



CANADA'S NATIONAL NEWSLETTER ON REFUGEES

REFUGEE

POLITICS AND REFUGEES:

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

By Howard Adelman

Political questions and refugee problems are inseparable. How should humanitarian organizations assisting refugees deal with the political questions? There are at least three approaches.

One approach assumes that since refugees are a by-product of politics, a refugee problem cannot be adequately addressed unless its political causes are confronted. This conviction characterizes the work of increasing numbers of non-governmental organizations.

The other two approaches give immediate humanitarian issues priority and adopt an outwardly neutral stance toward political issues. Both United Nations bodies assisting refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), adopt this stance. The difference between the second and third approaches - as exemplified by UNHCR and UNRWA - hinges on the issue of resettlement.

UNHCR provides temporary relief while pursuing the objective of finding permanent homes for the refugees as soon as possible - through repatriation, settlement in the country of first asylum or resettlement abroad. UNHCR refuses to get into the political rights and wrongs of a refugee issue, but

Howard Adelman is a professor of philosophy at York University in Toronto.

nonetheless affects the political equation indirectly. To the extent that Salvadorans, Chileans, Southeast Asians, Afghans, Lebanese, Ugandan Asians, Czechs, Hungarians, East Germans, Jews and other post World War II refugees are permanently settled rather than left in camps, an explosive reminder of the source of each refugee problem is removed. When masses of discontented and readily radicalized refugees are dispersed, a weakening in the moral outrage at the causes of their displacement follows.

Resettled ethnic groups have always been divided on the degree to which they ought to attempt to right historical injustice. Many simply want to get on with the job of reconstructing their lives in their new homelands. Estonians, for example, may gather together to remember and protest the elimination of their nation's State, but the protest grows weaker and weaker as the children become Canadianized or

Americanized.

The third approach, exemplified by UNRWA, attempts to completely separate humanitarian and political questions.¹ UNRWA was first established to provide temporary relief for Palestinian refugees. In contrast to UNHCR, it was not mandated to pursue resettlement. UNRWA developed on the assumption that the three solutions of repatriation, permanent settlement in countries of first asylum and resettlement abroad were not viable options: "It was soon recognized that few if any would be allowed to return to their homes at an early date, that countries in the area were economically incapable of absorbing hundreds of thousands of refugees and that the refugees themselves feared they might

¹"Political aspects of the Palestine refugee problem, as well as the question of repatriation and compensation, are the responsibility of United Nations bodies other than UNRWA." *UNRWA: A survey of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees*, p. 1.

ALSO FEATURED IN THIS ISSUE . . .

VIS A VIS VISAS 5

How accessible is Canada's refugee determination procedure?

By Michael Schelew

MEASURING GROSS NATIONAL REFUGEE PRODUCT 8

A framework for the classification of refugee source countries.

By Firdaus Kharas

forfeit their claim to return if they somehow managed to establish themselves on a permanent basis."² The political issues were ostensibly left up to the refugees themselves, while UNRWA became a quasi welfare state in charge of the health, welfare and education of the refugees.

What are the consequences of this third approach? What are the effects of allowing the political objectives of refugees to be determined by the refugees themselves while humanitarianism becomes the responsibility of an outside agency?

Since political questions and refugee problems are inseparable, any attempt to assist refugees must have some political consequences and be based on some political premises. One effect, therefore, of attempting to separate humanitarianism from politics is that the political premises become unquestioned assumptions. For example, the Palestinians assisted by UNRWA are by definition Palestinian Arabs. The Palestinian Jews who fled Nablus, other settlements in what is now the West Bank and the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem were not classified as refugees. Nor were the Jews who left

Yemen, Morocco, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, etc. Thus the historical past is distorted.

Humanitarian options for the future are cut off as well. For example, one assumption made by UNRWA was that countries in the area were economically incapable of absorbing hundreds of thousands of refugees.³ History has proven this false. All of the Palestinian refugees could have been resettled in Middle East countries just as over a million Jewish refugees from Arab countries were absorbed and resettled in Israel. In fact, most Palestinian refugees have been resettled in these countries. Almost 40% of the refugees live in a prosperous and thriving Jordan. Another 37.5% who fled the West Bank and Gaza when it was occupied and subsequently annexed by Jordan have been absorbed into the economy of Israel since Israel occupied those areas. Although the Palestinian Arabs understandably chafe and protest against Israeli administration and occupation, there is almost full employment in the area and the terrible conditions of the refugee camps are gradually being replaced by new housing developments. Of the over 12% of the refugees in Lebanon, many do continue to be a political problem, in part because they did not settle into a viable economic life. But, in general, the historical facts of the wealth of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Libya, etc., where many Palestinians are employed, prove overwhelmingly that UNRWA's premise that the area was economically incapable of absorbing hundreds of thousands of refugees was false.

UNRWA could not pursue humanitarian options of resettlement in countries of first asylum or in third countries because of a political obligation restricting its activities: the refugees' right to resettle at some date in the homes from which they fled, or to receive compensation if they chose not to do so.

The pure humanitarianism thus becomes politicized to a degree. Rights logically ascribe wrongs, when those rights are not permitted to be actualized. If it is assumed that the refugees have a right to return and they do not return, then the countries from which they fled must be judged guilty for preventing their return. Humanitarian agencies, ostensibly neutral on political questions, cannot help pointing out this corollary to the rights issue, for it creates a critical boundary condition for their activities. Thus, not only does UNRWA blame one party; it attributes the need for its continued existence to the failure of that same party: "Failure to implement the United Nations Resolutions that might have facilitated a solution has perpetuated the need for UNRWA's

³ Ibid.

services to the refugees."⁴ Further, UNRWA claims that "failure to maintain UNRWA's services could be harmful to the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."⁵ The goal of a refugee relief organization - refugee relief - has become tied to a political goal - peace. Whether the peace is just or not depends on one's political views.

The most serious consequence of attempting to pursue pure humanitarianism is that the humanitarian agency becomes part of the no-solution outlook. If resettlement in other countries is ruled out as a viable solution by one party, and return to the country of origin is ruled out by the other, then no solution is possible. UNRWA is destined not only to play its role in a non-solution, but to effectively perpetuate premises which inhibit a solution.

Viable solutions are eliminated because humanitarianism is separated from politics in a way which allows politics to dictate the boundary conditions for humanitarianism. Particular political rights are taken as prior to universal rights. The right of a refugee to return is not a universal right; it is a political demand. Refugees do have universal rights - the right to a home where they can live free of the fear of persecution and where they can provide for themselves. When humanitarian agencies base their efforts on universal rights they diffuse political issues. When humanitarian agencies base their mandates on political rights, the result is a severe limitation on the possibility of solving the refugee problem and an exacerbation of the political issues.

UNRWA, through its attempt at pure humanitarianism, is thoroughly politicized in its assumptions, its goals, its perceptions and its view of the necessity for its own role. If its moral purity is somewhat sullied, its welfare role is even more questionable.

Three factors determine eligibility for the services provided by UNRWA. First, the refugees must be registered as being "persons or descendants of persons whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of that conflict, lost both their homes and their livelihood." Second, the refugees must be in need. Third, they must have taken refuge in areas adjacent to 1948 Israel.

