



CANADA'S NEWSLETTER ON REFUGEES
REFUGEE

Baha'is

A Model of Private Sponsorship

From an Interview with Carolyne Dowdell

Is private sponsorship obsolete? The statistics suggest it is at least heading that way. There has been a precipitous decline in the private sponsorship of refugees since the peak of 1979-80 when 35,899 Indochinese refugees were privately sponsored to Canada. Since then, only 4,694 privately sponsored refugees have come to Canada. But in the midst of this decline one extraordinary program of private sponsorship stands out: the very original and highly successful effort of the Baha'is in Canada.

The Unique Baha'i Model

There are 20,000 Baha'is in Canada, living in 1,500 localities. In 325 of those localities there are enough Baha'is to have a local elected spiritual assembly of nine. These local spiritual assemblies elect a national spiritual assembly. The national spiritual assembly signed an umbrella agreement with Employment and Immigration Canada under which it assumes full responsibility for sponsorships undertaken by its constituent members.

During the Indochinese movement some organizations — most notably the Anglican Church and the Canadian Jewish Congress — did not sign such umbrella agreements. They preferred to leave the initiation of and responsibility for individual sponsorships to local groups, with the central organization acting primarily as a publicist. Other organizations signed umbrella agreements and acted as guarantors of sponsorships by local groups. The

Mennonite Central Committee and the Christian Reformed Church not only signed umbrella agreements to act as guarantors; they very actively encouraged, coordinated and backed up local sponsorship efforts.

The National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is is going a step beyond the direction of the Mennonites and the Christian Reformed Church. The national assembly is itself the sponsor of all the Baha'i refugees coming to Canada. It then assigns a refugee or a group of refugees to a local spiritual assembly, or even to a local group of Baha'is if a locality has too few Baha'is to constitute an assembly. That group agrees to accept immediate responsibility for the settlement of the refugees. Funds for the sponsorship are distributed to the local groups from a centrally located fund for relief. Thus the formal sponsorship is centralized. The fundraising is centralized. The distribution of the funds is centralized to even

out the cost. The human responsibilities are localized. The resultant costs are \$500 - \$1,000 per refugee, significantly less than the \$2,100 per refugee spent on basic living allowances for government-assisted refugees under the Indochinese refugee program.

Another unique feature of the Baha'i model is that the refugees are given these monies as an interest-free loan, the repayment of which is spaced over a long period of time and which, under special circumstances, may be forgiven. The national community model of private sponsorship is uniquely conjoined with placing the ultimate responsibility for cost on the individual refugees. At the same time, the plan permits a great deal of flexibility. A refugee sent to Sudbury who is unable to find a job can be moved rapidly to another area where a support group will be readily available.

So far, 200 Baha'i refugees have arrived

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REFUGE

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Refuge is dedicated to encouraging assistance to refugees, by providing a forum for sharing information and opinion on Canadian and international issues pertaining to refugees. It is published five times a year, in September, November, January, March and May. It is a non-profit, independent newsletter supported by grants from the Canadian Foundation for Refugees, Wintario, Operation Lifeline, and the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission; by private donations; and by subscription payments of \$10 a year. It is a forum for discussion and the views expressed in it do not necessarily reflect those of its funders, staff or Editorial Board.

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Special thanks to Howard Adelman for his assistance in the preparation of this issue.

Thanks also to the artists of Dreadnaught Cooperative Inc., Toronto, for their donation of our logo design.

ISSN0229-5113

Letters

From the Editor:

With this issue I take my leave of the editorship of *Refuge*, and have the pleasure of announcing that the new editor will be Dr. Howard Adelman. Dr. Adelman is Director of the Refugee Documentation Project at York University. *Refuge* will be publicizing the work of the Project and will share support services with it.

I would like to express my thanks to readers and to those who contributed writing, information and other assistance throughout the past year, for their interest and support. I hope that *Refuge* has been interesting and helpful and I am confident that it will become even more so in the future.

Kristin Hanson
Editor

To the Editor:

I would like to make the strongest objection to your publication of the piece "Politics and Refugees" in the May/June issue. To quote your own policy, *Refuge* is "dedicated to encouraging assistance to refugees by providing a forum for sharing information and opinion on Canadian and international issues pertaining to refugees." As such, there is no place in your newsletter for such biased, self-serving articles as that of Howard Adelman on Palestinian refugees. There are so many unsubstantiated or unbalanced statements made in this article that it is

possible only to mention a few representative ones here. That anyone would publicly suggest, as he does, that dispersal of refugees in order to lower their political consciousness is a viable option or that Israeli occupation of the West Bank can be rationalized by "full employment" of Arabs there is shocking. To see such things advanced in a government-supported newsletter is unacceptable.

I have found *Refuge* to be a valuable source of news and information on refugee matters. Nevertheless, your newsletter must clarify its editorial position on what qualifies as objective discourse on contentious refugee matters so that situations like this do not occur in the future.

Doreen Indra
Edmonton
July 1982

I will reply to two points. Doreen Indra states that I advocated the dispersal of refugees in order to lower their political consciousness. I did no such thing. I did say that a lowered political consciousness is an effect of dispersal of refugees. I provided a descriptive account rather than a prescriptive one.

Secondly, I did not rationalize Israeli occupation of the West Bank because of full employment. I merely said that there was full employment. Though I did not say it in the article published in *Refuge*, I have written elsewhere that I support self-determination for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but that political point was not relevant to my article.

It is difficult in areas of sensitive political issues to avoid accusations of bias, but I do hope the article will be re-read more judiciously.

Howard Adelman
Toronto
August 1982

To the Editor:

I want to express to you my delight with your last issue, and in particular with the valuable and scholarly contribution of Dr. Howard Adelman. I do believe he hit the nail on the head in his key statement: "Viable solutions are eliminated because humanitarianism is separated from politics in a way which allows politics to dictate the boundary conditions for humanitarianism."

I sincerely hope that a basis will soon be found for a political solution based on humanitarian principles, and I see Dr. Adelman's analysis as a valuable contribution to a complex problem.

Imre Rosenberg
Ottawa
July 1982

REFUGE is a non-profit, independent bi-monthly newsletter about refugees. The annual subscription price is \$10.00 for five issues.

If you would like to introduce REFUGE to your colleagues, please send a stamped envelope addressed to them and we will send them a free sample copy.

We also invite articles, announcements, letters, pictures, etc.

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UNHCR is currently involved in a voluntary repatriation program aimed at providing limited relief and rehabilitation assistance to returnees in Ethiopia. On April 30, 1982 the UNHCR launched an appeal for U.S. \$20 million to finance the program.

