research investigatory activities on a larger scale in order to acquire knowledge concerning the effects of Swedish measures on behalf of refugees. Funds should be allocated for research in this field.



# MONTREAL, TABLE DE CONCERTATION AU SERVICE DES REFUGIES VOLUME 1, 1983, OCCASIONAL

— A Review —

The Table de Concertation, a group of social service NGOs now in its fourth year of activities for refugees, has launched this occasional periodical which contains a mix of articles about settlement of refugees in Montréal, personal testimonies, short poems, and news items of interest to refugees and their advocates. Editor Constantin Stoiciu has put the accent on questions of cultural adaptation of refugees (and to a lesser extent newly-arrived immigrants from developing countries) in the Montréal area.

Each issue appearing last year revolved about a separate topic: la semaine des réfugiés (May 7-14, 1983); intercultural integration and cultural adaptation in Montréal (July and September, 1983), and the October 21 demonstration on behalf of inland refugee claimants (December issue). Correspondingly, the themes of bureaucratic litigation, phenomenological and critical appreciations of cultural life, and unification of refugees for particular political purposes occupy much of the space of the respective issues.

Although the theme of inland refugee claimant determination problems is a persistent matter throughout Canada, Montréal is particularly affected because of a relatively large number of such claimants (more than 1200). The Table de Concertation has established a shelter and series of services to assist these claimants since other forms of financial assistance formerly provided by the federal government were withdrawn in November, 1980. Forceful arguments are advanced about the serious problems in family and personal life which ensue upon delays of 6 months to 3 years in the claimant process. The executive of the Table de Concertation and another service organization deposited a brief with Immigration Canada calling for a moratorium on the withdrawal of medical and social benefits to such claimants, while requesting that the Québec Ministère d'Immigration intervienne officially in the granting of immigrant status and that Canada add an additional "first country of asylum" status to its categories of

eligibility for residents of Canada.

The editor transformed the strident political tone of the spring issue to a critical appreciation of cultural life in later issues. He solicited articulate and sensitive testimony from former refugees and immigrants of a wide variety of backgrounds, all of whom have written professionally since their arrival in Montréal. Despite considerable shifts from article to article in style, content and approach, each exemplifies the intent of the journal: to indicate that a plurality of cultures need not imply homogenized contributions.

Nevertheless, the December issue underlines the necessity for unification of refugees in order to support the distressed situations of refugee claimants, for whom NGOs and earlier-arriving refugees have publicized and politicized a question which previously appeared to have only administrative implications. Still, the editor reinforced his conviction that Montréal (and the rest of Québec? and the rest of Canada?) should move toward "interculturalism" rather than "integration" as a model for assimilation of refugees and new immigrants. Admittedly optimistic and filled with serious social complexities, the goal of the preservation of cultural

integrity of the immigrant's original culture cannot be subsumed by a pan-Québec/Canadian cultural overlay.

The editor's dual focus on the political and cultural does not easily resolve into a single image for this very promising periodical. Clearly, its occasional appearance does not strengthen its ability to advocate immediate political questions. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a journal which attempts to represent the integrity of various cultural backgrounds as expressed in contemporary Montréal can afford the allocation of time or the shift of social and psychological space without weakening the impact of the cultural message. While there are several political arenas available, the cultural life of refugees has received far too little attention. If the editor intends to illuminate a subject clearly, without interference, he would be well advised to develop his themes of "interculturalism" and critical appreciation of life in Montréal from the multiple optics of the newly-arrived residents. A challenge filled with risk and promise.