⁴ UNRWA: A survey of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees. p. 2.

⁵ Ibid, p. 3.

To subscribe to *Refuge*, send your name and address to *Refuge*, 8 York Street, 2nd Floor, Toronto, Ontario M5J 1R2. (416) 363-0211.

A voluntary subscription payment of \$10 a year is requested where possible. Some back issues are available at no charge upon request.

² UNRWA "Fact Sheet" No. 9.

REFUGEE

Editor:

Kristin Hanson

Editorial Board:

Stuart Beaveridge, Victoria

Douglas Cohen, Montreal

Claudio Duran, Toronto

Arie van Eek, Burlington

Donald Ferguson, Toronto

James Hathaway, Moncton

Michael Pitman, Toronto

Linda Weigl, Regina

Typesetting and Layout:

Five Seven Nine Design


Refuge is dedicated to encouraging assistance to refugees, by providing a forum for sharing information and opinion on Canadian and international issues pertaining to refugees. It is published five times a year, in September, November, January, March and May. It is a non-profit, independent newsletter supported by grants from the Canadian Foundation for Refugees, Wintario, Operation Lifeline, and the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission; by private donations; and by voluntary subscription payments of \$10 a year. It is a forum for discussion and the views expressed in it do not necessarily reflect those of its funders, staff or Editorial Board.

Submissions of articles under 2,000 words, letters, news items, facts, quotes, suggestions, announcements, drawings, photographs, documents and summaries of documents are invited. All material in *Refuge* may be reproduced without permission unless copyrighted or otherwise indicated. Credit should be given to the author or source if named.

Special thanks to Howard Adelman for his assistance in the preparation of this issue.

Thanks also to the artists of Dreadnaught Cooperative Inc., Toronto, for their donation of our logo design.

ISSN0229-5113



Source: UNRWA, June 30, 1981

In 1979 there were 1,803,564 refugees registered. In 1952, there had been approximately 1,000,000. In 1949 UNRWA provided a figure of 726,000 refugees.

Was the original figure correct? Even if it was, how did it grow by almost 250% in 30 years?

Emil Ghory, the Secretary of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, estimated that there were 300,000 Palestinian refugees in July of 1948 following the second truce. Other Palestinians left after that date because they did not want to live in Israel. (They did not lose their homes and livelihood because of the conflict; they lost them because they did not like the results of the conflict. Nevertheless they were registered as refugees with UNRWA.)

Even the addition of these later refugees does not create a total of 726,000 Palestinian refugees in 1949. There was a maximum of 1,200,000

Arabs resident in Palestine in 1947⁶, of which 450,000 to 550,000 were not displaced or left in Israel. Hence, displacement could have totaled 726,000 equal to the total number of refugees UNRWA claims to have registered. But 160,000 Palestinian Arabs remained in their homes or were allowed to return to their homes in Israel.⁷ 40,000 emigrated to distant countries. 70,000 settled in the countries of first asylum but did not register. The maximum number of Palestinian refugees must have been under 500,000.

Where does the discrepancy of 226,000 between this figure and UNRWA's figure come from? Whether pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian sources are cited, it seems that the original number of registered refugees was grossly exaggerated by counting Palestinians resident in Jordan whom UNRWA registered as refugees, enabling them to get ration cards.

The original number of refugees was exaggerated. What about the increase? The Palestinians have a very high birth rate. In the West Bank in the period 1972-1975, for which there are accurate statistics, the birth rate averaged slightly under 45 births per thousand and the

mortality rate around 16 per thousand. If losses due to fighting and net migration are assumed to be minimal, the population could not have grown by more than 3% per year. And this presumes a lower mortality rate than would have been likely in the period 1948-1952, considering the conditions in the camps.

Perhaps it doesn't matter that the number of refugees is grossly exaggerated. Not all registered refugees are eligible for aid: only those in need. In 1979, 46% of the 1,803,564 registered refugees received basic rations. At the time, 37.5% of the refugees lived on the West Bank in Gaza where unemployment was almost nil; and 40% of the refugees were registered in Jordan which was booming with virtually full employment as well.

The original number of refugees was exaggerated. The level of growth was exaggerated. 44% of the refugees received rations although almost 80% lived in areas of full employment. And yet the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Olof Rydbach, argues that in 1980 over 600,000 refugees over and above the 800,000 refugees already receiving rations were really entitled to rations. Unfortunately, UNRWA was unable to provide them "because a limit was placed on the number of recipients several years ago."⁸

I recall visiting the Gaza Strip in 1977. At one major intersection in the Gaza refugee camp, I met a vendor selling flour, rice, oil and sugar. The bags of

⁶ Cf. Terence Prittee, "Middle East Refugees" in *The Palestinian*, Transaction Press, New Jersey, 1945.

⁷ A study very sympathetic to Palestinian nationalism estimates 650,000 refugees. Cf. *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, William Quandt, Fuad Jabba, Ann Mosely Lesch, University of California Press, Berkeley, USA, 1973, p. 48. Cf. also Don Peretz, "The Palestine Arab Refugee Problem," in P.Y. Hamoud and Sidney S. Alexander, eds., *Political Dynamics in the Middle East*, New York: American Elsevier, 1972.

⁸ UNRWA 1981, p. 13.



Palestinian refugees in 1950 . . . and 1980.

flour and rice were clearly marked "UNRWA". I asked, through an interpreter, why he was selling UNRWA rations. He told us he had bought 140 ration cards. Evidently they are sold like taxi licenses in many cities, and the price fluctuates according to estimates of their future value; that is, estimates of how long and in what quantities they would entitle the holder to receive free UNRWA rations. (Currently the annual basic ration per card in the Gaza Strip is 60 kilos of flour, 4 kilos of rice, 4.5 kilos of oil and 2.4 kilos of sugar.)

UNRWA claims that it is on the brink of collapse from lack of money. It claims that its collapse would lead to "disaster for the Palestinian refugee community, for the host governments and for the peace and stability of the

Near East region."⁹ The only disaster for the Palestinian refugee community would be for the entrepreneurs and commodity traders who deal in UNRWA ration cards.

Nor would there be disaster for the host countries. Israel and Jordan would merely have to assume their full financial responsibilities for all their inhabitants who participate in their economies. 60% of the UNRWA budget goes to education. Why should the international community subsidize the Israeli and Jordanian governments which clearly could support the education and welfare needs of the refugees?

And as for UNRWA's collapse being a disaster for the peace and stability in the Near East - there is no peace and

⁹ Ibid, p. 6.

stability in the Near East. To the extent that some measure of progress was achieved through the Camp David agreements between Israel and Egypt, UNRWA had no relevant role.

When thirteen million refugees are in need of assistance, one needn't look far for better uses for the funds that support UNRWA. They could be used to help the refugees produced by the recent Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Two years ago, UNRWA's annual budget was \$238 million per year, to which Canada was pledged to contribute \$3.6 million in cash and \$4.5 million in flour. Now the budget is almost \$300 million.

UNRWA is a costly lesson in how humanitarian organizations assisting refugees should deal with political questions. □

Do immigrant women have adequate access to language training in Canada?