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in Canada and 500 more will be coming. This represents an amazing ratio of one sponsored refugee for every 30 Baha'is resident in Canada — a sign of strong dedication and support.

The Non-transferability of the Model

Unfortunately, there are certain aspects of the Baha'i model that make it unlikely that other groups could copy it directly. Almost all of the refugees speak English. Almost all of them are educated. Almost all of them are in the very employable age group of 20 - 40 years of age. The refugees share the religious affiliation of their sponsors.

Most importantly, the refugees are in serious danger. Recent studies have clearly indicated that potential sponsors respond to the real and perceived needs of refugees. The Baha'is are not designated class refugees but true Convention refugees. They are not suffering under a generally repressive regime: they are being persecuted by that regime.

The Persecution of Baha'is

The evidence for their persecution in Iran is overwhelming. There are 300,000 — 500,000 Baha'is in Iran. All Baha'i property has been confiscated, including cemeteries. Businesses of wealthy Baha'is have been seized. Baha'i homes have been looted. Baha'i children are not allowed to go to school. Baha'i farmers have had their crops burned and their livestock confiscated. Baha'is employed by the government have been fired. One, who has come to Canada, worked in the Department of Fisheries in Iran for ten years. The persecution has been widespread in all areas of the country and in all sectors of society.

Individual Baha'is have been stoned by mobs and shot by revolutionary firing squads. One entire national governing body of Baha'is was kidnapped and disappeared without a trace. Their successors were also kidnapped; seven of their bodies were found.

The Iranian government, in a submission to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, claimed that the trials which led to the executions of the Baha'is were "in no way because of their faith,

but solely on account of their acts of which they are accused." According to the deposition, Islamic laws and standards governing Iran provide that "no one is to be molested, persecuted or prosecuted on account of his religious beliefs." However, Baha'is are not recognized as a religious group, although they are the largest religious minority in Iran. The Iranian Constitution states: "Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian Iranians shall be the sole recognized religious minorities." Further, it exempts from human rights protection "those who engage in activities against Islam or the Islamic Republic of Iran." Since the Baha'is are not by definition a recognized religion, the very activity of being a Baha'i is considered an act against Islam, and they are therefore, not entitled to human rights protection. Thus, they are not denied human rights because of their faith, but because of their acts in being Baha'is. As Siyyid Rida Levasani, the judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Kirmanshah, ruled in a directive to the Zamzam Company, "It is hereby announced that if the Baha'i workers and employees repent, and write in their personal files that they adhere to the Islamic Ithna'Ashari creed (Shi'ih) they will be allowed to continue their work for the company; otherwise they should be dismissed."

So much for the denial of religious persecution. The Baha'is are accused of promoting prostitution (Baha'is believe in the equality of men and women and women do not wear the veil), corrupting the earth, warring against God, cooperating with Zionism (their holy shrine is located in Israel near Haifa), and spying for the Americans (their faith advocates the compatibility of science and religion).

Persecution of the Baha'is is not new to Iran. There was some persecution of them in the 1950s under the Shah. In the revolution of 1906-11, they were accused of being the conspiratorial force behind the constitutional movement by one side, and charged with promoting authoritarianism by the other. Ironically, this came about because their religious principles command them to remain apolitical in the national context and to promote an international world order. In fact, since the Baha'i religion was founded in 1844, Baha'is have endured very serious persecution, killings and pogroms in Iran.

The Canadian Sponsorship Program

It is not the Baha'is in Iran who are being sponsored. It is very difficult to arrange to assist members of persecuted minorities who are still in their home countries. "Such persons are technically not Convention refugees nor is it advisable to

create a designated class on their behalf because of the difficulties that such a designation could cause them vis-à-vis their home governments," notes a document of the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission.

It is Baha'is who are stranded abroad who are being sponsored. On August 12, 1981, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran circulated to its embassies instructions that they should "carefully prepare a list of names of all the Baha'is residing within their jurisdiction" and "refrain from extending the passports of those individuals." Thus, if Iranian Baha'is who are abroad return home, they face persecution within Iran. If they remain abroad until their passports expire, and they are not in countries which grant asylum, then they become stateless.

Canada and Australia are the only two countries with programs for resettling Baha'is stranded in countries which do not provide asylum. Most of the Baha'is sponsored to Canada come from the Far East: mainly the Philippines and India; also from Bangladesh, Thailand and Taiwan. Canada's immigration offices abroad confirm that the applicants are bona-fide Baha'is and that they are not entitled to permanent residence in their host countries. They check on their health and backgrounds, and then admit them to Canada as refugees sponsored by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is in Canada.

The Baha'i sponsorship program is a unique phenomenon combining the dedication and commitment of Canadians of Baha'i faith with commendable initiative on the part of the federal government to help in the resettlement of Baha'is stranded around the world.

Refugee Policy at the CNE

People who wondered whether Canada's regional priorities in refugee assistance were based on persecution and humanitarian need should have asked Multifax, Multiculturalism Canada's exhibit at the CNE. Multifax says:

Starting in the late fall of 1980, Canada began receiving a larger number of Polish families. These people fled Poland before the imposition of marshal (sic) law to Austria, where they were housed in camps. From there they emigrated to Canada. Their major reason for leaving Poland was to seek a better life for their children. Most of these new immigrants are skilled and highly educated.

Private Sponsorship VS. Government Assistance

A Summary of some findings of Employment and Immigration Canada's Evaluation
of the Indochinese Refugee Movement, 1979-80

In 1979-80 Canadians privately sponsored 35,899 Indochinese refugees to Canada. Another 25,978 came to Canada with government assistance. How have those refugees fared? How effective was private sponsorship compared to the traditional mode of government resettlement assistance? What is the future role of private sponsorship?

Employment and Immigration Canada recently released the first three (of four) studies* evaluating the 1979-80 Indochinese refugee movement. The release of the studies coincides with a dramatic decline in private sponsorships. Concerns about the inequities inherent in the dichotomy between private sponsorship and government assistance have been voiced. Further, the need to find the most efficient and effective modes of refugee resettlement in light of economic constraints has prompted calls for a new partnership between the government and private sectors for the sponsorship of refugees. The Inter-Church Committee for Refugees recently convened a study session in Kingston to work out some basic principles for a new sponsorship model which probably would combine government funds with private efforts. Employment and Immigration Canada's studies offer basic data from which to develop such new models.