C. Michael Lanphier  
Professor of Sociology and Ethnic  
Research, York University

## WELFARE DEPENDENCY AGAIN

In several past articles of *Refuge* we have questioned reports that the Indochinese refugees have become dependent on welfare in the United States. A survey by the Church World Service on the American Immigration and Refugee Program entitled, "Making It On Their Own: From Refugee Sponsorship to Self-sufficiency", concludes "that there is no evidence of any significant long-term welfare dependence among refugees". From 1980 to early 1983, sponsors and churches across the country contributed over \$133 million in cash and kind to assist refugee families in moving toward self-sufficiency. The unemployment rate of refugees who have been here over three years drops to 14%, and most of them are actively seeking work. Almost half of them are mothers at home with young children. Only 2% of the refugees are reported to be unwilling to work and only 1% are reported to be not looking for work because they are on public assistance. Again, these results run contrary to some congressional reports which are critical of the refugees.



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## World Refugee Survey — 1983

For 25 years, *World Refugee Survey* has been published by the U.S. Committee for Refugees. In 1982, The U.S. Committee merged with the American Council of National Services, but retained its name. Readers should not be misled by the title. The publication is a review of the refugee situation largely from the American perspective. Most of the authors are American and most of the articles are American-oriented. Further, though the *Survey*, particularly its section on Country Reports, is often used as a reference, the quality of *World Refugee Survey* is uneven.

Between Roger Winter's opening summary of 1982 as a year in which protection for refugees declined, and the statistical section at the end, twelve articles are included. Two deal with general issues: (i.e. the problem of definition and repatriation, primarily in Africa). Three articles take up the case of a specific group of refugees — the Banyarwanda in Uganda and Rwanda — and two other groups which have a special interest for Americans — Palestinians and Soviet Jews.

Two articles take a non-American perspective, one on Australian policy and the other on the role of the Inter-Governmental Committee for Migration. Five articles deal directly with U.S. policy: Robert DeVecchi on the U.S. Status determination process; Sid Mohn on U.S. policy towards Central American refugees; Rep. Hamilton Fish on "A Congressional Perspective on Refugee Policy"; and two articles on the adjustment of the Indochinese refugees in the U.S.

Using the measuring stick of refugee protection, Roger Winter (a director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees) argues that the situation of refugees has declined. He cites the forcible refoulement of refugees from Djibouti, Thailand, Uganda and the U.S.A., the use of humane deterrence by Hong Kong and the U.S.A., and the lack of protection of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, of Guatemalans in Mexico and of Vietnamese in the waters of Thailand. His separate article on the Banyarwanda is a valuable, detailed description of the

Ugandan government's orchestrated displacement of 75,000 Banyarwanda in Uganda, both citizens and non-citizens, in October of 1982, 40,000 of whom crossed the border into Rwanda.

Gilbert Jaeger, a former UNHCR official for 27 years, reviews the limitations of the UN definition of a refugee. Unfortunately, his assertion that the alien status is undisputed in defining a refugee is incorrect in both the use of the term refugee and in the review of arguments about definition. The restriction of the UNHCR definition to refugees outside their homeland is indeed a matter of dispute. In the same *World Refugee Survey*, for example, the article by Roger Winter quotes refugee experts in Africa who refer to the forcibly displaced Banyarwanda *within* Uganda as refugees. And in my article on the Palestinians as well as in the general literature, the Arab Palestinians displaced in 1948 from one part of their homeland to another are referred to as refugees.

As Jaeger correctly asserts, it is not theory but practice that restricts the application of the term (as in the case, for example, of the U.S. interdiction of Haitians at sea and, after summary consideration of their claims, sending them back). Similarly, the regular use of humane deterrents, such as the detention of refugee claimants, not only runs counter to the spirit of international refugee law but is explicitly prohibited by Article 31 of the Convention.

Jaeger is very helpful and very clear in considering the issue of economic oppression and deprivation. It is applicable to the consideration of refugee status when economic hardships are directed at a particular group because of their race, political beliefs, religion, etc., but is not applicable if economic oppression is used by an elite against the rest of the population.