What services is a refugee entitled to if he is sponsored to Canada by his family?

Should special employment services be provided for immigrants?

"WE'LL ANSWER THAT QUESTION WHEN OUR STUDY IS COMPLETED . . ."

A major review of Canada's policies and programs for settlement and integration of newcomers into Canadian society is now complete. The review has been a joint undertaking of the three federal departments involved in settlement: Employment and Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Secretary of State. The three ministers plan to establish a position on the key policy and program issues raised in the report and make a joint submission to Cabinet. According to Mr. Axworthy the next stage will be consultation with the provincial governments and the private sector, probably in the autumn of 1982.

Sponsorship and Settlement TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION

Have changes in settlement services in Canada kept in step with changes in Canadian immigration patterns in recent years? Gordon Kaufman, Executive Director of the Toronto Region of Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada, noted at a recent meeting on sponsorship and settlement services that whereas at one time occupational skills and experience provided the main criteria for

immigration selection, now family reunification is probably the most important consideration. This, together with the provisions for refugees in the new Immigration Act that took effect in 1978, means that most immigration to Canada now involves some form of sponsorship - from family members, from a private group or agency, or from the federal government itself.

Language Training and Settlement TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY

A major aspect of the settlement review concerns language training for newcomers. Teaching English as a Second Language Across Canada (TESL Canada) has presented to the federal departments conducting the review a position paper on ESL for newcomers subtitled *Six Principles Toward a National Policy*. TESL Canada hopes to see its six principles embodied in any new policy:

- universal accessibility to ESL for all newcomers;
- greater flexibility and sufficiency of programs;
- national, provincial and local coordination;
- functional Canadian orientation and citizenship content in ESL material;
- increased support for community agencies providing settlement services;
- recognition of the key roles of the ESL professional and the ESL profession.

TESL Canada has also proposed a specific model for newcomer integration based on two stages:

Stage I: a full-time three-month reception ESL program called *Welcome to Canada*, available to all newcomers;
Stage II: referral to a more flexible range of Manpower-sponsored options, including "English in the Workplace" programs.

TRENDS IN CANADIAN IMMIGRATION, 1966-1980

YEAR	TOTAL	SPONSORED			INDEPENDENT
		FAMILY CLASS %	ASSISTED RELATIVES %	REFUGEES AND DESIGNATED CLASSES %	
1966	194,743	34.2			65.8
1967	222,876	33.4			66.6
1968	183,974	20.8	19.1		60.1
1969	161,531	20.8	24.2		55.0
1970	147,713	21.8	23.8		54.4
1971	121,900	27.4	24.1		48.5
1972	122,006	27.1	25.2	4.2	43.5
1973	184,200	22.6	24.0	1.3	52.1
1974	218,465	24.8	24.3	0.8	50.1
1975	187,881	34.1	24.3	3.0	38.6
1976	149,429	40.7	21.8	7.9	29.6
1977	114,914	44.7	22.7	6.4	26.2
1978	86,313	52.8	19.9	4.9	22.4
1979	112,096	41.7	10.2	24.9	23.2
1980	143,117	35.7	9.4	28.2	26.7

Source: Canada Employment and Immigration Commission

VIS A VIS VISAS

How Accessible Is Canada's Refugee Determination Procedure?

By Michael Schelew

Canada prides itself on a humanitarian tradition toward the displaced and the persecuted throughout the world. In light of this tradition, Canada has established an inland refugee determination procedure to evaluate applications for refugee status in Canada. However, the tendency of the Canadian government to impose visa requirements on refugee-producing countries makes it extremely difficult for refugees from certain countries - including Chile, El Salvador, Haiti and Pakistan - to reach Canada to make a refugee claim. This in turn makes it extremely difficult for refugees from these countries to obtain Canadian protection at all.

Canada sometimes imposes visa requirements on other countries because they impose visa requirements on Canada. Canada may also impose visa requirements on other countries because nationals from those countries come to Canada to work illegally. As long as such countries are not refugee-producing, visa requirements may be justified.

In certain cases, Canada has also imposed visa requirements to prevent abuse of the inland refugee determination process. Sometimes people have come to Canada and claimed refugee status, knowing that they can work in Canada until they are deported for having made an unfounded claim. Since processing even an unfounded claim can take well over a year, by the time such a claimant is deported, he can have worked in Canada and made a considerable sum of money in comparison with what he could have made working in his home country. The best defense against such abuse, of course, is a streamlined inland refugee determination procedure, through which manifestly unfounded claims can be dealt with quickly, abusers deported immediately, and potential abusers thereby deterred. Again, as long as such countries are not in fact refugee-producing, a visa requirement may be justified, and is not relevant to refugee policy.

However, if a country is refugee-producing, a visa requirement can play a critical role in Canadian refugee policy.

Michael Schelew practices law with the firm Heifetz, Crozier and Schelew and is Vice President and former Refugee Coordinator for the Canadian section (anglophone) of Amnesty International. His views expressed in this article represent the views of the Canadian section (anglophone) of Amnesty International.

If nationals from refugee-producing countries are coming to Canada for the purpose of claiming refugee status and there is no past or present history of immigration abuse from nationals of these countries, then the imposition of a visa requirement is simply unjustified. It constitutes disguised refoulement, and runs counter to Canada's international obligations and humanitarian tradition toward the displaced and the persecuted.

The situation is more complicated when refugee claimants are coming to Canada from a country which does have a history of immigration abuse but is also refugee-producing. The imposition of a visa requirement may be necessary. But at the same time, the imposition of a visa requirement makes it very difficult for an individual to obtain a fair determination of his right to Canadian protection as a refugee.

WHICH COUNTRIES ARE VISA COUNTRIES?

Those countries whose citizens can enter Canada for a temporary period without a visa are indicated on the chart on page 9.

If a person wishes to be admitted to Canada as a refugee, but he is a national of a country on which Canada imposes a visa requirement, he has two options.

He could attempt to obtain a visitor's visa to come to Canada, and then make a claim upon arrival. But many refugee claimants would not be granted a Canadian visitor's visa because they would have to convince the visa-granting officer that, first and foremost, they simply wanted to visit Canada as tourists, which would not be true. Moreover, as proof of this intention to come to Canada simply for a visit, the Canadian government often requires that the applicant have sufficient funds to be self-supporting while in Canada, a requirement that is often impossible for refugee claimants to satisfy. If a refugee claimant lies about these matters to an immigration officer in order to obtain a visa, he may face credibility problems with the decision-makers who consider his refugee claim here in Canada.

Often several visits to a Canadian Embassy are necessary before a visa is granted. In some countries, the applicant must go once to the Embassy to obtain an appointment for an interview; again to attend the interview; and then, if the interview is a success,

still again to obtain the visa. If a person's life is in danger, this wait for a visa can be very serious. It is not beyond contemplation that a student or trade unionist in Guatemala, for example, could be murdered while waiting for a Canadian visa.

The situation is even more complicated when there are no Canadian diplomatic offices in a country where a visa requirement exists. The refugee claimant must then go to a third country where there is a Canadian diplomatic office in order to apply for a visa which he may not even be granted. For example, Salvadorans must go to Mexico to apply for Canadian visas. A refugee cannot simply board an airplane and fly to Canada without the necessary visa because Canada imposes sanctions on airline carriers which fly foreign nationals to Canada without the necessary documentation: the carriers must pay the removal, detention and medical costs of such passengers, and may also be fined.