*The four studies are:

(i) a review, based on a survey by mail, of the experiences and opinions of Canadians who privately sponsored Indochinese refugees, prepared by the Program Evaluation Branch of Employment and Immigration Canada;

(ii) an in-depth assessment of the Indochinese refugee group sponsorship program, based on intensive interviews with selected church leaders, representatives of voluntary agencies, and private sponsors of refugees, prepared by DPA Consulting Inc. in association with Mr. Maxwell Brem;

(iii) a study of the impact of the Indochinese movement on Canada Immigration Centres (CIC) and Canada Employment Centres (CEC) based on interviews with staff,

prepared by the Program Evaluation Branch of Employment and Immigration Canada; and

(iv) a longitudinal study of the socio-economic adaptation of Indochinese refugees admitted to Canada during 1979 and 1980, being prepared by a group of sociologists.

Private sponsorship brings strong personal support, knowledge of the community and networks of Canadian friends and acquaintances to refugee resettlement. This human element obviously offers emotional advantages. It also has positive material consequences, evident in the critical area of employment.

Employment

Overall, 84.9% of the working age population of Indochinese refugees were participating in the Canadian labour market by the time they had been in Canada 18 months. A very high proportion of Indochinese refugee women were working: 82.4%, compared to only 50.9% of all Canadian women. This, the report suggests, reflects the need to have two incomes to make ends meet. (Seventy-seven per cent of the refugees had an annual income of less than \$10,000, while only 29.3% of Canadian families had an income of less than \$11,000 in 1980.) There is another important difference between Indochinese refugee and overall Canadian labour force participation. Indochinese refugees 45 years old and over had a very high unemployment rate of 18.8%, compared to an unemployment rate for that same age group in Canada as a whole of only 5.1%. In contrast, Indochinese refugees between 15 and 24 had an unemployment rate of only 9.5% compared to an overall Canadian rate for that group of 15.3%. The most commonly cited reason for unemployment was lack of English or French.

The unemployment rates of government-assisted and privately sponsored refugees were about the same, with the exception of some regional variations. (In Quebec, which resettled a higher proportion of government-assisted refugees than privately sponsored refugees than other provinces, government-assisted refugees had a higher unemployment rate than

those who were privately sponsored. The reverse was true in British Columbia and the Yukon.) But the unemployment rates were the same for the two groups *in spite of* the fact that overall, government-assisted refugees were found to be more likely to have some knowledge of English or French than privately sponsored refugees. Therefore, the report concludes, private sponsorship *per se* has been a positive force in helping refugees find jobs.

Forty-five per cent of privately sponsored refugees had found jobs they had at the time of the survey through their sponsors. Both privately sponsored and government-assisted refugees had been expected to use Canada Employment Centres (CEC's) to find jobs. But many sponsors thought these services "needed improvement". And government-assisted refugees have constituted as much as 90% of the clientele of voluntary refugee aid agencies that provide direct services such as finding jobs or accommodation.* Also, privately sponsored refugees were somewhat more likely to be working in occupations similar to their former ones, which may reflect the time sponsors were able to take to acquaint themselves with the refugees' backgrounds and, again, their ability to use personal contacts to help the refugees find suitable jobs. Only 13.7% of government-assisted refugees and 17.7% of privately sponsored refugees were working in the same occupations they had had in Indochina, after 18 months in Canada. Considering that all but 6.6% of the refugees previously held medium or high-skilled occupations, these statistics indicate that previous training is grossly underutilized.

Finally, privately sponsored refugees also found their first jobs in Canada four weeks earlier than government-sponsored

*It is worth noting that CEC staff felt that private agencies often found inappropriate jobs for the refugees, such as seasonal jobs. Also, most agencies felt that privately sponsored refugees who had been here longer than one year (the length of the formal sponsorship commitment) were increasingly using their services.

refugees did. However, the price of this early start to employment was an early stop to language training. The mean duration of the language training of privately sponsored refugees was 2.7 weeks less than for government-assisted refugees.

Language Training

Government-assisted refugees received living allowances while attending language classes, but privately sponsored refugees did not; they were generally supported by their sponsors. The trade-off between early employment and immediate language training was one of the most contentious issues within sponsorship groups and also among government settlement officers. The study found that, overall, government officials tended to give priority to language training, whereas sponsors tended to give priority to employment. Many sponsors interviewed mentioned that the refugees themselves gave priority to employment and economic independence.

Furthermore, although language training itself was paid for by the government for both government-assisted and privately sponsored refugees, the study encountered allegations that government-assisted refugees were given priority for seats in language classes, on top of the fact that there was as much as a three to four month wait for seats.

Other Differences

Privately sponsored refugees had the assistance of their sponsors in finding jobs. Government-assisted refugees had government support while they studied English or French. These conclusions point to a larger problem of inequitable treatment of refugees. Levels of material support given to privately sponsored refugees varied according to sponsors; those given to government-assisted refugees varied according to local CEC's interpretations of guidelines. Moreover, some CEC officers noted that privately sponsored refugees sometimes expressed resentment at receiving less than

government-assisted refugees; for instance, they were often given hand-me-down clothes instead of money for new items. Some refugees were troubled by feeling indebted to a private benefactor, some CEC officers noted, and preferred receiving monies on the basis of government entitlement.

Refugees' material dependence on sponsors may pose problems for the emotional relationship between refugees and sponsors, one of the studies (based on in-depth interviews with sponsors) suggested. On the sponsors' part, it may reinforce a paternalistic and possessive attitude. On the refugees' part, it may induce dependency, suspicion, or even dishonesty. If all refugees were entitled to certain basic funds from the government, the study suggests, these emotional dangers might be less significant; and the problem of inequity would be ameliorated.

Cost

The average cost of settling a privately sponsored refugee was \$753 less than for a government-assisted refugee, the study found. Private sponsors spent an average of \$1,347 per refugee. The government spent an average of \$2,100 on basic living allowances and language training allowances for each government-assisted refugee.

The study suggests that the apparent savings of \$753 is somewhat misleading since the questionnaire on which the statistic is based asked sponsors not to include material contributions such as donations of clothing and furniture in their summaries of their expenditures. However, it is even more misleading for the report to discount these savings in this way. Donations of used items do not represent expenditures in the same way cash disbursements do, and the distinction is extremely important to finding ways to make refugee settlement cheaper.

Willingness to Sponsor Again

The majority of sponsors of Indochinese refugees would sponsor again if they felt there were a need and if they felt sure that

there would be sufficient money and help to see the sponsorship through, the study found.