When the question is raised about why asylum countries in general interpreted refugee asylum claims in a more restrictive manner, Jaeger answers that the explanation is *not* the large numbers: relative to wealth and population, the three to four million refugees concen-

trated in the Northern Hemisphere in the 1920s could be viewed as proportionately larger. Instead, Jaeger suggests, it is a combination of objective factors — unemployment, lack of arable land, ethnic incompatibilities, etc. — which make local and regional solutions more difficult. When these are combined with subjective factors such as the fear of escalating influxes because of a widespread collapse of a norm of peaceable coexistence and what Jaeger dubs, "psychohistorical fatigue" (which may mean the same thing as the hip word of last year in refugee circles — *compassion fatigue*) the refugee situation reaches a crisis point.

Corresponding to the alleged restriction in the application of the refugee definition, is the decline in the use of repatriation as a solution in Africa, the continent where the definition of a refugee is broadest. Although Joseph Cerquone documents successful cases of repatriation — 250,000 returned to Zimbabwe after the defeat of the white-dominated regime in Rhodesia, and 150,000 returned from Cameroon to Chad — political circumstances combined with economic assistance seem to be complementary components of successful repatriation efforts. The combination is the exception rather than the rule. The international community can only significantly influence the latter. And the alternative to repatriation, i.e. self-sufficiency, is more experimental than widespread. The limited influence on repatriation and the limited application of self-sufficiency suggest that the alternatives to resettlement are suffering as well.

My article on the Palestinians, while acknowledging a connection, differentiates the refugee question from the issue of self-determination. The old welfare definition in terms of need is replaced by the broadest political definition of Palestinian refugees, a definition which goes beyond that of the UNHCR to include in-homeland, uprooted individuals who lack a state of their own which guarantees their protection in the fullest sense of the term. After a long review of numbers and the situation of

*Continued on p. 18*

## Survey

*Continued from p. 17*

the 600,000 Palestinian refugees (according to this broadest political definition), the article focuses on the serious plight of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who lack even an international agency with an ostensible responsibility for their protection.

Abraham Karlikow reviews the background to the exodus of 12 1/2% of the Soviet Jews and the increasing restrictions on exit visas during the last few years since the peak exodus in 1979 of over 50,000. Karlikow suggests, rather than argues, that the easing of restrictions on the exit of Soviet Jews is a direct correlative of improved U.S.-USSR relations. The peaks of 1972 and 1973 corresponded to an ease in trade between the U.S. and the USSR, while the decline could be correlated with restrictions to that trade, particularly the Congressional Amendment to the Trade Act on December 13, 1974 which limited credit to the USSR to a mere \$300 million.

The peaks of 1978 and 1979 are correlated with another area of U.S.-USSR cooperation when SALT I was signed.

Other factors may have impacted on the shifts in policy — a shift from traditional Jews or Jews with religious or Zionist convictions to assimilated Jews from the heartland of Russia reacting to increasing discriminatory actions against Jewish access to higher education, and the increasing numbers of Soviet Jews opting to go to the U.S., Canada and Australia rather than Israel. But the central theme is the state of detente. The reaction of the West to Afghanistan, Poland and the arms buildup, capped by Reagan's rhetorical anti-Sovietism, can be correlated with the smallest number of visas since the sixties. Corresponding to the decline is an increased oppression of Jews in the USSR, indicated by mounting anti-semitism.

Karlikow's article ends with a call for increasing international pressure. He argues that the USSR reveals its susceptibility to such pressure when it stages press conferences to counter anti-Soviet publicity on the issue. Unfortunately, the article itself seems to undermine its hortatory conclusion in its objective documentation that Soviet-Jewish exit visas are a direct trade-off with less restrictive policies to the Soviet Union.

There is no evidence to suggest that superego campaigns against the Soviet Union can be correlated with the easing of exit restrictions or internal discrimination and persecution of dissidents.