The second option available to a national of a visa country who wants to be admitted to Canada as a refugee is to make a claim for refugee status at a Canadian Embassy in a third country or possibly in his home country. If he goes to a third country, a claimant may risk being deported while waiting for a decision to be made on his claim. For example, in Brazil, refugee claimants from neighboring countries are allowed six months to obtain refugee status in another country. After that, they are deported. Processing a claim for refugee status abroad often takes longer than six months.

Moreover, whether in the home country or in a nearby country, people from repressive countries are sometimes afraid to enter a Canadian Embassy at all, let alone to make a refugee claim. Often they fear that the

SPECIAL MEASURES FOR CHILEANS

Chilean nationals who had been facing expulsion from Canada will be permitted to become permanent residents of Canada provided they entered Canada prior to the imposition of the visitor visa requirement in January 1980; can demonstrate an ability to support themselves; can comply with normal medical and security checks; and are free of serious criminal objections, according to special measures announced in April 1982 by Employment and Immigration Minister Lloyd Axworthy.

Among the Chileans affected are many whose claims for refugee status had been turned down and/or who had hoped to stay in Canada for humanitarian reasons.

Embassy might be under surveillance by their country's government or that local people working in the Embassy might advise the local authorities of their presence in the Embassy. Sometimes refugee claimants fear that Canadian officials might call the local police. Even though the Canadian government did this on one occasion in Chile, it is not Canadian government policy to report refugee claimants to the local authorities. But whatever the reality, the perception of danger exists, and very few will risk going into a Canadian Embassy, or the embassies of other countries, to make claims for refugee status.


Those who do take these risks are by no means certain of having their claims evaluated as fairly as they would be in Canada. Practices vary from embassy to embassy and it is virtually impossible to document the circumstances of negative decisions, since the claimants never reach Canada. But accounts from successful claimants and from friends and relatives of unsuccessful claimants suggest that there are several difficulties inherent in the procedures for evaluating claims abroad.

To my understanding, the procedure used to evaluate refugee claims abroad is an interview with an immigration officer followed by a decision by that officer. All negative decisions are reviewed by a senior officer. On occasion senior officials in Ottawa or the Minister of Immigration may participate in cases which come to their attention; as may Canadian churches, the Canadian section of Amnesty International, etc.

An immigration officer abroad performs numerous functions. He may not always have the time required to hear and process a claim of more than minimal complexity. Also, he may not have the necessary training and experience in the legal criteria to be applied in evaluating a claim or in the appropriate methods of eliciting a claim.

A claimant's anxiety may impede his ability to divulge sufficient information to meet the level of detail required for a successful claim. Even in Canada many refugee claimants show continuous anxiety about the confidentiality of the information they give and fear possible danger in exposing all details of political involvement and persecution. This problem is greatly compounded when a claim is made in or near the country where the claimant fears that the persecution will take place.

A refugee making a claim at a Canadian Embassy has no right to independent counsel. In several cases, when a claimant has appeared at a Canadian Embassy with a representative, he has not been allowed to have that person attend the interview. Moreover, in many repressive countries, the local



bar has been intimidated, making it difficult if not impossible for a refugee claimant to obtain private legal counsel to act for him. This lack of counsel can result in a claimant not having adequate preparation for the interview, and in particular not being aware of the criteria to be applied in determining the claim and therefore not realizing the extent of the information and detail required or the importance of documentary or other corroborative evidence. Without counsel, a claimant may also lack the moral and psychological support so necessary to being able to relate to a government official details of the traumatic, psychologically disturbing and often deeply humiliating experiences that he may have had to endure.

Also, claimants abroad are not able to challenge the competency of a

translator, nor make written submissions of a persuasive nature. Often they are not given the opportunity to present corroborative evidence such as medical reports of physical abuse and torture or psychiatric assessments of the effects of torture. Even if such evidence were invited by the Canadian authorities, it is highly unlikely that a claimant would be able to produce such reports in his own country. Doctors and psychiatrists who could provide such reports might put their own security at risk if they gave corroborative evidence of torture and mistreatment. Furthermore, attempts by an immigration officer to verify a claimant's story by seeking corroborative testimony could jeopardize the claimant's security.

The criteria applied abroad in determining who is a *bona fide* refugee

Dear Mr. Minister,

I am a Roman Catholic lay missionary. I returned in January from two years in Chiapas, Mexico. Chiapas, the southernmost state in Mexico, has as its southern neighbor, Guatemala . . .

In 22 out of Guatemala's 24 provinces, popular struggle has broken out, and the army, in desperation, has moved from selective to massive repression - massacring hundreds of people, even entire villages. 80,000 have been killed up to 1979, and up to 50 killings a day are now being reported . . .

The repression has caused Mexico, which shares an 800 kilometer border with Guatemala, to begin to feel the problem of a new type of refugee. Accustomed to receiving intellectuals in exile, Mexico is now faced with an influx of peasants and Indians . . .

The Mexican government, despite having made high-level declarations of solidarity with Central America and its popular struggles, still deports the refugees. Immigration vehicles are seen hunting refugees, charging 1,000 pesos (\$25.00) to not deport those found - a sum very few refugees have. The refugees feel constantly threatened with being returned to Guatemala and see the regularizing of their legal status as necessarily having priority, but for this to happen, the Mexican government must sign the United Nations Refugee Protocol . . .

We should offer to admit to Canada Guatemalan refugees now in Mexico under relaxed job criteria[*], and send economic resources to assist these refugees with the basic necessities of life.

Yours truly,

Dan Anstett
Dan Anstett



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

Dear Mr. Heape,

In response to your letter of January 14 regarding Guatemalan refugees in Mexico, I have had Canadian Embassy officials discuss the situation with the Mexican authorities.

The Mexicans apparently were deporting Guatemala last summer but have stopped and United Nations office have confirmed this. A new coordinator of the Mexican Refugee Commission has been appointed and he has as our officials that there will be no further deportations and that the Mexican Government is now providing assistance to refugees from both Guatemala and El Salvador.

With regard to your enquiry about Canadian acceptance of Guatemalan refugees, I can confirm that both Guatemalan and Salvadorans are being processed by our Embassy Mexico, both from within Mexico and from elsewhere in Central America, under relaxed criteria[*] as you suggest.

Yours sincerely,

Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Pierre Elliott Trudeau

GUATEMALAN REFUGEES: How Clear Is A Politician's Clarification?

* Mr. Anstett's suggestion and Mr. Trudeau's reply may leave one somewhat confused about Canada's policy on admitting Guatemalan refugees. The notion of "relaxed criteria" does not figure in Canadian refugee policy. Guatemalan refugees in need of resettlement are eligible for admission to Canada under the 1982 refugee quota for Latin America, if they appear likely to be able to settle in Canada successfully. This is the same policy that applies to Salvadorans or any other Convention refugees outside Canada, unless they are also members of a designated class.