Fifty-nine per cent of sponsors surveyed indicated that they would be prepared to sponsor again; 28% indicated they might be; and 13% indicated they would not. Some of these sponsors cited specific conditions that would have to be met for them to be willing to sponsor again. Their most important concern involved need, with sponsors saying such things as, "I would sponsor again if a real 'need' can be demonstrated. I am not totally convinced that all the Indochinese were 'refugees' in the true sense"; and "I would sponsor again if I were satisfied that, given world conditions, it is those refugees who are most in need of our help who are being admitted to Canada."

Their second most important concerns involved means: sponsors wanted to be sure that there would be more government and agency support services available; that there would be an equitable sharing of workload; and that there would be adequate funds for the sponsorship.

In this connection it is interesting to note that a willingness to sponsor again was more likely to be expressed by sponsors associated with a church as a parent organization. Some churches and other national organizations had signed umbrella agreements with the federal government to facilitate sponsorship by their constituent groups. These umbrella agreements simplified the bureaucratic procedures of sponsorship and assured sponsors of back-up assistance in case of an emergency. These assurances had often made the difference between choosing whether or not to sponsor the first time around.

Finally, government leadership was thought to be critical in motivating sponsors. Church leaders felt this was so, and sponsors and agencies attributed the present decline in sponsorship, not to a decline in public interest or willingness to sponsor, but to a lack of continuing government interest and leadership.

Miscounting Refugees

a Case Study of Lebanon

by Howard Adelman

"Refugee" is an equivocal term. It is used in many different senses. It describes people whose homes are destroyed by earthquakes; people who are driven from their homes during wars; people who

flee persecution in their countries and become "Convention refugees". By failing to distinguish the various different senses of "refugee", gross differences in numbers of refugees can be reported.

Given the complexity of the situation in Lebanon in particular and in the Middle East in general, it is not surprising that such differences characterized the re-

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ports on the number of refugees following the recent invasion of Lebanon by Israel.

Israel Gravinsky, head of the Lebanese Relief Section within the Finance Ministry of Israeli government, was reported to have estimated that there were 20,000 "roofless" people in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon in July of 1982. The caption under a picture of a devastated Palestinian refugee camp south of Beirut published in an August issue of *Newsview* also reported that 20,000 people were left homeless by the Israeli invasion. On the other hand, a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times*, sponsored by the Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of the Palestinian and Lebanese People, protested vehemently against the invasion which produced 700,000 refugees. An advertisement in the August *New York Review of Books*, sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee, solicited donations to help the 600,000 refugees resulting from the recent attack on the Palestinians and Lebanese.

How many refugees were there in Lebanon following the invasion? 20,000 or 700,000? To answer the question in a useful and accurate way that can contribute to planning relief, you have to categorize the refugees according to their situations and clarify terminology accordingly.

First you must distinguish Lebanese nationals, who would technically be described as internally displaced persons, from Palestinians in Lebanon. The Lebanese in turn have to be divided into five groups:

(1) those in southern Lebanon whose homes were destroyed or so damaged as to be uninhabitable as a result of the Israeli invasion. In August 1982, there were approximately 250 homes destroyed in Tyre and four times that many in Sidon, resulting in about 6,250 Lebanese refugees or "roofless nationals" in southern Lebanon.

(2) those who, as a result of the Israeli defeat of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon, returned to homes destroyed or so damaged as to be uninhabitable as a result of the civil war and, in particular, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) conflict with Lebanese in 1975-76 and after. Six hundred Lebanese Christians have returned to the town of Damour, which was occupied and totally destroyed by the PLO in the 1975-76 war. Of the 6,000 people who once lived there, some have found new homes, but many have been in temporary shelters and may wish to return.

These estimated 5,000 Lebanese refugees are also "roofless nationals", but their situation predated the Israeli invasion; even though some are still "roofless", they can be said to have benefited from the war because they have at least regained their land on which they

can rebuild their homes.

(3) those who were refugees as a result of the 1975-76 war but who recovered their homes and their lands following the invasion. 50,000 Lebanese refugees from Nabatieh returned to that city following the ouster of the PLO by the Israelis.

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An (

The Honourable
Minister
and

Dear Mr. Axworthy,

In the *Toronto Star* of October 6, 1982, your advisor on immigration, Ian Rankin, suggests that Canada's refugee intake will be reduced in response to financial constraints of the federal government. In the *Globe and Mail* of October 7, 1982, you suggest that a reduction is being considered in response to our unemployment problems. Neither rationalization is valid. Reducing Canada's refugee intake because of these economic constraints is both inappropriate and unnecessary.

It may be one thing to reduce overall immigration levels in response to high unemployment in Canada. It is quite another to reduce the refugee intake. People who are persecuted; people who are stateless; people who are mired in the hopelessness of refugee camps, should not suffer further from our economic problems. Canadians' problems are fairly minor by comparison. It should not be forgotten that unemployment levels were invoked to keep out Jewish refugees in the 1930's.

As for the financial constraints of the government, reductions in unnecessary government expenditures should be made whenever possible, in good times and in bad. But reductions should not be made at the expense of refugees. Fortunately, we know that we can reduce the costs of resettling refugees without reducing the numbers of refugees we take in. How? The research reports of your ministry point the way. By combining the

human support of private sponsors with government financial resources.

Privately sponsored Indochinese refugees were resettled at a direct cost of approximately one third less than government-assisted refugees. This was not because the private sector was more efficient. The employees of your department working in this field were dedicated, knowledgeable and extraordinarily hard-working. But civil servants cannot be expected to look for an old unused chest of drawers in their aunt's basement or to rustle up jobs and housing through friends and acquaintances. By adopting a new model for sponsorship that would involve private sponsors in the resettlement of every refugee in Canada, we could bring in the number of refugees we brought in last year for the reduced amount of money that is available this year.

The annual refugee plan could be established on the understanding that the private sector would participate fully in meeting the levels in the plan. If sufficient effort were forthcoming on the part of the private sector, then, since the costs for resettling each refugee would be higher, the intake would be reduced to fit in with the budget allocations for refugee resettlement.

Such a plan might include the following provisions:

1. All refugees brought into the country during the first half of the

(4) those who have fled Beirut and are temporarily without shelter. 30,000 -60,000 citizens of West Beirut have fled the city, some of whom have lost their homes, but the majority of whom have simply fled the battle scene and are temporarily homeless. These people would

technically be described as temporarily displaced persons.

(5) those whose homes are destroyed or so damaged as to be uninhabitable as a result of the Israeli - PLO fighting in West Beirut.

(6) those whose homes were destroyed in the internecine fighting in

West Beirut. The numbers of such Lebanese citizens are estimated in the thousands.