Paul Cullen documents the radical shift in Australian policy from one which centred on whites only to a record which gave Australia the highest per capita intake of Indochinese refugees from 1975 to 1982. Unlike Canada, but like Europe, Australia inducts most of its refugees through migrant centres, with small interest-free loans available to the refugees when they move out of those centres. However, a small but increasing number have bypassed the migrant centres since October 1979, moving directly into the community with the support of voluntary groups. One regrets, as with many of the other articles, that the pieces are so cursory and descriptive and that more critical and probing analysis is not available.

This is certainly true of James Carlin's article on the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration which documents ICM's role and versatility in processing and transporting over two million refugees in its 32-year history. When we get to the articles concerned with American policy, we find we go beyond description to either a moral condemnation or defense of American refugee policy.

In his article on Central American refugees, Sid Mohn documents the tensions between State Department policy, which does not grant refugee status to those who flee regimes to whom the U.S. is providing military assistance, and U.S. religious and human rights agencies who have gone beyond the practice of simple criticism to action programs providing underground railroads and religious sanctuaries to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. They condemn the U.S. government as doubly guilty — first, in propping up military oppressive regimes which are the major source of the refugee exodus, and then in deporting the refugees to potential persecution or even death.

In this context, there is an excellent brief insert by Richard Feen on the ethical assumptions underlying actions on behalf of refugees. These ethical assumptions can be rooted in a foreign policy of "shared humanity" or the much more restrictive "ally responsiveness". The norms can be grounded in domestic collective values — the idea of the U.S. as a

haven for the oppressed or, on the other hand, the obligation to maintain the integrity and security of the existing culture. The values can also be based on domestic individual premises — heroic altruism, minimal altruism (help as long as no great sacrifice is involved) and social Darwinism.

Hamilton Fish, Jr., a Republican Representative from New York, writes an apologia which casts the U.S. in a heroic light — as the protector of the world's persecuted, buffeted, at present, by public pressure propelled by the "illegal migration" from Cuba and Haiti. Fish advocates strong measures to restrict "illegal migrants" to enable, as he sees it, the U.S. to provide refuge to the real victims of persecution. The rhetoric simply obfuscates the underlying issues.

Similarly, the 1982 Refugee Assistance Amendments, which require more ex-

## New Appointment

Lloyd Jones, Longhouse Village, R.R. 13, Thunder Bay, Ontario, P7B 5E4, has been appointed refugee resettlement field officer for Canada for the Hong Kong Christian Service.

His duties are to co-ordinate the Canadian resettlement of refugees now in Hong Kong under private sponsorship.

Lloyd, a graduate of McMaster University, and the University of the Pacific, has been involved in resettlement of refugees, including minor unaccompanied sponsorships for the past four years. He and his wife Willa operate an International C.H.A. hostel in Thunder Bay.

Financial assistance is available for the sponsorship of Indochinese refugees from Hong Kong. If you are interested in sponsorships of Vietnamese refugees, be free to call Lloyd at 807-983-2042.

Lloyd Jones is also interested in the Central American refugee work. His church in Thunder Bay has assisted in finding sponsorships for 4 minor unaccompanied El Salvadoran and Guatemalan teenagers.

change of information between voluntary agencies and welfare agencies, are lauded as a means to prevent the refugee from becoming dependant on welfare — a fixation unique to American refugee discourse. Because of the way in which it is presented, Fish's proposal is made to seem moderate. He uses as foils, the Huddleston Amendment, which proposes to integrate refugee and immigration totals, thereby ensuring that family reunification migrants would compete with refugees for a limited number of slots, and the Bumpers Amendment, which proposes to restrict total non-emergency emissions to 75,000 through a Congressional Veto. In the American context, it may indeed reflect a mind set convinced that alternatives to resettlement, particularly voluntary repatriation, should be pursued (in spite of the evidence in the same periodical of the limits to such efforts) to counteract the "pull factors" alleged to have acted as a major motor to refugee flows.