The notion of "relaxed criteria" comes from the special humanitarian measures that Canada sometimes invokes to assist people to come to Canada during times of crisis in their home countries. For example, under special measures announced in 1981, Salvadorans with relatives in Canada who were sponsored as assisted relatives have been permitted to immigrate to Canada under relaxed job criteria.

No such special measures exist for Guatemalans. Assisted relative applications from Guatemalans are being dealt with on a case by case basis. Immigration officers have been instructed that family class applications (in which job criteria are never relevant) from both Guatemalans and Salvadorans should be dealt with as quickly as possible, particularly when the individuals may be in danger.

are not necessarily the same as those applied in Canada. For example, an officer evaluating an application made abroad for refugee status in Canada may take into consideration the claimant's ability to establish himself successfully in Canada. The successful establishment criteria applied to immigrants have no place in refugee determination and do not figure in the refugee determination process in Canada. A well-founded fear of persecution is the only relevant factor.

A negative decision abroad will be reviewed only by a senior immigration officer. Because there is no transcript of the interview and no written reasons are given to the claimant, there is no material to support judicial review. An unsuccessful refugee claimant abroad has no right or means to seek review at the Immigration Appeal Board or in the Federal Court.

For all these reasons, a refugee claim abroad may not be handled with the same degree of fairness as it would be in Canada. Therefore, no cases which involve any element of doubt should be determined abroad. Instead, claimants with strong claims should be given Minister's Permits, enabling them to leave for Canada as quickly as possible. If a claimant belongs to a target group that is being persecuted in his country and relates evidence of past persecution or justifiable fear of future persecution, but the immigration officer is not convinced that the person is a *bona fide* refugee, the immigration officer should issue a visa to allow that person to come to Canada to make a claim for refugee status. Only where there is no evidence whatsoever to support a claim should a claim be rejected abroad and a visa denied.

There has been much discussion recently about the need for an oral hearing to be introduced into Canada's inland refugee determination procedure, to ensure that it is as fair as possible. But it is pointless to discuss our inland refugee determination procedure if refugees cannot reach Canada to make their claims.

The imposition of visa requirements on refugee-producing countries seems to be based on an assumption that without a visa requirement there would be a massive influx of claimants wanting to come to Canada. Argentina, Guatemala and Uruguay have been refugee-producing countries for a long time and there are no Canadian visa requirements. Yet over the years, Argentines, Guatemalans and Uruguayans have not been coming to Canada in large numbers to make claims for refugee status. The notion that large numbers of refugees want to come to Canada is a myth which must be dispelled. □

NEW U.S. POLICY ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEES

Indochinese refugees arriving in countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia after April 30, 1982, are now eligible for resettlement in the United States only if they have close relatives in the U.S. or if they fear persecution because of having worked for the U.S. Government or for a former non-Communist government in Indochina. The new requirements, which do not affect refugees already in refugee camps, are intended to discourage people from leaving their homes. The U.S. has a quota of 100,000 Indochinese refugees for its 1981-82 fiscal year.

In the first four months of 1982, 18,849 people (15,843 by boat; 3,006 by land) sought asylum in various countries in Southeast Asia and 27,615 people (20,589 by boat; 7,026 by land) were either resettled in third countries or moved to Refugee Processing Centres pending resettlement in third countries. Canada's 1982 quota for Indochinese

refugees is 4,000, not including family and group sponsorships.

Also, in the first four months of 1982, 3,000 people left Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Program, of whom 644 have come to Canada.

Indochinese Refugee Camp Caseloads

April 30, 1982

Thailand	186,451
Land	87,604
Boat	6,630
Kampucheans	92,217
Malaysia	9,819
Hong Kong	9,816
Indonesia	5,511
Philippines	5,217
Macau	1,139
Other (Singapore, China, South Korea, Japan)	2,160
TOTAL	220,113

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

N.B. These figures do not include refugees in the Refugee Processing Centres in Indonesia and the Philippines.

The Will of Heaven

by Nguyen ngoc Ngan

by C.D. Le, Secretary-General, Canadian Federation of Vietnamese Associations.

Shortly before the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975, Tran van Huong, a 71-year-old former school teacher from the Mekong Delta, succeeded President Thieu to the presidency after the latter's resignation and departure from Vietnam. In his acceptance speech Huong said, "If this is the will of Heaven for our country to fall to the Communists, then Saigon will become a mountain of our bones and a river of our blood. And we will stand to fight together to the last drop of our blood." The statement made by Huong in the last hours of the Republic of Vietnam crystallized the mood of the Vietnamese people as they found themselves betrayed by their ally and abandoned by their leaders. When everything was collapsing around them, when their country was being swallowed by the Communists, when their families and their own lives were shattered beyond their comprehension and their control, the Vietnamese people could find only one explanation: the will of Heaven.

In *The Will of Heaven*, Nguyen ngoc Ngan has been able to depict the complex feelings of the Vietnamese people in the most turbulent years of their country's history. Twelve years ago he was a teacher of Vietnamese literature in a high school in Saigon. Now he works in a grain elevator in Prince Rupert, British Columbia. His account of his conscription into the South Vietnamese army; his brief effort at teaching under the new regime; his voluntary enrolment in a ten-day "re-education" program that turned out to

be a three-year internment in various labor camps; and his tragic flight from Vietnam tells a human story amid the story of the tumultuous events that swirled around him and thousands of other Vietnamese, like a tornado engulfing a willow tree in an open field.

Published by E.P. Dutton Publishing Co., Inc., New York, N.Y. 1982. Distributed in Canada by Clarke, Irwin and Co., Ltd., Toronto.

The Way of the Willow

written and directed by John Kent Harrison

This film dramatizes the events in the life of the Trans, a Vietnamese family, from the moment they meet their sponsors at Mirabel Airport through the turbulent first seven days of their life in Montreal in the middle of winter. For the Trans the experience has to do with freedom and the will to survive; for the Canadian sponsors, the issue is the extent and depth of commitment.

The Way of the Willow can be borrowed free of charge (for non-commercial use) from regional offices of the National Film Board.

Canada and the Indochinese Refugees

by Howard Adelman

This new book documents the role of Canada and the Canadian public in the Indochinese refugee movement, from 1975 to 1980. It includes chapters on the development of refugee policy at the federal and provincial levels; the role of the media; the roles of churches, ethnic groups and the grass-roots movement; and the opposition to Canada's policies toward the refugees.

Published by L.A. Weigl Educational Associates Ltd., Regina, 1982.

MEASURING GROSS NATIONAL REFUGEE PRODUCT

A Framework for the Classification of Refugee Source Countries

By Firdaus Kharas

Recently a leader of the Indian community in Canada voiced bitter resentment against the refugee determination process. Why, he demanded to know, was Canada rejecting every refugee claim from India, while encouraging refugees from Poland?

Claims from India have been found to be manifestly unfounded. The practical consequence of claims being classified as manifestly unfounded is that members of the Refugee Status Advisory Committee (RSAC) do not review the entire transcript of the claimant's interview with an immigration officer and other information relevant to the claim. Instead, they read a summary of the materials prepared by a member of the RSAC secretariat. The effect, therefore, is to treat such claims differently from other claims.