Thus, it is accurate but terribly misleading to say that there were over 100,000 Lebanese refugees following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. There may have been 100,000 Lebanese citizens uprooted in the turmoil in Lebanon in the past few years, but the situations of these people, the causes of their situations and their present needs, differ radically.

If reports on the Lebanese refugees are confusing, those on the Palestinians are even more so. Some Palestinians are registered refugees: basically those who arrived in 1948 following the creation of the State of Israel, and their children. These refugees are entitled to rations and benefits from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Some are unregistered: basically those who arrived in 1970 following King Hussein's slaughter of the PLO in Black September. Other Palestinian refugees have become Lebanese citizens but have never been struck from the official rolls of UNRWA.

Furthermore, the basic information on camp populations before the invasion is confusing. For example, the official population of the camp that was totally razed, Ein Hilweh, was 24,340 refugees. However, an UNRWA official said that since 1969 the PLO had not allowed them to check their figures. Deaths were often not reported and to compensate for this, UNRWA had adopted a policy of not registering more than five children in a family unless a death was also registered. Some registered Palestinians had moved into town or were working abroad in Bahrain or Kuwait or Abu Dhabi and had leased their camp homes to Egyptian or Syrian migrant workers. Also, PLO volunteers from Pakistan and Bangladesh lived in the camp. In addition, it is estimated that as many as 10,000 unregistered refugees lived in the camp, including many militants and their families. The destruction of Ein Hilweh alone can be estimated to have produced as many as 30,000 "roofless refugees", most of whom would be stateless Palestinians.

According to UNRWA there are approximately 107,000 registered refugees living in southern Lebanon, of whom around 60,000 lived in camps and 47,000 in towns and cities. Some refugee camps were only slightly damaged in the fighting and Palestinians, both registered and unregistered, remained in those camps. On the other hand, Ein Hilweh in Sidon and Rashidieh in Tyre were completely destroyed in the battle between the Israelis and the PLO. El-Buss and Burjel-

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Letter

Lloyd Axworthy,
Employment
Commission

year would be privately sponsored, with the exception of any urgent cases for which sponsors were not forthcoming. Based on the number of sponsorship applications made, projections would be made for the second half of the year to indicate the amount of the refugee resettlement budget that would be needed for the sponsorships involving private groups. Any remaining funds would be spent on direct government sponsorship of refugees. In this way, the total intake would be a direct reflection of the efforts of the private sector.

2. All private sponsorship groups would receive a basic allowance of \$500.00 from the government for each refugee sponsored within the levels tabled in Parliament.

3. The allowance would be increased by \$500.00 if the refugee sponsored did not have a minimum proficiency in English or French.

4. The allowance would be increased by \$500.00 if the sponsorship group did not share with the refugee some kinship such as family, ethnic or religious identification.

5. A further \$500.00 per refugee would be available in a back-up fund to be disbursed to sponsors upon proof of necessary expenditures beyond the basic allowances.

6. Private sponsors would provide the government with audited statements of their expenditures, indicating that any funds left over from the allowances had been donated to an approved charity involved in assisting refugees (e.g., a church or a refugee aid organization).

This model undoubtedly has some shortcomings, and it is only one of many possibilities. But we do not have to solve the problem of a specific model at this time. Legislation requires only that the levels for refugee intake be tabled in Parliament. The same levels as last year could be tabled with the clear understanding that the resettlement efforts will have to be undertaken within greater financial constraints; and that therefore, in order to meet the levels, the involvement of the private sector will be needed. The private sector can then be invited to work out an effective plan for meeting the levels *within* the government's financial constraints — a plan which at the same time can be fairer to sponsors and more effective for refugees.

Yours Sincerely,



Howard Adelman

Cont. from page 7

Shemalia were severely damaged. Overall, of these 60,000 registered refugees in camps in the south, and possibly another 25,000 unregistered refugees in camps there, the most reliable estimates indicate that as many as one-half or 42,000 may have lost their homes. In addition, it is estimated that there were approximately 80,000 Palestinian refugees living in the West Beirut and Mount Lebanon area of whom around 18,000 lived in camps. As of this writing, the extent of destruction of these camps is not known but it is probably very extreme. Even if we assume that all refugees living in camps in this area lost their homes in the bombardment, then the total number of homeless Palestinian refugees in all of Lebanon in August 1982 would have been a maximum of 60,000.


In its report on the situation in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion, the United Nations indicated that 300,000 Lebanese needed aid, a figure that included Lebanese in all of Lebanon who had suffered losses of schools, pock-marked homes, psychological trauma, etc. In its news release announcing aid to Lebanon, the Canadian National Development Agency notes that "UNRWA, which has responsibility for the more than 200,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, estimates that the vast majority of them have been displaced, with refugee camps being razed." In addition there are an estimated 100,000 unregistered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Thus, if you do not distinguish among the various meanings of the word "refugee" — if you do not distinguish among "stateless" and "homeless" and "in need" — then you can say that there are 600,000 refugees in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion,

(though not strictly as a result of the Israeli invasion).

But if you wish to specify what aid is required, and therefore wish, for example, to say how many Lebanese and Palestinians are homeless as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, then an accurate figure will be 10,000 Lebanese and 50,000–60,000 Palestinians. Probably another 30,000 people in southern Lebanon have had to temporarily flee their homes in order to avoid the fighting. At the same time, 60,000 will have recovered their homes and another 6,000 will have recovered their land. Policy and rehabilitation efforts should be decided on the basis of as accurate a set of facts as possible.

"The introduction of an effective census mechanism to work independently of relief agencies in order to determine in an impartial and professional way the numbers of border-crossers requiring assistance in mass influx situations," is one of nine recommendations made by Sadruddin Aga Khan in his report *Human Rights and Massive Exoduses*, which will be summarized in the next issue of *Refugee*.

Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, 1980



Source: UNRWA

Howard Adelman visited Lebanon in August 1982 and published a report entitled *Homeless Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southern Lebanon, Resulting from the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, June 1982*. The report may be obtained by sending \$2.50 for the report alone, \$5.00 for the report with selected appendices, or \$20.00 for the report with full appendices to: *Refugee Documentation Project, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Downsview, Ontario M3J 2R6*.

CANADIAN FINANCIAL AID TO LEBANON

Canada has contributed \$2.55 million for humanitarian relief in Lebanon since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. A grant of \$950,000 has been allocated to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which is responsible for registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The funds are to be used to provide food, shelter and clothing. Another \$450,000 has been granted to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), for assistance to homeless mothers and children, mainly in southern Lebanon and the Beirut area. One million dollars has been granted to the International Committee of the Red Cross for relief to displaced Lebanese civilians. Finally, \$150,000 has been granted to the World Council of Churches for humanitarian assistance to people in southern Lebanon, Beirut, and the Beka'a Valley.