The first of the last two articles on Indochinese adaptation focuses on the premise of increased welfare dependency of the Indochinese, and seeks to explore whether the source of this dependency is in the program, in the opportunities available in the local community, or in the refugees themselves. Increasing labour force participation rates correlated with time of entry and the recent recession suggest the problem does not stem primarily from either the program or the refugees themselves but in the opportunities available to the refugees. This interpretation is supported by the high rate of employment and low wage entry-level positions and in the expanding employment sectors such as the electronic industry. When the situation of the refugees themselves is addressed, problems of welfare are correlated with language ability and the proportion of employed persons in the refugee household, since it would appear that self-sufficiency for many refugees usually requires the efforts of more than one wage-earner per family.

The final article by John Finck entitled, "Progress Towards Self-Sufficiency of the Indochinese" is really a celebration of the whole gamut of social adaptation strategies, of which economic self-sufficiency is but a part.

The statistical section requires a review

of its own. The 1983 *Survey* is an improvement over 1982 in distinguishing 'refugees in need' from the number of refugees who have long been re-established in resettlement countries. This reduces the world total to 7,860,200 refugees. Even then, problems of definition and reliability of information affect the credibility of the data.

The editor argues that "judicious decisions have been made in choosing sources and figures", but judicious is a weasel word. It can, on the one hand, mean carefully weighed judgements of all sources of data or, on the other hand, it can connote diplomatic pragmatics. For example, what definition is used for Palestinian refugees? Is it consistent with the definition involving other refugees? What are the sources? When the data in the country surveys directly conflict with the data provided in the articles published by *World Refugee Survey* itself, which figures are to be taken as the authoritative source? Don't the discrepancies publicized by the same journal in the same issue require at least an explanation?

A case in point is the 45,000 Ugandan refugees listed in Rwanda. This figure is consistent with the figures given in the article on the Banyarwanda, but the 69,900 listed from Rwanda in Uganda is consistent with the article *only if* 34,900 displaced citizens and long-term Banyarwanda residents of Uganda who joined the 35,000 in existing refugee camps in Uganda are also defined as refugees. Under even the broadest political definition of refugees (which I

used in approaching the Palestinian issue), displaced citizens within a country are not refugees.

In contrast, when we consider the Palestinians, my published article shows 217,000 in the Gaza Strip while the Table shows 377,000. The Table numbers 749,000 Palestinian refugees in Jordan in spite of the fact that these Palestinians were given citizenship long ago. The editor's preamble clearly states - "everyone would probably agree that the status ceases to be salient at some point...for example, refugee individuals who have obtained a permanent legal status in a nation." Further, the Table directly contradicts its stated basis — "to separate specifically refugees in need and those resettled or generally deemed to be settled or otherwise 'no longer in need'". Either one of these three criteria can be used to exclude individuals from the 'in need' category. Since the Palestinians in Jordan fill at least one and sometimes all three of these criteria, they should not be included in the list. And yet they are.

Statistical collections which are scissors and paste collages of conflicting criteria are virtually useless and add to the credibility gap. If *World Refugee Survey* is to publish a reliable reference guide to numbers, it will have to be consistent with its professed criteria, definitions and sources of data. Until then, I am afraid its 'judicious' handling of figures is more a matter of being unwilling to step on toes than a fair and considered assessment of the variety of sources and definitions of refugees.

H.A.

### The Canadian Foundation for Refugees

The financial report for the year ended June 30, 1983 was received. It showed current cash assets of \$171,000, a decrease of \$18,000 in cash to cover the excess of operating expenses over income. The income of \$20,000 was earned as interest on its cash. No monies were given to any refugee aid organization. Instead, over \$38,000 was spent (\$20,000 from income and \$18,000 from capital) as follows:

- over \$16,000 (almost 1/2) for travel costs of the directors and staff

- over \$ 9,000 for professional services (presumably the community animateur)

- over \$ 4,000 for promotional media (presumably for publication of *Let's Learn English*)

\$ 7,000 office expense  
\$36,000

This budget does not include the up to \$200,000 it costs CEIC in office space, seconded officials, furnishings, telecommunications and other supplies.

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