Whether particular claims were well-founded or not is not at issue here. There is no doubt that the four hundred claims from India rejected by the RSAC in 1980 were spurious. The charge of political persecution based on secessionist activity to create a separate State of "Khalistan" is simply a fabrication.

What is open for discussion is whether or not certain refugee claims should receive less consideration than other claims. And if such a system is to be retained, what should the distinction be based on?

Whether or not a claim can be classified as manifestly unfounded must rest largely on the political situation in the country from which the claim arises. For example, a claimant from India might recount political involvement, yet in light of information on his country, his claim could be considered manifestly unfounded. On the other hand, a claimant from Iran might explicitly deny any political involvement, yet, particularly in light of the new guidelines for the RSAC, under which a person may hold no political opinion and still be a political refugee, no claim from Iran could presently be considered manifestly unfounded, although some might of course be found to be invalid.

In principle it is difficult to defend a system of classifying refugee claims from certain countries as manifestly unfounded. Such a system assumes that there are certain countries from

Firdaus Kharas is president of an Ottawa-based consulting firm on international affairs. He has written papers on human rights and a recent book on Canadian immigration policies.

which no valid refugee claim could arise. No such country really exists.

Such a country would have to be truly democratic, have no political conflict and have no suppression of human rights. The closest the world has to this ideal are countries that may be called liberal democracies, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, or the Netherlands, for example. Yet during World War II Canada incarcerated and confiscated the property of Canadian citizens of Japanese descent and in 1970 made mass arrests in Quebec under the War Measures Act. In 1972 the United Kingdom was taken before the European Commission on Human

ORAL HEARINGS

"With the changes I have already implemented and others I will be announcing in the next few weeks, we will have moved a great distance toward a truly fair and humane system for refugee determination. Saying that, there is, obviously, always room for improvement.

Some changes, such as the right to an oral hearing before the RSAC, require legislative amendments and will have significant cost and administrative implications. Nevertheless, such changes should not be dismissed on these grounds alone if they are deemed necessary to ensure fairness in the process; I think that was one of the conclusions from the symposium. I will therefore authorize that a study be conducted specifically on the question of oral hearings."

—Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Employment and Immigration; before the Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immigration, April 1, 1982, discussing changes effected in the refugee determination process.

Rights where it openly admitted, and offered its own justification for, the use of torture in Northern Ireland. In Belgium, political violence between the French and Flemish sections of the population continues to erupt periodically. In the Netherlands, the late 1970's saw increased terrorist activity, including the hijacking of trains, by Dutch-born South Moluccans. Thus there is at least the possibility, no matter how small, that there may be a valid British, Belgian, or Dutch refugee claim. If there exists such a possibility from liberal democracies, there surely exists such a possibility from every country of the world.

Such a theoretical argument, however, does not ease the backlog of illegitimate refugee claims now awaiting

processing. Taking the avenue of expediency to deal with such claims may be a necessary evil, at least until other measures are implemented to prevent abuse of the system. And as long as any kind of screening of manifestly unfounded claims exists, then country information must be taken into account in the screening process and therefore must be dealt with systematically.

Until recently, the claims that were screened were those coming from countries considered to be "democracies". Now it is claims from countries from which no valid claim has arisen since the establishment of the RSAC in 1978. I would like to propose that for the purpose of screening manifestly unfounded claims, refugee source countries should be classified along a continuum; and to suggest one possible framework of inquiry for such a classification.

Political refugees are usually displaced from their native land for one of two reasons: political instability, in the form of inter-State wars, revolutions, coups d'état, and so on; or the suppression of human rights through arrests, the use of torture, etc. These are separate causes, although a relationship may exist between the two.

A classification of refugee source countries, therefore, must allow for ranges along these two variables. The level of coerciveness in a country, and hence the likelihood of its producing refugees, can thus be given a measurable dimension.

The following is a simple, five-point classification based on these two factors.

(1) **Uncoercive** Civil and political rights are always protected by the State, and laws and institutions are available for redress. There is virtually no political violence except occasional legal demonstrations and strikes. Political power is not concentrated, and regular changes in leadership occur. Balances are maintained throughout the system through free courts and media.

(2) **Occasionally Coercive** Some infringements of human rights and/or isolated political violence like terrorist activity by a tiny percentage of the population has occurred, especially in periods of real or perceived crisis.

(3) **Routinely Coercive** The rights of minorities may be infringed, while the rights of the majority are upheld. Some political opposition may exist, but the

leadership may have significant powers. Balances of the courts and the media may be present but ineffective. Large-scale arrests do not occur, but a few political leaders may be jailed. Low-level political violence may be present throughout the system.

(4) Broadly Coercive The State suppresses a large section of the population, employing arbitrary arrests, torture and imprisonment. Or, high-level political violence may be present, including riots, assassinations, terrorism, guerrilla or civil wars, revolutions or inter-State wars.

(5) Very Coercive Neighbors live in fear of each other. The smallest act of dissent can mean a jail term or even execution. No political opposition is tolerated. There is only one party, and only one candidate for each election. No significant balances exist, and leaders have absolute powers. Or, widespread political violence is present, with hundreds if not thousands of people dying as a result.

To classify countries within these categories, possible components of each of the two variables must be listed. For example, political instability may consist of: changes in leaders, laws and attitudes; coups d'état; strikes, demonstrations; riots; arrests; executions; local revolts; political crises; terrorism; civil wars; guerrilla wars; revolutions; border clashes; invasions; inter-State wars; etc. A similar list pertaining to human rights violations must be developed.

Using a check-list approach, individual countries are investigated and evaluated. Because of space constraints detailed check-lists and their applications cannot be presented here; but results for 156 major countries of the world, based on data such as world surveys of human rights and cross-national studies of political instability, that were correct as of January 1, 1982, are contained in the chart below.

It is important to bear in mind that the classification is not static. Countries need to be constantly re-evaluated and reclassified according to the latest available data. Also, the methods of classification can always be refined to suit the purpose. For example, the system proposed here classifies whole countries only, not political sections or groups within countries. Also, it excludes political forecasting or incorporation of a time lag which could take into account the short-term nature of some refugee problems, as when in the early 1970's most refugees from Bangladesh returned to their country as soon as political conflict in the area ceased.


Under this scheme, the political situation in uncoercive and occasionally coercive countries would suggest

that most citizens of these countries would not have a valid claim. There is a greater possibility of a valid claim from routinely coercive and broadly coercive countries, based on the particular situation of the individual. And in very coercive countries, political conditions suggest that there is only a slim chance of a truly unfounded claim. Thus, claims from uncoercive and occasionally coercive countries could be dismissed as manifestly unfounded unless very extraordinary circumstances were related in the interview. A rare valid claim might, for example, arise from a particular segment of the population in an occasionally coercive country; or a description of a particular political event might have to be checked out before the claim could be classified. In contrast, some claims from very coercive countries might even be found to be justified without extensive consideration of individual circumstances. These would tend to be the countries for which various special measures sometimes prove the most sensible way to deal with refugees.

Such a classification of countries is

not, of course, intended to be used to determine the validity of individual claims, except in the case of manifestly unfounded, and possibly manifestly well-founded claims. Thereafter, country information becomes background information, and the particular situation of the claimant is of prime importance.