NEWSFLASH:

The UNHCR has cancelled its agreement of cooperation with the Canadian Foundation for Refugees.

From Djibouti to Quebec

by Scott Mullin

An incident in which Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti were said to have been returned to Ethiopia against their will received considerable publicity throughout the past spring and summer. Here, Mr. Scott Mullin, one of Canada's immigration officers stationed in Africa, describes what happened and Canada's role in the events.

Djibouti achieved independence from France in 1977. A small country wedged between Ethiopia, Somalia and the Red Sea, Djibouti has virtually no natural resources and depends on its strategic location and good port facilities for virtually all of its economic activity. Its location has also resulted in its having to deal with over 35,000 Ethiopian refugees. The refugees represent an extraordinary 10% of Djibouti's population and have placed enormous strains on the country's undeveloped economy. The influx of refugees has also created security concerns for the authorities as Djibouti depends heavily on trade with Ethiopia for its economic, and political, survival. At the time of the international discussion preceding its independence, there was a great deal of debate over whether the French Territory of the Issas and Afars, as it was known then, would become independent or be absorbed by either one of its two neighbours, Ethiopia or Somalia. Djibouti has a population which is largely ethnic Somali and the well-known dispute in the Horn of Africa has placed Djibouti in a complex and difficult relationship with its neighbours.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and voluntary agencies active in Djibouti soon appreciated that it was necessary to use overseas resettlement as one of the solutions to the refugee problem in the country. While the vast majority of the refugees were nomadic peasants who were living in the rural areas of Djibouti, there were between 2,000 and 3,000 urban refugees for whom resettlement abroad seemed the only appropriate solution. At the request of the UNHCR Canada has been dealing with refugee applicants from Djibouti since 1980. At one time the United States ran a large-scale resettlement program from Djibouti but it was ended in early 1982. Canada now remains the only country prepared

to accept applicants for resettlement from Djibouti. Sixty-five Ethiopian refugees have gone to Canada so far this year, and perhaps another 35-50 are expected to leave before Christmas.

In February of this year the Djibouti government, which is also plagued with a large number of illegal aliens in the country, conducted a series of raids in the capital designed to locate such aliens with a view to deporting them to their country of origin. In the confusion that followed there were allegations that Ethiopian refugees had been included in the round-up and that some had been returned against their will to Ethiopia. A senior UNHCR official from Geneva was dispatched to Djibouti and received assurances from the authorities that it had not been and was not their intention to expel any refugees.


As a result of the intervention of UNHCR, nine Ethiopians, among a large group of illegal aliens in trucks on their way to the Ethiopian border, were intercepted and identified. It seems reasonable to believe that confusion had resulted in their

inclusion in a group being deported, but the nine became "proof" of the allegations that some refugees may have been sent back. The nine were detained by the Djibouti authorities who were clearly embarrassed by their presence in Djibouti. As a result of the incident relations between UNHCR and the Djibouti government became strained and the future of the nine refugees became a source of irritation and frustration to both sides.

When the situation was explained to us, it was decided that Canada could greatly assist in resolving a difficult problem and could ensure the future safety and security of the nine by agreeing to immediately resettle them. None of the nine spoke English or French and several were illiterate, but it was decided that their security was of paramount concern and that all nine would be accepted under our refugee resettlement program. In view of their detention and the serious strains the situation had created, it was decided to immediately arrange for their resettlement. Through the use of Minister's Permits, usual processing requirements were temporarily waived, and through the participation of the Service d'Immigration du Quebec (SIQ), it was ensured that the refugees would be dealt with as cases requiring more than usual government assistance. This facilitated their quick departure as it would have been very inappropriate to have waited for private sponsorships to materialize. The nine refugees were resettled in Quebec less than two weeks after they were interviewed in an isolated camp near the Ethiopia-Djibouti border.

Both the Djibouti government and the UNHCR expressed their sincere thanks for Canada's efforts on behalf of the group and both commented that our decision to accept the nine refugees resulted in a marked drop in the tension and frustrations their presence had caused in Djibouti.

Djibouti,
in the midst of the Horn of Africa



News in Brief

Quebec's French Language Training Program in Thailand

The program of French language training for Quebec-bound refugees in Thailand, run by the Ministère de l'Immigration of the Government of Quebec, has been extended until 1983. Quebec's program is the only Canadian program of language training or orientation for Canada-bound refugees operated abroad

Under the Thai government's "humane deterrent" policy, only one refugee camp, Phanat Nikom, is open to third country resettlement officials. Refugees seeking resettlement abroad must first be transferred there. Those refugees who are selected for resettlement in Canada may still have a three to four month wait at Phanat Nikom before their departure for Canada. Quebec's language training program at Phanat Nikom has enabled around 470 Indochinese refugees to use this time to learn French. Quebec government officials feel this has been of benefit not only to the refugees' integration into Quebec society but also to the morale in the refugee camp.

The program is operated in conjunction with the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, and also received some initial financial assistance from the Canadian Foundation for Refugees.

New Representative of UNHCR in Canada

Mr. Itshaq Brown is the new representative in Canada of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). An Israeli national, Mr. Brown has worked for UNHCR since 1957, most recently as Acting Chief of the Europe Regional Section at UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva. Mr. Brown succeeds Mr. Raymond Terrillon who retired in July 1982.

Humanitarian Measures for Lebanese Nationals

Lebanese nationals in Canada who do not wish to return to Lebanon at the present time may remain and work in Canada for one year under Minister's Permits, under special measures announced by Employment and Immigration Minister Lloyd Axworthy in June 1982. At the end of one year their position will be reviewed. Those who have relatives in Canada eligible to sponsor them may, if they wish, apply for permanent residence without leaving the country. Also, immigration applications from people in Lebanon who are affected by the war and who have relatives in Canada are being dealt with under relaxed criteria.

The measures are identical to those introduced to assist Poles in October 1981. "The situation has not improved; if anything, Poland's political and economic life has further deteriorated," Mr. Axworthy stated recently. He announced that Poles who had been here on Minister's Permits would be allowed to apply for permanent resident status.

The measures are also similar to those announced for Salvadorans in 1981. Salvadorans arriving in Canada are still being given Minister's Permits, and those whose permits are expiring after the one year are being permitted to have them extended or to apply for landing.

Self-Sufficient Refugees

Refugees and members of designated classes who have enough money and enough knowledge of English or French to be able to settle in Canada without government assistance have been enabled to come to Canada relatively expeditiously, through the creation of a new category of designated class entrants, called DC-4's. DC-4's do not receive government assistance and are not counted against the annual refugee plan levels. So far, mostly Poles have come to Canada under this category.