However, it is interesting to note that the small role that such classification need play is something of a luxury that Canada can enjoy in light of the relatively small number of claims made here. For example, in West Germany, where over 150,000 people sought asylum in 1980 and where abuse of the asylum policy is common, country information is extremely important in the refugee determination process. Each asylum-seeker is quizzed by officials on his knowledge of the political situation in the country from which he is fleeing, and claimants are encouraged to provide documentation of the political situation in their country. Although West Germany has no procedures for treating claims differently according to where they



VISA COUNTRIES

• Nationals of these countries are not required to have a visa to come to Canada for a temporary stay. Visas are also not required for citizens of the following countries not classified here: Fiji, Gambia, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, San Marino, Tonga, Tuvalu; nor for citizens of the United Kingdom's colonies who derive their citizenship through birth, descent, registration or naturalization in one of the British dependent territories of Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands or in one of the West Indies Associated States of Antigua or St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla.

come from, country information figures largely in decisions on individual claims. West Germany maintains an internal system of classifying countries.

By reducing a large amount of research to a single page summary, a classification system also offers an easy reference for people who may not have knowledge about political situations in every country but who may have to deal with refugees. For example, a lawyer in Canada or a Canadian immigration officer in Singapore may suddenly be confronted with a refugee claimant from Vanuatu. This classification can give the lawyer or the immigration officer a fairly accurate idea, although admittedly a cursory one, of the political situation in Vanuatu that pertains directly to refugee claims; and can at least serve as a starting point for further research.

As long as it is necessary to screen manifestly unfounded claims there are several benefits to doing it through a country classification system. As a system of information-processing, the classification ensures that a country information specialist will examine every aspect of political situations that impact on the refugee determination process.

Moreover, although the system does not eliminate judgment, it is fair to the extent of evaluating all countries according to the same method and data. The decision-maker who is screening claims is using a uniform system that is applied to every claim, regardless of where that claim is coming from.

And the next time an Indian or anyone else charges racism or discrimination in the refugee determination process, the answer can be objectively justified and demonstrated. □

© 1982, F. Kharas.

Southeast Asian Women Should Have Their Immunity To Rubella Tested

Out of 300 Southeast Asian women between 12 and 40 years of age screened, one in four was susceptible to rubella (German measles), according to a recent study jointly sponsored by the Manitoba Minister of Health and the Manitoba Joint Refugee Coordinating Committee. Most Canadian women, by contrast, have been immunized before they reach child-bearing age. The Manitoba Minister of Health is encouraging Indochinese women to have their immunity tested and to be vaccinated if necessary, provided they are not pregnant.

NEWS IN BRIEF

NEWFOUNDLAND/CANADA AGREEMENT ON "SPECIAL NEEDS" REFUGEES

Newfoundland and Canada have signed a federal-provincial agreement to assist refugees who would normally be excluded from Canada on the grounds that they might place excessive demands on health and social services; for example, unaccompanied minors, the mentally or physically handicapped, people from radically different cultures, people with tuberculosis, etc.

The agreement, which is similar to an agreement signed with Manitoba in September 1981, establishes a Special Program for Assisting Refugees (SPAR). Under the program, a joint federal-provincial committee will review individual cases to assess the refugees' needs, identify the availability of the special services that would be required, and consider whether, given special assistance, the refugee(s) could eventually be successfully established in Canada, normally within two years.

The committee is responsible for deciding, within one month of receiving all necessary information, the conditions for admission or refusal of such refugees. If the committee does not recommend admission of a refugee and the request was identified by a private group, the committee must give the private group written reasons for its decision. If the committee does recommend admission, it must also plan and follow up on the delivery of whatever services it deems necessary to ensure the refugee's(s)' successful settlement.

The agreement includes a list of which services it is the responsibility of the federal government to provide if required, which the provincial government and which the private group if one is involved. For instance, basic living allowances, dental care and temporary medical assistance are the responsibility of Canada; provincial medical insurance, funds for non-insurable health costs incurred once the refugees are in Newfoundland, and certain forms of social assistance are the responsibility of Newfoundland.

If a special needs case comes to the attention of the committee after the refugees are already in Newfoundland, the case may still be dealt with under the program.

The number of refugees to be admitted to Newfoundland under the program will be negotiated each year by the committee. Since 1979 Canada has resettled around 1,311 cases of special needs refugees. Of these, 829 have been people with tuberculosis, 437

unaccompanied minors, and 45 handicapped people. Newfoundland, which takes .5% of the refugees who come to Canada, has resettled three tuberculosis cases, one handicapped case, and 18 unaccompanied minors.

AID TO MISKITO INDIANS IN HONDURAS

In May 1982 Canada pledged \$250,000 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for its program of assistance to Miskito Indians in Honduras.

Some 8,500 Miskito Indians who have fled Nicaragua are living in a refugee camp at Mocoron, about 50 km from the Honduras-Nicaragua border. According to the Canadian International Development Agency, rudimentary facilities at the camp are under strain because of the continuing influx of refugees. Food and medicine must be transported over 83 km of sand and clay road, taking several days to reach the camp, and upkeep of the road is required to ensure that basic supplies can be furnished during the rainy season. Canada's contribution will be used toward the leasing of aircraft required to fly in road grading equipment, spare parts and other supplies.

There are also an estimated 23,000 Salvadoran refugees in Honduras (out of a total of around 300,000 in northern Latin America), of whom around 15,000 are assisted by UNHCR at the request of the Honduran government; and at least 1,000 Guatemalans.

CANADA'S REFUGEE QUOTA FOR POLAND

A Canadian government task force that visited Austria in January recommended that there be no increase in Canada's quota for government-assisted Polish refugees.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 47,000 Polish asylum-seekers in Europe, of whom most are in Austria and other countries as follows:

Austria	30,000
Federal Republic of Germany	11,000
Sweden	1,500
France	1,000
Italy	1,000
United Kingdom	500

In addition, an estimated 90,000 Poles are in Europe on extended visitor's visas or residence permits, having not registered for asylum, possibly in order to wait and see what happens in Poland.

A few Poles in Asia, Africa and Latin America - for example, sailors or technicians who were working abroad - have also requested asylum.

Third countries have allocated resettlement places to Poles as follows.

Estimated portions of ongoing settlement programs for Eastern European refugees	
Australia	4,500
Canada	3,500 (not including family and group sponsorships)
U.S.A.	5,500
Special allocations	
Iceland	25
Luxembourg	75
The Netherlands	100
New Zealand	100
Switzerland	1,000

A further 800 Poles have been resettled in other countries for special reasons.

Around 5,000 Poles have indicated that they would like to remain permanently in Austria, and UNHCR has given Austria U.S. \$2 million to facilitate this. In 1981 the Austrian government spent over U.S. \$50 million on assistance to the Poles.

ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR SETTLEMENT SERVICES

The federal government has allocated an additional \$17.7 million for providing assistance for refugees and immigrants to adapt to life in Canada. The funds will go to the Adjustment Assistance Program (AAP) which provides basic living allowances for government-assisted refugees, and to the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP), which funds voluntary organizations across Canada to provide direct settlement services to immigrants, such as reception, counselling, interpretation and translation.

The additional funds will not only increase the total allocations for fiscal year 1982-83 for these programs; the

new levels of funding for this year will also be guaranteed for 1983-84. Previously, both programs had been operating from year to year with only very low levels of funding being guaranteed from year to year. These levels had been set prior to the start of the Indochinese Refugee Program.

In recent years, therefore, the bulk of the funding for these programs has had to be negotiated later in the fiscal year through "Supplementary Estimates." Last year, for example, the guaranteed level of funding ("A" base) for AAP was \$2.8 million and several increases later, the estimated accrued expenditures for the program totalled \$20 million.

	AAP	ISAP
1981-82 Approximate Expenditures	20.0	2.8
1982-83 "A" Base	2.8	1.8
1982-83 Supplementary Estimates	16.6	1.1
1982-83 TOTAL	19.4	2.9
1983-84 "A" Base	19.4	2.9

RESOURCE EXCHANGE

CULTURAL PROFILES FOR EL SALVADOR AND POLAND

Cultural profiles to assist sponsors of refugees from El Salvador and from Poland will be available shortly to supplement the *Guide to Private Sponsorship of Refugees in Canada*.

The guide, produced cooperatively by many voluntary and government agencies across Canada, offers comprehensive, practical information on how to sponsor. It includes directories of local services for each province except Quebec, and cultural profiles on refugees from Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, Laos, Uruguay, and Vietnam, in addition to the two new ones. Orders for the guide should specify which province and nationality(ies) information is required for and should be sent to:

Canadian Foundation for Refugees
P.O. Box 50,000
Ottawa, Ontario K1G 4B6

SETTLEMENT INFORMATION

The Indochina Refugee Action Centre (IRAC) in Washington, D.C., has published seven documents resulting from a Practitioner Workshop held last year:

- Refugee Orientation
- Health-Related Services
- Social Adjustment Services
- Vocational Training and Skills Recertification
- Manpower/Employment Services
- Outreach, Information and Referral
- Refugee Resettlement Services

This series is available free of charge to non-profit organizations involved with refugee assistance; and at a cost of \$35 to others.

Canadian Foundation for Refugees
P.O. Box 50,000
Ottawa, Ontario K1G 4B6

REFUGEE CAMP HEALTH CARE: SELECTED ANNOTATED REFERENCES

This 52-page annotated bibliography lists books and published papers on refugee health care and relevant technical issues and includes a country bibliography. The publisher of this book, the Ross Institute of Tropical Hygiene, also offers an annual course on health care in refugee camps in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This year it will be held in London from June 28 - July 2, 1982.

Ross Institute of Tropical Hygiene
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Keppel Street (Gower Street)
London WC1E 7HT

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: ABSTRACTS

The International Refugee Integration Resource Centre (IRIRC), a new joint project of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the

International Council of Voluntary Agencies, and the International Committee for Migration, has published its first issue of *Refugee Abstracts*, a quarterly providing summaries of significant books, journals, reports and projects dealing with refugee resettlement worldwide.

IRIRC
13, rue Gautier
1201 Geneva
Switzerland

"A FUTURE FOR US ALL"

A resource guide for refugee women's program development.

Centre for Applied Linguistics
3520 Prospect St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
U.S.A.

CONFERENCE

THE STANDING CONFERENCE OF CANADIAN ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED FOR REFUGEES

1982 Refugee Consultation
Friday, June 18 - Sunday, June 20, 1982
Redemptionist Centre
Aylmer, Quebec (near Ottawa)

For more information contact:
The Standing Conference of Canadian Organizations Concerned for Refugees

1857 de Maisonneuve Ouest
Montreal, Quebec H3H 1J9
(514) 937-5351

STATISTICAL SURVEY

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES FISCAL YEAR 1981-82

Canada contributed \$26,700,000 to humanitarian and emergency relief efforts in the fiscal year ending March 31, 1982. Funds amounting to \$7,775,000 were provided as annual contributions to United Nations humanitarian organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The balance of \$18,926,000 was granted in response to emergency situations caused by natural or man-made disasters, or civil strife; and to alleviate the hardships of millions of refugees. The major portion of the budget was devoted to refugee assistance, as follows.

DATE	DESCRIPTION	ORGANIZATION	AMOUNT
I. Annual Contributions			
April 21, 1981	General Program	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	400,000 **
May 27, 1981	General Program	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	4,000,000
May 27, 1981	General Program	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)	2,900,000
August 26, 1981	General Program	United Nations Education and Training Program for Southern Africa (UNETPSA)	300,000 **
August 26, 1981	General Program	United Nations Fund for Namibia (UNFN)	175,000 **
II. Disaster Relief Fund			
Africa			
June 1, 1981	Medical Team for Djibouti	League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS)	82,000 *
June 2, 1981	Uganda emergency	UNICEF	300,000 **
July 20, 1981	Refugees in Angola	UNHCR	600,000 *
July 20, 1981	Refugees in Zaire	UNHCR	500,000 *
July 22, 1981	Refugees in Chad	UNHCR	300,000 *
July 22, 1981	Returnees in Ethiopia	UNHCR	160,000 *
July 22, 1981	Refugees in Djibouti	UNHCR	100,000 *
November 12, 1981	Medical team for Djibouti	LRCS	158,000 *
November 13, 1981	Refugees in Sudan	UNHCR	1,600,000 *
November 27, 1981	All-Africa appeal #7 (1981)	ICRC	1,600,000 **
January 16, 1982	Drought and conflict in Chad	LRCS	80,000 **
March 14, 1982	All-Africa appeal #8 (1982)	ICRC	1,000,000 **
March 16, 1982	Returnees to Chad	UNHCR	750,000
March 22, 1982	Refugees in Somalia	UNHCR	1,500,000 **
March 25, 1982	Africa Programs (1982)	LRCS	450,000 **
Asia			
August 12, 1981	Afghan refugees in Pakistan	LRCS	150,000
August 12, 1981	Afghan refugees in Pakistan	ICRC	150,000
November 2, 1981	Afghan refugees in Pakistan	UNHCR	3,000,000
December 1, 1981	Kampuchea - Thailand refugee relief	UNICEF	300,000
December 1, 1981	Kampuchea - Thailand refugee relief	UNHCR	300,000
December 1, 1981	Kampuchea - Thailand refugee relief	ICRC	375,000
December 1, 1981	Kampuchea - Thailand refugee relief	World Food Program (WFP)	900,000
Central America			
July 9, 1981	Salvadoran refugees in Central America	UNHCR	500,000
III. Special Allocation made through the Department of External Affairs			
February 26, 1982	Thailand - anti-piracy task force	UNHCR	150,000 **

* Commitment made at International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, April 1981, Geneva.

** It is of course difficult to separate refugee relief from relief in general; these contributions did assist refugees, but not exclusively.

N.B. These figures do not include contributions made to assist internally displaced persons in Iran, El Salvador, Angola and other countries.

Source for figures: Canadian International Development Agency

CANADA'S NATIONAL NEWSLETTER ON REFUGEES

REFUGE

8 York St., 2/F., Toronto, Ontario M5J 1R2.

Postage paid at Scarborough, Ontario
under Second Class Mail Registration No. 5512