Resource Exchange

Book Review

Canada and the Indochinese Refugees, by Howard Adelman. L.A. Weigl Educational Associates Ltd., Regina, 1982, 186 pp., \$6.75.

by Harold Troper

Canada and the Indochinese Refugees is an important book. It is not only the first published study of the Canadian response to the 1979 Indochinese refugee crisis; it is also a book written by one who was exceptionally close to the centre of policy formation during the period of the narrative. Howard Adelman, who was among the founders and guiding lights of Operation Lifeline in Toronto, steers his readers through a short but interesting review of the refugee phenomenon in the

modern world and, separating need from law, briefly touches on the thorny issue of whether or not the Boat People can be considered refugees under the definitions of Canadian or international law. He recalls for us the building crisis to which so many Canadians would respond, and carefully links the unfolding of events in the Far East with the mounting pressure on the Canadian government to increase its commitment to refugee resettlement. From the federal commitment he moves to the role of the provinces, especially Quebec and Ontario, in the refugee field; the complementary activities of voluntary agencies such as Operation Lifeline; and the support for refugee admission and settlement from religious and ethnic groups. Finally Adelman weighs the negative impact of anti-refugee sentiment in Canada, the nature of the

anti-refugee campaign and the measure to which this campaign influenced the direction or commitment of Canadian refugee relief and resettlement.

Perhaps any book which details Canadian involvement in the Indochinese refugee crisis would cover this ground, but Adelman offers us something more: his own experience. Since he was so involved in the key events of the day, at both the private and government levels, Adelman is able to pepper his narrative with incidents in which he was involved and insights which only he can offer. Thus in a hybrid style — somewhere in the middle ground between historical detachment and personal memoirs — Adelman recalls both events as they passed and the impression he had of those events at the time. He is thus able to impose order on

Cont. on page 11

Cont. from page 10

what others caught up in the Indochinese refugee movement might recall as an exhausting, confusing and exhilarating period — a period of emotional involvement perhaps not readily reduced to historical analysis.

Herein lies the book's great appeal and, perhaps, its greatest weakness. On the one hand Adelman plucks from memory and from the historical record as he researched it, those factors which seemingly stand out as critical in accounting for the shape and direction of the Canadian response. He orders the steps, one after another, which led to the government's decision to expand its Indochinese refugee program, led to the explosion of public involvement with these refugees and led provincial and private institutions into the refugee arena. From his telling, the Indochinese crisis has a logical and, if not smooth, at least an ordered chronology and policy direction. As one who was but a minor actor on the Operation Lifeline stage, I have no doubt that Adelman's analysis is substantially correct.

But there is a problem at least for me. I recall many of the same events from the early days of Operation Lifeline as does Adelman — the same meetings, the same telephones ringing off the wall, the same parade of volunteers requesting assistance, the same efforts to shape organization out of good will. What I don't remember is order. Adelman's efforts — largely successful — to press order out of the chaos of my memories leave me feeling a little bit robbed. As an historian I acknowledge a structure to historical events, even events we live and cannot fully understand as we live them. Adelman has performed a service by offering a retrospective path through the tumult of the period, especially the early stages of mass voluntary involvement. But I cherish my memories of the frenzied activity, spontaneous sacrifice and emotional response to human suffering which marked those days — a loving chaos with its own momentum and a momentum that seemed to feed off itself. It is that spirit of which Adelman was so much a part, even a symbol, and which his book, important as it is, has not quite captured.

Adelman's work is a pioneering one. He is the first to tackle this important topic and rightly so. After all, he also pioneered in channeling the mass outpouring of Canadian public concern on behalf of these Indochinese refugees. If he imposes some order on my memories of a boundless good will in confusion, it hardly matters.

Harold Troper is a professor of history at the

Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in Toronto and co-author of the recently published book, *None is Too Many*, which documents Canada's response to the plight to European Jewry between 1933 and 1948. *None is Too Many* will be reviewed in the next issue of REFUGE.

1983 UNHCR Calendar

UNHCR Branch Office for Canada
280 Albert Street, Suite 401
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5G8

Transnational Legal Problems of Refugees

The Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies, 1981

Contents include:

- Refugees in International Law and Organization
- National Law and Policy on Refugee Entry and Resettlement
- Legal Remedies for Refugees
- Review of United States Laws
- Review of Foreign Laws

Published by Clark Boardman Company, Ltd. 435 Hudson Street, New York, N.Y. 10014 U.S. \$55.00

Refugees from Sovereignty-Association

Two Vietnamese refugees had violent and traumatic dreams in the weeks before the sovereignty-association referendum in Quebec in 1980, a study found. The refugees were extremely apprehensive about the possibility of yet another political independence movement in Quebec which might mean that they could well become refugees for a second time within a span of some twelve months.

Fear of political instability, prosecution and imprisonment by the party in power in the Quebec government was a real and widespread fear among many Indochinese refugees who came to Montreal in 1979 and 1980, according to findings of sociologists Kwok B. Chan of Concordia University and Lawrence Lam of York University. Mr. Chan and Mr. Lam are engaged in a longitudinal study of the social and economic adaptation of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees who have come to Quebec since 1975. They undertook an analysis of the refugees' dreams, to provide data on the refugees' socio-psychological state.

Refugee Documentation Project York University

A Refugee Documentation Project has been established at York University. The Project was launched to fulfill three functions:

- to ensure the preservation of archival material related to refugees. The Project has documents, published and unpublished papers, periodicals, books, press clippings, conference papers and audio-visual materials pertaining to refugees from all parts of the world. The collection is presently particularly strong in the area of Indochinese refugees. A catalogue will be available in the spring of 1983.
- to create an index of Canadian personnel and organizations concerned with refugees. The index will include those who can provide information about refugees and those who work directly in refugee resettlement or overseas assistance.
- to assemble information on current refugee problems through scholarly research including field work.

If you have any archival refugee-related material that you no longer need but that you wish to have preserved and made available to others, we would encourage you to consider donating it to the Project. Also, if you are currently doing research on refugees, we would be interested in hearing about your work so that others can know what projects are underway.

The Refugee Documentation Project's library is open to the public on weekdays from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. If you cannot make a personal visit but wish to obtain access to materials, please write or phone and we will do our best to make arrangements to assist you. If there are materials or information that you want that are not in our collection we will try to help you obtain them.

The Project is funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. It is directed by Professor Howard Adelman and administered by Caroline Stephens.

For more information, please contact:

Caroline Stephens
at
Refugee Documentation Project
York University
4700 Keele Street
Downsview, Ontario
M3J 2R6
Telephone: (416) 667-3639

Statistical Survey

Counting the World's Refugees, 1982

Africa	
Country of Asylum	Number
ALGERIA.....	65,000
Western Sahara, various	
ANGOLA.....	73,000
Zaire, Namibia, South Africa	
BOTSWANA.....	1,500
Angola, Namibia, South Africa	
BURUNDI.....	55,000
Rwanda	
CAMEROON.....	20,000
Chad	
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC.....	5,000
Chad	
DJIBOUTI.....	30,000
Ethiopia	
EGYPT.....	5,500
Various	
ETHIOPIA.....	11,000
Sudan	
KENYA.....	3,900
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, various	
LESOTHO.....	11,000
South Africa, various	
NIGERIA.....	40,000
Chad	
RWANDA.....	10,000
Burundi, Uganda	
SENEGAL.....	4,000
Various	
SOMALIA.....	700,000
Ethiopia	
SUDAN.....	500,000
Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad, Zaire	
SWAZILAND.....	5,700
South Africa	
TANZANIA.....	156,000
Burundi, Zaire	
UGANDA.....	113,000
Rwanda, Zaire	
ZAIRE.....	370,000
Angola, Uganda, Zambia	
ZAMBIA.....	42,000
Angola, Namibia, various	
OTHER COUNTRIES.....	30,000
Africa TOTAL.....	2,251,600

Middle East	
Country of Asylum	Number
IRAN.....	110,000
Afghanistan, Kurds, Iraq	
LEBANON.....	3,200
PAKISTAN.....	2,600,000
Afghanistan	
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES.....	1,884,000
Jordan.....	733,000
West Bank.....	334,000
Gaza Strip.....	370,000
Lebanon.....	232,000
Syria.....	215,000
OTHER COUNTRIES.....	40,000
Middle East TOTAL.....	4,637,200
Europe	
Country of Asylum	Number
AUSTRIA.....	43,000
Eastern Europe	
BELGIUM.....	33,000
Various	
DENMARK.....	1,800
Various	
FRANCE.....	150,000
Various	
GERMANY (FRG).....	94,000
Various	
GREECE.....	3,800
Various	
ITALY.....	14,000
Various	
NETHERLANDS.....	12,000
Various	
NORWAY.....	6,000
Various	
PORTUGAL.....	7,600
Africa, Latin America	
ROMANIA.....	1,000
Chile	
SPAIN.....	40,000
Latin America, Southeast Asia	
SWEDEN.....	20,000
Various	
SWITZERLAND.....	37,000
Various	

UNITED KINGDOM.....	148,000
Various	
YUGOSLAVIA.....	2,000
Various	
Europe TOTAL.....	613,200
North America	
Country of Asylum	Number
CANADA.....	338,000
Various	
U.S.....	849,000
Various	
North America TOTAL.....	1,187,000
Latin America	
Country of Asylum	Number
ARGENTINA.....	26,000
Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia	
BELIZE.....	7,000
El Salvador	
BOLIVIA.....	500
Europe, Latin America	
BRAZIL.....	24,000
Europe, Latin America	
CHILE.....	1,500
Europe	
COLOMBIA.....	2,000
Latin America	
COSTA RICA.....	13,000
El Salvador, Latin America	
CUBA.....	3,000
Latin America	
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.....	3,800
Haiti	
ECUADOR.....	700
Various	
GUATEMALA.....	50-100,000
El Salvador	
HONDURAS.....	25,000
El Salvador, Nicaragua (Miskito Indians), Guatemala	
MEXICO.....	70-140,000
El Salvador	
NICARAGUA.....	20,000
El Salvador	

PANAMA.....	1,000
El Salvador	
PERU.....	1,500
Europe, Latin America	
URUGUAY.....	1,700
Europe, Latin America	
VENEZUELA.....	18,000
Europe, Latin America	
Latin America TOTAL.....	268,700-388,700
Asia	
Country of Asylum	Number
AUSTRALIA.....	304,000
Various	
BHUTAN.....	1,500
Tibet	
CHINA.....	265,000
Southeast Asia	
HONG KONG.....	14,000
Vietnam	
INDIA.....	3,300
Afghanistan, various	
INDONESIA.....	6,000
Vietnam	
JAPAN.....	1,800
Vietnam	
LAOS.....	3,800
Cambodia	
MACAO.....	1,200
Vietnam	
MALAYSIA.....	99,000
Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia	
NEPAL.....	11,000
Tibet	
NEW ZEALAND.....	10,000
Various	
PAPUA NEW GUINEA.....	1,000
Indonesia	
PHILIPPINES.....	6,600
Vietnam	
SINGAPORE.....	500
Vietnam	
THAILAND.....	193,000
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia	
VIETNAM.....	33,000
Cambodia	
Asia TOTAL.....	954,700

NB:

Reports of refugees in countries include both those who are settled and those who still require a durable solution because precise figure on refugees who have been resettled are not readily available... Virtually all refugees reported in North America and Australia are resettled. Many reported in western Europe and Latin America have been accepted for permanent residence. In some African countries, for example Sudan and Tanzania, substantial numbers of the refugees reported are "settled in place." The 265,000 reported in China are resettled there. Of the 10 million refugees reported, then, perhaps one-quarter have found a durable solution in a country of asylum. SOURCE: Reprinted from *World Refugee Survey*, 1982, U.S. Committee for Refugees.

A Note on the Politics of Counting the World's Refugees

In a mammoth and commendable job, the U.S. Committee for Refugees has compiled these statistics from various intergovernmental bodies and from the United States Government. However, they have not screened out some of the political biases deriving from these sources. One fundamental principle of statistics, that the same principles of counting should be used in relationship to all the figures, is not observed. For example, the number of refugees listed for Canada does not include the children of refugees. The number of Palestinian refugees listed does not include children of refugees and must also include all those who are long ago dead and buried. Also, the statistics for Canada simply describe a portion of its population. Another country in which resettled refugees (including almost 800 refugees from Indochina) make up an even greater proportion of its population is not even listed: Israel. It should be noted that according to the 1981 World Refugee Survey Israel ranks number one with the highest ratio of refugees to population - 1:37 (Canada and Australia's ratios are 1:285 and they are third and fourth in the ranking.)

CANADA'S NEWSLETTER ON REFUGEES

REFUGEE

c/o Refugee Documentation Project, York University
4700 Keele Street, Downsview Ontario M3J 2R6

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